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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that German unification in October 1990, the Soviet Empire’s 
disintegration in 1991, and the end o f the Cold War had profound implications for the conduct 
o f Germany’s foreign and security policy behaviour. Its aim is to compare and contrast 
German foreign policy towards Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic) and Poland between 1990 
and 1998. Germany’s foreign policy towards both states was guided by three crucial 
components: political reconciliation, economic, and security interests. By discussing the 
interplay between agential and structural sources o f Germany’s foreign and security policy 
behaviour, this thesis provides an exhaustive description of how German influence manifested 
itself in these states, and how it was channelled and constrained. Germany’s foreign and 
security policy behaviour towards both states helps to explain three problems: the manifold 
implications o f Germany’s return to the European Mittellage (centre); Germany’s ability to 
manage complex bilateral relationships despite being burdened by history, and the multi-level 
nature o f its foreign and security policy apparatus.
Thesis Certification
I, Chad S. Peterson, declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own.
Chad S. Peterson
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INTRODUCTION
In response to a question on the internal state o f a unified Germany, the external
consequences o f unification1, and their implications for German foreign policy, German
President Richard von Weizsacker declared in 1992:
Some partners and neighbours originally thought that the Germans were the only ones 
who profited from the end o f the Cold War. They worried about the possible 
consequences o f Germany’s behaviour after unification. In the context o f unification, 
we were quickly regarded as an obstinate great power. Now it is apparent that we are 
experiencing difficulties and there is talk o f a ‘German sickness’. In reality, Germany 
is neither a giant or sick.2
He not only indirectly criticised those individuals portraying a unified Germany as the
ultimate benefactor o f the end o f the Cold War, but also implied that the immense financial
burdens imposed by unification had not reduced it to Europe’s ‘sick man’. Between 1990 and
1998, Germany was perceived by its Western and Eastern European neighbours as wavering
from one extreme to the other.
The future o f Germany’s socio-political and economic development after unification
was a source o f concern, especially for the new independent states in East Central Europe
(ECE).J Weizsacker’s critical observations raise two important questions: what impact has
unification had on Bonn’s political leadership and the formulation and implementation o f its
foreign and security policy? More specifically, how has unification shaped Germany’s foreign
’‘Unification’ ( Vereinigung) and ‘reunification’ ( Wiedervereinigung) were used interchangeably after 
1990, the latter being more frequent. ‘Unification’ refers to the re-creation of a unified single German 
state. The term ‘reunification’ as defined in the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law) suggests that 
Germany would return to its 1937 borders. This is inappropriate: there were no plans to return 
Germany’s Ostgebiete (Eastern territories) after unification in 1990.
2Gunter Hoffmann and Werner A. Perger, Richard von Weizsacker im Gesprach (Frankfurt am Main: 
Eichbom, 1992), p. 95. MT.
3ECE includes the countries o f the Visegrad Group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia).
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relations with Czechoslovakia (CSFR)4 and Poland from unification on 3 October 1990 to 27 
September 1998?5
German diplomacy in the twentieth century has been the subject o f countless
analyses. James Der Derian defines diplomacy by the following criteria:
It is the formal means by which the self-identity o f the sovereign state is constituted 
and articulated through external relations with other states. Like the dialogue from 
which it is constructed, diplomacy requires and seeks to mediate otherness through the 
use o f persuasion and force, promises and threats, codes and symbols. ... Diplomacy is 
now considered to be an essential international institution which provides the norms, 
protocols, and practices for reconciliation of differences between normal states. ... 
Diplomacy remains, however, the institution by which states pursue their own 
particular interests.6
Throughout the Cold War, the objectives o f West German diplomacy were intimately linked 
to the successful conclusion o f the ‘German question’. Observers and policy-makers from 
Germany and abroad struggled to understand its numerous incarnations. As W. R. Smyser 
pointed out, ‘from 1945 to 1990 the struggle over Germany helped shape the world. It formed 
the central vortex o f the Cold War, sucking in every state in Europe and many beyond’.7 The 
‘German question’ was on the policy-making agenda o f every post-Second World War West 
German government in Bonn and East German government in East Berlin. Overcoming the 
division o f the Federal Republic o f Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) after the Second World War became the foremost domestic policy goal o f  every Bonn 
government from 1949 onwards. On the other hand, East Berlin, under the Soviet yoke, was 
quite content with Germany’s division and position as one o f the most privileged Soviet 
satellite states.
4The CSFR was dissolved on 1 January 1993. There were two successor states: the Czech Republic and 
Republic o f Slovakia.
5Chancellor Kohl’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party lost the federal elections on 27 
September 1998, but he remained chancellor until 27 October 1998.
6James Der Derian, ‘Diplomacy’ in Joel Krieger (ed.), The Oxford Companion to the Politics o f the 
World (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 244-245.
7W. R. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle over Germany (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1999), p. xvii.
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The fall o f the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 -  twenty-seven years after its 
erection and coincidentally the same date as the proclamation of the Weimar Republic in 
1918 and Reichkristallnacht in 1938 -  followed by German unification on 3 October 1990, 
significantly altered the nature o f the ‘German question’. The Cold War’s end and Soviet 
Union’s disintegration put into question its new incarnation: how would a unified Germany 
manage its newly won sovereignty and enhanced geographical status in international 
relations? More importantly, how would Germany’s internal and external transformation 
affect the conduct o f its foreign relations with its two immediate neighbours to the east, the 
CSFR and Poland? This thesis will examine Germany’s foreign and security policy -  also 
known as Ostpolitik8 -  towards the CSFR (Czech Republic) and Poland from German 
unification to the political demise of Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s government, and the domestic 
and external forces that shaped it.9 The following questions will be answered: What are the 
socio-political, economic and security dimensions o f Ostpolitik after unification? Why and 
how did ECE evolve as one o f the most significant but potentially disturbing geographical 
areas in German foreign and security policy-making calculations after 1990?
Germany’s position in Europe was fundamentally changed by unification, the Soviet 
Union’s collapse, and the slow decline o f American hegemony in Europe once the Cold War 
was over. Germany sought its national identity, raison d’etre, future role and position in an 
evolving European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and 
considered its bilateral relations with ECE states. Unification placed Germany back into the 
Mittellage (geographical centre) o f Europe, a position offering innumerable challenges to 
Germany’s foreign policy-makers. The extension o f its Eastern frontier exposed the existence 
o f ‘new’ Ostprobleme (Eastern problems) and revealed the German political leadership’s
8The term ‘Ostpolitik’ can be traced to Karl Georg Pfleiderer, a Free Democratic Party (FDP) member 
of the Bundestag in the early 1950s. See Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History o f West 
Germany: From Shadow to Substance J945-1963. Vol. 2 (Oxford; Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993), 
pp. 319, 375-376.
9Christopher Hill defines ‘foreign policy’ as ‘the sum o f official external relations conducted by an 
independent actor (usually a state) in international relations’. See Christopher Hill, The Changing 
Politics o f Foreign Policy (Basingstoke; New York: Pal grave, 2003), p. 3.
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penchant to wallow in what could, retrospectively, be described as Ost-Angst (Eastern 
anxiety): a condition with complex historical roots and profound implications for Germany’s 
development after 1990. The Soviet Union’s demise, coupled with the subsequent withdrawal 
o f its conventional and nuclear infrastructure from former Warsaw Treaty Organisation 
(WTO) states between 1990 and 1994 undeniably facilitated a more proactive German 
involvement in the political and economic affairs of its Eastern neighbours due to its position 
in the Mittellage once again. The Soviet Union’s retreat from ECE left a political, economic, 
and military void in the region that could be partially filled by a unified Germany looking 
increasingly eastwards but not intent on severing its extensive Westbindung{Western ties).
Germany’s Eastern problematique was not new if one considers the historical, 
political, economic, and cultural significance o f ECE in its history. The years 1918 and 1989 
are crucial to understand the events that profoundly shaped the twentieth century and the 
course o f German history. According to Lonnie Johnson, ‘both dates mark the demise o f great 
empires, a recession o f Russian influence in the region as a consequence o f domestic 
revolution and turmoil, the advent o f democracy for oppressed peoples and the beginning of 
self-determination’.10 However, leaving aside the Soviet Empire’s collapse and its 
implications for ECE for a moment, there were multiple historical, economic, and cultural 
arguments influencing a unified Germany to look eastwards. History is a powerful tool to 
assess the rich but often destructive links between Germany and ECE. Jochen Thies, for 
example, declared that history would be linked to the significance o f this region for Germany: 
‘Germany cannot escape from it, nor can the country run away from the new realities of 
geography. There is no relief from being positioned in the middle o f Europe’.11 Walter Russell 
Mead agreed: ‘Germany’s involvement with the East and the East’s influence on German life 
are facts o f nature, not arbitrary and baffling choices made by misguided German
10Lonnie Johnson, Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, Friends (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996), p. 295.
1 Jochen Thies, ‘Germany & Eastern Europe, Past & Future’ in Amulf Baring (ed.), Germany's New 
Position in Europe: Problems and Perspectives (Oxford: Berg, 1994), p. 72.
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politicians’.12 A sense of manifest destiny and historical obligation drew Germany eastwards 
as no German politician could possibly resist Mitteleuropa’s siren cries.
With an extended Eastern frontier, a unified Germany re-emerged in a strikingly 
familiar territorial and historical position vis-a-vis its Western and Eastern European 
neighbours. Its geographical position on the eve o f the First World War looked remarkably 
similar after 1990. There were, however, distinct differences. According to Victor Gray, 
‘unlike 1914, however, Franco-German enmity has been replaced by a firm German anchor in 
the West. And to those who fear a return to 1933, there is not only that anchor in the West but 
a half o f century o f successful experience with democracy to provide assurance to the 
contrary’.13 The FRG, with its allies’ support, had successfully pursued a policy o f 
Westbindung  or Westintegration (Western integration) after 1949. The Bismarckian 
Schaukelpolitik  (balancing policy between East and West), which characterised German 
foreign policy throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, had become obsolete 
after 1949. Westbindung and Ostpolitik represented two sides o f the same coin. The pursuit o f 
a German Sonderweg  (special path) in ECE and revival o f residual German-Russian links that 
would alienate Mitteleuropa after unification were made more complicated by Germany’s 
extensive Westbindung  after 1949.
Furthermore, the powerful legacy o f historical agreements and treaties concluded 
between Germany and Russia exerted a profound influence on German as well as East and 
Central European decision-making structures. In ECE, the prospect o f a Bonn-Moscow 
rapprochement after unification raised fears which the spectre o f the Treaty o f Rapallo (1922) 
and the Hitler-Stalin Pact (1939) intensified. Historical memories generated by these 
questionable bilateral agreements cast doubts on the real motives underlying Germany’s 
Eastern ‘urge’ after unification. History’s lessons, however, taught its political leadership that
12Walter Russell Mead, ‘The Once and Future Reich’, World Policy Journal, vol. 7, no. 4 (Fall 1990),
p. 602.
,3Victor Gray, ‘Germany: The ‘Reluctant Power’ Turns East’, Parameters, vol. 24, no. 3 (Autumn 
1994), p. 85.
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an Ostpolitik could not be pursued in isolation or opposition to the interests o f its neighbours 
in ECE or Western Europe.
Historical memory is an essential component, especially in the respective 
reconciliation processes o f  German-Czech and German-Polish relations.14 As Theo Sommer 
noted, ‘history casts a long shadow. The short span o f 75 years of unity was not the happiest 
o f  Germany’s 1000-year existence nor the happiest period for its neighbours. Memories 
linger, and Germans will do well to keep them in mind’.15 Memories -  especially when 
painful and traumatic -  act as powerful constraints. A unified Germany was a prisoner o f its 
own history. Nowhere is this more apparent than in its bilateral relations with its Eastern 
neighbours, given its tendency to frame and enunciate foreign and security policy decisions 
within a complex and often symbolic historical context. The fundamental problems 
underlying Germany’s Ostpolitik, therefore, derive from German as well as foreign 
perceptions o f the country’s history.
The power o f history or historical memory alone do not account for German foreign 
policy. The socio-political, economic and security realities o f the European continent after 
1990 are equally important. They encouraged a unified Germany to become an ‘advocate’ for 
the political and economic interests o f ECE. Germany’s political leadership acknowledged the 
existence o f concerns or ‘risks’ in ECE and the former Soviet satellites which were intimately 
linked with the Soviet Union’s collapse and the demise o f communism. For Germany, 
managing the decline o f the former superpower and the substantial residual socio-political, 
economic, and military fall-out for ECE were two major foreign policy imperatives after the 
end o f the Cold War. Daniel Schoenbaum and Elizabeth Pond argued:
14William E. Paterson, ‘The Germany in the New Europe’, German Politics, vol. 5, no. 1 (August 
1996), pp. 181-182. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel argued: ‘We have leamt from the 
experiences o f our past. They determine our politics.’ See Bulletin, no. 106 (2 October 1992), p. 985. 
MT.
15Theo Sommer, ‘Germany: United But Not a World Power’, European Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1 (February-
March 1991), p. 40.
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For the West in general and Germany in particular, managing the Russian decline was 
first perceived as avoiding two historically defined traps (or at least minimising their 
impact): the kind o f turmoil and violence that followed the break-up o f the Ottoman 
Empire, and the kind of humiliation and backlash that engulfed Weimar Germany.16
Germany and Russia remained key regional powers and, consequently, regarded each other as
natural competitors and prospective partners.
For Germany’s Eastern neighbours, especially the CSFR and Poland, two vital
questions persisted after October 1990: would Germany foster stability or instability in ECE,
and would its policies be guided by principles o f reconciliation and moral responsibility or
revisionism and revanchism?17 Germany’s Eastern and Western neighbours equally feared
German isolationism and excessive activism in ECE after unification.18 Having initiated two
world wars in the twentieth century, it was legitimate to ask whether Germany would again
pursue an imperialistic version of Mitteleuropa. Sixteen years after the fall o f the Berlin Wall,
the legitimacy o f these fears and cardinal questions continue to baffle many. After 1998, there
was some confusion about the nature and objectives o f German Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s
Ostpolitik. It was Germany’s classic Eastern dilemma: would a unified Germany emerge as a
hegemon or stabiliser and moderniser in ECE? There is a wide schism between those
attributing dubious motives to Germany’s ‘eastward urge’ and those regarding it as a positive
and indispensable force in the socio-political and economic development o f the CSFR and
Poland. As often, however, reality is more complex than this simplistic view suggests.
Bonn’s policy choices in ECE were unlimited; in many cases, however, they
depended on endogenous and exogenous factors often beyond its control.19 For Garton Ash,
Germany was confronted with four main policy options, two o f which are particularly
,6David Schoenbaum and Elizabeth Pond, The German Question and Other Questions (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1996), p. 202.
^Reconciliation is literally translated as Versdhnung or Aussohnung. The Germans used these terms 
and others interchangeably. See Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided 
Continent (New York: Random House, 1993), pp. 298-300.
18Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Germany in Central Europe’ in All Souls College Foreign Policy Studies 
Programme (ed.), Germany, Europe and the World (Oxford: All Souls College, 1998), p. 37.
19Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Germany's Choice’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 4 (July-August 1994), pp. 65- 
81.
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relevant when assessing Germany’s foreign relations with its Eastern neighbours. The ‘Wider 
Europe’ option emphasises Germany’s choice to promote the dual enlargement processes o f 
the EU and NATO. The ‘Moscow First’ option indicates that Germany might focus primarily 
on its relationship with Russia. This is particularly significant: the contours of any future 
German-Russian partnership on the European continent would have had profound 
implications for all states in ECE as well as its Western European and transatlantic allies. For 
Garton Ash, the ‘Wider Europe’ choice was the preferred option. In 1994, he argued that 
German foreign policy would be dominated by the desire to fuse the important elements o f 
each foreign policy option into one, supposedly, coherent foreign policy.
Through what Gunther Hellmann contends are the five major schools o f thought in 
the German discourse on foreign policy -  ‘pragmatic multilateralists’, ‘Europeanists’, 
‘euroskeptics’, ‘internationalists’, and ‘normalisation-nationalists’ -  one common strand 
emerges about Germany’s future role and position in ECE after 1990. In the German foreign 
policy discourse vis-a-vis ECE virtually all observers agreed that Germany could not and 
would not be able to pursue the Mitteleuropa option -  which entailed Germany’s political and 
economic domination of ECE -  and emphasized its futility.20 Proponents o f the ‘euroskeptic’ 
and ‘normalisation-nationalist’ schools, however, argued that Germany would have to act 
unilaterally in ECE if political and economic conditions deteriorated and Western 
international institutions failed to address Germany’s socio-political, economic and security 
concerns on its Eastern frontier. The infamous Wolfgang Schauble-Karl Lamers Paper (1 
September 1994) captured this sentiment:
20Gunther Hellmann, “Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy o f Contemporary Germany,” Mershon 
International Studies Review, no. 40 (1996), p. 25.
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The only solution which will prevent a return to the unstable pre-war system, with 
Germany once again caught in the middle o f East and West, is to integrate Germany’s 
Central and Eastern neighbours into the European post-war system and to establish a 
wide-ranging partnership between this system and Russia. Never again must there be 
a destabilising vacuum o f power in Europe in central Europe. If European integration 
were not to progress, Germany might be called upon, or tempted by its own security 
constraints, to try to effect the stabilisation o f Eastern Europe on its own and in the 
traditional way.21
Hellmann also pointed out that pursuing the Mitteleuropa option ‘would mark a major
departure from Germany's traditional Western orientation (including a dramatic unlearning o f
historical lessons) and would almost certainly lead to a deterioration o f Germany's relations
with the West’.22 The move towards ECE was regarded as natural by those intimately
involved with its history: the region would either become a German sphere o f influence or
develop peacefully as a community o f nations between Germany and Russia.
A unified and sovereign Germany, no longer constrained by superpower politics, is
still adjusting to its new geographic position in Europe’s centre and role as a crucial power
and geopolitical hinge between states in Western and Eastern Europe. Post-unification
Germany remains a state in transition, like its East and Central European counterparts, albeit
with more economic and financial resources. Its difficult internal and external transformation
from a semi-sovereign to a sovereign power created what Ludger Kuhnhardt describes as a
foreign policy identity crisis in Bonn:
Foreign policy thinking seemed to have vanished in a state that was the very product 
o f foreign policy developments and decisions and that is still very dependent on the 
evolution of the international order. Germany remains a foreign policy country -  a 
country dependent on the future o f the world and its responses -  but many o f its 
policy-makers are domestically oriented and domestic in habit indeed.23
21‘Uberlegungen zur europaischen Politik: Position der CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion vom 1 
September 1994% quoted by John Newhouse, Europe Adrift (New York: Pantheon, 1997), pp. 126-127. 
For the complete text, see ‘Positionspapier der CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion vom 1 September 1994% 
BfdiP, no. 10 (1994), pp. 1271-1280. Symbolically, the paper was released on the fortieth anniversary 
of the Nazi invasion o f Poland and one day after the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from the former GDR.
22Hellmann, ‘Goodbye Bismarck?’, p. 24.
23Ludger Kuhnhardt, Ideals and Interests in German Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: German 
Historical Institute, 1993), p. 17.
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The foreign policy debate amongst the German public also reflected this issue.24 It 
also raised important questions about Germany’s self-image as a major foreign and security 
policy actor on the international political scene and its perceptions o f and responses to 
complex foreign and security policy challenges in ECE. The dynamics of unification, to a 
certain degree, were responsible for driving Germany’s foreign policy agenda. Eckart 
Arnold’s observation ‘that it is the domestic problems o f unification, far more than external 
factors, that will be the driving force shaping the future stance o f German foreign policy’ 
illustrates the power of domestic factors in forecasting future German foreign policy 
orientations.25
In retrospect, that a unified Germany would play a more prominent and powerful role 
on the world stage was to be expected. However, it was uncertain how Bonn would manage 
its own internal transformation processes and the conduct o f its foreign policy. Given the 
anarchic and chaotic nature o f the European system after 1989-1990 and Bonn’s impression 
that the country might drown in a potential sea o f instability, Germany’s political leadership 
was forced to focus extensively on ECE. Safeguarding extensive German investments in the 
Eastern Lander (states) and socio-political, economic and security interests in ECE became an 
overriding foreign policy imperative.
Before focusing on the significance o f the CSFR (Czech Republic) and Poland after 
1990, why there are obvious research omissions in this thesis should be explained. Ostpolitik, 
as noted earlier, was used extensively by Germany’s political leadership throughout the Cold 
War to define the entire spectrum o f its relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
The Ostvertrage (Eastern treaties) were the main foundation o f Ostpolitik, especially during 
Willy Brandt’s chancellorship. The term ‘Ostpolitik’ is paradoxical: it implies the existence o f 
a specific geographical area and foreign policy strategy focusing solely on Germany’s foreign
24Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ‘Offentliche Meinung und Aussenpolitik: die fehlende Debatte in 
Deutschland’, Internationale Politik, no. 8 (1995), pp. 3-12.
25Eckart Arnold, ‘German Foreign Policy and Unification’, International Affairs, vol. 67, no. 3 (1991), 
p. 455.
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relations with the ‘East’ or Eastern bloc. It often treats the ‘East’ as one coherent bloc; it 
rarely differentiates or highlights the numerous nuances existing in Germany’s bilateral 
relations with its Eastern neighbours. This thesis argues that Ostpolitik is still a pertinent 
analytical term in the discourse on German foreign policy; nonetheless, it is a mistake to 
group together all ECE states into one category. Bonn’s Ostpolitik strategy was not conducted 
in a uniform fashion; Germany’s foreign policy objectives were simply too diverse to apply 
one overall strategy. Germany entertained different policy goals vis-a-vis each ECE state. A 
decision was made to concentrate only on the Czech Republic and Poland, for reasons 
explained below, which offers a unique opportunity to compare and contrast Germany’s 
multi-faceted foreign policy behaviour towards these states.
No attempt will be made to examine Germany’s foreign relations with Hungary after 
1990 and Slovakia after 1993, except within the overall context o f its interest in the EU and 
NATO enlargement processes. There are several reasons for this approach. First, there are no 
mutual borders between these states and Germany. Second, complex reconciliation and ethnic 
German issues did not complicate the normalisation o f Germany’s relations with Hungary and 
Slovakia. Germany’s relations with Hungary were not burdened with similar historical 
baggage as with the Czechs and Poles. During both World Wars, Hungary did not side with 
Germany’s adversaries, although it is true that several hundred thousand Volksdeutsche 
(ethnic Germans) were expelled from Hungary after 1945. Nonetheless, dismissing altogether 
the political, economic, and military significance of Hungary and Slovakia in German 
Ostpolitik calculations would be a mistake. Slovakia’s role as an independent state after the 
CSFR’s dissolution (January 1993), will be assessed in the overall context o f German-Czech 
relations. Hungary’s role as a founding member of the Visegrad Group and integral 
component o f Germany’s plans to enlarge the EU and NATO will also be acknowledged.
Why focus exclusively on Germany’s foreign relations with the CSFR (Czech 
Republic) and Poland? A sound geographical, historical, cultural, economic and strategic 
logic is undeniable. First, both states share a common border with Germany stretching 
roughly 1200 kilometres from Szczecin (Poland) in the north, to Plechy (Czech Republic) in
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the south. Second, Germany’s protean border (the Oder-Neisse line) with Poland has been the 
subject o f much political controversy in the twentieth century. Third, the physical relocation 
o f the Federal German government from Bonn to Berlin (48 kilometers from the Polish 
border) in 1999 further highlighted the geographical, strategic, and economic significance o f 
not only Poland but also all of ECE for Germany’s political leadership. Fourth, Germany and 
its neighbours have particularly strong historical and cultural ties due to their close 
geographical proximity. Fifth, the legacy o f the Second World War and its immediate 
aftermath constituted an omnipresent trait in Germany’s foreign policy behaviour before and 
after unification. Czechoslovakia and Poland suffered immensely under the Nazi regime. 
They are ideal case studies to examine the processes by which the three countries handled the 
issues o f expulsion26, moral responsibility, minority rights, material claims, and compensation 
for victims o f Nazism. Despite these striking similarities, however, both states were accorded 
a different priority by Germany’s foreign policy-makers after 1990. Sixth, Germany’s cultural 
presence in Mitteleuropa and powerful economic interests were always linked. Finally, there 
were powerful security reasons behind Germany’s focus on these two countries after 1990.
THESIS CONTRIBUTION
Sixteen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, this thesis intends to fill a significant 
gap in the discipline of International Relations by examining Germany’s complex and multi­
faceted foreign and security policy towards the Czech Republic and Poland, and the domestic 
and international factors that shaped it. It will consider the socio-political, economic, cultural, 
historical and strategic dimensions o f Germany’s relations with both states. It will discuss the 
metamorphoses o f German diplomacy and foreign policy after unification and the role and 
significance of bilateral relations in an interdependent system. Past studies have almost 
exclusively focused on the totality of Germany’s Ostpolitik after unification without 
attempting to deconstruct its key components or compare and contrast them in the cases o f the
26The term ‘expulsion’ remains controversial. It is widely used in Germany to describe the ethnic 
Germans’ fate in Czechoslovakia and Poland after the Second World War. In Czechoslovakia, it is 
widely referred to as Odsun or ‘transfer’, not as Vyhnani which means expulsion.
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Czech Republic and Poland. Striking similarities and differences in Germany’s foreign policy 
strategy vis-a-vis each state will be highlighted. This work also suggests that not all o f 
Germany’s priorities in the region are uniform. There are contradictions and paradoxes 
inherent in Bonn’s desire to strike a balance between promoting deeper integration in the EU, 
assisting in the political and economic reconstruction o f ECE, and the need to foster a new 
relationship within the Atlantic Alliance.
The research methodology employed in this thesis allows the reader to appreciate two 
important facts. First, Germany’s foreign policy was not created and implemented against the 
backdrop o f a grand German vision or strategy that applies equally to all states in ECE or 
even the FSU. Second, its foreign policy was not pursued solely within a multilateral context, 
although multilateralism cannot be ignored when examining Germany’s foreign policy. This 
approach is complemented by a discussion of Germany’s bilateral ties and its presence -  
governmental and non-governmental -  in the region.
This thesis will address the following gaps in the study of German foreign policy in 
International Relations. By 2006, no study, either in Germany or abroad, had provided an in- 
depth examination o f two important features o f Germany’s foreign policy behaviour towards 
ECE. First, there has been no attempt to provide a comprehensive, comparative, analysis o f 
Chancellor Kohl’s foreign policy record vis-a-vis the Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic) and 
Poland from October 1990 until his political demise in September 1998. Second, studies on 
Germany’s Ostpolitik objectives after 1990 have proliferated, but none have sought to explain 
the connections between Germany’s political reconciliation processes, and economic and 
security interests towards the Czech Republic and Poland. Recent analyses have viewed these 
states in isolation from each other despite striking historical similarities and differences, 
which highlight Germany’s strategies and interests vis-a-vis both states. An exhaustive 
description o f how German influence manifests itself in both states, how it is channelled and 
constrained will close this significant research gap. Germany’s foreign policy behaviour 
toward ECE in the post-unification period -  that is the geographical area and the time frame -
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which have been crucial to Germany’s sense o f itself for the last one thousand years -  will be 
analysed.
THESIS OUTLINE
This thesis aims to provide a lucid, concise, and structured overview o f the mechanics 
of Germany’s foreign relations with the Czech Republic and Poland after October 1990. The 
evaluation o f this critical power’s foreign and security policy machinery will include its goals 
in ECE, the principal domestic and international sources o f its foreign policy, and the nature 
o f its bilateral and multilateral instruments.
Chapter One examines the main theoretical traditions in the International Relations 
and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) literature and discusses their relevance in understanding 
the socio-political, economic, and security dimensions o f German foreign policy. It also 
focuses on how each tradition, where pertinent, explained German foreign policy behaviour 
towards ECE, both in general and more specifically towards the states under study.
Chapter Two assesses the main characteristics o f Germany’s domestic and 
international environment and their implications for its foreign and security policy towards 
ECE. It provides an explanatory model for the study o f German foreign policy towards the 
Czech Republic and Poland. Understanding the complex interplay between the ‘domestic’ and 
‘international’ is crucial.
Chapter Three offers a brief historical overview o f Mitteleuropa’s significance for 
successive German leaders and governments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The 
historical legacy o f Germany’s former role and record as a stabilising and destabilising force 
in ECE is directly linked to its foreign policy behaviour after unification.
Chapter Four examines one o f the central components of Germany’s foreign policy 
behaviour towards ECE: the pursuit o f political reconciliation to resume ‘normal’ relations 
with its two Eastern neighbours. It was an essential precondition if a unified Germany was to 
enjoy productive and prosperous relations with Czechoslovakia and Poland.
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Chapter Five concentrates on the economic dimension o f Germany’s Ostpolitik, 
specifically the importance o f its Osthandel (Eastern trade). It explores Germany’s position as 
a ‘trading state’ in the international system and underlines the significance of ECE, especially 
Czechoslovakia and Poland in its economic calculations. It addresses the following questions: 
what were the main domestic and external determinants o f Bonn’s economic Ostpolitik and 
how important were economic instruments in meeting Bonn’s foreign and security policy 
goals in ECE?
Chapter Six considers the security dimension of Germany’s foreign relations with the 
Czech Republic and Poland. Within the context of German security policy, ‘exporting 
stability’ to ECE became the principal security leitmotif guiding the German government 
after 1990. This chapter discusses Germany’s Eastern security environment and focuses on 
the military and non-military threats or ‘vulnerabilities’ in ECE and the Former Soviet Union 
(FSU) as perceived and articulated by Germany’s political leadership.
This thesis concludes with an assessment o f whether Germany’s foreign and security 
policy towards both states was a success and met its stated objectives, and with the 
implications o f these findings for Germany’s new leadership under Chancellor Angela 
Merkel.
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CHAPTER ONE
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
German foreign and security policy behaviour can be evaluated by exploring the vast 
array of analytical and theoretical tools contained in International Relations literature. Identifying 
the main determinants o f a unified Germany’s foreign and security policy behaviour is a complex 
process that requires a closer assessment o f the principal assumptions guiding theoretical 
perspectives in the fields o f International Relations and FPA. Where does one start and what does 
one focus on in International Relations? A simultaneous examination o f unit and systemic levels 
o f  analysis seems adequate.
Analysts remain at odds about several fundamental questions in International Relations 
theory, which have important implications for the study o f Germany’s foreign and security policy 
behaviour. First, can the nation-state, given the extensive proliferation o f international institutions 
and other global phenomena, still be categorised as the primary actor in International Relations? If 
the nation-state is under threat or in ‘retreat’, then something similar must be said o f the practice 
o f national foreign policies as international institutions or forces of globalisation swallow the 
traditional functions o f states.' These phenomena raise the question of whether states actually 
pursue distinct and discernible national foreign and security policies. The perceived existence o f a 
national foreign policy begs the question o f whom or what is actually responsible for framing and 
pursuing specific objectives. Finally, do systemic or unit level theories account for shaping a 
state’s interests and strategies? These are but a few of the questions which have implications for 
the research methodology o f this thesis.
In addition to the theoretical problems associated with defining a state’s interests and 
strategies, examining perceived German interests, especially towards ECE, is difficult due to the 
complex and controversial historical connotations. The ‘perceived’ pursuit o f explicit German 
interests by the political leadership reawakens demons o f the past, domestically and abroad, and
'Susan Strange, The Retreat o f the State: The Diffusion o f Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
rekindles collective memories o f Germany’s pre-war attempts to maximise its power in the 
international system by using military force, especially vis-a-vis ECE. Peter Pulzer observes that 
the ‘German past, German national identity and the continuities or breaches in institutions or 
society -  all these are sensitive areas, subject to taboos or heavily coded debates’.2 Any attempt to 
define German national interests will remain difficult as long as Germany is still evolving as a 
nation.3
Despite the existence o f several analytical obstacles rooted in Germany’s controversial 
past, a debate on the nature o f its foreign and security policy interests was conducted between 
1990 and 1998. It focuses on the following important question: should Germany, in light o f its 
controversial past, be pursuing explicit interests in the international political system? In other 
words, should Germany act like a ‘normal’ power in the international system? Whether a state 
responsible for two world wars in the twentieth century should be able to conduct its foreign and 
security policy operations in a similar manner as its Western European counterparts, like Britain 
and France, is the subject o f considerable debate. The FRG’s evolution as a peaceful and model 
democratic state after the Second World War did not inspire confidence in all comers o f the 
world, especially in ECE. It should be noted that some dismiss the debate on perceived German 
interests as redundant, which is not the case.4 The debate’s leitmotifs reflect Germany’s attempts 
to create a foreign and security policy identity consistent with its new status as one o f the most 
powerful states on the European continent.
As this chapter will show, Germany’s foreign policy behaviour represents somewhat o f  an 
enigma in international politics. Recent attempts to explain Germany’s foreign policy behaviour 
are numerous and rooted in some o f the most influential schools in International Relations theory 
and FPA: realism, neorealism, liberalism, neoliberal-institutionalism and social constructivism. 
Each tradition, however, only manages to highlight one or several facets o f its foreign and
2Peter Pulzer, ‘Nation State and National Sovereignty’, German Historical Institute Bulletin, vol. 17, no. 3 
(November 1995), p. 6.
3See Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Random 
House, 1993), p. 73.
4Lothar Kettenacker, Germany since 1945 (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 234- 
235.
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security policy behaviour. Past studies would have us believe that a state’s foreign policy 
behaviour can be solely elucidated with theoretical tools from one tradition. It is not so; moreover, 
this is not a good strategy for understanding the complex evolution of German foreign policy. An 
examination o f Germany’s foreign relations with the CSFR and Poland exposes this crucial fact 
and highlights the need for a different theoretical approach: one taking into account the multi­
level nature o f the internal and external determinants that influence Germany’s complex foreign 
policy machine.
This chapter’s first section surveys the main components o f the various traditions in 
International Relations theory and examines the main internal and external determinants 
responsible for shaping and influencing a state’s interests and strategies. The second section 
focuses specifically on recent theoretical attempts to explain Germany’s foreign policy behaviour 
towards Czechoslovakia, Poland, and in some cases ECE.
Realism and Neorealism
Realism emphasises the primacy o f the nation-state in international relations, the flawed 
nature o f man, and the anarchical international system within which states pursue their national 
interests.5 An anarchical international system is characterised by the absence o f a central political 
authority that is significantly more important and influential than the state. The logic o f political 
realism follows from this main point. Rational state actors in an anarchical international system 
are primarily concerned with the perennial struggle for power and security as they engage in self- 
help activities that often result in conflict. The anarchical characteristics o f the international 
system, in turn, are responsible for shaping a state’s interests. According to realism, conflict is a 
natural state o f affairs; states always seek to enhance their power and position vis-a-vis other 
states in the international system. This ‘reality’ has important implications for states seeking to 
define their interests in terms o f power. The maximisation o f power is the common factor that 
unites all states.
5Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Amongst Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1985).
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The ‘national interest’ concept is fundamentally realist and is linked to the notion that 
states are rational and unitary actors in the international system. More precisely, the national 
interest ‘is employed to describe, explain, or evaluate the sources o f adequacy o f a nation’s 
foreign policy. As an instrument o f political action, it serves as a means of justifying, denouncing, 
or proposing policies’.6 According to Hans Morgenthau, the concept o f ‘interest’ serves the 
following purpose:
[It] provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and 
the facts to be understood. ... We assume that statesmen think and act in terms o f 
interest defined as power, and the evidence o f history bears that assumption out. That 
assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman— past, 
present, or future—has taken or will take on the political scene.7
A state’s foreign policy objectives can be classified as constant; they are easily discernible to
other political leaders and observers at any one time.8 For Morgenthau, interest is the essence o f
politics -  a notion historical evidence supports. The political and cultural environments within
which a state’s foreign policy is conducted often determine interest and power alike.
If a state’s foreign policy can only be examined by evaluating interest in terms o f power
then what power means in realism must be defined. For Morgenthau, power ‘may comprise
anything that establishes and maintains the control o f man over man’.9 For Arnold Wolfers, power
is ‘the ability to move others or to get them to do what one wants them to do and not to do what
one does not want them to do’.10 In addition to pursuing interests in terms o f power, the ultimate
goal o f a state remains self-preservation and survival. National security concerns are at the top of
a state’s agenda; therefore, it comes as little surprise that politicians have used both the ‘national
interest’ and the ‘national security interest’ interchangeably to justify a plan o f action."
Intricately linked with the concept o f ‘national interest’ is the notion o f ‘self-interest’.
According to Robert Osgood, there are five main reasons why a state pursues a policy of self­
6James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study o f Foreign Policy (London: Frances Pinter, 1980), p. 283.
7Morgenthau, Politics amongst Nations, p. 5.
8Joseph Frankel, The Making o f Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 3.
9Morgenthau, Politics amongst Nations, p. 11.
10Amold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 103.
"Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, pp. 147-148.
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interest in the international system. First, states are primarily concerned with self-preservation and 
survival. Second, states pursue ‘vital interests’ which are important for their well being but not 
necessary for their survival. Third, states aim to be self-sufficient. Fourth, the inherent longing for 
national prestige is an inevitable by-product o f pursuing policies based on the national interest. 
Finally, by pursuing their self-interest, states can ultimately increase their levels o f national 
power.12 However, the ‘national interest’ concept as a tool for explaining a state’s foreign policy 
behaviour is prone to much criticism. Some have highlighted the complex analytical problems 
associated with ‘interests’ in general, especially when they are defined in terms o f power. Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye argue that ‘the state may prove to be multi-faceted, even schizophrenic. 
National interests will be defined differently on different issues, at different times, and by 
different governmental units’.,J The concept is only useful if we have a clear understanding o f the 
nature o f the political processes by which interests are formulated and implemented. According to 
P.A. Reynolds, ‘even if the ‘real interest’ is conceivable, and should exist, no practical decision­
maker in an actual situation, and no observer o f that situation afterwards, could have the totality 
o f knowledge necessary correctly to identify it’.14 Hedley Bull raises the following point:
The criterion o f 'national interest', or 'interest o f state', in itself provides us with no 
specific guidance either in interpreting the behaviour of states or in prescribing how 
they should behave -  unless we are told what concrete ends or objectives states do or 
should pursue: security, prosperity, ideological objectives or whatever. ... However, 
the conception o f the national interest or interest o f state does have some meaning in 
a situation in which national or state ends are defined and agreed, and the question at 
issue is by what means they can be promoted.15
According to James Rosenau, there are three main limitations:
One is the ambiguous nature o f the nation and the difficulty o f specifying whose interests 
it encompasses. A second is the elusiveness of criteria for determining the existence o f 
interests and for tracing their presence in substantive policies. Still another confounding 
factor is the absence o f procedures for cumulating the interests once they have been 
identified.16
12Robert E. Osgood, Ideas and Self-Interest in America’s Foreign Relations (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 5-6.
13Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence. (New York: Harper Collins, 1989), p. 
35.
14P.A. Reynolds, An Introduction to International Relations (New York: Longman Publishing, 1994), p. 52.
15Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 66.
16Rosenau, The Scientific Study o f Foreign Policy, p. 287.
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The ‘national interest’ concept remains ambiguous and difficult to define but, despite its 
theoretical flaws, policy-makers still continue to use the ‘national interest’ as a device to gain 
support and justify the choice o f a particular policy.
Using classical realism as a theoretical foundation, the founding father o f neorealism, 
Kenneth Waltz, developed a more ‘pure’ theory of international relations, one that focused 
exclusively on the dynamics o f the international system. This system is primarily composed o f 
structure and interacting units. This structure is defined as a ‘set o f constraining conditions’; it 
works ‘through a process o f socialisation that limits and moulds behaviour’ and ‘competition’.17 
Consequently, the nature o f the structure affects the behaviour of the units; ‘states are the units 
whose interactions form the structure o f international political systems’.18 In Man, the State and 
War, Waltz showed that the major causes of war could be attributed to the anarchical nature o f the 
international state system (third image), not within states themselves or within man; his later 
works refined this idea.19
One o f Waltz’s objectives in Theory o f  International Politics was to differentiate between 
system and unit-level theories and describe the dynamics o f political structures as they pertained 
to the units in the system. Waltz defined the structure o f the international system by analysing 
three core propositions. First, he argued that international politics are anarchic and decentralised, 
unlike domestic political structures. Anarchy in international politics manifests itself in the lack o f 
order and organisation. This has important implications for the units in the system as ‘structures 
are formed by the coaction of their units’. Indeed, units in the system function according to the 
principle o f self-help.20 He also believes that the ‘first concern o f states is not to maximise power 
but to maintain their positions in the system’.21 Second, states being in a constant state o f anarchy 
and self-help, they are prone to excessive competition which often results in the failure to
1?Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 73, 76.
18lbid., p. 95.
19Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
20 Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, p. 91.
21 Ibid., p. 126.
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cooperate when faced with common interests.22 Increased competition in the international system
results in either bandwagoning or balancing behaviour by states.23 States or ‘units’ perform
similar functions because ‘anarchy entails relations o f coordination among a system’s units’ and
‘international politics consists o f  like units duplicating one another’s activities’.24 Waltz stresses
that these ‘units’ or states are sovereign entities pursuing their own destiny in the international
system.25 Third, the distribution o f capabilities amongst units reveals how the structure works and
even changes. He argues:
The structure o f a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the 
system’s units. And changes in structure change expectations about how the units o f the 
system will behave and about the outcomes their interactions will produce. ... Power is 
estimated by comparing the capabilities o f a number o f units. Although capabilities are 
attributes o f units, the distribution across of capabilities across units is not. The distribution 
o f capabilities is not a unit attribute, but rather a system-wide concept.26
As the structure is determined by or directly linked to the distribution of capabilities across units,
states in a self-help system ‘have to use their combined capabilities to serve their interests’. A
state’s ranking in the international system depends on how it fares in not just one o f the following
sectors but in all: size o f population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability,
military strength, political stability and competence.27
Like Waltz, John Mearsheimer highlights anarchy as the prime characteristic o f the 
international system because ‘in anarchy there is no higher body or sovereign that protects states 
from one another’.28 This state o f affairs affects how states view each other in the international 
system. Essentially, they operate in a constant state o f competition as they struggle for survival.
22Joseph M. Grieco, ‘Anarchy and the Limits o f Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism’ in David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 118.
23 Waltz, Theoiy o f International Politics, pp. 125-126.
24lbid., pp. 93, 97.
25See Arthur Stein, ‘Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World’ in David A. Baldwin 
(ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 29-59.
26Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, p. 97.
27lbid., p. 131.
28John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International 
Security, vol. 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990), p. 12.
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To counter anarchy, states seek to maximise their power.29 Their primacy is paramount. Despite
the end o f bipolarity in the international system and increasing interdependence, states continue to
represent the dominant force in international politics.30 The international system being a
competitive arena, states increasingly seek to improve their security prospects and military power
to counter or balance any potential aggressors.
Another neorealist, Christopher Layne, argues that ‘structural driven phenomena’,
differential growth rates, and anarchy are responsible for great power emergence in the
international system /1 Whether a great power rises or not, however, is ultimately linked to
decisions taken at unit-level, which contradicts the basic premise o f neorealism. Layne argues that
(1) structural constraints press eligible states to become great powers; (2) such states 
make unit-level decisions whether to pursue great power status in response to these 
structural constraints; (3) if a unit-level decision to seek great power status produces a 
consequential shift in polarity, it has a structural impact. Rising states have choices 
about whether to become great powers/2
According to neorealists, it was highly probable that Germany would opt for great-power status
after unification. Powerful constraints inherent in the bipolar structure o f the international system
during the Cold War had been removed; therefore, it seemed likely that a unified Germany would
emerge as the main benefactor from structural changes in the international system. The rationale
underpinning this logic was simple, but in Germany’s case, ignored powerful unit-level factors.
Powerful domestic constraints actually hindered Germany’s ability to assume great power status
in the international system.”
Liberalism and Neoliberal Institutionalism
The tradition o f liberalism in International Relations encompasses several theoretical 
ideas and concepts which have their roots in the Western political and economic philosophy o f
29Ibid., p. 12.
30John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Disorder Restored’ in Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton (eds.), Rethinking 
America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992), 
p. 214.
31Christopher Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise’, International Security, 
vol. 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 9.
32Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion’, p. 9.
33 See chapter two.
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David Hume, Emmanuel Kant, John Locke, Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill. Political liberalism
highlights the role o f individual equality and liberty; it focuses on economic and social
interdependence and the role of international institutions in international relations. Economic
liberalism emphasizes commitment to individuals, the free market and private property.
According to Ole Holsti, liberal models offer the following explanations for international political
processes: ‘(1) international behaviour and outcomes arise from a multiplicity o f motives, not
merely security, at least if security is defined solely in military or strategic terms, and (2)
important international processes and conditions originate not only in the actions o f nation-states
but also in the aggregated behaviour of other actors’/ 4 Liberals view a state’s foreign policy
behaviour through a domestic lens/5 According to Andrew Moravcsik, a liberal theory o f
international politics is based on three main assumptions: the primacy o f societal actors,
representation and state preferences, and interdependence and the international system /6 His first
assumption is based on the premise that individuals and private groups are the main actors in
international politics. He states:
Political action is embedded in domestic and transnational civil society, understood as an 
aggregation o f boundedly rational individuals with differentiated tastes, social 
commitments, and resource endowments. Socially differentiated individuals define their 
material and ideational interests independently o f politics and then advance those interests 
through political exchange and collective action.37
Indeed, these individuals or political leaders are responsible for shaping states’ interests and
influencing powerful international and domestic constraints, which in turn influence a state’s
behaviour. As Mark Zacher and Richard Matthew acknowledge:
340 le  R. Holsti, ‘Theories o f International Relations and Foreign Policy: Realism and its Challengers’ in 
Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory. Realism and the Neoliberal 
Challenge (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), p. 44.
35See Helen Milner, ‘The Assumption o f Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique’ in David 
A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 143-169, and William Wallace, Foreign Policy and 
the Political Process (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1971), p. 12.
36Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’, 
International Organisation, vol. 51, no. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 516-21.
37Ibid., p. 517.
33
Liberal international’s theory’s conceptualisation o f progress in terms o f human freedom 
and the importance attributed to liberal democracy, free trade, cognitive changes, 
communications and moral norms all indicate that liberals regard individual human 
beings as the primary international actors. Liberals view states as the most important 
collective actors in our present era but they are seen as pluralistic actors whose interests 
and policies are determined by bargaining among groups and elections.38
As for political leaders, they entertain personal belief systems, perceptions, or worldviews about
the international environment they live in.
Moravcsik’s second assumption rests on the notion that ‘states (or other political
institutions) represent some subset o f domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state
officials define state preferences and act purposively in world politics’/ 9 Individuals and groups
within a state’s domestic political system ‘constrain’ policy-makers by lobbying for their
individual or collective ‘preferences’. ‘Preferences’ are defined as a ‘set o f fundamental interests
defined across ‘states of the world’ which ‘are by definition causally independent o f the strategies
of other actors and, therefore, prior to specific interstate political interactions, including external
threats, incentives, manipulation o f information, or other tactics’.40 The notion o f the
‘disaggregation of the state’ is particularly important in an examination of the forces which shape
a state’s foreign policy behaviour. Moravcsik argues:
States may act in either a unitary or “disaggregated” way. In many traditional areas o f 
foreign policy, “politics stops at the water’s edge,” and there is strong co-ordination 
among national officials and politicians. In other areas, the state may be “disaggregated,” 
with different elements-executives, courts, central banks, regulatory bureaucracies, and 
ruling parties, for example-conducting semiautonomous foreign policies in the service of 
disparate societal interests.41
The third premise highlights the significance o f interdependence in the international 
system. For Moravcsik, preferences determine states’ behaviour. They are defined by a ‘purpose’ 
guiding a state’s conduct and enticing it to act or pursue a particular foreign policy option. In this 
context, it is important to note that in contrast to neorealism or neoliberal institutionalism, a state 
within the liberal school does not pursue ‘its ideal policy, oblivious o f others; instead, each state 
seeks to realise its distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the preferences o f
38Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew, ‘Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent 
Strands’ in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory, p. 118.
39Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously’, p. 518.
40Ibid., p. 519.
41 Ibid., p. 519.
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other states’.42 In effect, interdependence constrains state behaviour. Interdependent states also
tend to display similar foreign policy characteristics. As Richard Rosecrance mentions,
interdependent states are often trading states. He argues:
While trading states try to improve their position and their domestic allocation o f 
resources, they do so within a context o f interdependence. ... The incentive to wage 
war is absent in such a system for war disrupts trade and the interdependence on which 
trade is based. Trading states reveal they can do better through internal economic 
development sustained by a worldwide market for their goods and services than by trying 
to conquer and assimilate large tracts o f  land.43
There are, therefore, numerous incentives for states to become trading states. Thus, the role and
nature o f domestic politics determine a state’s behaviour.
The second strand of liberalism deserving attention is institutional theory or neoliberal
institutionalism, although the latter has more in common with its neorealist counterpart than
liberalism.44 Robert Keohane defines the main theoretical assumptions o f institutionalism as
follows:
... institutionalist theory assumes that states are the principal actors in world politics 
and that they behave on the basis o f conceptions o f their own self-interests. Relative 
capabilities -  realism’s ‘distribution o f power’ -  remain important, and states must 
rely on themselves to assure themselves gains from cooperation. However, 
institutionalist theory also emphasises the role o f international institutions in 
changing conceptions o f self-interest. Thus it draws on liberal thinking about the 
formation o f interests.45
International institutions are defined ‘as persistent and connected sets o f rules, often affiliated 
with organisations that operate across international boundaries. Institutions range from 
conventions (such as sovereignty) to regimes (such as the non-proliferation regime) to formal 
organisations (such as NATO)’.46 States create institutions to achieve their objectives and 
interests. As in realism, ‘states pursue self-interested goals, which are defined at least partially in
42Ibid., p. 520.
43Richard Rosecrance, The Rise o f the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New 
York: Basic Books, 1986), p. 24.
44See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), and Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State 
Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989).
45See Robert O. Keohane, ‘Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War’ in David A. 
Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism, p. 271.
46Helga Haftendom, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, ‘Introduction’ in Helga Haftendorn, 
Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander (eds.) Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and 
Space (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 1-2.
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terms o f relative power and autonomy’.47 International institutions do not limit a state’s actions in 
the international system; they merely ‘affect the incentives facing states, even if  those states’ 
fundamental interests are defined autonomously’. As Keohane notes, however, ‘state actions 
depend to a considerable degree on prevailing institutional arrangements’.48
States coexist in an anarchical international system yet international institutions play a 
vital role in civilising anarchy. Neoliberal institutionalism concentrates on international political 
processes and how institutions affect state strategies. The focus on institutions is appropriate 
because they ‘help us understand the conditions under which states’ attempts at cooperation, in 
their own interests, will be successful’.49 The political process, as outlined by Keohane and 
Joseph Nye, in their complex interdependence model requires international institutions. This 
model is based on three characteristics: multiple channels, absence o f hierarchy among issues, and 
the minor role o f military force.50 The first characteristic is the most important as it emphasises 
the role of international organisations and their part in the international system. Keohane and Nye 
argue that
in a world o f multiple issues imperfectly linked, in which coalitions are formed 
transnational ly and transgovemmentally, the potential role of international institutions in 
political bargaining is greatly increased. In particular, they help set the international 
agenda and act as catalysts for coalition-formation and as arenas for political initiatives 
and linkage by weak states.
According to Nye, ‘institutions provide a framework that shapes expectations’.51 They serve four
functions: they provide a sense o f continuity, an opportunity for reciprocity, a flow of
information, and ways to solve conflicts.52
Proponents o f liberalism and neoliberal institutionalism offer essential tools to dissect or
interpret Germany’s foreign and security policy behaviour. Liberals focus on the primacy o f
47Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, ‘Introduction: The End o f the Cold War in Europe’ in Robert O. 
Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.), After the Cold War: International Institutions and 
Stale Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 5.
48Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, pp. 2, 5.
49Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 246.
50Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. 35.
5'Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflict: An Introduction to History and Theory (New 
York: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 38.
52Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 38-39.
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domestic politics in determining a state’s interests whereas neoliberal institutionalists focus on 
how international institutions affect a state’s foreign policy behaviour and vice-versa. Liberals 
emphasise domestic political processes, not international political processes, and concentrate 
primarily on the link between domestic politics and the fulfilment of Germany’s foreign and 
security policy interests. Behind a state’s foreign policy behaviour, there are a domestic political 
system and individuals directly responsible for shaping its foreign and security policy objectives. 
As the political leadership o f a given state does not pursue its objectives or ‘preferences’ in an 
international vacuum, who or what is responsible for advocating a state’s preferences? As William 
Wallace notes, ‘states do not make policy; governments do’.53 Governments are composed o f 
individuals acting collectively in a given state’s interest. Individuals or actors are at the heart o f 
governments’ decision-making processes and, therefore, are a fundamental component o f the 
international system. The connection between domestic political actors and foreign policy 
formulation and implementation is a central one in the discourse on German foreign policy 
analysis.
Social Constructivism
The social constructivist school in International Relations, in stark contrast to the four 
previous schools, justifies a state’s foreign policy behaviour by the systemic level constructions of 
a state’s identity.54 Constructivists highlight the power of social factors in shaping state behaviour. 
Thomas Berger argues that ‘constructivism differs from the dominant paradigms in the study o f 
foreign policy formation which share a view o f foreign policy as being made by rational state or 
bureaucratic actors seeking to maximise their interests within the constraints imposed by the 
international and domestic political systems’.55 The main difference between constructivism and 
its theoretical counterparts is the emphasis on culture and identity, two factors largely ignored by 
the dominant traditions in International Relations. According to Peter Katzenstein, this school
53WilIiam Wallace, Foreign Policy, p. 25.
54Alexander Wendt, ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State', American Political Science 
Review, vol. 88, no. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 384-396.
55Thomas U. Berger, ‘The Past in the Present: Historical Memory and German National Security Policy’, 
German Politics, vol. 6, no. 1 (April 1997), p. 43.
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seeks to link the materialism and rationalism that characterises mainstream theorising 
to processes o f communication and social discourse that constitute actors and help 
define their interests. The analysis o f institutional forces has retained an even stronger 
appeal in the analysis o f domestic politics. The “new” institutionalism encompasses a 
broad array o f approaches. Prominent among them is the historical-sociological 
approach that seeks to understand how institutional norms and identities shape policies 
and politics.56
A state’s security interests are not taken for granted. As Alexander Wendt states: ‘actors do not
have a ‘portfolio’ o f interests that they carry around independent o f social context; instead, they
define their interests in the process of defining situations’.57 He also points out that a ‘fundamental
principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, including other actors,
on the basis o f the meanings that the objects have for them’.58 Indeed, interests are ‘constructed
through a process o f social interaction’ and ‘defined by actors who respond to cultural factors’.59
The state is regarded as a social actor influenced by numerous yet different sociological processes;
a state’s identity defines its interests. States are not unitary rational actors; their governments do
not only consist o f people intent on maximising their power and security (billiard ball model).
Their interests and foreign policy behaviour cannot be solely explained by the international
system’s structural characteristics. For Stephen Walt,
Constructivist approaches emphasise the impact o f ideas. Instead o f taking the state 
for granted and assuming that it simply seeks to survive, constructivists regard the 
interests and identities o f states as a highly malleable product o f specific historical 
processes. They pay close attention to the prevailing discourse(s) in society because 
discourse reflects and shapes beliefs and interests, and establishes accepted norms of 
behaviour.60
A state’s security interests, specifically its national security policies, are primarily shaped 
by three main factors: norms, identity and culture. Katzenstein defines them as follows:
56Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘United Germany in an Integrating Europe’ in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), Tamed 
Power: Germany in Europe (Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 16.
57Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction o f Power Politics’ in 
Friedrich Kratochwil and Edward P. Mansfield (eds.), International Organisation: A Reader (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1994), p. 90.
58Wendt, ‘Collective Identity Formation’, p. 80.
59Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security’ in Peter J. Katzenstein 
(ed.), The Culture o f National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), p. 2.
60Stephen M. Walt, ‘International Relations: One World, Many Theories’, Foreign Policy, no. 108 (Spring 
1998), pp. 40-41.
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[Norms] are collective expectations for the proper behaviour o f actors within a given 
identity. ... Norms operate like rules that define the identity o f an actor, thus having 
‘constitutive effects’ that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognise 
a particular identity. ... Norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment 
o f an already defined identity. In such instances, norms have ‘regulative’ effects that 
specify standards of proper behaviour. ... Identity [is described] as a shorthand label 
for varying constructions o f nation- and statehood. ... Culture [is described] as a broad 
label that denotes collective models o f nation-state authority or identity carried by custom 
or law. Culture refers to both a set o f evaluative standards (such as norms and values) and 
a set o f cognitive standards (such as rules and models) that define what social actors exist 
in a system, how they operate, and how they relate to one another.61
These factors ‘result from social processes, purposeful political action, and differences in power
capabilities’. The formulation o f a state’s national security policy is dependent on two main
determinants: the cultural-institutional context and the constructed identity o f states.62 The former
focuses on how cultural-institutionalist factors, specifically international regimes or institutions,
have shaped a state’s interests and strategies. The latter concentrates on the impact domestic and
international environments or societies have on the construction o f a state’s collective identity.
The nature o f historical processes, collective memories, and common values a society places
emphasis upon influence both determinants. According to Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich,
collective memories are the ‘vessel through which pass individual, scattered, fragmented, and
populist attitudes, on the one hand, and elite, coherent worldviews on the other’.6j For
Katzenstein, ‘memories are contemporary experiences, interpretations, and reinterpretations o f
history’.64 Markovits and Reich define collective memories as follows:
On a national level, collective memory is the view of the past articulated by national 
leaders and the political class. This is collective memory in two senses. First, it is 
memory about a collectivity, the nation state, about its domestic developments and its 
foreign involvements. Second, it is, in an extended sense, memory o f a collectivity. 
National leaders, representative o f  the polity as a whole, articulate memories in the 
name of the nation-state.65
Historical factors are also important in assessing interests because they affect the development of
a state’s identity.
61Katzenstein, ‘Introduction: Alternative Perspectives’, pp. 5-6.
62Ibid., p. 4.
63Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich, The German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe 
(Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 12.
64Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘The Smaller European States, Germany and Europe’ in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), 
Tamed Power: Germany in Europe (Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 296.
65Markovits and Reich, The German Predicament, p. 18.
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According to Berger, a constructivist approach to foreign policy formulation ‘argues that 
state behaviour is first and foremost shaped by particular sets o f normative and cognitive beliefs 
which a society and its leaders hold about the nation, its role in the international system, and the 
utility o f military force in the realisation o f national goals’.66 Values and memories o f  political 
actors shape interests. Berger’s concept o f political-military culture is a ‘subset o f the larger 
political culture that influences how members o f a given society view national security, the 
military as an institution, and the use of force in international relations’.67 Social constructivists, 
in their rejection o f neorealism and neoliberalism, focus extensively on non-systemic factors in 
their analysis o f state interests. In Germany, the domestic and international forces responsible for 
shaping its foreign and security policy are rooted in sociological processes that have moulded its 
political-military culture and its foreign policy behaviour. Constructivists use mainly sociological 
tools to analyse Germany’s foreign and national security policy-making processes.
Germany’s Ostpolitik and International Relations Theory
Numerous theoretical tools and concepts are available to explain the foreign and security 
policy behaviour o f individual state actors and the complex dynamics o f the international system. 
However, within the field of International Relations, surprisingly few studies apply theoretical 
tools to the main dimensions o f Germany’s Ostpolitik after 1990, especially its foreign policy 
behaviour towards the Czech Republic and Poland. Sixteen years have passed since unification; is 
it too soon -  given Germany’s transition from a semi-sovereign power to a sovereign one -  to be 
able to assess the intricacies o f a unified Germany’s Ostpolitik? The extensive proliferation o f 
analytical material on this important subject indicates that it isn’t.
There are two obvious gaps in the International Relations research literature on 
Germany’s Ostpolitik. First, few cases, grounded in International Relations theory, have actually 
explored the multiple dimensions o f Germany’s Ostpolitik. Past studies have operated from the 
assumption that Germany pursues a uniform and coherent approach to all state actors in the 
region. Individual state actors in ECE are mostly treated as one homogeneous group, i.e. the
66Berger ‘The Past in the Present*, p. 41.
67Thomas U. Berger, ‘Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan’ in Peter J. 
Katzenstein, (ed.), The Culture o f National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics, pp. 325-326.
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Visegrad states, not as individual state actors in the international system with their own distinct 
foreign and security policy objectives. There is some merit to this approach when considering 
Germany’s multilateral reflexes, for example, within the EU and NATO, but it would be 
erroneous to entirely ignore Germany’s bilateral reflexes and how these state actors featured 
individually on the agenda o f Germany’s political leadership between 1990 and 1998.
Second, from a German perspective, the Czech Republic and Poland have only been 
assessed in virtual isolation from each other. International Relations theory has been applied 
sporadically to identify one or many facets o f Germany’s foreign policy behaviour towards either 
state. Relatively few studies have compared and contrasted Germany’s foreign policy behaviour 
toward both states. It is quite clear, as the introduction to this thesis argues, that there are ample 
similarities and differences between the two which require further explanation if  we are to outline 
the principal motives underlying Germany’s plans in ECE after 1990. This thesis seeks to redress 
some of these imbalances.
Realism and Neorealism
With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration o f the Soviet Union, International 
Relations theorists were forced to return to the drawing board to assess the relevance o f their 
theories in predicting epochal events such as those that occurred in 1989-90.68 In the FRG, few 
predicted the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the Soviet Union’s collapse or the end o f 
Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. The puzzle o f the perennial ‘German question’ finally 
solved, Germany underwent phenomenal internal and external changes, which were to leave a 
lasting imprint on the European continent. As Volker Rittberger noted, it seemed obvious to many 
observers in the field o f International Relations, especially realists and neorealists that Germany’s 
power would increase after unification. Few would dispute this claim, given German unification 
and the Soviet Union’s demise. However, how Germany would adapt to the dynamics o f a ‘new’
68John L. Gaddis, ‘International Relations and the End o f the Cold War’, International Security, vol. 17, no. 
3 (1992/1993), pp. 5-58.
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international system or manage the practise o f its foreign and security policy was a mystery.69 
Rittberger declared:
Realists would expect German foreign policy behavior to change as a result o f this 
change in Germany’s power position in the international system. Indeed, such a change in 
German foreign policy was anticipated not only by students o f International 
Relations, but also by many policy-makers around the world. Germany was expected 
to turn away from its multilateral orientation towards a more unilateral and power- 
oriented foreign policy.70
Sixteen years after unification, the chance o f this scenario becoming reality remains slim although
some evidence suggests that Germany pursued a more power-oriented foreign policy in the former
Yugoslavia.71 Given Germany’s extensive Westbindung during the Cold War, it seemed even
more unlikely that Germany would abandon its multilateral tendencies in favour o f unilateral
ones, although indications of the latter were visible in the early stages o f Germany’s foreign and
security policy behaviour.
In retrospect, Rittberger’s conclusion was logical given states’ historical behaviour in the
international system; this line o f reasoning was frequently adopted by those ensconced in the
realist and neorealist camps. Almost immediately after the fall o f the Berlin Wall, neorealists like
Waltz, Mearsheimer, and Layne were confident that profound changes in the international system
would elevate Germany to the status o f a great power with a keen interest in acquiring nuclear
weapons. Within the space of several years after unification, their arguments were responsible for
launching an academic debate on the main determinants which were to shape Germany’s actions.
According to Waltz: ‘the behaviours of states, the patterns of their interactions, and the outcomes
their interactions produced had been repeated again and again throughout the centuries despite
profound changes in the internal composition o f states’.72 It was, therefore, unwise to assume that
Germany would behave any differently from its Western European counterparts. All states
69See Volker Rittberger and Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘Deutsche Aussenpolitik nach der Vereinigung: 
Realistische Prognosen auf dem PrUfstand’, Tiibinger Arbeitspapiere zur internationalen Politik und 
Friedensforschung, no. 28 (1997), p. 2.
70See interview with Volker Rittberger at http://amber.berkeley.edu:5031/fall/fallp6.html.
7IBonn’s unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in December 1991 supports this assertion. See 
Beverly Crawford, ‘Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany’s Unilateral 
Recognition o f Croatia’, World Politics, vol. 48, no. 4 (1996), pp. 482-521.
72Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure o f International Politics’, International Security, vol. 18, no. 
2 (Fall 1993), p. 45.
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throughout history have attempted to maximise their economic capacities to improve their relative 
political-military position in the international system. According to Waltz, the link between an 
increase in economic capabilities and the achievement o f  great power status is fundamental when 
analysing all states’ actions. Economic power would ultimately turn Germany into a great power. 
A connection between possessing nuclear weapons and achieving great power status also 
existed.75 In Germany, the development o f the former was far more likely than the latter.
Realists and neorealists have not undertaken any in-depth studies of the nature of 
Germany’s foreign policy behaviour toward ECE in particular the Czech Republic and Poland.74 
Several observations, however, were made about Germany’s future position in the region. Waltz’s 
reasoning suggests that Germany, given its economic capabilities, would behave like a great 
power again. Neorealists and realists drew the appropriate conclusions about Germany’s future 
development from their analyses o f the dynamics o f the new international system. They took their 
assessments one step further and applied them to Germany’s interactions with its political and 
economic hinterland in ECE. Waltz asserted that ‘Germany is in the best position to play a leading 
role in Eastern Europe, Ukraine, and Russia. ... Ironically, Japan in Asia and Germany in Eastern 
Europe are likely in the next century to replay roles in some ways similar to those they played 
earlier’.75 Jacob Heilbrunn argued that Germany ‘is creating an old-fashioned sphere o f influence 
in the East, in which Central and Eastern Europe form a vital market for German goods and 
provide cheap labour for German manufacturers’.76 For Gregory Treverton, the consequences o f 
German unification for its European allies and new Eastern neighbours were increased levels of 
German power which might result in economic and political tension in the region. Germany's 
Zwang nach Osten (need to help the East) or the ‘pull o f perceived obligation’ would likely result 
in the following scenario:
73Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure’, p. 54.
74There have been more neorealist attempts to explain Germany’s integration in the EU and its support for 
Economic and Monetary Union. See Thomas Pedersen, Germany, France and the Creation o f the Union: a 
Realist Interpretation (London; New York: Pinter, 1998).
75Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure’, p. 63.
76Jacob Heilbrunn, ‘Tomorrow’s Germany’, The National Interest, no. 36 (Summer 1994), p. 47.
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Eastern Europe seems destined to return to its prewar pattern, its economies organized 
around Germany's; prewar Germany had at least a quarter o f Eastern Europe's trade. 
Territories adjacent to Germany, especially the former German ones, will wind up bearing 
the same relation to Germany as northern Mexico does to the United States —  
independent in sovereignty but in practice o f a piece with the German economy.77
Although Treverton’s observations are to a certain degree accurate, increased levels o f German
power did not necessarily result in political or economic tension in the region. Paradoxically, its
counterparts in ECE welcomed Germany’s economic engagement there but emphasised the need
to balance German investment with investment from other countries in Western Europe.78
There were, however, some residual doubts about Germany’s future economic role and
‘perceived’ increased levels o f ECE dependency on the German economy. Markovits and Reich,
for instance, wondered why these Eastern European countries had allowed themselves to become
so dependent on the German economy and its political and economic institutions for advice and
technological expertise. They argued: ‘belief in the centrality of Germany’s involvement—and
indeed Germany’s prosperity—to the development o f these European states, provides the
Germans, de fa c to , with tremendous influence whether they want it or not’.79 Indeed, like many
realists and neorealists, they presumed that Germany would act like any other state in the
international system; it would seek to maximise its power in a region ripe for economic
penetration. The emphasis on the preponderance o f German economic power -  not military power
-  should be noted, although systemic developments did influence Germany’s security policy
toward the region.
Neorealists, like their geopolitical, geostrategical, and realist counterparts emphasise the 
primacy o f the international system, geographical factors, and the concept o f the ‘national’ or 
‘se lf  interest in defining the main political, economic and security parameters o f Germany’s 
Ostpolitik.80 Several studies grounded in ‘interest’ based language derived from realism focus
77Gregory Treverton, Germany, America and the Future o f Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1992), p. 200.
78Interview with Polish official in Warsaw.
79Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich, ‘Should Europe Fear the Germans?’ in Michael G. Huelshof, Andrei 
Markovits and Simon Reich (eds.), From Bundesrepublik to Deutschland: German Politics after 
Unification (Ann Arbor, MI: University o f Michigan Press, 1993), p. 287.
80See Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Zentralmacht Europas: Deutschlands Ruckkehr auf die Weltbiihne (Berlin: 
Siedler, 1994); Christian Hacke, Weltmacht wider Willen: die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1993); Michael Sturmer, ‘Deutsche Interessen’ in Karl Kaiser
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specifically on Germany’s foreign relations with ECE, in particular the Czech Republic and 
Poland. For example, Stephan Martens’ La politique a I ’Est de la Republique federate 
d ’Allemagne depuis 1949 examines Germany’s Ostpolitik through a realist and Realpolitik lens 
concluding that Germany has successfully achieved its objectives in ECE under the aegis o f a 
proactive Europapolitik.
Within the economic dimension of its relations with ECE, it is apparent that Germany’s 
motives in the region are governed by extensive cultural and commercial interests which 
consequently serve German national goals.81 Patricia Davis argued that Germany’s bilateral 
relationship with Poland was driven primarily by the pursuit o f self-interest and self-help in three 
main areas: reconciliation between the two nations, ethnic Germans in Poland, and foreign 
economic assistance for Poland’s economic transition. According to Davis, there is ample 
evidence, from a German perspective, to suggest that Germany does not always advocate the 
‘European interest’.82 The pursuit o f German national interests is paramount and should serve 
Germany’s objectives in the EU.
Studies o f Germany’s Sicherheitspolitik (security policy) also focused on the international 
system and ‘interest’ driven language. This is not particularly surprising given that the two 
principal German defence documents on defining Germany’s security interests were inherently 
realist and geopolitical in their outlook: the Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien (1992) and the 
Weissbuch zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage und Zukunft der 
Bundeswehr (1994).8j Jolanda Wijnsma used neorealist, realist, and geopolitical theories to 
explain the evolution of Germany’s Ostpolitik after 1990.84 Ostpolitik is described as a form of 
geopolitics in a study that concentrates almost exclusively on the primacy o f international
and Joachim Krause (eds.), Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik: Interessen undStrategien. Vol. 3 (Munich: R. 
Oldenbourg, 1996), pp. 3-13, and Wilfried von Bredow and Thomas Jager, Neue deutsche Aussenpolitik: 
nationa/e Interessen in internationalen Beziehungen (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1993).
8'Francois Bafoil (ed.), Les strategies al/emandes en Europe centrale et orientate. Une geopolitique des 
inveslissements directs (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997).
82See Patricia Davis, ‘National Interests Revisited: The German Case’, German Politics and Society, vol. 
16, no. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 82-111.
83Both documents represent the most unambiguous statements o f Bonn’s security interests after 1990. See 
chapter 6 for further detail.
84Jolanda Wijnsma, German Ostpolitik since Unification: Geopolitical Determinants in German Security 
Policy. NUPI Report, no. 230 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute o f International Affairs, 1997).
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systems, Germany’s geographical position vis-a-vis the East, and the division o f power within the 
region. Geopolitical and geostrategic theories were applied extensively by German as well as 
American analysts who located the logic underpinning Germany’s security interests in the East in 
concepts that focused on Germany’s geographic position in the Mittellage o f Europe. Germany’s 
security perceptions of the East were fundamentally shaped by the Soviet Union’s collapse and 
the emergence o f new independent but unstable states on its Eastern security frontier.85
Liberalism and Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
Proponents o f liberalism and neoliberal institutionalism offer several useful tools to assess 
Germany’s foreign policy behaviour. Studies focusing on the domestic sources o f Germany’s 
foreign and security policy are becoming more plentiful.86 More emphasis is being placed on the 
roles played by domestic and societal actors: policy-makers, government ministries, political 
parties and interest groups, in the formulation and implementation o f German foreign and security 
policy. This trend, however, has only been apparent in a few studies concerned with Germany’s 
foreign relations with the Czech Republic and Poland. The use of this approach is limited due to a 
significant lack o f primary material, although there is enough secondary material to support the 
conclusion, for example, that Chancellor Kohl took a personal interest in steering the 
reconciliation processes with the Czech Republic and Poland.87
The domestic sources o f German foreign policy towards Poland are the subject o f Dieter 
Bingen’s Die Polenpolitik der Bonner Republik von Adenauer bis Kohl, 1949-1991. He considers 
the relationship between Germany’s domestic political system and the formation o f a German 
foreign policy consensus towards Poland. Specific attention is paid to the roles played by
85See Heinz Brill, Geopolitik heute: Deutschlands Chance? (Berlin: Ullstein, 1994) and Ronald D. Asmus, 
Germany's Geopolitical Maturation: Public Opinion and Security Policy in 1994 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand,
1994), especially chapter 2.
86See for example Emst-Otto Czempiel, Kluge Macht: Aussenpolitik fu r  das 21. Jahrhundert (Munich: 
Beck, 1999); Stephan G. Bierling, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Normen, Akteure, 
Entscheidungen (Munich; Vienna: R. Oldenbourg, 1999), and Reinhard Rode, Deutsche Aussenpolitik 
(Berlin: G+B Verlag Fakultas, 1996).
87Kohl’s former speechwriter, Michael Mertes, highlights another significant research problem that will 
complicate assessments of the Kohl era. Kohl’s ‘most important means o f communication was private 
conversation, either face-to-face or on the telephone; not memos or letters’. See Michael Mertes, ‘Germany 
Moves On’, Prospect (March 2000), p. 10.
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successive German chancellors. The study concentrates almost exclusively on the FRG’s relations 
with Poland throughout the Cold War and does not, except from 1990-1991, analyse the dynamics 
underpinning Kohl’s Polenpolitik until 1998. A similar study also examined German-Czech 
relations. Libor Roucek focuses on the main domestic and external determinants o f German- 
Czech relations, but does not include a post-unification assessment of the relations between these 
two states.88
When assessing the domestic sources o f German foreign policy towards the Czech 
Republic and Poland, it is important to highlight the roles played by the Vertriebeneverbande 
(expellee organisations) -  which exercised considerable influence on Kohl’s government from 
1990-1998. This was apparent in the negotiations with Poland and the CSFR in their respective 
friendship treaties with Germany and the subsequent Czech-German Declaration on 
Reconciliation (1997). As a powerful lobby group, the Sudeten Landsmannschaft with their parent 
organisation, the Bundesverband der Vertriebenen, used their close connection with the Christian 
Social Union in Bavaria to try and influence German foreign policy toward the Czech Republic. 
No significant study seems to have addressed the complex dynamic of CDU/CSU/FDP coalition 
politics and German foreign policy toward the Czech Republic or Poland. On the contrary, 
numerous studies have focused on these organisations’ roles in shaping Germany’s Ostpolitik 
after unification.89
The role o f bureaucratic politics in Germany’s domestic political system also came to the 
fore with the German debate on the NATO enlargement from 1993-1997. The debate exposed the 
degree to which the Chancellor, the Foreign Office and the Ministry o f Defence were advocating 
different timetables for NATO enlargement. It highlighted the significance o f the ‘Russia factor’
88Libor Roucek, Die Tschechoslowakei und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1989: 
Bestimmungsfaktoren, Entwicklungen und Probleme ihrer Beziehungen (Munich: Tuduv, 1990).
89Herbert Czaja, ‘Die politische Rolle der Vertriebenen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und ihr Anteil 
am Ausgleich mit den ostlichen Nachbam’ in Christof Dahm (ed.), Verstandigung der deutschen 
Vertriebenen mit den ostlichen Nachbarn: Vergangenheit und Zukunft (Bonn: Kulturstiftung der 
Vertriebenen, 1992), pp. 23-37. On the role o f the ethnic Germans, the expellees, and the planned eastward 
extension o f the EU to ECE, see Dieter Blumenwitz, Gilbert H. Gomig and Dietrich Murswiek (eds.), Der 
Beitritt der Staaten Ostmitteleuropas zur Europaischen Union und die Rechte der deutschen Volksgruppen 
und Minderheiten sowie der Vertriebenen (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1997).
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in Germany’s domestic political establishment, and fundamental differences about the approach 
the Atlantic Alliance should be adopting vis-a-vis its neighbours in ECE and Russia.90
Two major academic works tried to isolate the principal domestic determinants o f 
Germany’s economic Ostpolitik. Michael Sturm combines a liberal, institutionalist, and 
international political economy approach to explaining how Germany’s economic mechanisms 
manifested themselves in ECE. He describes the main governmental actors and interest groups, 
which exercised the most influence in Germany’s economic decision-making processes. He also 
focuses extensively on the role o f non-governmental organisations, and assesses the significance 
o f private sector interests in defining German government responses to the transition phases in 
ECE. His study refutes the notion that neorealism is the appropriate paradigm for viewing 
Germany’s economic Ostpolitik and suggests that a combination of bilateral and multilateral 
measures, formed in conjunction with other external actors were the dominant methods by which 
Germany promoted its foreign economic policy.91
Silvia Engels assesses Germany’s response to the economic crises in the new ECE 
independent states from 1989-1992. She compares Germany’s foreign economic relations with 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary and discusses the role o f the main governmental and 
private actors in planning and implementing Germany’s economic Ostpolitik. In contrast to 
Sturm, however, she comes to a rather different conclusion about the roles played by domestic 
German actors (especially the private sector) in formulating an economic Ostpolitik.92 Using a 
theoretical approach grounded in liberal theory, Engels maintains that transnational or societal 
actors play a major role in determining Germany’s economic policy but have not replaced the 
importance o f the state or the state system in determining the parameters, which shape a state’s 
foreign economic policy. Germany’s foreign policy is still a privilege o f state actors although
90The internal debate on the evolution of Germany’s position on NATO enlargement illustrates the role of 
bureaucratic politics in the German system. See for example, Ulrich Weisser, Sicherheit fu r  ganz Europa: 
die Atlantische Allianz in der Bewahrung (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999) and Reinhard Wolf, 
‘The Doubtful Mover: Germany and NATO Expansion’ in David Haglund (ed.), Will NATO Go East? The 
Debate over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance (Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University Press, 1996).
9,Michael Sturm, Stabilitat und Geschaft: Deutsche Aussenwirtschaftspoltik in Osteuropa nach 1990 
(Amsterdam: G+B Verlag Fakultas, 1998).
92Silvia Engels, Deutsche Wirtschaft -  Gestalter der Ostpolitik? Die Bedeutung der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 
fur die Regierungspolitik: die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Polen, Ungarn sowie die Tschechoslowakei, 
1985-1992 (Cologne: SH-Verlag, 1999).
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transnational actors are beginning to play a more important role. This trend was especially 
apparent from 1989-1992.
The role o f international institutions in defining and shaping German interests after the 
Second World War and the Cold War cannot be underestimated as a critical factor in defining 
German foreign policy. Like its predecessor, the FRG, Germany’s political leadership relied 
extensively on institutionalist and multilateral frameworks to meet its foreign policy objectives.9"* 
From 1989-1991, however, German bilateral diplomacy and unilateral action, in the form of 
political reconciliation, vis-a-vis ECE prevailed. Jeffrey Anderson and John Goodman argue that 
‘Bonn’s bilateral diplomacy targeted issues that either fell outside the current purview of 
international institutions or generated such a lack o f consensus within multilateral frameworks 
that timely action was precluded’.94 International institutions were not ignored; they were simply 
not perceived as adequate foreign policy instruments for addressing Germany’s immediate 
political, economic and security concerns in the East from 1989-1991. After 1991, this strategy 
was replaced by a reflexive, multilateral approach that emphasised the significance o f 
international institutions and multilateral strategies in Germany’s foreign policy behaviour, 
especially towards ECE.
The institutionalist or integrationist perspective has a powerful history in Germany’s 
foreign policy tradition. Of all the theoretical traditions in International Relations attempting to 
explain German foreign policy towards ECE and the Czech Republic and Poland in particular, this 
approach was undoubtedly adopted the most frequently. The use o f multilateral instruments to 
meet German as well as EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) objectives in ECE was 
a dominant feature o f Germany’s foreign policy behaviour towards the region.95 For Bonn,
93See Christian Deubner, Deutsche Europapolitik: von Maastricht nach Kerneuropa (Baden-Baden: Nomos,
1995); John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions and German 
Security Policy after Unification (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Thomas Banchhoff, The 
German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy 1945-1995 (Ann Arbor, Ml: 
University o f Michigan Press, 1999), and Jeffrey Anderson, German Unification and the Union o f Europe: 
The Domestic Politics o f Integration Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999).
94Jeffrey J. Anderson and John Goodman, ‘Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold War 
Europe’ in Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.), After the Cold War: 
International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard 
University Press, 1993), p. 40.
95Josef Janning, ‘Deutschland und die europaische Union: Integration und Erweiterung’ in Karl Kaiser and 
Joachim Krause (eds.), Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik: Jnteressen und Strategien. Vol. 3 (Munich: R.
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international institutions or frameworks were regarded as ideal, convenient, and uncontroversial 
forums within which to pursue interests and strategies. Germany relied extensively on multilateral 
institutions like the EU and NATO to conduct its foreign and security policy. Germany also used 
the institutions’ multilateral frameworks to pursue its own interests, which were not always the 
same as its Western partners. This cannot be underestimated when considering Germany’s foreign 
relations with the Czech Republic and Poland.
The studies o f German foreign policy toward ECE, and the Czech Republic and Poland in 
particular have focused extensively on its use o f multilateral instruments to meets its objectives. 
As one of the principal powers and easternmost states o f the EU, it was naturally in Germany’s 
interest to support the EU’s enlargement eastwards.96 As states bordering Germany, the Czech 
Republic and Poland mattered a great deal to Germany’s political leadership. Besides, both states 
viewed Germany as an ideal vehicle for achieving their own foreign and security policy interests 
in Europe. All paths to the EU and NATO went via Germany. To meet each other’s respective 
objectives, mutual interests began to emerge amongst all three states. In Poland, the phrase 
‘community o f interests’ coined in early 1990 by the Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof 
Skubiszewski, began to characterise the bilateral and multilateral dynamics o f the German-Polish 
relationship 97 This convergence o f interests was visible in almost all aspects o f German-Polish 
relations after unification: political reconciliation, the creation of the Weimar Triangle with 
France, Germany’s support for the dual enlargement processes o f the EU and NATO to include 
Poland, and the establishment o f intensive cross-border cooperation projects. Germany’s role as a 
‘lawyer’ for Polish interests was frequently mentioned to highlight the intimate nature o f this key 
relationship.
Oldenbourg, 1996), pp. 31-54; Reinhardt Rummel, ‘Germany’s Role in the CFSP: Normal itat or 
‘Sonderweg?’ in Christopher Hill (ed.), The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 1996), 
pp. 40-67.
96Roland Freudenstein, ‘Poland, Germany and the EU’, International Affairs, vol. 74, no. 1 (January 1998), 
pp. 41-54.
97Friedbert Pfluger, ‘Die deutsch-polnische Interessengemeinschaft’ in Karl Kaiser and Joachim Krause 
(eds.), Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik: Interessen und Strategien. Vol. 3 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1996), 
pp. 143-148.
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There was no such framework to satisfy the mutual interests o f Czechs and Germans. 
Bilateral structures had to suffice. As it had done for Poland, Germany concentrated on 
advocating the extension o f multilateral frameworks to include the Czech Republic, although it 
was blatantly obvious that this relationship did not elicit the same support from the Germans 
which the Poles benefited from. However, this did not delay or hinder the Czech Republic’s 
chances o f gaining entrance into NATO or concluding important association agreements with the 
EU. Germany’s institutionalist orientation was prominent in all political, economic, and military 
areas o f cooperation with the Czechs.98
The argument that Germany would only be able to meet its foreign and security policy 
goals in ECE if it merged its national and European interests into one policy gained significant 
momentum during the Kohl years. Klaus Goetz maintains that the process has already been 
completed: the Europeanisation of the German state has led to the permanent fusion o f national 
and European interests.99 The institutionalisation of a ‘sovereign power’ raises important 
questions. Peter Katzenstein states: ‘why does Germany, the most powerful state in Europe, 
appear bent on giving up voluntarily its newly won sovereign power? Why have long-standing 
institutional inefficiencies not blocked advances in European integration’?100
According to Hanns Maull, the institutionalisation and ‘softening’ o f German power 
during the Cold War had profound implications for the FRG’s development. After unification, 
Germany’s membership in several multilateral institutions had a ‘civilising’ effect on German 
foreign and security policy. He regards Germany, along with Japan, as the quintessential civilian 
power in the international system or, as James Sperling maintains, Germany was a civilian power 
in an uncivilian world.101 This ‘civilian power’ model was also applied to the study o f Germany’s
98Rudolf Seiters, ‘Erweiterung von europaischer Union und NATO im Kontext der deutsch-tschechischen 
Beziehungen', Konrad Adenauer Stiftung - Aus/andsinformationen, no. 5 (1995), pp. 3-13.
"See Klaus Goetz, ‘Integration Policy in a Europeanised State: Germany and the Intergovernmental
Conference’, Journal o f European Public Policy, no. 3 (1996), p. 40.
100Peter Katzenstein, ‘United Germany in an Integrating Europe’ in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), Tamed Power:
Germany in Europe (Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 2.
101 See Hanns W. Maull ‘Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Vierzehn Thesen fur eine neue deutsche 
Aussenpolitik’, Europa-Archiv, vol. 43, no. 10 (1992), pp. 269-278; Michael Staack, Handelstaat 
Deutschland: deutsche Aussenpolitik in einem neuen internationalen System (Paderbom: Schoningh, 2000), 
and James Sperling, ‘German Security Policy after the Cold War: The Struggle o f a Civilian Power in an
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foreign policy behaviour towards ECE after unification. In contrast with Maull, Henning Tewes
makes the important distinction that a civilian power does not always pursue a multilateral foreign
policy. Using three elements (aid, trade, and institutional extension) to highlight the main
characteristics o f German civilian power, Tewes argues that Germany’s foreign policy towards
the region can be analysed through a ‘non-military, multilateral, and institutionalised
framework’.102 Despite this approach, Tewes states that there was no coherent German
programme, especially after unification, to extend EU memberships to its Eastern neighbours.
In a similar vein, Patricia Davis and Peter Dombrowski maintain that Germany’s foreign
economic relations with ECE, especially its foreign assistance programmes were indicative o f
similar multilateral and institutionalist tendencies, which had shaped Germany’s foreign policy
behaviour after unification.103 They concluded its economic expenditures in ECE served other
‘unknown’ purposes, not just German interests.
Richard Rosecrance offers the concept o f the ‘trading state’ in International Relations The
FRG was described as the model Handelsstaat in the international system. Trading states are
‘independent nations which accept equality of status on the basis o f differentiation o f freedom’.
Their objectives are ‘to improve national welfare and the allocation of resources through internal
development and trade’.104 Citing Germany and Japan as prime examples of trading states in the
international system, he argued:
For a time, they were incapable o f fighting war on a major scale; their endorsement o f the 
trading system was merely an adoption o f the remaining policy alternative. But that 
endorsement did not change even when the economic strength of the two nations might 
have sustained a more nationalistic and military policy. Given the choice between military 
expansion to achieve self-sufficiency (a choice made more difficult by modem 
conventional and nuclear weapons in the hands of other powers) and the procurement o f 
necessary markets and raw materials through international commerce, Japan and 
Germany chose the latter.105
Uncivilian World' in Stuart Croft and Phil Williams (eds.), European Security without the Soviet Union 
(London: Frank Cass, 1992), pp. 77-98.
102Henning Tewes, ‘The Emergence of a Civilian Power: Germany and Central Europe’, German Politics, 
vol. 6, no. 2 (August 1997), p. 113. See Henning Tewes, Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe: 
enlarging NATO and the European Union (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002).
103Patricia Davis and Peter Dombrowski, ‘Appetite of the Wolf: German Foreign Assistance for Central and 
Eastern Europe’, German Politics, vol. 6, no. 1 (April 1997), p. 19.
104Rjchard Rosecrance, The Rise o f the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New 
York: Basic Books, 1986), p. 28.
105Ibid., pp. 138-139, especially chapter five.
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Institutionalist and integration theory occupies a prime spot when analysing Germany’s foreign 
policy behaviour towards the Czech Republic and Poland and also the complete spectrum of 
Germany’s Ostpolitik after unification. Institutionalists emphasised the significance o f Germany’s 
multilateral foreign policy in determining the nature o f its relations with ECE. For example, Claus 
Hofhansel outlines multilateralism’s impact on shaping Germany’s foreign policy behaviour after 
unification. He explores the history o f diplomatic negotiations between Germany and the Czech 
Republic, disputes over compensation for Czech and Polish victims of Nazi crimes, and the 
German position on EU enlargement. He considers the political reconciliation processes in all 
three countries but does not dwell on the powerful economic and security factors driving German 
interests in ECE.106 Germany’s political leadership opted for multilateralism as the preferred 
method for integrating the Visegrad states into Western international institutions. Moreover, ECE 
actually favoured this ‘multilateral’ strategy as they chose to negotiate with the West through 
international institutions and not on a bilateral or collective basis with Germany.
Social Constructivism
Germany is an ideal case to test constructivist tools. Its complex historical record and the 
power o f citizens’ collective memory are considered potent forces in the development o f German 
interests in the post-Cold War era. To this date, however, some constructivist theory has been 
applied to Germany’s complex foreign relations with ECE, especially the Czech Republic and 
Poland. In Germany, historical processes have profoundly influenced the development o f its 
political institutions, the political leadership, and the creation of a German identity.107 The 
reconciliation processes in German-Polish and German-Czech relations were no exception.108 Karl 
Cordell and Stefan Wolff explore the main determinants o f German foreign policy making in
106See Claus Hofhansel, Multilateralism, German Foreign Policy and Central Europe (New York: 
Routledge, 2005).
107Thomas Banchoff, ‘Historical Memory and German Foreign Policy: The Cases o f Adenauer and Brandt’, 
German Politics and Society, no. 14 (Summer 1996), pp. 36-53.
108Lily Gardner Feldman, ‘The Principle and Practice o f ‘Reconciliation’ in German Foreign Policy: 
Relations with France, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic’, International Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2 (1999), 
pp. 333-356, and Ann L. Phillips, ‘The Politics o f Reconciliation: Germany in Central-East Europe’, 
German Politics, vol. 7, no. 2 (August 1998), pp. 64-85.
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relation to the Czech Republic and Poland. They focus on the historical continuity o f Ostpolitik in 
shaping priorities after unification and they see Ostpolitik ‘as a broadly conceived strategy o f 
foreign policy to achieve peace, reconciliation, and regime change’.109 Using social 
constructivism as a theoretical model, they look at the domestic, governmental, bilateral and 
international contexts. Germany’s economic and security interests in ECE are not discussed in 
significant detail.
Germany’s historical record as an aggressor during the Second World War had profound 
implications for the evolution o f its political-military culture and post-war and post-Cold War 
identity. Thomas Berger argues that the Second World War and the subsequent Allied occupation 
resulted in the rise o f anti-militarism in Germany, the restructuring o f the Bundeswehr, and the 
rejection o f the use o f force as an instrument in international relations. Germany’s new national 
security policy was based on a policy o f continuity marked by its ‘multilateralism, a non­
threatening force posture and a model of civilian control based on democratising and integrating 
the armed forces into society’.110 Bonn’s pursuit o f continuity in its foreign policy represented the 
dominant leitmotif after unification but it did not take place at the detriment o f its national 
interest. Historical and collective memories had shaped Germany’s post-war identity and the 
political elites’ and public’s general aversion to the militarism that dominated the pre-war era. 
Collective memories continue to exert a fair amount o f pressure on Germany’s foreign policy­
making processes. Markovits and Reich argue: ‘Germany is caught between the Scylla o f 
collective memory which will not permit it to exercise power in a normal manner, and the 
Charybdis o f contemporary exigencies, which demand German acceptance o f its responsibilities 
in Europe and maybe even in the world’.111 Germany’s collective memory, combined with an 
‘ideology o f reticence’, continued to limit German power in the post-Cold War era.
Constructivists argue that a state’s identity reveals clues about the nature o f its interests. 
How did the evolution o f Germany’s post-war political-military culture and the power of
109KarI Cordell and Stefan Wolff, Germany’s Foreign Policy Towards Poland and the Czech Republic: 
Ostpolitik Revisited (London; New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 8.
I10Thomas U. Berger, ‘The Past in the Present: Historical Memory and German National Security Policy’, 
German Politics, vol. 6, no. 1 (April 1997), p. 56.
11’Markovits and Reich, The German Predicament, p. 7.
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historical and collective memories affect the construction o f a German or ‘European’ identity after 
the Second World War? More importantly, what impact did identity have on German interests 
after unification? Germany’s political-military culture was transformed after 1945 as Germans 
dealt with their state’s destruction and allied occupation. These post-war realities shaped the 
development o f  a German identity as ordinary Germans struggled to define what being ‘German’ 
actually meant. The ‘Europeanisation’ o f Germany had its roots in the FRG’s post-war political 
culture. Throughout the Cold War, West Germany’s identity was slowly becoming more 
European. The fall o f the Berlin Wall, German unification in 1990, and the decision to amend 
Article 23 o f the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) intensified the links between Germany and the 
European Union and accelerated the ‘Europeanisation’ process.112
However, no consensus exists among Germans that Germany’s identity has been 
supplanted by a European one. Christopher Coker, for example, maintains that ‘the Germany 
struggling to be bom in the post-war era was heir to impulses it only half understood. ... What 
could be identified in the closing years of the Cold War was an undertow o f redemptive yearning, 
a wish to be exceptional of necessity, not choice— once again to be “German”’. These thoughts 
were reflected in both the Left and Right in Germany, especially in the 1980s when the main 
theme to emerge was the following: Germany’s ‘Western integration was an ideological fa9ade 
that had outlived its usefulness’.1 lj
Multilateral terminology that is primarily European in nature is often applied to a unified 
Germany’s national interest. As Garton Ash notes: ‘... French and German politicians utterly 
conflate the national and the European, so it is almost impossible to distinguish when they are 
talking about Europe and when about their own nations’.114 Thomas Banchoff s analysis o f Kohl’s 
post-unification foreign policy rhetoric suggests that two historical themes were intertwined in the 
German foreign policy process: ‘that European integration is a ‘question o f war and peace’, and
112For the exact wording of Article 23 o f the Basic Law, see BfpB, Grundgesetz fu r  die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (Bonn: BfpB, June 1993), p. 22.
113Christopher Coker, Twilight o f the West (Boulder, CO; Oxford: Westview, 1998), p. 113.
I14Timothy Garton Ash, History o f the Present: Essays, Sketches and Despatches from Europe in the 1990s 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1999), p. 181.
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that German and European unity represent ‘two sides o f the same coin’.1,5 German and European 
interests have successfully blended. Germany’s identity became European as social constructivists 
would have us believe.
As this chapter demonstrated, scholars in International Relations have used numerous 
theoretical tools to interpret Germany’s foreign policy behaviour after unification. Germany's 
transition from a ‘semi-sovereign’ to a ‘sovereign’ state after the end o f the Cold War has 
presented them with multiple, unanswered questions sixteen years after unification. There is 
general agreement that a unified Germany experienced fundamental internal and external changes, 
which influenced its foreign policy behaviour, especially towards the CSFR and Poland. 
However, there is fundamental disagreement on whether primarily internal or external factors are 
responsible for shaping a state’s interests, strategies and conduct. Despite the dramatic changes 
which occurred in the international system after 1989, two crucial facts still apply: states coexist 
in an anarchic realm (since there is no higher authority they can depend on to ensure their 
security), and states continue to put national before supranational interests. Germany’s relations 
with the Czech Republic and Poland offer us a glimpse of this reality.
n5Banchoff, ‘German Policy toward the European Union’, p. 61.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL SOURCES OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Germany is central to many theoretical debates in International Relations. However, there 
is little consensus about the qualitative variables which shaped Germany’s foreign and security 
policy behaviour. Germany is not an isolated case. There is a lack o f consensus on the 
determinants o f a state’s behaviour and this is reflected in the current state o f research and 
theoretical study in International Relations. There is no comprehensive theory which explains the 
interplay between agential and structural variables that shape a state’s foreign policy behaviour, 
although Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) tools are helpful in guiding us through the complexities 
o f Germany’s foreign policy behaviour after unification.
What types o f theoretical problems present themselves when one analyses Germany’s 
foreign and security policy behaviour? Sixteen years after unification, there is no consensus on 
whether Germany can be classified as a ‘normal’ actor in International Relations.' How does one 
define ‘normality’ in Germany’s case? The ‘normalisation’ debate exposed a rift between two 
major groups. Proponents of normalisation argue that Germany should implement a foreign policy 
which is based on defined and explicit national interests. Opponents argue that a foreign policy 
based on national interests is not appropriate given Germany’s disturbing historical record in the 
twentieth century. This controversial debate dominated the German foreign policy discourse 
throughout the Kohl era. Sixteen years after German unification and eight years after Kohl’s 
demise, it is possible to discern the domestic and external sources o f Bonn’s Ostpolitik from 1990 
to 1998.
This chapter has three main sections. The first provides a theoretical framework for 
examining the domestic and external sources o f German foreign policy after unification. The 
second examines domestic sources. The emphasis is, first, on describing the roles played by these 
sources and then on discussing how they shaped German foreign policy. This section’s aim is to 
hint at these sources’ significance before describing their roles in Germany’s relations with the
'For an overview of the ‘normalisation’ debate in German foreign policy discourse, see Philip H. Gordon, 
‘Berlin's Difficulties: The Normalisation o f German Foreign Policy’, Orbis, no. 38 (Spring 1994), pp. 225- 
243.
Czech Republic and Poland in subsequent chapters. The third section will define the external 
sources with reference to the Czech Republic and Poland. By examining all sources, instruments, 
and the constraints imposed by domestic society on foreign policy makers, it is possible to 
ascertain where and how Germany and its leaders exert influence and, more importantly, where it 
maintains political and economic leverage in its bilateral relations with the Czech Republic and 
Poland. It is also possible to determine which influences were temporary and would endure as 
significant and constant factors in influencing Germany’s foreign policy behaviour.
A Theoretical Framework for Analysing German Foreign Policy
This thesis relies on a FPA theoretical framework which allows us to explain and 
appreciate the vibrant links between das Primat derA ussen- und Innenpolitik (primacy o f foreign 
and domestic policy) in shaping Germany’s behaviour.2 There are historical precedents for this 
approach’s application when studying West Germany’s foreign policy behaviour after the Second 
World War. Lewis Edinger, for example, observed: ‘Domestic and foreign affairs are so closely 
intertwined in West German public affairs that domestic policy issues are frequently coloured by 
foreign policy considerations and foreign policy decisions influenced by domestic policy 
concerns’.’ Wolfram Hanrieder argued: ‘Given the intimate connection between the major 
patterns o f the international system and the evolving characteristics of West German society, 
external events ‘penetrated’ the domestic ‘subsystem’ o f West Germany to a high degree o f fusion 
o f national and international systems’.4 The first Social Democratic leader after the Second World 
War, Kurt Schumacher, had remarked that in Germany a decision about foreign policy is 
simultaneously a decision about domestic policy. These observations highlight the interplay 
between the domestic and the international in German foreign policy before and after unification.
Das Primat der Aussen- und Innenpolitik  captures the essence o f the agency-structure 
debate in FPA and is useful for examining Germany’s foreign relations with the Czech Republic
2Reinhard Rode, Deutsche Aussenpolitik (Berlin: G+B Verlag Fakultas, 1996), pp. 4-9.
3Lewis J. Edinger, West German Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 230-231.
4Wolfram F. Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963: International Pressure and Domestic 
Response (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 228.
58
and Poland. According to Christopher Hill, it is important to understand ‘the interplay, indeed
overlap’ of these sources and their impact on ‘understanding an individual’s behaviour’.5 For Hill,
agents are ‘the entities capable o f decisions and actions in any given context. They may be single
individuals or collectives’ but they are ‘individual human beings taking decisions and
implementing them on behalf o f entities which possess varying degrees o f coherence, organisation
and power’.6 As Arnold Wolfers notes:
All events occurring in the international system must be conceived o f and understood 
from two angles simultaneously: one calling for concentration on the behaviour o f states 
as organized bodies o f man, the other calling for concentration on human beings upon 
whose psychological reactions the behaviour credited to states ultimately rests.7
Thus, actors determine or at least shape a state’s behaviour: In Germany’s case, the chancellor is
one o f the major foreign policy actors. According to Robert Jervis, there are three main individual
sources which shape a decision maker’s opinion: an actor's beliefs about his own domestic
political system, an actor's previous experiences, and the course o f international history.8 In the
case o f Ostpolitik, the belief systems of successive German chancellors were significantly
influenced by the course o f German history during the twentieth century.
Structure ‘focuses on the international context and diverse forms o f constraint and
opportunity that actors experience’.9 As a caveat, however, structure not only focuses on the
international context but also on ‘the political, bureaucratic and social structures which condition
foreign policy making’.10 The focus here is on external state actors, inter-governmental
organisations, and changes in the international political system from 1989-1991, such as German
unification and its external ramifications, as well as the Soviet Union’s and WTO’s collapse.
According to Robert Gilpin, international political change can be examined by focusing on the
anarchical international system which is absent o f any significant central or supranational
5Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics o f Foreign Policy (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave, 2003), p. 
xix.
6Ibid., pp. 27,51.
7Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 9.
8Robert Jervis, ‘Hypotheses on Misperception’, World Politics, vol. 20, no. 3 (April 1968), pp. 466-472.
9H ill. The Changing Politics o f Foreign Policy, p. 20.
10lbid. p. 26.
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authority.M The principal actor in the international system is the state, composed o f individual and 
collective actors; it may also ‘be conceived as a coalition o f coalitions whose objectives and 
interests result from the powers and bargaining among the several coalitions composing the larger 
society and political elite’.12 Thus, the dominant members or ruling coalitions o f a society shape a 
state’s foreign policy, although it is impossible to define all the domestic characteristics which 
affect this process. States, in particular political elites, are governed by multiple interests but as 
Gilpin notes
states, as such, have no interests or what economists call utility functions, nor do 
bureaucracies, interest groups or so-called transnational actors, for that matter. Only 
individuals and individuals joined together into various types o f coalitions can be said to 
have interests’.lj
States themselves are not responsible for shaping foreign and security policy interests,
governments are. Governments, in turn, rely on individual human actors to interpret and react to
events occurring in the international system or in their domestic political systems.
In Germany’s case, the debate is about whether the ‘agents’ or ‘actors’ there are shaped
by ‘structures’ (or vice versa), more specifically, the dynamics of Germany’s international
environment or milieu. According to Hill:
Structures are the set o f  factors which make up the multiple environments in which 
agents operate and they shape the nature o f choices, by setting limits to the possible 
but also, more profoundly, by determining the nature o f the problems which occur 
there, by shaping our very life worlds’.14
Both agents and structures are appropriate reference points in Germany’s Ostpolitik as the
interplay between both produces complex interactions and outcomes which shape its international
position and domestic context. Historically, this model has been successful in understanding West
Germany’s foreign policy behaviour after the Second World War. FPA tools allow us to discern
the motives o f individual actors and agents in Germany’s domestic political system and to
understand those policy arenas where decisions are actually being made.
nRobert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), p. 10.
12Ibid., p. 19.
13Ibid., p. 18.
14Ibid. p. 26.
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In all states -  Germany is no exception -  there are strong ties between the policy 
formulation processes and the outcomes o f those processes. The policy-making environment, 
within which a government operates, in some cases, constrains or improves foreign policy choices 
available to decision-makers. What Germany is able to achieve outside its territorial borders 
depends to a certain extent on the size, flexibility, and levels o f bureaucratisation inherent in its 
decision-making processes. States and their respective governments do not pursue their objectives 
from within a governmental vacuum that discounts societal pressures and public opinion. 
According to Hill, ‘foreign policy is not immune from the impact o f values, ideas and initiatives 
and upheavals, transnational in many respects but often also internally generated’.15
Constructivism’s emphasis on political culture, identity, and history also allows us to test 
how these influential variables influenced German domestic politics and its external behaviour. A 
state’s social dynamics cannot be ignored as an important factor in shaping a leader’s perceptions 
about its international environment. In Germany’s case, unification had a major impact on its 
perceptions of its external environment and foreign policy towards ECE. Special interest groups, 
such as the expellee organisations, also played a role in shaping Germany’s foreign relations with 
its eastern neighbours; they also functioned as a constraint.
The agential-structural approach also takes into account the ‘actor’ features o f German 
foreign policy: policy-making individuals, interest groups, and coalition politics. The ‘actor’ 
dimension is crucial to understanding the personal motivations behind the German political 
leadership’s views o f their position in the Mittellage and their external position vis-a-vis the 
Czech Republic and Poland. The agential-structural approach also allows us to focus on the 
significance of political, economic, and security arrangements, including international institutions 
which states use to pursue their multiple objectives. Institutions are essential in the process of 
identity and interest formation and Germany’s policy-makers were extremely adept at using them 
to achieve their national objectives.16
15Hill. The Changing Politics o f Foreign Policy, p. 222.
I6Jeffrey Anderson and John B. Goodman, ‘Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold War 
Europe’ in Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.), After the Cold War: 
International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard 
University Press, 1993), pp. 23-62.
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Agency and German Foreign Policy 
Federal President
The Grundgesetz o f 1949 is the constitutional foundation o f Germany. It is responsible 
for delineating the responsibilities o f the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in its 
political system, incorporating international law into national law, and the transfer o f  German 
rights o f sovereignty to supra-national institutions. This latter point is critical, especially in 
foreign policy where according to Peter Graf Kielmansegg, ‘West German foreign policy has been 
guided by what the political elites viewed as the raison d’etre o f the Federal Republic’, its 
integration in supra-national institutions.17 Within the executive branch, the ceremonial head o f 
state is the president. Article 59 o f the Basic Law gives the president the right to represent 
Germany in its international relations and conclude treaties with other states on its behalf. The 
president also accredits and receives envoys, although foreign policy as such is the responsibility 
o f the federal government, in particular, the chancellor and the Foreign Office. The president 
plays a minimal role in foreign policy although some presidents rise above their office’s confines 
to play powerful roles on the international stage. Although the president’s position is symbolic 
and ceremonial, he/she embodies the country’s major political institutions and structures in 
society regardless o f their party distinctions. Symbols are particulary important in modem 
Germany as the president embodies the state to the outside world which watches Germany very 
closely. He/she can also exercise considerable personal authority by acting in a neutral, mediating 
function and by commenting on issues of currency. This position allows him/her to rise above 
party-political controversies and set standards for the public’s political and moral guidance.
After unification, President Richard von Weizsacker played an important role in the 
political reconciliation processes with Czechoslovakia and Poland and he assisted the chancellor 
quite ably in this area. Weizsacker’s role was largely symbolic but the quality o f his personal 
relationships, for instance, with the CSFR’s President Vaclav Havel, and the sincerity and 
forcefulness with which his public statements were delivered cannot be underestimated as a 
powerful symbol in Germany’s bilateral relations with its Eastern neighbours. Early dialogues and
17Peter Graf Kielmansegg, The Basic Law -  Response to the Past or Design for the Future. Occasional 
Paper no. 1 (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 1990), p. 9.
62
exchanges o f letters o f apology were important instruments for expressing German war guilt and 
Czech and Polish regrets about the expulsion o f ethnic Germans from the Sudetenland and Poland 
after the Second World War. Weizsacker was involved with his Czech and Polish counterparts in 
developing a close political rapport and facilitating exchanges o f opinion on important bilateral 
matters o f state. His successor Roman Herzog was also involved in Germany’s reconciliation 
processes with the Czech Republic and Poland, although he lacked the same public profile and 
persona as his predecessor.
The Chancellor and the Federal Chancellery
In the executive branch, the most important actor in the government is the chancellor who 
acts as its head, chairman of the cabinet, and head o f the Bundeskamlei (Federal Chancellery). 
The chancellor’s omnipotent role in Germany’s decision-making processes has resulted in the 
German government being called a Kanzlerdemokratie (chancellor democracy) where the 
chancellor exercises control under the principle o f Kanzlerprinzip  (chancellor authority).18 These 
principles have persisted throughout Germany’s evolution as a peaceful and democratic state after 
the Second World War. It was clear that ‘the dominant characteristic o f foreign policy-making in 
the early years o f the Federal Republic was its extreme, not to say excessive, centralisation in the 
person o f the first chancellor’.19 Within the executive branch, the chancellor’s role in determining 
foreign policy is paramount. He or she holds the Richtlinienkompetenz (guideline competence), as 
executive authority is vested in the chancellor and ultimately his or her cabinet. The chancellor’s 
role as the chief executive o f the state is defined in Article 65 o f the Basic Law:
l8According to Karl-Rudolf Korte, the Kanzlerprinzip in the Kohl era allowed him to construct ‘his own 
political early warning system within the field of foreign policy" which enabled him ‘to distinguish himself 
from a Foreign Office that at the time was dominated by his Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher’. See 
Karl-Rudolf Korte, ‘The Effects o f German Unification on the Federal Chancellor’s Decision-Making’, 
German Politics, vol. 11, no. 3 (December 2001), p. 95.
19William E. Paterson, ‘The Chancellor and Foreign Policy’ in Stephen Padgett (ed.), Adenauer to Kohl: 
The Development o f the German Chancellorship (London: C. Hurst, 1994), p. 128.
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The Chancellor determines and bears responsibility for the general guidelines o f 
governmental policy. Within this policy, each minister conducts the affairs o f  his 
department independently and under his own responsibility. The government decides on 
differences o f opinion between ministers. The Chancellor conducts the business o f the 
government in accordance with the rules o f procedure adopted by it and approved by the 
President.20
The chancellor has the formal authority to determine government policy and to coordinate the 
work of the various departments. The cabinet ministers are appointed by the Federal President on 
the nomination o f the chancellor who has the sole power for this task as well as dismissing 
ministers under Article 64. To date, however, the Chancellor o f one o f the two major parties, the 
SPD or CDU, has often been forced to rely on a coalition partner, the FDP or the Greens, to 
maintain a Bundestag majority. In foreign policy, successive CDU governments have employed a 
foreign minister who was a member o f the FDP party. According to Karl-Rudolf Korte, however, 
‘the centralisation o f governmental management even led to the situation that the Chancellor’s 
Office itself began to interfere in the coalition partner’s departmental work’, especially in the area 
o f foreign policy, for example, in relations between Kohl’s Foreign and Security Policy Advisor 
Joachim Bitterlich and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel.21 Kohl’s tenure in office is replete with 
such interventions. The conduct of German foreign policy was subject to constant wrangling 
between personalities and different political parties which had an effect on policy outcomes.
Within the Chancellery, there is also the foreign relations directorate-general which is 
responsible for coordinating foreign policy positions amongst the various ministries. Judith 
Siwert-Probst notes that this entity plays an important role in the formulation and implementation 
processes of German foreign policy but cannot be expected to be a master o f all the paperwork 
flowing into the Chancellery from the various ministerial agents and actors. Indeed, ‘the 
Chancellery’s job is, first, to coordinate points o f view by maintaining the closest possible contact 
with ministries, secondly, to recognise and reconcile differences o f opinion in good time and, 
finally, whenever necessary, reiterate the chancellor’s stated guidelines’.22 The head o f the foreign
20David P. Conradt, The German Polity (New York; London: Longman, 1986), p. 264.
21Korte. ‘The Effects of German Unification on the Federal Chancellor’s Decision-Making’, p. 85.
22Judith Siwert-Probst, ‘Traditional Institutions of Foreign Policy’ in Karl Kaiser and Wolf-Dieter Eberwein 
(eds.), Germany’s New Foreign Policy: Decision-making in an Interdependent World (New York; 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 22.
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relations directorate general serves as the Chancellor’s foreign and security policy advisor and it is 
not uncommon that the incumbent o f this position clashes with the foreign minister on any given 
subject. Chancellor Kohl had two foreign and security policy advisors after 1990: Horst Teltchik 
and Joachim Bitterlich.
The Cabinet
The chancellor and the chancellery, however, were not left to their own devices although 
their primacy in the decision-making processes is beyond dispute. In Germany’s foreign relations 
with the Czech Republic and Poland, four ministries wielded control in their respective fields, the 
Auswartiges Am t (Foreign Office)), the Bundesministerium fu r  Verteidigung (Ministry o f Defence 
-  BMVg), the Bundesministerium fu r  Wirtschaft (Ministry o f Economics -  BMWi), and the 
Bundesministerium der Finanzen (Federal Ministry o f Finances — BMF). The Foreign Office is 
the foreign policy organ responsible for the conduct o f foreign affairs and Germany’s diplomatic 
relations with foreign states. The BMVg handles Germany’s defence and security matters and 
plays a role in developing, with input from the Bundeskanzlei and the Foreign Office, its 
Sicherheitspolitik. It plays a crucial role in defining the security and defence strategies used to 
meet its policy objectives in ECE and it was also the foremost proponent of NATO enlargement 
in the German government. In the economics sphere -  before and after unification -  the foreign 
economic policy making apparatus consisted o f several ‘agents’: the BMWi2j, the BMF; the 
Foreign Office, and the Bundeskanzlei. Each o f the ministries responsible for developing 
Germany’s foreign economic policy towards the Czech Republic and Poland seconded officials to 
serve on an Inter-ministerial Committee {Interministerieller Ausschufi: IMA) which according to 
Patricia Davis was ‘responsible for decision-making regarding the primary instruments o f 
economic persuasion: export and investment credit guarantees as well as tied and untied credits’.24
23According to Anderson and Wallander, the internal structures o f the BMWi, for example, were largely left 
intact. The creation o f a new Referat (administrative unit) to oversee Bonn’s bilateral and multilateral 
engagements in ECE was the only visible change as a result o f unification and new tasks taken on by the 
ministry. See Jeffrey J. Anderson and Celeste A. Wallander, In the Shadow o f the Wall: Germany’s Eastern 
Trade Policy after Unification. Working Paper, no. 96-3 (Cambridge, MA: Centre for International Affairs, 
Harvard University, 1996), note 21, p. 11.
24Patricia Davis, The Art o f Economic Persuasion: Positive Incentives and German Economic Diplomacy 
(Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 152.
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This decision-making arrangement, located in Bonn, steered the direction and content o f 
Germany’s foreign economic policy with the assistance o f the Ost-Ausschufi (Eastern Committee) 
which was charged with coordinating Germany’s foreign economic policy towards all countries in 
ECE on the ground. The Ost-Ausschufi, in tum, was linked to the German government via the 
Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie (Federation o f German Industry). The Lander also play 
an important role in this decision making structure; indeed, they are tied to the individual 
ministries in the form of Leitungsstabe (task forces or divisions) which are located in individual 
ministries and are a focal point for keeping the Lander informed about the government’s 
economic efforts in Europe but also in ECE.
It is apparent here that there were many actors and agents with considerable overlap in 
responsibilities. An issue or sector area was crucial in determining which actors held a stake in the 
outcome of a particular policy process. For example, the political reconciliation processes were 
controlled by the Bundeskanzlei and the Foreign Office with the former often taking direct 
responsibility for negotiations with the Czech Republic and Poland on significant matters. 
Chancellor Kohl often exercised his prerogative to personally manage and control Germany’s 
foreign relations; this was not necessarily his forte when he assumed office in 1982 but it quickly 
became his passion to delegate certain aspects o f German foreign affairs as Chefsache. 
Throughout the Two Plus Four Accord negotiations, Kohl personally steered the FRG through the 
high-level negotiations o f one o f the most complex diplomatic mazes in Germany’s history in the 
twentieth century. Kohl shone in the international spotlight and he appreciated the domestic and 
international attention he received as the ‘father’ of German and European unity. The Foreign 
Office was also involved with negotiating the friendship treaties with both the Czech Republic 
and Poland but, in most cases and in areas o f dispute, the Bundeskanzlei often took the lead role 
depending on the significance o f the issues at stake. There was an important historical precedent 
here as far as Ostpolitik was concerned. Chancellor Brandt personally spearheaded the 
negotiations o f the Eastern Treaties with the Foreign Office in the 1960s and 1970s. Here, the 
need for secrecy required the Chancellor’s personal attention.
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German Lander
Within Germany’s federal structure, the Lander have been playing an important role in 
the country’s foreign and security policy, especially vis-a-vis the EU’s decision-making processes 
and enlargement.25 In the Grundgesetz, Article 23(1) stipulates that future transfers o f sovereignty 
can occur only with the consent o f the Bundesrat (Lander’s  chamber). Subject to Article 79(3) 
which protects the ‘federal’ nature o f the Federal Republic, Article 23(5) strengthens the weight 
o f  Bundesrat opinion in relation to the passage of European legislation into German law. More 
efforts at ‘deepening’ European integration include the transfer o f sovereignty from the Federal 
Republic and the Lander to the EU. Germany’s federal structure permits the Lander to enjoy 
some sovereignty on those issues which are affected by European integration. The Bundesrat can 
therefore block legislative action proposed by the government through the Bundestag. The Lander 
can block treaties, for example, which directly affect their future existence.
Article 32 outlines the parameters within which the Lander can formulate independent 
foreign policies towards other states. The importance o f sub-national foreign policies (Neben- 
Aussenpolitik) or ‘para-diplomatic’ activities pursued by the Lander is evident in Germany’s 
foreign relations with the Czech Republic and Poland.26 This is crucial since the Lander, through 
the Bundesrat, have the power to veto legislation, which may adversely affect their interests. The 
German government’s executive and legislative branches are therefore subject to political 
decisions made by the Lander in the Bundesrat. One Land, Bavaria (led by the CSU and managed 
from Munich), often challenged the chancellor’s foreign and security policy, especially in the 
context o f German-Czech relations. This became apparent during the negotiations o f the German- 
CSFR friendship treaty from 1990-1992 and the Czech-German Declaration on Mutual Relations 
in 1997.
This ‘political meddling’ follows a trend where the Lander are more interested in 
expanding their scope o f participation in the foreign policy formulation processes, thus hoping to
25Charlie Jeffery and Stephen Collins, ‘The German Lander and EU Enlargement: Between Apple Pie and 
Issue Linkage’, German Politics, vol. 7, no. 2 (August 1998): 86-101.
26Michele Knodt, “Auswartiges Handeln der deutschen Lander” in Karl Kaiser and Wolf-Dieter Eberwein 
(eds.), Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik: Institutionen undRessourcen. Vol. 4 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 
1998), p. 156.
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increase their influence on the international stage. In the cases o f the Czech Republic and Poland 
this is accomplished with much success, as the governments o f individual Lander prodded Bonn 
to pay more attention to regional political and economic developments on its border and to 
intensify the ties between German Lander and their Eastern counterparts. In the context o f inter­
regional economic cooperation, for example, the Lander wanted to enhance their public profile 
and use their financial power to influence their immediate environment.27
German Non-governmental Actors/Political Lobbying Groups
Expellee Organisations
One of the most powerful interest groups in the post-war period was the umbrella 
organisation o f the expellee groups: the Bund der Vertriebenen formed in 1950. The expellees’ 
political agenda was shaped by their expulsion from their homelands in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union after 1944. The organisation played an integral role within the CDU/CSU political 
parties and was an active lobbying power for its interests in ECE both during the Cold War and 
after. After the Second World War, approximately ten million expellees became members in an 
effort to promote their interests vis-a-vis the CSFR, Poland, and Bonn more effectively. Their 
political aims were to prevent a normalisation o f relations between the FRG and ECE -  a goal 
which persisted before unification. There is no longer one official expellee party although there 
are large numbers of expellee organisations spread throughout Germany, including the Schlesier- 
and Sudeten Landsmannschaften. Their political influence in Bonn was at its peak in the 1950s 
but waned in significance because o f their intransigence on the political reconciliation processes 
initiated with ECE during Brandt’s Ostpolitik.
As a major source o f Ostpolitik, it will become evident in the next chapter how important 
the expellee organisations were in influencing Bonn’s foreign policies vis-a-vis the Czech 
Republic and Poland after unification. When Bonn wanted to renegotiate the Ostvertrage with 
Czechoslovakia and Poland, the expellee organisations exerted a lot o f political influence through 
their lobbying efforts and political party voice: the CSU. The negotiation processes o f the German
27MicheIe Knodt. ‘External Representation o f German Lander Interests’ in Karl Kaiser and Wolf-Dieter 
Eberwein (eds.), Germany’s New Foreign Policy: Decision-making in an Interdependent World (New 
York; Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 180.
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friendship and border treaties with both states exhibited high levels o f input on the part o f  the 
expellee organisations, although many o f their political demands were not met.
The expellee organisations exerted their influence on three levels: the federal, Land, and 
bilateral levels o f Germany’s foreign relations with its eastern neighbours. Despite their relatively 
small numbers in political terms, they shaped Munich’s political agenda in Bonn and put Bavaria 
on the map as far as the Sudeten German question was concerned. The Sudeten German question 
also affected the negotiations to enlarge the EU to include the Czech Republic, as the CSU was a 
major obstacle. German-Czech relations, in contrast with Poland, were often held hostage by 
Sudeten German and CSU demands. As a non-governmental organisation, they were certainly 
more powerful in voicing their demands in comparison with their Schlesier (Silesian) 
counterparts. As the principal coalition partner in Bonn and political master o f one o f Germany’s 
most prosperous and influential Lander, the CSU took an active interest in all areas o f the Czech- 
German relationship because o f the political power of the Sudeten Germans in Bavaria.
Political and Cultural Foundations
Political and cultural foundations are major players in promulgating and supporting
German foreign policy objectives, including Germany’s Kulturpolitik, especially in ECE. With
their close links to the German political system, in particular, through its political parties and
funding from the Foreign Office and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development,
these foundations perform a vital function in support of ‘official’ German foreign policy
objectives. According to Sebastian Bartsch:
German political foundations make an important contribution to the pluralisation o f 
German foreign policy. They strengthen the anchoring o f foreign policy in society, widen 
the spectrum of actors relevant to foreign policy, improve the official foreign policy 
network information and communication, add to the presence o f Germany abroad, as well 
as the range o f its political agenda and its profile, and expedite the communication o f 
values and ideas.28
These foundations, including institutes and think tanks, like the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung, Hanns-Seidel Stiftung, Friedrich-Naumann Stiftung, Heinrich Boll Stiftung,
28Sebastian Bartsch, ‘Political Foundations: Linking the Worlds o f Foreign Policy and Transnationalism’ in 
Karl Kaiser and Wolf-Dieter Eberwein (eds.), Germany’s New Foreign Policy: Decision-making in an 
Interdependent World (New York; Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 212.
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Stiftungsverband Regenbogen, and the Goethe and German Historical Institutes (to name a few)
exert a great amount o f political influence in their host nations as they seek to promote German
policies, culture, and language awareness.
The ultimate aim of the foundations is to assess and sway political and cultural opinions
in the states they operate and intensify bilateral relations, on all levels, between political and
socio-cultural elites. According to Peter J. Katzenstein, they perform the following functions:
The government’s traditional foreign policy is complemented by Germany’s societal 
foreign policy (gesellschaftliche Aussenpolitik). Most o f the major German institutions 
conduct their own foreign relations. Typically, they engage partner institutions in other 
countries thus creating or reinforcing a pattern o f transnational relations. This gives 
German political actors ample opportunities to intervene obliquely in the domestic affairs 
of other European states, without throwing their weight around unduly.29
In ECE, the following tools are useful in helping achieve their objectives: conferences, 
publications, political and cultural exchanges, student scholarships, and management and training 
workshops. Germany’s political and cultural foundations are important institutional components 
and proponents o f Germany’s foreign relations with the Czech Republic and Poland as they 
promote the political and economic stabilisation processes in ECE and enhance Germany’s socio­
political, cultural and economic position in the region by building on its prominent historical and 
cultural presence in Mitteleuropa.
Germany’s political foundations also fulfil another important role; they advance 
Germany’s relations with its eastern neighbours in the fields o f educational, cultural and research 
exchanges. These areas of interest were enshrined in the friendship treaties Germany signed with 
the Czech Republic and Poland and they also highlighted the need to get younger generations to 
participate in Germany’s reconciliation efforts with the Czech Republic and Poland. This effort is 
undertaken through the intensification o f education and research contacts between schools in 
Germany and ECE and the provision o f scholarship funds for foreign students seeking to study in 
Germany.
The development o f Germany’s Kulturpolitik was intricately linked with the promotion o f 
Germany’s cultural, economic, and political presence in ECE. Cultural instruments were regarded 
by Germany’s leaders as important tools in safeguarding Standort Deutschland. Advancing the
29Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Germany and Mitteleuropa: An Introduction’ in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), 
Mitteleuropa: Between Europe and Germany (Oxford; Providence, Rl: Berghahn, 1997), p. 25.
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German language in ECE was a central feature o f this strategy. For centuries, the German 
language functioned as the lingua franca  in Eastern Europe. Promoting a revival o f German 
culture and the German language was one o f the most significant components o f Germany’s 
Kulturpolitik.
Structure and German Foreign Policy
The international system was radically transformed between 1989 and 1991. The end o f 
the Cold War, German unification, and the disintegration of the Soviet Empire had a profound 
impact on all states. In its various incarnations from 1949-1990, Bonn’s Ostpolitik depicts a story 
o f how successive governments managed and, indeed, struggled with competing domestic and 
foreign policy goals vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the GDR, WTO states, and their West European 
and transatlantic allies. With German unification, the socio-political, economic, and security 
ramifications o f the German state changed. Otto von Bismarck’s dictum that geography is the 
only constant factor in foreign policy reminds us that Germany’s interests would always be 
shaped, amongst others, by this factor. During the Cold War, the FRG’s Ostpolitik was a product 
o f its international environment; the end of the Cold War did not alter this fact.
The main objective here is to define the external sources of Germany’s foreign relations 
with the Czech Republic and Poland. How has Germany been influenced by the foreign and 
security policies o f its Western and Eastern neighbours? External sources, such as states and 
institutions in the international system, also function as constraints limiting a state’s capacity to 
act. According to Robert O. Keohane, institutions constrain states ‘through the operation o f rules, 
and provide them with opportunities without positing the threats to other states that are so 
characteristic o f realist anarchy’/ 0 In Germany’s case, how did external actors and institutions act 
as constraints and as a stimulus for policy change?
It is important, however, in this context not to lose sight o f Wolfer’s warnings about the 
significance of external sources in a country’s foreign policy:
30Robert O. Keohane, ‘Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War’ in David A. 
Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism, p. 272.
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Factors external to the actor can become determinants only as they affect the mind, 
the heart, and the will o f the decision-maker. A human decision to act in a specific 
way ... necessarily represents the last link in the chain o f antecedents o f any fact o f 
policy. A geographical set o f conditions, for instance, can affect the behaviour o f  a 
nation only as specific persons perceive and interpret these conditions.31
To focus on a state’s foreign policy behaviour one should simultaneously focus on the
endogenous and exogenous parameters within which a state devises and implements its foreign
policy objectives. Understanding this link is crucial. Three major structural or international
sources will be examined here: the Soviet Union and its successor, the Russian Federation, France
and the United States. In addition, the historical roles o f two institutional sources will be assessed:
the EU and NATO.
Soviet Union/Russian Federation
The Soviet Union and its political-military hegemony in Eastern Europe played a major 
role in shaping Germany’s foreign relations with the CSFR and Poland. The Soviet conventional 
and nuclear threat to the FRG’s existence defined the mindset o f its political leaders throughout 
the Cold War. The Soviet Union was a major superpower and the principal actor in Eastern 
Europe throughout the Cold War. The Second World War had shaped the post-war evolution o f 
German-Soviet relations and their relationship with Eastern Europe. As Celeste Wallander noted: 
‘German-Russian rivalry has been central to European conflict because of geopolitics: Russia’s 
westward expansion created the potential for conflict with Prussia (and later Germany) over 
territory in Central and Eastern Europe, especially Poland and the Balkans’/ 2 Germany and 
Russia were enchanted with ECE and reluctant to cede control o f the region to the other.
Germany’s foreign relations towards ECE were influenced by five main Soviet/Russian 
factors: (1) Soviet and Russian perceptions about the nature o f Germany’s future role in ECE; (2) 
the presence o f Soviet/Russian troops in the former GDR after unification until August 1994; (3) 
fears in ECE o f a German-Russian rapprochement (4) the socio-political and economic 
implications o f the demise o f international communism in ECE and Russia for Germany; finally,
31 Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, p. 42.
32Celeste A. Wallander, Mortal Friends, Best Enemies: German-Russian Cooperation after the Cold War 
(Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 1.
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(5) political uncertainty and instability in the Soviet Union/Russia and the impact on security 
levels in Germany and ECE.33 After unification, relations between Germany and the Soviet 
Union and its successor, the Russian Federation, determined the content o f Germany’s foreign and 
security policy strategies and objectives in ECE. In contrast with the Cold War’s bipolar order, the 
roles were now reversed. The Soviet Union, in steady decline between 1989-1991, operated from 
a position o f political, economic, and military weakness whereas Germany emerged from the Two 
Plus Four Accords as the European victor o f  the Cold War, despite being financially burdened by 
unification. This dramatic reversal o f fortune had a significant impact on German strategies vis-a- 
vis its new Eastern neighbours, Russia’s future political-military role in ECE and the FSU, and 
perceptions in ECE of increasing levels o f German power, especially economic power. Despite 
the Soviet Union’s relative decline in political and economic importance after 1991, especially in 
ECE, it nonetheless exerted high levels o f influence on Germany’s ambitions in ECE. Germany’s 
leaders felt uneasy about the country’s return to the Mittellage and the unpredictable events 
unfolding in ECE and the FSU.
German unification was described by the Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander 
Bessmertnykh as ‘one o f the most hated developments in the history o f Soviet foreign policy’/ 4 
Germany derived substantial benefits from the Cold War’s end whereas the Soviet Union lost 
everything its leaders had sought to protect after the end o f the Second World War. Unification 
induced a profound sense o f disillusionment among the Soviet Union’s political leadership about 
their foreign policy and military capabilities in 1990. Unification also marked the end o f the 
Soviet Union’s influence in ECE and the dawn of its own disintegration. The loss o f its satellite 
states in Eastern Europe and a more proactive German presence in its former political and 
economic hinterland exacerbated the Soviet Union’s unease about a unified Germany’s 
development and the implications for its future position in ECE. Now, Germany became the 
political and economic focal point for all states in ECE, at the Soviet Union’s expense.
33Points 2 and 5 are discussed in chapter 6.
34Bessmertnykh quoted in Philip Zelikow and Condoleeza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe 
Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. ix.
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Given the Soviet Union’s domination o f ECE for forty-five years, this process was
inevitable. From Moscow’s perspective, Bonn was no longer perceived as an enemy. However,
Bonn was a long way from becoming Moscow’s friend and partner in the creation o f a new
European security architecture. Volker Riihe’s contention that ‘peace and stability in Europe can
only be achieved with Russia, not against her’ highlighted Russia’s significance in the
development o f a European security architecture/5 As Peter Frank observed, the ability to achieve
stability in Russia was also crucial for the peaceful evolution o f ECE after 1990:
Russia holds the key to stability in Central and Eastern Europe. ... Stability in Russia is 
not in itself a guarantee o f stability elsewhere. But there is little doubt that, were Russia to 
degenerate into violent disorder, economic breakdown or environmental catastrophe, it 
would have extremely serious adverse consequences for Central and Eastern Europe, 
too.36
The Soviet Union’s position on German unification had been shaped through a Cold War 
lens which initially showed little flexibility but then became more so under Soviet President 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s leadership. Although Gorbachev was politically weakened by the Soviet 
Union’s impending collapse, he played an invaluable role, despite vehement domestic opposition, 
in facilitating German unification. His conduct throughout the Two Plus Four Accord negotiations 
exemplified his non-obstructionist attitude towards the ‘German question’, although the Soviet 
Union was absorbed by the FRG’s status as a close ally o f the United States and proponent of its 
interests; the role o f the Bundeswehr as ‘NATO’s ‘first army” , and the presence o f U.S. Pershing 
missiles on German so il/7 Bonn’s objective was to assuage Soviet concerns about a unified 
Germany’s future political-military status in Europe. This point is crucial since it formed the crux 
o f what evolved into a fundamental disagreement between Russia and the West on NATO’s 
enlargement/8 By not resisting Germany’s aspirations o f self-determination, the Soviet Union
35Volker Riihe, ‘The Future of European Security: A German View’, Central European Issues: Romanian 
Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 1, no. 2 (1995/96), p. 19.
36Peter Frank, ‘Stability and Instability in Eastern Europe’ in IISS, European Security after the Cold War. 
Adelphi Paper 285. Conference Papers - Part II (London: Brasseys for IISS, 1994), p. 13.
37Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (London: Doubleday, 1996), p. 517.
38According to Gorbachev, U.S. Secretary o f State Baker made the following remark on Germany’s future 
status to him: ‘Assuming unification takes place, what would you prefer: a united Germany outside NATO 
and completely autonomous, without American forces stationed on its territory, or a united Germany that 
maintains its ties with NATO, but with the guarantee that NATO jurisdiction or troops would not extend 
east o f the current line’. See Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 529.
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acted with a keen historical instinct. In playing the ‘German card’, Moscow aimed to benefit 
financially from its consent for unification to proceed. Furthermore, it relied on Germany to 
provide assistance for its economic transition processes and support for its European objectives.
During the Two Plus Four negotiations, the Soviet Union and Germany viewed each other 
with immense self-importance. The latter, however, with the support of the United States, was in a 
more powerful position to dictate the negotiation’s terms despite internal and external constraints. 
Whereas Moscow was operating from a weak negotiating position, Bonn was extremely confident 
about achieving its foreign policy objectives: unification and its continued membership in NATO. 
For Bonn, its classic ‘Eastern problem’ was highlighted again. It had to pay attention to the 
political, economic, and security interests o f ECE and Russia without compromising its position 
as an effective advocate for ECE interests and as Russia’s principal voice and partner in Western 
international institutions.
Soviet influence in ECE decreased dramatically. There were several reasons for this 
development. First, with the Cold War’s end and the peaceful revolutions o f  1989 in ECE, the 
Soviet Union was forced to relinquish control o f its political and economic hinterland. Second, 
having suffered for nearly forty-five years under Soviet tutelage, the states o f ECE wished to 
realign their economic interests with Germany, their European partners and the United States. As 
ECE looked to the West to subscribe to the values of Western liberal democracy and the free 
market, the Soviet Union became a marginal and less attractive political and economic player in 
the region, although it still figured largely as a potential security threat for the region.
After the Soviet Union’s demise, Russia’s relations with ECE were in a state o f disrepair. 
They remained strained since Russia shifted its foreign policy priorities away from the region 
allowing Germany to play a more influential political and economic role. Despite the loss o f 
political-military and economic leverage, Russia had three priorities in its relations with ECE. 
First, it wanted to ensure that no physical threats to its security emanated from the region, a 
geographical space perceived still to be located in a Russian sphere o f influence despite the end o f 
the Cold War. Russia’s foreign and security policy interests were shaped significantly by its 
historical perceptions o f the region’s role in facilitating successive invasions o f its territory. 
Second, Russia wanted to minimise the impact o f  ECE’s political and military ties with Western
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international institutions that excluded Russia. Third, Russia wanted to limit Western influence in 
ECE to resurrect more interest in Russia on the part o f ECE.39
Throughout history, Germany and Russia exerted a profound influence on what was 
defined as Zwischeneuropa (middle Europe). The prospect o f NATO’s enlargement to the East 
galvanized Russian interest in the region. As Peter Shearman notes: ‘Due to their political, 
historic, and economic interests in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and Germany are bound to 
perceive each other as the significant other in their foreign policy-making in the region’.40 In 
Russia, German unification was regarded as a German cloak for expanding its zone o f influence in 
ECE -  a fear also apparent throughout ECE. NATO’s enlargement to include the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland gave credence to these worries. The ECE governments were cognisant o f  the 
region’s importance in German and Russian calculations and were therefore keen to avoid being 
located, first, in a geopolitical no man’s land and, second, in a region where two larger powers -  
Germany and Russia -  were vying for more influence. The fear o f a German-Soviet/Russian 
rapprochement during the Two Plus Four Accord negotiations and immediately after unification 
was acute, especially in Warsaw.
The genesis o f the post-unification debate on a potential rapprochement between 
Germany and Russia has its roots in history. The Treaty o f Rapallo (1922) and the Hitler-Stalin 
Pact (1939) are examples o f what ensues when Germany and Russia share similar expansionist 
ambitions vis-a-vis Eastern Europe. Even before unification, the rapprochement thesis was 
gaining credibility throughout ECE and in some Western European quarters. Western and ECE 
policy-makers, especially in Poland, feared the prospect o f a Bonn-Moscow rapprochement and a 
German drift eastwards into Mitteleuropa.41 As the FRG suffered from an acute ‘Potsdam 
complex’ after the Second World War, Poland feared that the conditions o f its independence and
39Angela E. Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse and the New Europe 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 207-208.
40Peter Shearman, ‘Russian Policy towards Western Europe: The German Axis’ in Peter Shearman (ed.), 
Russian Foreign Policy since 1990 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), p. 98.
41A German-Russian partnership axis was actually advocated by Klaus Kinkel and the Russian Foreign 
Minister Andrei Kozyrev. Kozyrev maintained that ‘good German-Russian relations could relieve Eastern 
European countries of the feeling that they are being tom between the interests o f Germany and Russia’. 
SeeDPA, 18 July 1993, FB1S-WEU-93-136, 19 July 1993, p. 11.
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freedom would be determined by a concert of German and Russian interests, which historically 
flatly ignored its existence. Many of these fears in Warsaw were justifiable as Poland’s historical 
experiences with Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had shown. On the other 
hand, Warsaw failed to recognise that Germany’s relations with Russia after unification were 
always going to be a paramount factor in its Ostpolitik.42
Russia’s instability was the principal problem facing Western and ECE after the Cold 
War’s end. The ongoing presence o f nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the FSU 
sparked concerns in Bonn and the West about their possible proliferation to third-party countries. 
The Soviet Union’s disintegration also raised fears in Bonn about Russia’s future role in extra­
territorial conflicts and the spill-over effect of regional crises which would have socio-political 
consequences for Germany in the form of higher levels o f East-West migration. The principal 
non-military threat to emerge from a collapse o f transformation processes or an outbreak o f armed 
conflict in ECE or the CIS stemmed primarily from the potential influx o f ethnic Germans, illegal 
immigrants, refugees or asylum seekers from the East onto German territory. The notion o f 
Germany’s ‘Algeria lies to the East’ captured Bonn’s mood about potential immigration problems 
on its Eastern frontier. The political and economic implications of a large influx o f immigrants 
from the East were portrayed by Bonn as a potential threat to its domestic political and economic 
systems and its own transformation processes.
The demise o f international communism in the Soviet Union and ECE also had enormous 
implications for the political and economic infrastructures o f the states concerned. After 
unification, any perceived security threats to the stability o f ECE were regarded as potential 
threats to German security. By linking the political and economic fates of ECE with Germany’s 
‘domestic situation’, the stability o f its Eastern frontier, and general prosperity and security in 
Western Europe, Bonn wanted to assist the transformation and reform processes in ECE and 
urged other states to do the same. Bonn feared that instability in the East would ultimately be
42MieczysIaw Tomala, ‘Deutschland -  Russland: Grund zur Unruhe oder eine Chance fur Zusammenarbeit 
mit Polen’ in Michal Dobroczynski (ed.), Deutschland, Polen, Russland: europaische Sicherheit und 
Zusammenarbeit (Wesola: Assur Agencja for Zentrum fur Ostliche Studien/Warsaw University, 1996), p. 
74.
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exported to the West if  political and economic assistance for ECE and the CIS were not
forthcoming from states other than Germany. Kohl explained the rationale behind this thinking:
The entire West should always remember that it is in its own interests to help actively the 
reforming nations o f central, Eastern, and south Eastern Europe, as well as the republics o f 
the Soviet Union, in their process o f renewal on their way to democracy, the rule o f law, 
and the market economy. ... The Germans cannot bear the burden alone.43
On the other hand, Kinkel noted the following:
We have from the beginning engaged ourselves more than our partners in central and 
Eastern Europe and the twelve new states. As a result o f  our history and geography, this is 
necessary and is connected to our increasing responsibilities throughout the world after 
unification. We are, however, pushing our partners to engage themselves more strongly; we 
do not want nor can we solve this colossal task ourselves.44
The economic rationale behind Germany’s eastward outlook was compelling. If  the political and
economic transformation processes failed in ECE or the Commonwealth o f Independent States
(CIS), Germany would lose its traditional export markets in the East. Germany relied on ECE as
an outlet for its products and as a source o f cheap labour for the German private sector seeking to
invest in the region. Vital imports from the East would also stop or would be limited by states
seeking to control the flow o f raw materials, like gas and oil, for political purposes. ECE was
heavily dependent on these materials and so was Germany.
Russia played a vital role as an external source o f Germany’s Ostpolitik between 1990 
and 1998. It also functioned as a significant constraint since it remained the predominant 
conventional and nuclear power on the European continent. In ECE, Germany and Russia were 
driven by two fears. Germany was obsessed with instability on its Eastern frontier 
feared that a future European security architecture would not include it but, instead, 
towards it.45 Richard Kugler highlighted another difference in German and Russian 
vis-a-vis ECE:
43Berlin ADN, 31 October 1991, FBIS-WEU-91-213, 4 November 1991, p. 10.
44See Kinkel’s speech on 25 May 1992 published in German Foreign Office, Deutsche Aussenpolitik nach 
der Einheit, 1990-1993: Eine Dokumentation (Meckenheim: DCM, 1993), p. 163.
45Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn, p. 204.
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A complicating factor is that Germany and Russia rely on different instruments o f 
power. Germany is a great economic power but only a medium-sized military power. 
Russia has large military forces but lacks economic strength. This situation may allow 
for Germany’s economic power to expand eastward, whereas Russia will lack the 
economic strength to influence the trade and commerce o f ECE.46
Germany and Russia would once again play the most important roles in determining the evolution
of a security architecture which either included ECE or left it outside. Germany chose to support
the former path; ECE chose to put its destiny into the hands o f NATO and the EU. Russia, despite
signing extensive cooperation agreements with NATO and the EU, remains outside these
international institutions.
Russia was a central component in Bonn’s strategic calculations since it had the potential to 
significantly shape -  whether it wanted to or not -  the outcome of the reform and transition 
processes in ECE and Germany. The internal German debate on NATO’s enlargement was ample 
evidence of a German craving to satisfy the strategic interests o f ECE and Russia simultaneously 
-  an impossible feat even in ideal circumstances. The German strategy to enhance cooperation 
between NATO and Russia and the EU and Russia to make enlargement more acceptable to the 
Russians was only partially acceptable. NATO enlargement was never palatable for the Russians; 
however, the EU was another matter. Russia’s significance in Germany’s foreign relations with 
ECE was felt in all policy areas. Besides coping with difficult domestic and international issues, 
Germany felt obliged to advocate Russian interests in Western international institutions. There 
was a German interest in finding a balance between ECE and Russia on major foreign and 
security policy themes, a strategy that often perplexed the Czech Republic’s and Poland’s political 
leaders. The dynamics o f NATO enlargement clearly exposed this German dilemma straining the 
decision-making processes in Bonn to their limit.
France
The evolution of Franco-German relations after the Second World War is crucial to our 
understanding o f the role France played in Germany’s foreign relations with ECE after 
unification. France was the FRG’s principal partner and ally in Western Europe; the country 
embodied the European pillar o f Germany’s foreign policy. This relationship between France and
46Richard L. Kugler, Enlarging NATO - The Russia Factor (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1996), p. 166.
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Germany was instrumental in establishing the foundations for Europe’s integration. Throughout 
the Cold War, Paris was driven by two main ambitions in Western Europe. First, it aimed to 
protect its unrivalled position as the dominant actor in European politics and especially the 
European Community. Second, it aimed to tie the FRG extensively into Western European 
political and economic institutions to ensure peace and stability on the European continent and 
prevent another world war emanating from the territory of its neighbour. These goals should be 
viewed against a backdrop of a central theme running throughout the history o f French presidents 
in the Fifth Republic: the promotion o f French independence, ideas, and power throughout the 
world. These objectives were promoted and achieved with remarkable diplomatic skill.
German unification, however, altered the European balance o f power and threatened 
France’s political hegemony in Western Europe and any political and economic aspirations it 
might have entertained vis-a-vis Moscow, Prague and Warsaw after 1990. Before examining 
France’s role in Germany’s foreign relations with ECE after unification, it is necessary to 
highlight France’s general unease about two processes: first, German unification and its potential 
impact on Europe’s integration processes and, second, French fears about Germany’s eastern 
interests after unification at the possible expense o f its Westbindung. These two omnipresent fears 
amongst the French political leadership and elite are intimately linked.47 French calculations 
surmised that unification would strengthen Germany’s position in Western and Eastern Europe. 
Paris was aware o f the negative impact unification would have on its future political and 
economic role in the region. Bonn viewed French perceptions on these matters with great interest. 
They were a constant reminder that France’s consent was required for unification to proceed and 
that it would be watching Germany’s movements in ECE with great interest. French perceptions 
influenced and often complicated Kohl’s negotiation strategies during the Two Plus Four Accords 
with France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Polish border 
question and France’s support for Poland in the Two Plus Four process exacerbated Franco- 
German tensions on this matter.
47ParadoxicaIly, French public opinion did not share the same fears of Germany. See Renate Fritsch- 
Bournazel, Europe and German Unification (Providence, Rl: Berg, 1992), pp. 174-175.
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While Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was the most sceptical about German 
unification in Europe, French President F ran c is  Mitterand shared similar views about the impact 
unification would have on German levels o f power in Western and Eastern Europe.48 Unlike 
Thatcher, however, the French displayed their lack o f enthusiasm for unification in a more 
circumspect and ambivalent manner. Throughout the Cold War, France had prospered as a result 
o f Germany’s division and its political and economic containment in international institutions. 
The prospect o f German unification, however, threatened the status quo, which had dominated 
France’s external existence after the Second World War.49 France pursued a German unification 
policy rooted in its historical anxieties: it had been invaded by Germany three times in a little over 
one hundred years and this shaped its sceptical reaction to the events occurring in Bonn and 
Berlin.
The FRG’s political and economic development after the Second World War and its close 
cooperation with France were viewed as extremely positive developments by Paris. However, 
German unification threatened the harmony o f the German-French relationship and exposed a 
pervasive fear held by a segment o f France’s political and intellectual elite that Germany would 
rival France’s dominant position in Europe. If German unification was to proceed in a manner 
which did not encroach upon France’s foreign and security policy interests, then it was vital that 
Franco-German cooperation continue to function as the principal cornerstone o f further European 
union and as a mechanism to ensure peace and stability in the East.50 From Paris’s perspective, 
Franco-German cooperation would complement Germany’s foreign relations with ECE and its 
objectives. Mitterand was extremely tolerant about Germany’s motives for pursuing unification 
but was often sceptical, especially after the fall o f the Berlin Wall, whether a unified Germany 
would continue to support further European integration.51 The answer provided by Germany’s 
political leadership was overwhelmingly positive and reassured the French that Bonn’s interests
48For evidence of Prime Minister Thatcher’s thinking on the prospects o f German unification, see Margaret 
Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 793.
49Georges-Henri Soutou, L ’alliance incertaine: Les rapports politico-strategiques franco-aflemands, 1954- 
1996 (Paris: Fayard, 1996), pp. 397-401.
50Friedbert Pfluger, ‘Polen -  unser Frankreich im Osten’ in Wolfgang Schauble and Rudolf Seiters (eds.), 
Aussenpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert: die Thesen derjungen Aussenpolitiker (Bonn: Bouvier, 1996), p. 183.
5,Rice and Zelikow, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, p. 116.
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should not be viewed with suspicion. Mitterand remained uncomfortable with unification but he 
realised he could not prevent the self-determination o f the German people. Throughout the 
negotiations o f the Two Plus Four Accords, however, deep suspicions about the nature o f 
Germany’s future interests amongst French officialdom persisted. These sentiments extended long 
after unification had been completed in 1990; indeed, the Kohl era was dogged by France’s 
obsession with rising levels o f German power within the EU and in ECE.52
In the context o f France’s German unification policy and its ‘perceived’ role as a 
champion o f East and Central European interests, it is important to pay brief attention to the first 
main challenge facing the architects o f Germany’s foreign policy during the Two Plus Four 
Accords: the FRG’s recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as Poland’s Western border and France’s 
role in this process.5-5 After November 1989, French diplomacy wanted to ensure that Germany’s 
neighbours, such as Czechoslovakia and Poland, did not feel threatened by Germany’s impending 
unification. Although the Czechoslovak and Polish leaderships welcomed the prospect o f German 
unification they, nonetheless, remained concerned about the impact unification would have on 
their relations with Germany.
Poland played a symbolic role during the Two Plus Four Accords because o f the status o f 
its Western border along the Oder-Neisse line. In the absence o f clear signals from Bonn during 
1990, the French were sceptical and critical o f Kohl’s fluctuating stance on the legality o f the 
Oder-Neisse line as Poland’s Western border. A comment made by a German government 
spokesman had caused significant alarm and disquiet in France in late 1989: ‘Who can contest 
that Silesia is a German territory?”54 The future status of the Oder-Neisse line became a cause 
celebre in French political circles. Mitterand’s foreign policy strategy concentrated on obtaining 
cast-iron guarantees from Bonn that it would recognise the Oder-Neisse line before unification 
occurred.55 Mitterand told Kohl that ‘it was not possible to move on from one historical phase to
52Frangoise Nicolas and Hans Stark, L 'AUemagne: une nouvelle hegemonie (Paris: IFRl-Dunod, 1992).
53See chapter four.
54Rice and Zelikow, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, p. 206.
55Weidenfeld, Aussenpolitik fu r  die deutsche Einheit, pp. 486-487. Mitterand’s thoughts on resolving the 
Polish border question before unification can be examined in Francois Mitterand, De L ’Allemagne, de la 
France (Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 1996), pp. 213-218.
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another without this solemn act having been accomplished’.56 He also used the Two Plus Four 
Accords to ensure that unification took into the account the interests o f its future Eastern 
neighbours.
By adopting this strategy, Mitterand wanted to place France at the centre o f Germany’s 
relationship with Poland. Mitterand took this action because he was clearly troubled by the 
prospect o f higher and disproportionate levels o f German political and economic power in ECE 
after unification.57 France’s extensive involvement in the dispute about the Polish border question 
in German-Polish relations marked the first visible sign that France desired to play a prominent 
role in the processes which had a direct impact on Germany’s foreign policy behaviour, especially 
towards an independent Poland.
Germany emerged as the dominant political and economic actor in ECE after unification. 
France, on the other hand, despite huge promises o f cooperation and economic assistance, did not 
play the role originally envisaged by ECE. Its geographical position and increased focus on the 
Southern Mediterranean and Maghreb regions precluded France from becoming actively engaged 
in a region that was far removed from its core foreign policy interests. However, despite having a 
different regional focus France wanted to avoid becoming a marginal figure in the political and 
economic development o f ECE. German interests in ECE prompted France to develop a higher 
profile in the region than would have normally been the case. If France could not unilaterally 
influence the political and economic transformation processes in ECE, then it was important to act 
with the dominant actor in the region -  Germany -  and in partnership with other European states 
in international institutions. Germany was not averse to this strategy; indeed, it actually preferred 
to pursue its objectives in ECE with France and other European partners. The pursuit o f a ‘joint 
Ostpolitik’ suited German as well as French interests.
56Mitterand quoted by Paul Latawski, ‘Germany's Reconciliation with its Eastern Neighbors’, RUSI 
Journal, vol. 139, no. 6 (December 1994), p. 66.
57Stanislaw Parzymies, ‘The Interests o f Partners in Weimar Cooperation’, Central European Review, vol. 
5, nos. 20-21 (February 1998), p. 74.
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Weimar Triangle
The Franco-German reconciliation processes culminating in the 1963 Elysee Treaty were 
the foundation for Germany’s political rapprochement with its Eastern neighbours after 1990. 
Franco-German co-operation after the Second World War was regarded as a model by the Poles 
which could be emulated in German-Polish relations after 1990, the aim being to improve 
German-Polish relations.58 The political and historical dynamics o f Franco-German co-operation 
after the end of the Second World War formed the backdrop for the highly symbolic creation o f a 
trilateral forum -  the Weimar triangle -  designed to recognise Poland’s significance as the most 
pivotal and critical state in ECE. In August 1991, the German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher and French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas proposed the creation o f a trilateral forum 
in which German, French, and Polish ministers and legislators could discuss areas o f mutual 
interest. The Weimar Declaration (29 August 1991) highlighted the important role played by the 
three actors in the future development and success o f European institutions. Article VI o f the 
declaration stipulates:
The reform states o f middle and Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, must be 
helped comprehensively. Europe cannot be divided by borders between the rich and 
the poor. France and Germany support all efforts to bring Poland closer to all states in 
the European Community. Both are pushing for quick association agreements with 
the democracies o f middle and south-east Europe and want to promote the widening 
of a political dialogue. It is in accordance with the goals o f the European Community 
to open a path for membership for these new democracies.59
This forum’s creation was concrete evidence of Germany and France’s will to act jointly in ECE.
Extensive cooperation between Bonn and Paris was based on the premise that their foreign policy
interests could be accommodated in the development o f joint policies and strategies towards
Poland and other states in ECE.
The Weimar triangle, however, served different purposes for France, Germany, and
Poland. Although its main aim was to address the socio-political, economic, and security concerns
o f Poland and identify its domestic, foreign and security policy needs, there were fundamentally
different motives behind France and Germany’s creation o f the triangle. From Poland’s
58Wladyslaw Bartoszweski, ‘Polen und seine Nachbam: Bemerkungen zur polnischen Aussenpolitik’, 
ZeitschriftfurPolitik, vol. 43, no. 1 (1996), p. 68.
59‘Gemeinsame Erklarung der Aussenminister von Deutschland, Frankreich und Polen in Weimar’, Bulletin, 
no. 92 (3 September 1991), p. 735. MT.
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perspective, it was delighted to be elevated to the status o f a ‘preferred’ partner in ECE for the
French and Germans. The former Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek described the
significance o f this trilateral relationship for Poland:
Today, the French-German co-operation serves as an example o f a correct 
relationship between neighbouring countries for others to follow. This relationship is 
often referred to as the engine o f European integration. ... For sovereign Poland, which 
has been able to shape its foreign policy independently since 1989, the co­
operation between France and German is inspiring. It has encouraged us to improve 
our bilateral relationships with France and Germany.60
The Czech Republic, however, was not accorded a similar privilege.61 France wanted to achieve
the following objectives: first, it wanted to lift its stagnating profile in Poland by becoming a more
visible political and economic actor; second, it wanted to balance, monitor, and check Germany’s
political and economic presence in Poland and ECE.62 Third, despite public support for the dual
enlargement processes of NATO and the EU, the French, privately, wanted to delay these
processes out o f fear that they could not compete economically with Germany in ECE. Whereas
Germany pursued a simultaneous policy o f ‘deepening’ and widening’ in the EU, France was
concerned about the slow pace o f the former. Krzysztof Rak argues that the French were
paralysed by the fear of an EU that was contiguous with a larger sphere o f German influence in
ECE.63 Closely linked to these concerns about Germany’s influence was Poland’s interest in
maintaining a strong institutional link with France to check German influence.
Germany, on other hand, had different objectives. By inviting Poland to join in a trilateral
framework with France, Germany was displaying sound historical instincts by recognising that its
integration in multilateral frameworks after the Second World War had played a fundamental role
in its own positive democratic and economic development. Germany wanted to emulate this
60Bronisla\v Geremek, ‘The Weimar Triangle', Central European Review, vol. 5, nos. 20-21 (February 
1998), p. 71.
6'Czechoslovakia’s exclusion from the Weimar triangle was perceived by the Czechs as ‘no cause for 
uncontrolled outbursts o f enthusiasm but neither for deep depression’. See Petr Robejsek, ‘The Weimar 
Triangle in the Fractal Geometry o f Post-Communist Europe’ in Vladimir Handl el al, Germany and East 
Central Europe since 1990 (Prague: Institute o f International Relations, 1999), p. 131.
62Valerie Guerin-Sendelbach and Jacek Rulkowski, “ Euro-Trio’ France-Germany-Poland’, Aussenpolitik 
(English version), no. 3 (1994), p. 246. The military dimension o f the Weimar triangle is examined in 
chapter 6.
63Krzysztof Rak, ‘Das Weimarer Dreieck’ in Lennart Souchon and Kai Hirschmann (eds.), Die Deutsche- 
Polnische Kooperation in Fragen der Sicherheitspolitik; Diskussionspapiere des 1. Deutsch-Polnischen 
Workshops vom 28.-30. November 1994 in Berlin/Bundesakademie fur Sicherheitspolitik. (Bonn; Berlin; 
Hamburg: Mittler, 1995), p. 54.
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successful experiment with Poland. Poland’s integration into the EU and NATO was essential if it
was to master its internal transformation and reform processes. As Kinkel noted:
Germany considers itself to be an advocate o f central Eastern European states aspiring to 
join the EU. ... Cooperation within the Weimar Triangle has proven to be the moving 
force in bringing Poland closer to the EU. The main motive behind the trilateral 
cooperation is Germany’s desire to have equally good and close neighbourly relations 
with Poland and France. ... Just like the relations between Germany and France which are 
the moving force behind progress in West Europe, German-Polish relations must provide 
for and anchor stability in central Eastern Europe.64
By working with France and Poland in a trilateral forum, Germany was able to deflect any
criticisms of potential German Sonderwege in Europe. In Western and ECE where scepticism was
rife about Germany’s objectives, this strategy was crucial in establishing Germany as an actor
intent on operating from within trilateral and multilateral frameworks to achieve its multiple
foreign and security policy objectives.
United States
In Western Europe, the Franco-German motor was one o f the most important sources o f 
Germany’s foreign policy during and after the end o f the Cold War. However, Germany’s foreign 
and security policy included a transatlantic dimension manifested by its close partnership with the 
United States. The role of the United States cannot be underestimated when examining 
Germany’s conduct in ECE as it shaped its foreign and security policy objectives before and after 
unification. Throughout the Cold War, the FRG’s Ostpolitik was a product of the nature o f the 
international environment, especially the superpower struggle between the United States and the 
Soviet Union.65 As a semi-sovereign state in the international system, the FRG was limited in its 
capacity to operate an independent foreign policy, especially one that contravened the interests of 
the United States. Wolfram Hanrieder described the foreign policy objectives o f the United States 
vis-a-vis the FRG after the Second World War as follows:
MWPROSTPoznan, 21 June 1996, FBIS-WEU-96-121,21 June 1996, pp. 13-14.
65 See chapter 3.
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The restraint o f the Federal Republic through international organisations and treaties 
was at the core o f Washington’s postwar European policy o f double containment: the 
containment o f the Soviet Union at arm’s length, and o f West Germany with an 
embrace. Every major event follows from this: the rearmament and economic 
reconstruction o f the Federal Republic within the restraints o f international 
organisations, the development o f NATO from a loosely organised mutual assistance 
pact into an integrated military alliance, American support for West European 
integration, and the solidification o f the division o f Germany and Europe.66
By the early 1950s, the United States and the FRG shared one common goal: the prevention o f a
Soviet invasion o f Western Europe and containment. The FRG’s Westintegration precluded a
proactive West German foreign policy towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, although in
practice Bonn carved a role for itself in the process o f detente. The United States aimed to
preserve the stability o f Western Europe and the FRG. The FRG’s security dependence on the
United States served as the cornerstone o f European security within NATO. Bonn and
Washington recognised that their security objectives in Europe, within NATO, and vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union could only be achieved if there was a bilateral consensus on important challenges.
The Soviet Union’s demise and German unification had a profound impact on the bilateral
dynamics o f U.S-German relations and the objectives they entertained regarding Western
Europe’s future security, especially ECE. In contrast with the British, French and Soviets, U.S.
President George H. W. Bush entertained few reservations about the prospects o f unification and
Germany’s desire for self-determination. He remarked:
I would think it’s a matter for the Germans to decide. But put it this way: If that was 
worked out between the two Germany’s, I do not think we should view that as bad for 
Western interests. I think there’s been a dramatic change in post-World War II 
Germany. And so, I don’t fear it. ... But 1 think there is in some quarters a feeling—  
well, a reunified Germany would be detrimental to the peace o f Europe, o f Western 
Europe, some way; and I don’t accept that at all, simply don’t.67
The United States was Germany’s most ardent supporter during the Two Plus Four Accord
negotiations. Bush’s offer to Germany to become ‘partners in leadership’ after the Brussels North
Atlantic Summit (May 1989) was symbolic o f the United States’ commitment to German
unification after forty-five years o f division and occupation. This commitment was also reflected
by the United States’ position on the future status o f the Oder-Neisse as Poland’s Western border.
66Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years o f German Foreign Policy (New Haven, 
CT; London: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 6.
67Bush quoted in Robert M. Gates, In From the Shadows (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 484. See 
George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p. 187.
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Whereas Germany’s other allies were sceptical about Germany’s intentions to recognise the Oder-
Neisse line as Poland’s Western border, the United States played a significant role in assuaging
Polish concerns about Germany’s plans.68 Washington’s support for Bonn on the border issue was
the first sign of its willingness to allow Bonn to freely exercise its interests vis-a-vis Poland.
The United States functioned as a vital external source o f Germany’s foreign relations
with ECE for three main reasons. First, inherent in the ‘partners in leadership’ offer made by
Washington to Bonn was the notion that it should assume a more prominent position not only in
the political and economic reconstruction o f ECE but also in the global arena. Second, the
intensification o f German-American ties and cooperation in multilateral institutions was essential
if  Germany was going to be able to pursue a harmonious security relationship with its Eastern
neighbours. The forward presence o f the United States in Europe was crucial if Germany was
going to achieve its bilateral and multilateral security objectives in ECE, Third, the United States
played a critical role in steering the NATO enlargement debate and securing one o f Germany’s
prime military objectives after unification: the stability o f its Eastern frontier.
The ‘partners in leadership’ model closely linked German and American foreign and
security policy interests. Bush outlined the significance o f this partnership for the United States:
You [Germany] are our partner in building a more united and cooperative Europe. In 
that spirit, we strongly welcome German involvement in global affairs. Strong 
German-American cooperation is fully compatible with the development of a more 
unified Europe; a goal that the United States has consistently supported over the years, 
just as unequivocally as we supported a united Germany.69
Bonn’s formal acceptance o f the offer -  albeit two years later -  in Washington was indicative o f
its willingness to become a more proactive international actor but it also raised several questions
about its capacity, in light o f reunification, to assume more political and economic leadership
commensurate with its enhanced status in the international system. Washington and Bonn often
entertained different definitions about the aims of their respective partnership. Washington was
clearly not afraid o f the prospect o f Germany becoming more engaged in ECE at the expense o f
68Rice and Zelikow, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, pp. 217-222.
69US State Department Dispatch, 4 May 1992, p. 348.
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its Westbindung.70 Bush noted rather bluntly: ‘What his (Kohl’s) neighbours were really afraid o f 
was that the Germans might drift to the East (meaning develop closer ties to Moscow at the 
expense o f the West) — which was nonsense —  as well as the rapid development o f Germany, 
faster than the rest o f Western Europe’.71 Bush and his successor, Bill Clinton, were confident that 
Germany would fulfil its role as a harbinger o f the United States’ political and economic interests 
in ECE.72
As a partner in leadership with the United States, Germany was one o f the major
European powers that could help the United States fulfil its strategic objectives in Europe after the
Cold War’s end. Germany was also a crucial power for promoting closer ties with ECE.
Washington’s perspective on Germany’s future engagement in ECE was clear:
... it is only a strong Germany that can help contain nationalism and help to stabilise 
Eastern Europe. While it is clear that East Europeans have ambivalent feelings about 
German influence and power in the region, it is only a strong Germany that can provide 
them with the support they need both bilaterally and multilaterally -  be it 
political, economic or security ... Often they see the American role and presence as a 
hedge against a resurgent Germany. But they must also realise ... that a strong 
Germany will actually make it easier for the United States to remain engaged in 
Europe.73
Washington was convinced that only a strong Germany could assist the transition states in ECE.74 
At a time when the Soviet Union was in decline and ECE was in a state o f transformation, the 
United States was unable for domestic reasons to play a constructive role in the economic 
reconstruction o f the region although its symbolic physical presence in Europe, especially 
Germany was comforting to both the Czech Republic and Poland. Washington believed that 
Germany’s objectives to maintain peace and stability on its Eastern frontier, despite the fears 
voiced by ECE about increasing levels o f German power, was a legitimate exercise. The U.S. 
presence and commitment to the transformation processes o f the ECE states played an important 
role in ensuring that German objectives were met in partnership with its allies and within
70W. R. Smyser, Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift? (Oxford; Boulder, CO: Westview,
1993), p. 53.
7,Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, pp. 198-199.
73Ronald D. Asmus, Germany in the Eyes o f the American Security Elite (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1993),
p. 18.
74Robert D. Hormats, ‘United Germany and the United States: A New Partnership for the 1990s’ in Steven 
Muller and Gebhard Schweigler (eds.), From Occupation to Cooperation, pp. 195-198.
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international institutions such as NATO. The symbolism of the U.S. presence in Europe cannot be 
underestimated, especially for the governments in ECE.
Institutional Sources
This section briefly examines two important external institutional sources o f Germany’s 
Ostpolitik during the Cold War and after: the EU and NATO.75 The historical origins o f the EU 
and NATO were rooted in the interests o f Germany’s Western European and transatlantic partners 
to firmly integrate the FRG into multilateral structures which would contain and prohibit it from 
unleashing a third round of terror and destruction in the twentieth century. There was a unanimous 
consensus amongst all o f the Euro-Atlantic actors that the FRG’s integration into Western 
international institutions after the Second World War, instead o f the restoration o f its full national 
independence, was the only viable alternative to prevent a future rise o f German nationalism. How 
did these external sources shape the FRG’s evolution after 1949 and unification?
The European Union
The FRG’s development as a democratic and peaceful nation after the Second World War 
was to a large extent dependent on its integration in multilateral European and transatlantic 
frameworks. The FRG’s membership in the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 had a tremendous impact on the FRG’s political 
recovery and economic reconstruction. The foundations for Germany’s multilateralism have their 
roots in the efforts undertaken by the FRG’s occupying powers to allow German democracy to 
flourish in a multilateral setting with like-minded partners. The FRG’s multilateral tendencies 
were shaped during the Adenauer chancellorship; his policies of Westbindung and 
Westintegration formed the main foundation for the FRG’s foreign and security policy 
orientation. For Josef Janning, the EU was the multilateral setting ‘most responsive to Germany’s
75Germany’s position on NATO’s enlargement will be discussed in chapter six whereas its position on the 
EU’s enlargement will be discussed here.
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needs and its policy style’ because its ‘implicit values were closer to the internationalist spirit o f 
the Federal Republic’s diplomacy’.76
Throughout the Cold War, Bonn relied on multilateral institutions such as the EU to 
achieve its foreign policy objectives so much so that one observer noted that one important feature 
o f German Europeanism was ‘Europe acting as an identity crutch and political-economic 
bolstering device for German rehabilitation and German unification’.77 According to a close 
adviser to Chancellor Kohl, Wolfgang Bergsdorf, ‘Germany’s Staatsrason was its integration in 
Europe’ and its role in a Europa als Schicksalsgemeinschaft (Europe as a community o f common 
destiny).78 German notions o f national identity and sovereignty were permanently altered by 
Europe’s integration efforts. Its active participation here hastened its political rehabilitation in its 
neighbours’ eyes. Germany derived many benefits from this strategy. According to Helga 
Haftendom, ‘under the conditions o f the Cold War, Bonn viewed a multilateral approach to 
foreign affairs as a cost-effective variant in advocating their national interests . . . \ 79 This approach 
helped the FRG fare well throughout its existence as a divided and occupied state. It was not a 
surprise that its reunified successor would adopt a similar strategy to meet its objectives in ECE.
After unification, Germany’s membership and prominent position within the EU 
functioned as a magnet for the Czech Republic and Poland. Ironically, after 1949, successive 
Bonn governments operated on the assumption that European unification would precede German 
unification. Having now achieved German unity first, Bonn concentrated on finally achieving one 
o f the major objectives which had eluded it throughout the duration of the Cold War: further 
European union. As Reinhardt Rummel noted, ‘The goal o f Eastern enlargement and o f multiple 
connections with Russia and Ukraine has replaced German unification as Bonn’s condition for the
76Josef Janning, ‘Germany’s Interests in CFSP and the European Security’, Central European Issues: 
Romanian Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 1, no. 2 (1995/96), p. 151. See Rainer Baumann, ‘The 
Transformation o f German Multilateralism’, German Politics and Society, Issue 65, vol. 20, no. 4 (Winter
2002), pp. 1-26.
77U lf Hedetoft, ‘Germany’s National and European Identity: Normalisation by other Means’ in Carl 
Lankowski (ed.), Break out, break down or break in? Germany and the European Union after Amsterdam 
(Washington, DC: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1998), p. 3.
78Bergsdorf quoted in Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New  
York: Random House, 1993), p. 385.
79Helga Haftendorn, ‘Gulliver in the Centre o f Europe: International Involvement and National Capabilities 
for Action’ in Bertel Heurlin (ed.), Germany in Europe in the Nineties (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), p. 
104.
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EU’s further integration’.80 Bonn’s Eastern neighbours, abandoned on the Eastern fringes o f 
Western Europe, aimed to democratise their political systems and restructure their economies with 
the assistance of Western Europe and the EU in particular. Germany was their most fervent 
advocate.
The strategy for achieving these goals was only possible from within the EU framework 
as Germany enlisted more political and economic support for its immediate foreign and security 
policy concerns in the East. Burdened by the budgetary constraints imposed by unification, 
Germany simply did not have the financial means at its disposal to single-handedly solve its 
‘Eastern problem’ without diverting precious and limited economic resources from the 
transformation processes o f its Eastern Lander. Bonn argued on several occasions that it had 
reached its limits with regard to offering support to ECE and called upon other governments to 
play a more prominent role in the region.81 Kohl pointed out that ‘supporting development in these 
countries is not merely a contribution towards consolidating their stability, but an investment in 
Europe’s future which serves world peace’.82 He also noted that ‘it is inconceivable for Germany 
that Poland’s Western border should remain the European Union’s Eastern border. Despite all the 
institutional and economic challenges involved, enlargement to the east is not only a historic and 
moral duty but it is also in our political, economic and cultural interest’.83
Bonn’s goal to achieve socio-political, economic, and military stability in ECE was 
dependent on its role as an effective advocate or lawyer o f ECE interests in the EU and within the 
EU’s CFSP. The FRG had already played an active role in creating the foundations for its 
antecedent, the European Political Cooperation (EPC), which came into being after 1973. The 
Single European Act o f 1986 formalised the objectives o f the EPC. The FRG actively used the
80Reinhardt Rummel, ‘Germany’s Role in the CFSP: Normalitat or ‘Sonderweg’?’ in Christopher Hill (ed.), 
The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 46.
81 Bulletin, no. 15(16 February 1994), p. 136 and Bulletin, no. 40 (5 May 1994), p. 350.
S2The European (12 November 1993), p. 9.
83Kohl quoted by Jorg Schlegel, ‘The Political Situation in Berlin and Germany’ in Group o f the European 
People’s Party (Christian Democrat Group), European Parliament, European Digest, Berlin Study Days (4- 
8 May 1998), p. 29.
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EPC framework to develop common foreign policy positions on external issues amongst which 
was the closer forging o f ties between the EC and ECE.
It was self-evident that Germany’s multilateralism within the EU would be constrained by 
other actors who sought to limit German power or shared other priorities than Eastern 
enlargement, for example. Paradoxically, during the Kohl era Bonn was obsessed with linking its 
foreign and security policy activities to multilateral decision-making processes, especially in the 
EU. According to Peter Schmidt, ‘enlargement, therefore, seemed an appropriate means for the 
German side to invalidate the accusation o f any German striving for hegemony from the start, 
since this would multilateralise relations to the Central and Eastern European countries —  i.e. 
subject them to more broadly-based participation and control’.84 Josef Joffe used the appropriate 
analogy that ‘Germany is like a Gulliver who likes his ropes’. Germany’s integration into the EC 
resulted in the creation of what some called an ‘Europeanised state’. According to William 
Paterson and Simon Bulmer, ‘The Europeanisation o f Germany may be seen both as an objective 
and an achievement o f Bonn’s European policy’.85
Germany and the European Union’s Enlargement
Domestic German actors and agents worked within the EU and with other member states 
to shape a policy towards ECE which would meet not only German interests but also the EU’s. O f 
course, foreign policy cynics in Germany, the Czech Republic, and Poland questioned Germany’s 
motives and the nature o f its bilateral and multilateral strategies and interests vis-a-vis ECE. One 
politician from the region quipped, for example, that what association with the European Union 
really means for the countries o f ECE is association with Germany. The rise o f a German 
economic hegemon in ECE was not welcomed in Prague or Warsaw but, on the other hand, 
responsible political leaders in both cities were not going to easily turn away German foreign 
direct investment or trade, especially when it was desperately needed from 1990 to 1998 and even 
afterwards. Germany’s multilateral efforts, especially within the framework of the EU, calmed the
84Peter Schmidt, ‘German Security Policy in the Framework of the EU, WEU, and NATO’, Aussenpolitik 
(English version), no. 3 (1996), p. 213.
85Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson, ‘Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent 
Leader?’ International Affairs, vol. 72, no. 1 (January 1996), p. 12.
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cynics and also, paradoxically, made Germany’s leaders feel more comfortable as they adjusted to
their newly-won sovereignty and more privileged position in the international system.
What were the principal reasons underlying Bonn’s support for the enlargement o f the
EU? Political, economic, and security calculations drove Germany to become one o f the most
fervent advocates o f EU enlargement during the Kohl era. The political symbolism o f Germany’s
support for the enlargement o f the EU to include the Czech Republic and Poland was inescapable
as it was linked to the FRG’s Westintegration after the Second World War. Bonn believed that
international institutions, like the EU, had proven to be beneficial for the FRG’s development
after the Second World War so consequently, there was no reason to believe that they could not
perform a similar function for the transition states in ECE. Josef Janning, for instance, argued that
Germany does not want to choose between East and West and thus has no interest in 
operating the country’s relations with the East in a different mode than those with the 
West. Without integrating the new democracies into the Union, however, such a 
difference could hardly be avoided ... By enlarging the Union eastwards, offers a 
way out o f geopolitical determinism - in a union o f 20 or 25, there is no Mittellage for 
Germany in the old sense o f the word’.86
Bonn calculated that the prospect o f its neighbours becoming EU members would help create the
socio-political and economic climate necessary for these states to succeed in their political and
economic reform efforts. With enlargement, Bonn viewed the deepening o f the EU’s political and
economic structures as a way o f anchoring a reunified Germany in the West and ensuring the
existence o f a ‘European Germany’ rather than a ‘German Europe’.
The bilateral friendship treaties that Germany concluded with the CSFR and Poland after
unification embodied the EU’s significance in Germany’s political and economic thinking. Article
VIII in the German-Polish Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Cooperation
guaranteed Bonn’s support for Poland’s associate membership in the EU as a first step towards
full membership. Article X in the German-Czechoslovak Treaty o f Good Neighbourliness and
Friendship confirmed the same commitment on Bonn’s part. The preamble to the German-Czech
Declaration on Mutual Relations and their Future Development also reiterated Germany’s
unwavering support for the EU’s enlargement to include the Czech Republic. Germany’s bilateral
friendship treaties with the Czech Republic and Poland were symbolic since they contained and
86Josef Janning, ‘Germany’s Interests in CFSP’, p. 152.
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guaranteed strong German support for an endeavour that was desperately sought by these 
countries but was still considered politically explosive within other EU quarters.87
The geographical shift o f the EU to the East would also have positive implications for 
Germany’s security as it would be shielded or at least better protected against any political or 
economic instabilities emanating in the former Soviet Union or in Russia. Bonn’s aim was to 
address the security concerns it believed existed on its eastern frontier by ceasing to be the EU’s 
easternmost front-line state, thus allowing Berlin to prosper as Germany’s new capital after 1999. 
This particular theme resonated strongly in the minds o f Germany’s political leadership, 
especially between 1990 and 1998 but even until 2004 when the Czech Republic and Poland 
finally became EU member states.
The economic logic underpinning Bonn’s support for EU enlargement was to forestall the 
rise o f potential economic sources o f instability on its Eastern frontier, which would ultimately 
result in the creation o f zones or pockets o f poverty that would exacerbate economic tensions in 
the new Lander. Kohl frequently argued that it was in Germany’s best interest to close the gap 
between the rich in the West and the poor in the East to avoid the creation o f what he called a 
Wohlstandsgrenze (living standards border) on Germany’s Eastern frontier. The economic 
prospects o f membership would also avert a downward spiral of living standards in ECE. 
According to Kohl, this was an essential precondition for securing the ‘internal peace o f Europe 
and Germany’.88
There was also a domestic economic rationale for expanding the EU. Germany’s private 
sector were keen to gain a vital economic foothold in the region to promote their commercial 
interests by creating and expanding trade links with the ultimate aim of increasing their market 
share in their respective industries. The German government and the private sector were keen to 
operate in a region not characterised by ethnic strife, endemic nationalism, decreasing living 
standards, and gross economic disparities. Bonn firmly believed that the prospect o f EU
87The moral dimension o f German support was based on its ‘indebtedness to the new democracies o f central 
Europe for having brought about the peaceful unification o f Germany in 1989-90’. See Roland 
Freudenstein, ‘Poland, Germany and the EU’, International Affairs, vol. 74, no. 1 (January 1998), pp. 41- 
54.
88See Kohl’s broadcast on Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 6 September 1993, FBIS-WEU-93-171, p. 13.
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membership for these states would promote the political and economic stabilisation o f the region 
and provides an ideal environment for German investments and intensified economic activity and 
cooperation between Germany and the ECE. The prospect o f extending the EU to the East also 
had the effect o f distributing reconstruction costs more evenly amongst the EU’s member states.
A brief overview of the EU enlargement process after the disappearance o f the Iron 
Curtain in 1989/90 captures the significant efforts made by both Western Europe, especially 
Germany and ECE to redefine their political relations and expand their economic ties in an effort 
to assist the latter with its transformation efforts. The ideal institutional vehicle to achieve this 
endeavour was the EU. At the end of 1989, the European Commission created a grant aid 
programme entitled PHARE (originally an acronym for "Poland and Hungary Action for the 
Reconstruction o f the Economy) to assist countries that were moving towards market economies 
and developing democratic institutions. PHARE funds are focused on technical assistance for the 
transformation towards market economies and the introduction o f democratic procedures. It was 
initially intended to provide assistance to Poland and Hungary, but was soon extended to other 
countries in the region.
The negotiation and implementation o f the European Agreements with Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland (December 1991) also had extensive German support. The agreements 
established a framework to support the gradual integration o f ECE into the EC through 
harmonisation o f regulatory structures, technical standards, competition laws, opening o f services, 
etc. Their main purpose was to liberalize trade between the EU and the country in question, 
develop guidelines for political dialogue and promote cooperation in the following areas: free 
movement o f goods and services, removal o f tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, harmonisation 
of legislation, financial cooperation industry, environmental protection and transport. The Europe 
Agreements also included guidance on how to structure national laws so they could be integrated 
into EU law as well as providing the countries in question with guidance on how to become 
member states o f the EU. On 16 December 1991, the Europe Agreements were signed with 
Hungary and Poland and they came into force on 1 February 1994. On 4 October 1994, European 
Agreements were signed with the Czech Republic and Slovakia and they came into force on 1 
February 1995.
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The next step in defining the accession criteria for membership was taken at the 
Copenhagen European Council of 21-22 June 1993. The ‘Copenhagen criteria’ required the 
following from all candidates: (1) stable institutions to guarantee democracy, the rule o f law, 
human rights and the protection o f minorities (the political criterion); (2) a functioning market 
economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU (the 
economic criterion), and (3) the ability to take on all the obligations o f membership, i.e. the entire 
body o f EU law {acquis communautaire), and adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union (the acquis criterion). The European Council also stated: ‘Accession will take 
place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations o f membership by 
satisfying the economic and political conditions required’. Poland applied for EU membership on 
5 April 1994.
The following European Council Summit in Essen in December 1994 requested a 
strategic design for preparing ECE for future accession. Under the German presidency, the EU 
adopted a strategy which emphasised the establishment of structured relations, agricultural policy 
studies, and the request to the Commission to prepare a White Paper on creating the preconditions 
for bringing ECE into the internal market and achieving a harmonisation o f legislation. 
Consequently, the White Paper approved by the Cannes European Council Summit in 1995 
identified key legislative, regulatory and institutional aspects o f the acquis required for accession 
o f the ECE to the EU. The Czech Republic applied to join the EU on 17 January 1996. At its 
Luxembourg Summit in December 1997, the European Council decided to open accession 
negotiations on 31 March 1998 with six countries, as recommended by the European 
Commission: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The 
Luxembourg European Council o f 1997 declared that while compliance with the Copenhagen 
political criteria was essential for the opening o f negotiations, the economic and ‘acquis’ criteria 
must be assessed ‘in a forward-looking, dynamic way’.
During Kohl’s tenure as chancellor, the enlargement of the EU had developed an internal 
dynamic of its own with Germany, simultaneously, assuming the role of the prime advocate o f 
enlargement and the deepening o f the EU’s institutions to make monetary and political union 
irreversible. The genesis o f Kohl’s enlargement vision as the success o f European post-war
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integration was becoming reality although it was evident that not all members shared the same 
enthusiasm for enlargement as Germany did. However, Germany was not always successful in 
meeting its enlargement objectives. It failed, for example, to convince other EU member states 
that the EU should enlarge to only three countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) in the 
first instance.89 The Amsterdam Treaty o f June 1997 expanded on earlier achievements by 
publishing Agenda 2000, the first official document o f the EU to address the link between the 
EU's future evolution, its financing system, and progress in EU integration and enlargement. It 
also provided a comprehensive explanation o f the accession criteria, obligations of membership 
and future strategy for enlargement. Agenda 2000 together with the European Agreements 
constituted the core o f the institutional vehicle for enlargement at which Germany was at the 
forefront.90 Germany viewed no contradiction between deepening and widening processes in EU 
although it was evident that both were not always pursued in a contiguous fashion. The reform of 
the CAP is an example where Germany’s Europapolitik suffered from inherent contradictions: it 
supported the expansion o f the EU whilst wanting to close markets to some goods emanating from 
ECE. Indeed, Bonn, in contrast with other members in the EU, actively pushed a parallel process 
by which deepening and widening would be pursued jointly.91 The enlargement issue was used by 
Bonn to force enlargement onto the political agenda and make EMU and further political union an 
irrevocable process.
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
The FRG was one o f the principal beneficiaries o f NATO membership in the post-Second 
World War Two era; the histories o f the FRG and NATO became intimately linked after 1955 
when the FRG was accepted into the Atlantic Alliance.92 NATO played an instrumental role in the
89Karen E. Smith, The Making o f European Union Foreign Policy: The Case o f Eastern Europe 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p. 165.
90The ceremonial signing o f the Treaty o f Accession with the ten accession countries took place in Athens 
on 16 April 2003 with the participation of the Heads o f State and Government and the Foreign Ministers of 
the countries involved.
9lJosef Janning, ‘Deutschland und die europaische Union: Integration und Erweiterung’ in Karl Kaiser and 
Joachim Krause (eds.), Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik: Interessen und Strategien. Vol. 3 (Munich: R. 
Oldenbourg, 1996), p. 36.
92Karl Kaiser, ‘Forty Years o f German Membership in NATO’, NATO Review (July 1995), pp. 3-8.
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FRG’s evolution as a pillar o f democracy and stability. German military forces were denied an
independent command structure; they belonged to the Alliance’s integrated military structure. The
rationale behind Germany’s aspirations to become a NATO member ‘flowed from its desire for
protection from the Soviet Union; for the economic and military integration o f the Federal
Republic in the Western society o f states in an effort to gain respectability lost between 1933 and
1945; for regaining its sovereignty; ... and for achieving the goal of unifying a dismembered
Germany’.9j The FRG was permitted to flourish and prosper in an alliance of like-minded
members whose common fear was rooted in the expansion o f the Soviet Union into Western
Europe. After the traumatic experiences o f Nazism, the FRG evolved as a peaceful democratic
state after 1955 which was a lasting tribute to the benefits it derived from membership in the
Atlantic Alliance. According to Josef Joffe, NATO and its founding members managed to achieve
the following objectives with regard to Germany:
The Cold War alliance system protected Germany not only from others, but from itself. 
Contrary to the Bismarck Empire, postwar Germany did not have to labour under the 
double burden o f projecting the main threat to Europe’s stability and managing that order 
from a solitary position at the centre. ...With two Germanies countervailing each other in 
opposing blocs, German strength was both neutralised and harnessed. At the same time, 
the two Germanies were not left alone, but remained anchored in alliances that provided 
them with a shelter and a role.94
The FRG’s security policy had been shaped by the following factors: the division and occupation
of the German state, German history, domestic and international scepticism about the evolution o f
German democracy, its position in the Mittellage o f Europe and as a front-line state in what was
seen as the major battleground for a third world war, and, finally, its dependency on the United
States and NATO for all its security needs.
The FRG’s security objectives were successfully met by its membership in NATO. Under
these circumstances, it is no surprise that Bonn was keen to expand, not sever, its vital link with
NATO after unification despite the absence o f an overwhelming Soviet conventional military
threat. The same applied to its principal transatlantic partner in NATO, the United States. Herbert
Blankenhom defined the German consensus on NATO throughout the Cold War: ‘we [Germans]
93See Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling. ‘The Future Germany and the Future o f NATO’, German 
Politics, vol. 1, no. 1 (April 1992), p. 53.
94Josef Joffe, ‘The Foreign Policy o f the Federal Republic o f Germany: Tradition and Change’ in Roy C. 
Macridis (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Politics (Singapore: Prentice Hall, 1992), p. 76.
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ourselves cannot do without NATO. NATO after all is the cloak under which the German- 
American alliance becomes tolerable not only for France but also for smaller neighbours and, last 
but not least, for the Soviet Union itself.95 NATO’s functions served the FRG’s interests 
throughout the Cold War. After 1990, Bonn voiced few doubts that NATO could perform a 
similar function for a united Germany and, crucially, the new independent states in ECE. NATO 
provided an institutional mechanism for containing and integrating the FRG and supporting its 
political and economic agendas in Western and Eastern Europe. The 40-year partnership between 
the United States and the FRG within NATO’s multinational force planning process also 
illustrates how important NATO was as a tool for meeting German objectives. Successive 
German leaders have understood the strategic imperative o f anchoring their country in the 
operations o f Western institutions.
Given the speedy process o f unification and the collapse o f the Soviet Empire, it was 
unclear how NATO would reinvent itself after 1990 and how its members would address external 
security challenges on its Eastern frontier. After the end o f the Cold War, the U.S. mission in 
Europe, especially in Germany changed. Without a specific threat from the Soviet Union, the 
rationale for the existence o f NATO and presence of U.S. troops in Western Europe was 
questioned. The potential decline o f American hegemony in Europe was being debated in Western 
Europe and the United States.96 It also had far-reaching implications for NATO’s attempts to 
redefine its mission in the post-Cold War era. The decline o f its arch Soviet enemy raised the 
question whether NATO should be permanently disbanded since its primary mission, the 
protection o f its members from a conventional or nuclear attack from the Soviet Union, had been 
achieved.
NATO, despite its critics, survived in the post-Cold War era for two main reasons. 
Although there was no formal enemy in the post-Cold War era, the dissolution o f the Alliance 
would have unravelled the three main foundations o f NATO’s creation highlighted by Lord
95Blankenhom quoted by Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years o f German 
Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 37.
96207,660 U.S. troops were deployed in Germany in Europe in 1990. By 1999, the figure was 57,740. See 
Karen E. Donfried, ‘German-American Relations in the New Europe’, Congressional Research Service 
Issue Brief, no. 91018 (5 December, 1996), and I1SS, Military Balance 1998/99 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), p. 27.
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Ismay’s popular dictum: ‘NATO was designed to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and 
Germans down’. NATO could not be replaced; indeed, there was no other comparable military 
alliance which its member states could use to achieve their respective security policy objectives. 
The OSCE and the EU, for example, did not have the appropriate institutional mechanisms or the 
required support to replace NATO’s functions in a post-Cold War Europe.97
NATO’s existence provided for an American anchor in Europe and dispelled the notion 
that Germany might seek to establish a political-military hegemony in ECE. As Volker Riihe 
noted: Germany’s and the United States’ contribution to NATO remains ‘... the most visible 
element o f strategic and political continuity in transatlantic relations’.98 International institutions 
such as the EU and NATO were regarded by Germany’s Western European allies and its Eastern 
European neighbours as effective instruments for harnessing German power and ambitions in the 
post-Cold War era -  a role they had played successfully throughout the Cold War. Somewhat 
paradoxically, Germany’s foreign policy elite felt the same way. Cynically, if some political 
analysts were to be believed, it was actually necessary for Germany to stay firmly ensconced in 
Western international institutions to prevent it from exercising excess levels o f German power and 
pursuing any unilateral or independent foreign and security policy options. In short, Germany had 
to be ‘saved from itself. By continuing to operate within the NATO, Germany was able to rebut 
the notion that it was establishing a new sphere of influence in ECE where bilateral German 
instruments would supersede multilateral ones.
Although the Cold War officially ended sixteen years ago, NATO continues to function as 
the primary political-military alliance in Europe and North America. NATO was a vital external 
source o f Germany’s Sicherheitspolitik and by extension its foreign relations with the Czech 
Republic and Poland. There are three main reasons for this. First, Bonn perceived NATO to be the 
ideal and only military alliance to export stability to these states. Second, a unified Germany’s 
continued membership in NATO and its subsequent support for its enlargement was a confidence- 
building mechanism that reassured the Czechs and Poles about Germany’s objectives and future
97James Sperling and Emil Kirchner, ‘The Security Architectures and Institutional Futures o f Post-1989 
Europe’, Journal o f European Public Policy, vol. 4, no. 2 (June 1997), p. 158.
98Volker Riihe, ‘Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era’, Survival, vol. 35, no. 2 
(Summer 1993), p. 131.
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intentions in ECE. Third, as a NATO member, Germany could continue energetically to pursue its 
security objectives without overextending itself in the defence or in the provision o f military 
assistance to ECE. Germany’s membership in NATO was an invaluable asset in its foreign and 
security policy arsenal and as a multilateral security instrument for meeting its objectives in the 
Czech Republic and Poland.
A critical intersection of agential and structural factors played a fundamental role in 
determining Germany’s Ostpolitik after unification. The German government from 1990-1998 
was characterized by remarkable continuity in the staying power o f key individuals and decision 
making structures. Germany’s Ostpolitik between 1990 and 1998 endured a low turnover o f 
ministers in major cabinet positions in the highest echelons o f government. In the executive 
branch, there were two German presidents: Richard von Weizsacker (1984-1994) and Roman 
Herzog (1994-1999). Chancellor Kohl was in power from 1982 until he left office in October 
1998. His foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, served between October 1982 and May 1992 
(Genscher was first appointed foreign minister in Helmut Schmidt’s government in 1974). His 
successor Klaus Kinkel was foreign minister from May 1992 until September 1998. Gerhard 
Stoltenberg commenced his position as defence minister in April 1989; he retired from office in 
May 1992. His successor Volker Riihe stayed in the government until the CDU defeat in the 
Bundestag elections in September 1998. Theo Waigel (CSU) served as the finance minister from 
April 1989 until September 1998 and was regarded as a crucial political player with regard to the 
Sudeten German question with Prague.
Throughout Kohl’s tenure in office, his CDU party was the dominant political force in the 
country. The CDU’s coalition with the CSU and FDP enjoyed a parliamentary majority o f 60.1 
per cent after the federal elections in 1990. In 1994, the same coalition held on to a 50.7 per cent 
majority in the Bundestag. From the perspective o f the foreign minister’s portfolio in the 
government, the junior coalition partner, FDP, was given the position of the foreign minister, a 
traditional domain o f the FDP since Walter Scheel’s tenure in office under Willy Brandt between
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1969 and 1974." In the positions o f vital importance to the foreign and policy making structures 
o f the German government, there was a remarkable continuity o f individuals who stayed in office, 
especially after 1992, allowing us to better understand the individual dynamics shaping the 
Ostpolitik formulation and implementation processes.
The foreign policy predispositions o f the FRG shaped the foreign policy o f its unified 
successor. The principal foundation o f Germany’s Westbindung after the Second World War was 
its partnership with France in the EC and the United States in NATO. These were the FRG’s 
principal allies in the post-war period and after unification. Both were responsible for shaping the 
FRG’s political, economic, and military development after 1949. Furthermore, they were 
motivated by one prime concern: preventing the spectre of totalitarianism on the European 
continent. The FRG’s membership in the EC and NATO provided West German decision-makers 
with a number o f policy options which were outside the purview of its capabilities. The Cold 
War’s end did not change this power constellation; if anything, Germany’s overwhelmingly 
positive experiences within the EU and NATO and with its main allies strengthened its resolve to 
continue to act in multilateral frameworks and to eschew potentially dangerous and harmful 
unilateral options in ECE.
As a semi-sovereign state in the international system, the FRG’s multilateralism was the 
principal point o f reference for successive governments in Bonn. The bipolar nature o f the Cold 
War and Germany’s division prevented the FRG from adopting unilateral measures in ECE. Only 
from within international institutions such as the EU and NATO could the FRG pursue its foreign 
and security policy objectives, especially unification. The same applied to Ostpolitik which was 
heavily influenced by the same institutional actors, the foreign policies of Czechoslovakia and 
Poland, as well as the Soviet Union.
"Juliet Kaarbo, ‘Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role o f Junior Coalition 
Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 4 (1996), pp. 
501-530.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF GERMANY’S OSTPOLITIK
Ostpolitik has played a central role in German history, especially in the latter half o f the 
twentieth century. The term literally means ‘Eastern policy’ and was commonly used throughout 
the German foreign policy discourse. Its genesis was in the immediate aftermath o f the Second 
World War and in the context o f the FRG’s foreign policy before 1990, Ostpolitik encompasses 
all o f Germany’s foreign relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. After 1990, 
Ostpolitik also embraces the new independent states in ECE, South-East Europe, the Baltic States, 
Russia and the FSU.
Ostpolitik, in its various historical incarnations from the Iron Chancellor Otto von Bismarck 
to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, underwent a radical transformation in less than one hundred and 
thirty years. This historical period was crucial in defining the nature o f Germany’s foreign 
relations with the Czech Republic and Poland after unification. This chapter focuses on the 
historical origins o f Ostpolitik and its relevance for Germany’s post-unification foreign and 
security policy behaviour.
From Bismarck to Hitler: the Historical Roots of the FRG’s Ostpolitik
Germany’s position in the Mittellage of Europe influenced its history and Ostpolitik. Its 
physical location between Latin Christendom in the West and Slavs in the East was a cardinal 
factor in determining the course o f German history.1 An increased German focus on the lands 
inhabited by its Slavic counterparts had its roots in the migration o f German settlers and traders to 
the lands east o f the Elbe and Vistula rivers and beyond the Baltic shores during the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries. According to one o f the leading German intellectuals o f this era, Heinrich von 
Treitschke, an ancient German impulse rooted in the ‘northward and eastward rush o f the German 
spirit and the formidable activities o f people as conqueror, trader and discipliner o f its neighbours’ 
was responsible for driving German interests eastwards.2 He also noted rather prophetically in
'Golo Mann, The History o f Germany since 1789 (London: Pimlico, 1996), pp. 5-6.
2Heinrich von Treitschke quoted by Michael Burleigh, Germany Turns Eastwards: a Study o f Ostforschung 
in the Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 5-6.
1887 that ‘each great nation at the height o f her power decides to make some mark on the barbaric 
lands. ... Those who do not participate in this great rivalry will play a miserable role in the 
coming epoch. Colonisation became a matter o f life and death for the great nations’.3 
Increasingly, German leaders’ attention turned to the Slavic lands in the East: they clearly exuded 
a mythical lure that the Germans could not possibly resist.
Geography and a perennial German Blick nach Osten (eastward gaze) thrust Germans and 
Slavs into a common historical and cultural legacy: one with positive but overwhelming negative 
consequences for both parties. Over one thousand years ago, countless German peasants and 
urban settlers colonized the region and established settlements and towns alongside Slavic tribes. 
The historical implications o f this fateful decision were significant. According to Geoffrey 
Barraclough, ‘it gave for all time a new direction to German aspirations, a new outlet for German 
energies; it added to Germany an area equivalent in dimensions to two-thirds o f its original 
territories’.4 Two centuries after German settlers began colonising the East, German had replaced 
Slav as the pre-eminent language in the territories between the Elbe and Oder rivers. The 
Volksdeutsche represented the most significant minority in Mitteleuropa’s social fabric.5 More 
disturbingly, as time progressed, their existence created an acute source o f instability in 
Germany’s relations with its Eastern neighbours. In the near future, they were to become pawns in 
the game successive German leaders played in Berlin.
3Heinrich von Treitschke quoted by Ivan T. Berend, ‘German Economic Penetration in East Central Europe 
in Historical Perspective’ in Stephen E. Hanson and Willfried Spohn (eds.), Can Europe Work? Germany 
and the Reconstruction o f Postcommunist Societies (Seattle, WA; London: University o f Washington Press, 
1995), p. 133.
4Geoffrey Barraclough, Factors in German Histoiy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), pp. 40-46.
5Martyn Rady, ‘The German Settlement in Central and Eastern Europe during the High Middle Ages’ in 
Roger Bartlett and Karen Schonwalder (eds.), The German Lands and Eastern Europe: Essays on the 
History o f their Social, Cultural and Political Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p. 11. Alfred De 
Zayas defines Volksdeutsche ‘as ethnic Germans outside the Reich and holding citizenship in their 
respective countries o f residence’. See Alfred M. De Zayas, The German Expellees: Victims in War and 
Peace (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), p. 14.
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Bismarck’s Germany and Mitteleuropa
Between the creation o f the Second German Empire in January 1871 and the demise o f 
Hitler’s Third Reich in May 1945, Mitteleuropa played a fundamental role in the foreign policy 
calculations of successive German leaders. German conceptions o f the East were profoundly 
influenced by several factors: (1) Germany’s position in the Mittellage o f Europe, (2) 
Mitteleuropa as a source o f important raw materials and trade, (3) the presence o f ethnic Germans 
in Mitteleuropa, and (4) the loss o f German territory in the East after 1918 and 1945.6 The 
historical record o f Bismarck’s Second German Empire, Wilhelmine Germany, Weimar Germany, 
and Nazi Germany towards Mitteleuropa illustrates German and particularly Prussian concepts o f 
Mitteleuropa: dreams of conquest, expansion, and the acquisition o f colonial empires, started two 
catastrophic world wars. The history of German-Slav co-habitation in Mitteleuropa throughout the 
last one thousand years is a lasting testament to the notion that Germans and Slavs endured a 
‘love-hate’ relationship. Hatred, however, exercised more influence on Prussian and German 
politics. Prussian nationalism and Nazism aimed at reducing all Slavs, specifically Poles, to the 
status o f Untermenschen (subhumans) and servile subjects.
With German unification in 1871, the eternal quest for national unity and identity -  a 
constant factor in German history -  had been satisfied. The geographical contours o f Bismarck’s 
Germany after 1871 revealed much about the Second German Empire’s location in the heart of 
Europe. Lodged in the heart o f the German Empire were East and West Prussia and the Grand 
Duchy o f Posen, which had always been outside German borders. It excluded Bohemia and the 
German and Slovene provinces o f Austria and Trieste. Three principal entities controlled the vast 
heartland of Eastern Europe: Prussia, Russia and Austria-Hungary. Poland suffered partition; it 
was divided into three separate zones.7 The Volksdeutsche still inhabited vast portions o f 
Bohemia, Moravia and Poland.
Poland, on Germany’s Eastern perimeter, sparked Bismarck’s interests. Polish 
nationalism represented the arch antithesis o f German interests o f achieving national unity. One
6Peter Stirk, ‘The Idea o f Mitteleuropa’ in Peter Stirk (ed.), Mitteleuropa: History and Prospects 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), pp. 1-35.
7Norman Davies, God’s Playground. A History o f Poland. Vols. 1 & 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).
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hundred and twenty years of foreign partition exacerbated Prussian feelings o f domination and 
superiority over Poland and fuelled Poland’s contempt for Prussian politics. Bismarck’s 
Kulturkampf (cultural struggle) further alienated Poles and Germans. Besides, Polish Catholicism 
and Prussian Protestantism remained incompatible; Kulturkampf was designed to crush any 
potential political alliances between Catholics and opposition parties in Europe which threatened 
Germany’s existence. Bismarck’s principal foreign policy concern in the East was to counter any 
potential influence the Polish Catholic minority in Prussia’s Eastern provinces might exert 
throughout Europe.
With Bismarck’s resignation on 20 March 1890, Wilhelmine Germany embarked on a 
‘new course’ in foreign policy. It unravelled Bismarck’s alliance strategies and consequently, 
thrust the Empire into self-inflicted isolation with the prospect o f having to fight a future war on 
two fronts. The Empire was obsessed with maintaining its colonial possessions in Africa and East 
Asia. With the outbreak o f the First World War and the subsequent end o f the Wilhelmine era, the 
role o f ‘Middle Europe’ became increasingly important in Germany’s wartime calculations. Three 
main reasons explain this development. First, the region was considered a prime source o f 
invaluable raw materials. Second, Germany’s political, economic and military control o f 
Mitteleuropa would secure German hegemony on the continent and limit Russia’s role in the 
region. The creation o f a Middle European Reich with Germany as the central, organising, 
political, and economic power was gaining more credibility in the face o f a British blockade, 
which threatened Germany’s economic position and international markets.8 Finally, the ‘Middle 
Europe’ idea, i.e. German hegemony in Mitteleuropa, enshrined in Reich Chancellor Theobald 
von Bethmann-Hollweg’s September memorandum o f 1914, was viewed as the ultimate vehicle 
for cultivating Germany’s political and economic hinterland and creating a Central European 
economic area that would include Austria-Hungary, Poland, Denmark, Italy and Scandinavia. 
Bethmann-Hollweg’s dismissal in 1917, the defeat o f the First World War, and the punishing 
provisions of the Treaty o f Versailles destroyed for the time being all o f Germany’s Mitteleuropa 
ambitions.
8For a comprehensive overview o f the Mitteleuropa concept in German history, see Friedrich Naumann, 
Mitteleuropa (Berlin: Georg Reiner, 1916).
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Weimar Germany and Mitteleuropa
The German Empire collapsed with the abdication of Wilhelm II on 9 November 1918. 
Germany’s war defeat signalled the simultaneous destruction o f Prussian nationalism and 
Wilhelmine Germany. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles had disastrous consequences for Germany’s 
territorial possessions in Mitteleuropa and the region’s future ethnic composition. Before the 
Peace Settlements o f 1919, the Second Republic o f Poland had been proclaimed in 1918, and 
Czechoslovakia had become an independent republic under the leadership o f President Thomas 
Masaryk in October 1918. The perceived Diktat o f the Treaty o f  Versailles forced Germany to 
cede the following areas to Poland: the Polish Corridor (between East Prussia and Pomerania), 
Posen, Eastern Upper Silesia and the port city o f Danzig, which became a Free City under the 
control o f the League o f Nations. Lithuania annexed Memelland and Germany lost the 
Hultschiner territories to Czechoslovakia. The Austro-Hungarian Empire disappeared entirely. 
German losses in the East had devastating human and material consequences not only for German 
governments after unification in 1990 but also for subsequent political developments between 
1933 and 1945 and after.
Germany’s losses in Eastern Europe after 1919 also affected the region’s ethnic makeup 
in Czechoslovakia and Poland especially. The principles o f self-determination and nationality, 
which had inspired the spirit and conduct of the Peace settlements o f 1919, led to a precarious 
situation: one-third of the Polish population did not speak Polish and one-third o f the ‘new’ 
Czechoslovak population consisted o f Germans (approximately three million), Russians, 
Magyars, Poles and Ruthenes. The proportion o f Volksdeutsche in Czechoslovakia and Poland 
created an explosive cocktail with important ramifications for Germany’s future relations with 
both states. Large contingents of ethnic Germans suddenly became minorities in several newly 
created independent states in Eastern Europe after 1919.
To achieve the recovery o f Germany’s Ostgebiete, especially in Poland, the Weimar 
leadership resurrected Germany’s Mitteleuropa ambitions under the banner o f securing a revision 
o f the Treaty o f Versailles. There was a consensus amongst Germany’s political parties that the 
1919 German-Polish border was unacceptable and that the Polish Corridor, Danzig, and Eastern 
Upper Silesia should be returned to Germany. These revisionist objectives were part o f a
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comprehensive policy to restore German hegemony in Eastern Europe, not by military means but 
via economic strength, and promote Germany’s inclusion in European as well as international 
structures. These aims were facilitated by two international agreements: the 1922 Treaty o f 
Rapallo and the 1925 Locarno Agreements. The latter represented Weimar Germany’s first 
decisive foray into international politics after the end o f the war and marked the dawn of an 
autonomous foreign policy by a heavily constrained Germany. The former signalled a new 
German strategy to solve its post-Versailles treaty dilemmas in the East. The treaty between 
Germany and Soviet Russia raised the fear o f an entente and potential revisionist claims; it also 
caused acute alarm in Britain, France, and Poland. Germany’s relations with Soviet Russia 
steadily improved whereas its relations with Poland deteriorated over the lost German territory 
issue. It was increasingly manifest that as long as Germany could not regain its lost Ostgebiete, 
German-Polish relations would remain tense. Besides, as long as Germany and Soviet Russia 
remained friends, Poland’s future was uncertain.
The 1925 Locamo Agreements represented an overt attempt by German Foreign Minister 
Gustav Stresemann to pursue political rapprochement with the West, especially France, and 
secure a revision of its border with Poland. Westpolitik and Ostpolitik represented the two sides 
o f the same coin; both were intimately linked and dependent on each other’s success. Germany’s 
Westpolitik relied on achieving a political rapprochement with France, which in turn would 
facilitate its foreign policy strategy vis-a-vis Poland.9 The Locamo Agreements provided the ideal 
forum to meet this goal. Whereas a West-Locarno was feasible and desirable in most German 
political circles, an Ost-Locarno, i.e., the recognition o f the German-Polish border was 
tantamount to committing political suicide for any o f its advocates.10 Weimar’s Ostpolitik 
questioned the legitimacy o f the 1919 German-Polish border at every opportunity: its future 
revision was a priority. By signing the Locamo Agreements, Stresemann intended to regain the 
Reich’s lost territories in Eastern Europe by recognising the status quo in the European system 
and achieving a political rapprochement with the West, especially France. According to A. J. P.
9Klaus Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich: deutsche Aussenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler 1871-1945 
(Berlin: Ullstein, 1999), pp. 535, 540.
10Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich, p. 535.
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Taylor, the essence o f this strategy was not based on achieving supremacy in Mitteleuropa via 
military means -  an unrealistic goal. Supremacy in the region would be achieved ‘by the weight 
o f German industry and the preponderance o f German organizing power’.11 This strategy was not 
successful in the Weimar era but laid the foundations for Hitler’s aspirations to eventually recover 
the lost Ostgebiete.
Nazi Germany and Mitteleuropa
The dynamics o f the FRG’s bilateral relationship with Poland after the Second World 
War reflect the Nazi regime’s impact on both German and Polish politicians. The same applies to 
Czechoslovakia. With the collapse o f the Weimar Republic and the rise o f Adolf Hitler and his 
National Socialist Party in 1933, relations between Germany and its Eastern neighbours rapidly 
deteriorated. Hitler’s Mein Kampf (1925) presented the major foundations o f his ideology and 
political platform: the revision o f the 1919 Versailles Treaty and the inclusion of all ‘stranded’ 
Volksdeutsche in the German Reich, rabid anti-Semitism and anti-Slavism, and the dispersion o f 
the German Volk (people) into Mitteleuropa. Like its Weimar predecessor, Nazi Germany pursued 
extensive revisionist projects in Eastern Europe although Weimar’s aims, by comparison, were 
rather limited.12 At the heart o f Hitler’s ideology was the quest for additional Lebensraum (living 
space) for Mitteleuropa’s Germans and the protection o f the Deutschtum or Deutscher Volksboden 
in Eastern Europe.
The Pan-German movements in Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany provided the impetus 
for Hitler’s ideology. According to lan Kershaw, Pan-Germans used the Lebensraum and 
Raumnot (lack o f living space) concepts ‘to justify territorial conquest by evoking the colonizing 
o f Slav lands by Teutonic knights in the Middle Ages and, emotively, conjure up notions o f 
uniting in the Reich what came to be described as Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) scattered 
throughout Eastern Europe’.lj Acquiring additional Lebensraum in the East would facilitate
11 A. J. P. Taylor, The Course o f German History: A Survey o f the Development o f German History since 
18J5 (London: Methuen & Co., 1976), p. 233.
12Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity: A Political History o f East Central Europe since World War II 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 4.
l3Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris (Harmondsworth: Allen Lane, 1998), 247-250, especially p. 248.
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Eastern Europe’s Germanisation. Nazi Germany’s foreign policy vis-a-vis its Eastern neighbours 
epitomised every aspect o f this strategy as the Volksdeutsche became an important instrument in 
Hitler’s design for stirring up pan-German feelings in their respective homelands.
The most cathartic moment in German-Czech relations after 1933 was the 1938 Munich 
Agreement since it dismembered Czechoslovakia with Britain’s and France’s tacit approval. 
Hitler’s antipathy for the Slavic Czechs fuelled his desire to destroy Czechoslovakia at all costs. 
The leader of the Sudeten German Party in Czechoslovakia, Konrad Henlein, became Hitler’s 
stooge in achieving this objective. The party played the nationalist card in Czech politics thus 
creating chaotic conditions which prompted a forceful Nazi diplomatic and military intervention. 
Under immense Nazi pressure, the Munich Agreement secured a Czechoslovak withdrawal from 
the Sudetenland and the subsequent German annexation o f the territory. The Sudetenland 
annexation confirmed Czech suspicions in 1938 that Hitler could not be trusted and de-legitimised 
the Sudeten cause in Czechoslovakia.
Paradoxically, Nazi Germany sought a political rapprochement with Poland after 1933 at 
the expense of its relations with the Soviet Union. A Non-aggression Pact with Poland was signed 
in January 1934, Hitler’s first step to end Germany’s foreign policy isolation in Europe and 
challenge the French alliance system in Eastern Europe. Germany’s Anschluss with Austria, 
Czechoslovakia’s destruction, and the Hitler-Stalin Pact o f 1939, however, revealed Hitler’s real 
targets across the Baltics, Eastern Europe and Russia: the complete subjugation of all Slavic 
peoples and extermination o f all Jewry. Exerting political-military control over the vast Eastern 
heartland was regarded as essential for maintaining and consolidating Nazi Germany’s power 
base. With the invasion in September 1939 and creation o f a Soviet sphere o f influence in most o f 
Lithuania as well as Estonia and Latvia, the Hitler-Stalin Pact completed the full-scale 
dismemberment o f Poland. The brutal occupation o f Poland from 1939 to 1945 represented the 
most significant manifestation of the Nazi Drang nach Osten to create more Lebensraum for the 
German Herrenvolk (master race).14 Nazi Germany’s conduct during the Second World War was
14The term ‘Drang nach Osten’ in German, Eastern European, and Soviet literature has a complex history. 
See Wolfgang Wippermann, Der 'Deutsche Drang nach Osten’ (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1981).
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critical in defining the nature o f the FRG’s post-war Ostpolitik and the contours o f a unified 
Germany’s Ostpolitik.
The Nazi dictatorship’s collapse and the German Wehrmacht's unconditional surrender in 
May 1945 marked a significant turning point in German history. The Third Reich’s defeat at the 
hands o f the Allied Powers put an end to Nazi tyranny throughout Western and Eastern Europe. It 
also heralded the beginning o f a complex era in the relations between the FRG, the Soviet Union 
and its Eastern European satellite states, including the GDR.
The Big Three Agreements: Tehran (28 November -  1 December 1943), Yalta (4 
February -  11 February 1945), and Potsdam (17 July -  2 August 1945) created the future legal 
parameters o f the FRG’s foreign relations with its Eastern neighbours. At Tehran, the Allies 
agreed that Poland’s border should be moved westward to the Oder River but a decision was not 
reached on the status o f the Polish-German border south o f the Oder. The Neisse River became 
the focal point but there was some confusion about whether the Allies were referring to the 
Eastern or Western Neisse (the Western Neisse flows northward into the Oder at a point where the 
upstream line o f the Oder turns sharply eastward).15 Any shift o f Polish borders to the west would 
result in the loss o f Germany’s Ostgebiete. In addition, the Soviet Union reserved the right to 
annex northern East Prussia, including the city o f Konigsberg, and pre-war Eastern Poland 
(acquired in 1939 by agreement with Nazi Germany). The subsequent transfer o f ethnic Germans 
from Poland was discussed but no firm agreements on how this was to be achieved were reached.
By February 1945, the Allies reckoned it was only a matter of time before Nazi Germany 
capitulated. The Yalta Conference addressed the future shape o f post-war Germany; clarified 
Allied Power views on the future status of Poland’s Western and Eastern borders, and discussed 
the composition o f Poland’s first post-war government. Operating from a position o f strength in 
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union pressed for U.S. and British approval o f the Oder and Lusatian 
Neisse River as Poland’s Western border. It was Stalin’s wish that Poland be compensated for the 
future loss o f its Eastern territories to the Soviet Union by gaining all German territories east o f 
the Oder-Neisse River. Northern East Prussia was to be divided evenly between Poland and the
15W. R. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle over Germany (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1999), pp. 8-9.
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Soviet Union; the German cities o f Stettin and Breslau were to be incorporated into Polish 
territory. These demands met with broad approval from both the U.S. and British with the 
provision that only a final peace treaty with Germany could resolve this important issue. Indeed, 
as the Yalta Conference communique indicated, the Curzon Line was acknowledged as Poland’s 
Eastern frontier and there was agreement amongst the Allies that Poland should acquire 
unspecified amounts o f territory in the north and west. The communique was kept vague in 
anticipation of a final peace settlement to be concluded between the Allies and a defeated 
Germany after the end o f the war.
The Big Three Agreement at Potsdam was crucial to the FRG’s post-war development 
and its relations with the East. It sealed Germany’s fate in Europe. Nazi Germany was thoroughly 
dismembered by the Allied Powers: it was divided into four zones o f occupation and had lost its 
Ostgebiete. The agreement formed the basis for the Deutschlandpolitik of the victorious Allies 
and the emerging European bipolar security order. Besides advancing the principles o f 
denazification, demilitarisation, economic decentralization, and re-education o f the German 
people along democratic lines, the Potsdam Agreement sealed the loss o f Germany’s Ostgebiete -  
all German territories east of the Oder-Neisse River -  to Poland and the Soviet Union. The Oder- 
Neisse River was regarded as Poland’s Western border until a peace conference (which was never 
convened) took place to address the issue.16 The agreement’s main provision exposed the 
ambiguities inherent in the Yalta Agreement. There was eternal disagreement amongst the Allies: 
should Poland’s Western border correspond to the Western or Eastern Neisse line?17 Moreover, if 
the Allies harboured any doubts about the finality o f the Oder-Neisse line, the decision to expel 
ethnic Germans from Poland cemented Poland’s as well as the Soviet Union’s hold on Germany’s 
former Ostgebiete. By the end o f the Potsdam Conference, Germany was forced to relinquish 
twenty-four per cent o f the territory it had occupied in 1937.
16There are at least six international documents that pertain to the Polish-German border issue (Oder-Neisse 
line): the Potsdam Agreement of 1945, the Gorlitz (Zgorzelec) Treaty between the GDR and Poland o f  
1950, the Warsaw Treaty o f 1970, the Two Plus Four Agreement o f 1990, the Border Treaty between 
Germany and Poland (November 1990), and the Treaty o f  Friendship between Germany and Poland in June 
1991.
17Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 434-35.
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Expulsion of Ethnic Germans from Mitteleuropa
The deportation and expropriation o f Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovak border 
regions resulted from post-war decrees issued by Czechoslovak President Edvard Benes and 
approved by the Potsdam Conference. They affected over 3.5 million Germans. Benes issued 
several controversial decrees, the most important being the ‘Czechoslovak citizenship decree’ that 
stripped all ethnic Germans o f their citizenship and prepared their expulsion from the 
Sudetenland. By 25 October 1945, Benes had issued the ‘enemy property confiscation decree’, 
confiscating Sudeten German property and thus paving the way for Czechs to purchase property 
formerly owned by Sudeten Germans.18 The Bene§ Decrees which sanctioned and legalised the 
expulsion o f the Sudeten Germans after the Second World War had a devastating effect on the 
‘normalisation’ o f relations between both states after 1945 and 1990.
Following the first round o f ‘unofficial’ expulsions in late 1944 and early 1945, the 
Potsdam Agreement tacitly sanctioned the expulsion o f millions o f ethnic Germans from Silesia, 
Pomerania, East Brandenburg, and northern East Prussia, along with ethnic Germans who had 
lived outside the territories o f pre-war Germany, in Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic States, 
Hungary, Romania, and the Soviet Union.19 This fateful decision was rooted in the ethnic 
Germans’ willing complicity and collaboration with the Nazi regime. Paradoxically, the 
expulsions were to be undertaken in an ‘orderly and humane’ fashion, which according to Golo 
Mann ‘was somewhat reminiscent o f the request o f the Holy Inquisition that its victims should be 
put to death as gently as possible and without bloodshed’.20 The expulsions were actually carried 
out with brutal force in all states concerned. Revenge became the guiding leitmotif o f  the Czech 
and Polish governments: the Volksdeutsche were viewed as unwanted agents o f the Nazi 
occupation and therefore deserved expulsion. According to John Keegan, the Allies’ controversial 
decision to permit the expulsion o f ethnic Germans had important implications for the future
18Pavel Winkel, ‘The Czechoslovak Presidential Decrees, 1940-45’, Perspectives: The Central European 
Review o f International Affairs, no. 4 (Winter 1994/1995), pp. 13-23.
19Alfred M. De Zayas, The German Expellees: Victims in War and Peace (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1993); Philipp Ther, Deutsche und Polnische Vertriebene: Gesellschaft und Vertriebenenpolitik in der 
SBZJDDR und in Polen 1945-1956 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), and Radomir Luza, The 
Transfer o f the Sudeten Germans: A Study o f Czech-German Relations, 1933-1962 (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd, 1964).
20Mann, The History o f Germany, p. 493.
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ethnic composition o f Germany, Eastern Europe, and the creation o f a post-war European bipolar 
order:
By endorsing the resettlement westward o f Eastern Europe’s Germans -  both those o f 
the borderlands o f the Deutschtum in Poland and Czechoslovakia and the more 
scattered settlements of German commercial, agricultural and intellectual enterprise 
in the Slav and Baltic states -  it returned ethnic frontiers in Europe largely to those 
that had prevailed at the creation o f Charlemagne’s empire at the beginning o f the 
ninth century, solved at a stroke the largest o f the ‘minority problems’, and ensured 
Soviet domination o f central and Eastern Europe for two generations to come.21
Two critical factors: the loss of Germany’s Ostgebiete and the expulsion o f ethnic Germans from
Eastern Europe profoundly shaped the conduct o f its relations with Czechoslovakia and Poland
during the Cold War and after unification. Nazi Germany’s brutal occupation o f Czechoslovakia
and Poland cast a dark shadow on any future prospects o f a normalisation o f relations between the
FRG and these states after 1949. Given the nature o f these historical events, the FRG’s political
leadership under Konrad Adenauer struggled much to formulate a coherent foreign policy toward
the region which had suffered the most under Nazi occupation.
The FRG’s Ostpolitik: Policy Paradoxes between 1949 and 1969 
Konrad Adenauer’s Ostpolitik
With the creation o f the FRG and the GDR in 1949, the two Germanys became members 
o f  opposing ideological blocks with divergent foreign and security policy interests in Europe. 
After 1949, successive Bonn governments, whether they were led by the CDU/CSU, the SPD, the 
Grand Coalition (1966-1969) or in combination with smaller parties such as the FDP, pursued 
their Ostpolitik within the confines o f a superpower straightjacket. The FRG’s ability to pursue 
independent foreign policy objectives towards Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union was therefore 
limited. The history o f Bonn’s Ostpolitik, however, exemplifies how the FRG gradually evolved 
from a passive and constrained foreign policy actor in international politics after 1949 to a more 
independent and assertive actor after 1969. Ostpolitik was the most visible manifestation o f this 
significant change in the FRG’s foreign policy behaviour.
21John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Viking Penguin, 1990), p. 593.
115
The first post-war CDU German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, however, faced 
insurmountable domestic and foreign policy obstacles after 1949. His strong personal convictions 
about the FRG’s future role in Western and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union made his task 
harder. Adenauer was driven by a fundamental lack of interest in Eastern Europe, although the 
main focus o f his Ostpolitik was on Moscow.22 The controversial Potsdam Agreement only 
exacerbated the FRG’s difficulties after 1949. The FRG was not a party to the agreement which 
simultaneously sealed the fate o f its Ostgebiete and heralded the largest post-war expulsion o f any 
ethnic group in Europe, the Volksdeutsche. For Adenauer’s government, the agreement did not 
constitute a final peace settlement. Instead, it was dismissed as being short-lived, although its 
provisions were still binding under international law.2’
The permanent loss o f the Ostgebiete, the most important feature o f the agreement, was 
regarded as transient. This point exposed a significant gulf in domestic political opinion after 
1949, especially amongst the three largest political parties: the CDU, the CSU and the SPD. 
Adenauer wished to seal Germany’s fate in a final peace treaty thereby recovering the lost 
Ostgebiete. In retrospect, however, this policy was illusory and self-defeating since it did not 
recognise the nature o f the bipolar order in international relations and the Soviet Union’s political- 
military hegemony in Eastern Europe. Critics o f Bonn’s revisionist plans in Eastern Europe 
argued that the status of the Oder-Neisse line was final and should be regarded as permanently 
lost. The Soviet Union was regarded as the ultimate arbiter o f the affairs o f its satellite states in 
Eastern Europe and thus, would never permit any changes in its zone of occupation.24 One point, 
however, united Germany’s political parties: the brutal expulsion o f ethnic Germans from the 
former Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia and Poland was not condoned.
Germany’s division into four zones o f occupation and the Soviet Union’s control of what 
was defined as ‘Central Germany’, Northern East Prussia, and East Berlin exacerbated Bonn’s 
multiple Ostprobleme after 1949. Hoping to achieve unification as quickly as possible, the task of
22William E. Griffith, The Ostpolitik o f the Federal Republic o f Germany (Cambridge, MA; London: MIT 
Press, 1978), p. 47.
23PhiIlip A. Buhler, The Oder-Neisse line: A Reappraisal under International Law (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990).
24Karl Jaspers, The Future o f Germany (Chicago, 1L; London: University o f Chicago Press, 1967), p. 132.
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pursuing a compatible and successful Ost- and Westpolitik became much more difficult for Bonn. 
Would Bonn choose an Ostpolitik strategy denying the GDR’s existence or would it legally 
recognise it the GDR to improve its relations with its East German counterpart and its Eastern 
neighbours? The successive governments o f Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard, and Kurt Georg Kiesinger 
-  with different emphases -  believed largely in the merits o f the former strategy.
Bonn’s foreign policy priorities between 1949 and 1969 did not focus extensively or 
exclusively on formulating a constructive and proactive Ostpolitik. Westpolitik, in particular 
Westbindung, was paramount. Westbindung represented the ultimate panacea for Bonn in 
achieving its main objective: unification. In the spirit o f Westbindung, the government deemed it 
unwise to pursue a rapid rapprochement with the Soviet Union and Eastern European neighbours. 
According to Clay Clemens, the adoption o f this strategy ‘guaranteed against a ‘return to 
Potsdam’, that is, a return to the days o f complete national impotence, when the country’s fate 
was settled entirely by external powers in the absence o f German representation’.25 This fear laid 
the foundation for Adenauer’s ‘Potsdam complex’: the notion that the FRG would be excluded 
from future decisions or negotiations that directly affected its future in Europe.26 Ostpolitik was 
largely discredited in the German foreign policy discourse because o f its association with 
Germany’s expansionist heritage in Eastern Europe.
Ostpolitik was also complicated further as Bonn created its own internal legal obstacles, 
which actively prevented a speedy rapprochement with its Eastern neighbours and, in addition, 
affected its relations with its Western allies. The adoption o f extensive legal and quasi-legal 
language -  especially under the CDU/CSU led coalition governments -  manifested itself in the 
following political leitmotifs: the Alleinvertretungsrecht (sole power o f representation); the 
Selbstbestimmungsrecht (right of self-determination); the Recht a u f Heimat (the right o f expelled 
Germans to their homelands in Eastern Europe); and the 1956 Hallstein Doctrine.27 Adenauer’s
25Clay Clemens, Reluctant Realists: The CDU/CSU and West German Ostpolitik, 1969-1982 (London; 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), p. 19.
26Hans-Peter Schwarz, ‘Adenauers Ostpolitik’ in Wolfram F. Hanrieder and Hans Ruhle, eds. lm 
Spannungsfeld der Weltpolitik: 30 Jahre deutsche Aussenpolitik 1949-1979 (Stuttgart: Bonn Aktuell, 1981), 
p. 213.
27Roger Tilford, ‘Introduction’ in Roger Tilford (ed.), The Ostpolitik and Political Change in Germany 
(Westmead: Saxon House, 1975), p. 15.
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Politik der Starke (politics o f strength) included these factors along with his anti-communism. 
The self-imposed Hallstein Doctrine was the most serious policy impediment in the FRG’s efforts 
to improve relations with its Eastern European neighbours and any state which recognised the 
GDR.28 The principle o f Recht a u f Heimat consolidated the Vertriebeneverbande’s support for 
Bonn’s ‘passive’ Ostpolitik in the 1950s and 1960s. They represented a powerful domestic 
political force in the conduct o f Ostpolitik.29 Combined, each o f these foreign policy doctrines had 
a significant impact on the foreign policy processes of the FRG in the 1950s.
It is, therefore, erroneous to claim there was no Ostpolitik between 1949 and 1969.30 In 
the mid-1950s, the overall prospects for a political rapprochement and resumption o f diplomatic 
relations between the FRG, Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe were not good, unsurprisingly. The 
Paris treaties o f  23 October 1954 had successfully integrated the FRG into the Atlantic Alliance. 
In addition, it became a sovereign state on 5 May 1955. Nine days later, the Soviet Union created 
the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO), which included the GDR. The simultaneous creation o f 
two political-military alliances with one Germany in each had a profound impact on the FRG’s 
Ostpolitik as well as its Deutschlandpolitik. Against this backdrop, Adenauer’s visit to Moscow 
(9-13 September 1955) laid the first concrete step for a political rapprochement since the Second 
World War. Despite internal disagreements amongst Germany’s political elite and a lack o f 
progress on the ‘German question’, the summit marked an important turning point in the FRG’s 
Ostpolitik, especially as the quality o f its relations with the Soviet Union dramatically improved. 
The FRG’s failure to respond economically to the unrest and upheavals which occurred in Poland 
and Hungary in 1956 revealed, however, its lack o f interest in its Eastern neighbours’ affairs/1
28The Hallstein Doctrine was directly linked to the concept o f Alleinvertretungsrecht. It was implemented in 
1955 to prevent the recognition o f the GDR by third party states by threatening the abrogation o f diplomatic 
relations with the FRG. It was only applied twice: Yugoslavia (1957) and Cuba (1963).
29Clay Clemens, Reluctant Realists, p. 16.
30Gordon Craig, ‘Did Ostpolitik Work?’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no.l (January-February 1994), p. 163.
3lRobert W. Dean, West German Trade with the East: The Political Dimension (New York: Praeger, 1974), 
p. 172.
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Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik
Before 1966, Bonn operated in a self-imposed foreign policy vacuum vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union and its Eastern neighbours, although the decision taken by Chancellor Ludwig Erhard to 
open West German trade missions in Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary marked the beginning o f a 
new policy vis-a-vis the East. Ostpolitik still remained a hostage o f the international 
environment’s dynamics and especially the superpower rivalry. Bonn was engaged in a proactive 
W estpolitik whereas its Ostpolitik was suffocated by strong domestic and international constraints, 
preventing a ‘normalisation’ o f the FRG’s relations with its Eastern neighbours. The Berlin 
Wall’s erection in 1961 marked a turning point in the history o f the FRG’s Deutschlandpolitik  and 
Ostpolitik. It symbolically embodied the failure o f Adenauer’s Deutschland- and Ostpolitik. The 
impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 on the Cold War and the reciprocal Polish and 
German Episcopal addresses in 1965 on relations between the FRG and Poland were also 
noteworthy.
In its bilateral relations with Poland, the FRG continued to dispute the validity o f the 
Oder-Neisse River as Poland’s Western border. It also refused to declare the 1938 Munich 
Agreement, a significant factor in FRG-Czech relations, null and void. For both countries, these 
actions illustrated not only Bonn’s intransigence but also German revisionism and revanchism 
after the Second World War. Making matters worse, the WTO, under Moscow’s instructions, 
practised an explicit Abgrenzungspolitik  (barrier politics) against the FRG, a further obstacle to 
resuming diplomatic relations between the FRG and Eastern Europe. Czechoslovakia’s 
occupation by WTO states (except Romania) in August 1968 proved that Moscow would not 
tolerate dissent by its satellite states.
The SPD/FDP coalition government which came to power under the chancellorship of 
Willy Brandt in October 1969 charted a new foreign policy course vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the 
GDR and Eastern Europe aiming at closing the gap between a proactive Westpolitik and passive 
Ostpolitik.32 The FRG’s successful Westpolitik encouraged it to adopt a more constructive and 
forward-looking approach vis-a-vis Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The ‘new’ Ostpolitik,
32Marion Grafin Donhoff, Polen und Deutsche: die schwierige Versohnung (Munich: Goldmann, 1993), p. 
50.
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launched by Brandt during his previous tenure as foreign minister in the Kiesinger government,
was now given more impetus, especially after Bonn granted full recognition to Romania in 1967,
thereby signalling the de facto  end o f the Hallstein Doctrine. From 1969, Brandt as Chancellor
could pursue an Ostpolitik independently which was not held hostage to the workings o f the
CDU/CSU/SPD coalition government:
An essential ingredient o f our Ostpolitik was that we applied ourselves to our own 
affairs in a new and more positive manner instead o f relying solely on others to speak 
for us. This meant that, while remaining in touch with our allies and retaining their 
confidence, we became the advocate o f our own interests vis-a-vis the governments 
of Eastern Europe. By so doing we strengthened our voice inside the bodies devoted 
to West European, Atlantic, and international cooperation.33
This strategy was pursued within the confines of a europaische Friedensordnung (European peace
order)/4
To meet its objectives in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Bonn was forced to re­
evaluate all the domestic and external foundations o f its foreign policy for the previous twenty 
years. Brandt directly challenged the conventional wisdom o f previous CDU/CSU governments, 
which believed that maintaining the status quo in the international system was an effective 
strategy for furthering the FRG’s interests, unification especially. For Brandt, it only isolated the 
FRG further from its Western and Eastern neighbours. In addition, the government emphatically 
rejected claims made by the opposition and critics o f Ostpolitik that Brandt had lost bargaining 
leverage with the communist block and permanently sealed the lost Ostgebiete's fate.
To advance the FRG’s interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the GDR and Eastern Europe, 
Bonn acknowledged that German unification was not possible in the current tumultuous 
international environment. The FRG then could formulate and implement a new foreign policy 
strategy towards its Eastern neighbours including: political rapprochement with the Soviet Union 
to promote Entspannungspolitik (detente) in Europe, the normalisation of relations with its 
Eastern neighbours, better bilateral relations with the GDR, the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s
33 Willy Brandt, People and Politics (London: Collins, 1978), pp. 168-169.
34See Brandt’s government declaration published in Klaus von Beyme (ed.), Die grossen 
Regierungserklarungen der deutschen Bundeskanzler von Adenauer bis Schmidt (Munich; Vienna: Carl 
Hanser, 1979).
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signature, and an agreement on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).35 
The Brandt government’s foreign policy was meant to influence the ECE regimes to the FRG’s 
advantage/6
Bonn, however, still would not recognise the GDR as a legitimate, independent state. The 
Brandt government preferred talking, rather provocatively, about zwei Staaten in einer Nation 
(two states in one nation). That was one o f the chief aims o f Brandt’s Ostpolitik: finally 
acknowledging the consequences o f Germany’s defeat in the Second World War. For twenty 
years, Bonn’s political leadership had refused to accept the geopolitical and geo-strategic realities 
o f  the international system, including Germany’s division and the Potsdam Agreement. The logic 
behind the FRG’s new foreign policy was simple: implementing an Ostpolitik which 
simultaneously increased its capacity to act and expanded its international bargaining power and 
freedom o f action vis-a-vis its Western allies. Securing the ratification o f the Ostvertrage was a 
first step.
Eastern Treaties
Bonn’s foreign policy raison d’etre after 1969 became intimately tied to an Ostpolitik 
whose basis was the Ostvertrage: a multi-level amount o f complex diplomatic negotiations and 
agreements with Moscow and its satellite states in Eastern Europe. The Ostvertrage symbolised a 
revolutionary shift in Bonn’s Eastern foreign policy priorities after 1969; they were the first 
concrete attempt by any post-war government to facilitate a political rapprochement with the 
Soviet Union, GDR, and Eastern Europe. They signalled an important watershed in the FRG’s 
Deutschland- and Ostpolitik for numerous reasons. First, Brandt’s willingness to address 
historically and politically sensitive bilateral issues without insisting on the FRG’s 
Alleinvertretungsrecht represented a significant reversal in Bonn’s foreign policy thinking. 
Secondly, the negotiation o f the Ostvertrage was the political elite’s first critical step towards a 
‘normalisation’ o f relations with its Eastern neighbours. Bonn’s efforts at
35The CSCE became an Organisation (OSCE) on 1 January 1995. It has 55 member states, comprising all 
European states together with the United States and Canada.
36Philip Windsor, Germany and the Management o f Detente (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971), p. 84.
121
Vergangenheitsbewaltigung (overcoming or confronting the past) and the development o f a 
conscious Verantwortungspolitik (politics o f responsibility) injected an element o f realism into the 
political negotiations, strikingly absent in the foreign policy strategies adopted by previous 
German governments.
Finally, the negotiation processes o f the Ostvertrage offer a unique insight into how Bonn 
managed its Ostprobleme and the prioritisation of its bilateral relations with its Eastern 
neighbours: Moscow first, Warsaw second, the GDR third and Czechoslovakia fourth -  a set o f  
priorities remarkably similar to a unified Germany’s. The desire for a political rapprochement 
with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe also entailed Bonn’s implicit recognition that the 
CDU/CSU’s foreign policy strategies (especially those adopted by the Adenauer government) had 
failed to further its fundamental foreign policy interests. Under previous CDU/CSU governments, 
Ostpolitik was portrayed as a thorn in their side. Bonn wanted to achieve unification as soon as 
possible through Westpolitik. This policy o f ‘firmness’ or ‘strength’ vis-a-vis Eastern Europe also 
placed unnecessary strains on Bonn’s foreign relations with its Western Allies. Brandt’s priorities 
and strategies were different: the FRG would ultimately benefit (i.e., solve the ‘German question’) 
by formulating and implementing a strategy that recognised the status quo, guaranteed the 
legitimate sovereignty o f the GDR, and acknowledged the Soviet Union’s dominance in Eastern 
Europe. For Roger Morgan, the grand design of the Director o f the Policy Planning Staff in the 
German Foreign Office, Egon Bahr, was based on achieving ‘reconciliation with Germany’s 
Eastern neighbours [which] would result in the creation of a reunified German state, contained in 
a neutralised Central Europe freed from the military power blocs o f the Cold W arV 7 The central 
theme underlying the FRG’s Ostpolitik: ‘Wandel durch Annaherung’ (change through 
rapprochement) was devised by Egon Bahr as early as 1963.j8
The Ostvertrage were vital instruments furthering Bonn’s domestic and foreign policy 
ambitions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the GDR and Eastern Europe. A political rapprochement 
with Moscow first was necessary to secure similar agreements with its satellite states in Eastern
37Roger Morgan. West Germany’s Foreign Policy Agenda (Beverly Hills, CA; London: Sage, 1978), p. 20.
38‘Referat des Leiters des Presse- und Informationsamtes des Landes Berlins Bahr (SPD) vor der 
Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing am 15 Juli 1963’ in Boris Meissner (ed.), Die deutsche Ostpolitik 1961- 
1970: Kontinuitat und Wandel (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970), pp. 45-48.
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Europe, including the GDR. Previous West German chancellors, including Adenauer, had 
recognised Moscow’s prominence in Germany’s Ostpolitik. Moscow always occupied a 
predominant position in German calculations. Relations with Eastern Europe came second. A 
successful Deutschland- and Ostpolitik depended on a political rapprochement and a 
normalisation of relations with Moscow. Yet, the FRG’s political leadership remained lucid about 
the Cold War’s political-military realities: it was politically unwise to ignore U.S. and Western 
interests for the sake o f its Ostpolitik. German pursuits o f bilateral relations were frowned upon; 
the basis for any successful Ostpolitik was rooted in Germany’s membership in the European 
Community and NATO, and the use of multilateral instruments to meet foreign and security 
policy objectives -  a strategy adopted by successive German chancellors after 1949.
Moscow Treaty
The Moscow Treaty (12 August 1970) was the crux o f Brandt’s Ostpolitik. It was a
turning point in the FRG’s post-war history as it laid the political and economic foundations for a
rapprochement with Poland, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia/9 It also contributed significantly to
detente in Europe. Peter Frank, State Secretary in the Foreign Office from 1970 to 1974,
highlighted the Soviet Union’s significance in the FRG’s foreign policy calculations:
The Federal Republic of Germany cannot do without striving for good relations with the 
Soviet Union. A country in the middle o f Europe with more neighbours than any other 
European country is dependent on being friendly with its neighbours on all sides. ... It 
should also be borne in mind with regard to relations with the Soviet Union that the 
Soviet Union is de facto  the determinative force in Eastern Europe.40
The treaty illustrated the first major sign of improvement in West German-Soviet relations since
Adenauer had visited Moscow in October 1955. Negotiated by Egon Bahr and the Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko between 30 January and 22 May 1970, the treaty was an ideal
prototype for the FRG’s subsequent treaties with Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Signed on
12 August 1970 by Chancellor Brandt and the Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin it included
two important articles for Germany’s future with its Eastern neighbours. Articles II and III were
39Michael Freund, From Cold War to Ostpolitik: Germany and the New Europe (London: Oswald Wolff, 
1972), p. 112.
40Frank quoted by Avril Pittman, From Ostpolitik to Reunification: West German-Soviet Political Relations 
since 1974 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 11-12.
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especially pertinent because their emphasis on respecting the territorial integrity o f all states in the 
international system was critical in the context o f  detente during the Cold War. The FRG’s 
acknowledgement o f its frontier with the GDR and the Oder-Neisse line as Poland’s Western 
frontier was very important.
Warsaw Treaty
Eight months after the Moscow Treaty, the FRG was prepared to conclude a similar 
agreement with Poland. Old Ostpolitik business -  the status o f the Oder-Neisse line as Poland’s 
Western border -  was at the heart o f the FRG’s bilateral relationship with Poland and the Warsaw 
Treaty. Negotiations began in February 1970 and Chancellor Willy Brandt and Polish Prime 
Minister Jozef Cyrankiewicz signed the treaty on 7 December 1970 in Warsaw. Article I outlined 
the most important provisions regarding frontier settlement:
• The Polish People’s Republic and the Federal Republic o f Germany unanimously affirm that 
the existing frontier line, the course of which was established in Chapter IX of the decisions 
o f the Potsdam Conference o f August 2, 1945, as from the Baltic Sea immediately west o f 
Swinoujscie (Swinemiinde) and thence along the Oder River to the confluence o f the Lusatian 
Neisse River to the Czechoslovak frontier, constitutes the Western state frontier o f the Polish 
People’s Republic.
• They confirm the inviolability o f  their existing frontiers now and in the future, and mutually 
pledge to respect unreservedly their territorial integrity.
• They declare that they have no territorial claims against one another nor shall they advance 
such claims in the future.41
The treaty was paradoxical: it finally confirmed the Oder-Neisse line as Poland’s Western border;
but, this was not regarded as binding on a future unified Germany -  a major source o f contention
in 1989 and during the negotiation o f the Two Plus Four Accords in 1990. It also mentioned full
diplomatic relations between the parties and the renunciation o f the use of force. In a separate
agreement signed later, Poland allowed a number o f ethnic Germans living in Poland to be
reunited with their families in the FRG.
The Warsaw Treaty, a cornerstone o f Brandt’s Ostpolitik, had lasting political,
psychological and moral implications for the bilateral relations between both states. Brandt’s visit
to Warsaw (6 December 1970) and symbolic kneeling in front o f the monument to the 1943
Jewish Warsaw Ghetto uprising paved the way for the signing o f the most important document in
41For the English translation o f Article 1, see Wladislaw W. Kulski, Germany and Poland: from War to 
Peaceful Relations (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1976), p. 188.
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the FRG’s relations with Poland during the Cold War. It was also a signal that the FRG meant to 
normalise its relations with all WTO states.
Prague T reaty
For the first twenty years of the CDU/CSU’s Ostpolitik, Bonn’s relationship with Prague 
was practically non-existent. Several factors prevented the normalisation o f their relations. Czech 
collective memories of the Munich Agreement (29 September 1938) -  or what Czechs describe as 
Muichovane (Munichites) or Muicho vanstvi42 (Munichism) -  the separation o f Slovakia, the 
Sudetenland Nazi annexation in 1938, and the formation o f the Reich Protectorate o f Bohemia 
and Moravia in March 1939, froze any prospects o f political rapprochement after 1945. In 
addition, the Soviet Union’s hegemony in Eastern Europe, the close ideological relationship 
between Czechoslovakia and the GDR, Bonn’s foreign policy, and the political demands o f the 
Sudeten lobby provided additional obstacles.43
Against the backdrop of Czechoslovakia’s occupation by WTO troops (with the exception 
of Romania) and the Prague Spring, a treaty between Bonn and Prague was unprecedented. 
Chancellor Kiesinger’s policy statement in 1966 declaring the 1938 Munich Agreement null and 
void was an important step towards better relations with Prague. Political rapprochement was 
cemented by a bilateral treaty on commodity traffic and cooperation in economic, scientific and 
technical areas on 17 December 1970. It took three years and six bilateral sessions for Czech 
Foreign Ministry and German Foreign Office representatives to solve their differences about the 
validity of the Munich Agreement, which had erased Czechoslovakia from the European map. 
Czechoslovakia insisted that Bonn acknowledge ‘the invalidity of the Munich Agreement ab 
initio (ex tunc) with all the resulting consequences’. This specific wording was rejected, although 
Bonn did recognise that the Munich Agreement was null and void the moment Hitler invaded 
Czechoslovakia in 1939. The final treaty version simply reiterated the point that the agreement 
was ‘void with regard to their mutual relations’. Article II stated that it would not ‘affect the legal
42Joseph Frederick Zacek, ‘The Czechoslovak View’ in Maya Latynski (ed.), Reappraising the Munich 
Pact: Continental Perspective (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1992), p. 47.
43Libor Roucek, Die Tschechoslowakei und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1989: 
Bestimmungsfaktoren, Entwicklungen undProbleme ihrer Beziehungen (Munich: Tuduv, 1990), p. 18.
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effects on natural or legal persons o f law as applied in the period between 30 September 1928 and 
9 May 1945’. Crucially for Bonn, the legal status, war crimes liability, nationality, or reparations 
claims were not affected. As with the other Ostvertrage, the treaty prevented the use o f force, 
acknowledged the territorial boundaries between Czechoslovakia and Germany, and provided for 
repatriation services for Czechoslovaks and Germans should they be necessary.
As the last Eastern treaty to be signed, the Prague Treaty o f 11 December 1973 was 
obviously not accorded the same importance as the Warsaw Treaty. In fact, as Radko Brach noted, 
‘the impulse for concluding a treaty between Czechoslovakia and the FRG was rooted in the West 
German-Soviet political agreements, not as a result o f an organic bilateral necessity’.44 
Nonetheless, the treaty was symbolic as it announced Bonn’s bilateral treaties with Hungary and 
Bulgaria. As with all previous Ostvertrage, the CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion  attempted to stall 
the treaty ratification by subjecting it to numerous hearings and sessions. It took three years to 
reach an agreement with Prague after the Warsaw Treaty has been initialled.
In sum, the Ostvertrage contributed actively to Entspannungspolitik on the European 
continent though not at the expense of the FRG’s Westbindung. As Garton Ash argues: ‘Ostpolitik 
can be described as detente policy: Entspannungspolitik.45 With this comprehensive Ostpolitik 
strategy, the FRG’s room to manoeuvre in the international system vastly expanded, thus 
increasing its capacity to act and shape its own foreign policy destiny albeit in partnership with its 
Western allies. Political reconciliation with ECE countries was established under the pretext o f 
overcoming the ideological divisions o f the Cold War, forging a stronger European community o f 
states, and exporting political and economic stability to the East. The treaties served as political 
frameworks for Germany’s Ostpolitik until 1990; they were then revised completely after 
unification.
44Radko Brach, ‘Die Bedeutung des Prager Vertrags von 1973 fur die deutsche Ostpolitik’ in Hans 
Lemberg, Jan Kren and Dusan Kovac (eds.), Im geteilten Europa: Tschechen, Slowaken und Deutsche und 
ihre Staalen 1949-1989 (Essen: Klartext, 1998), p. 170. MT.
45Garton Ash, In Europe's Name, p. 22.
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Helmut Schmidt’s Ostpolitik
Helmut Schmidt’s ascent to power in May 1974 as the second post-war German 
chancellor of the SPD was due to a policy characterised by two leitmotifs: ‘continuity’ and 
‘concentration’. Pursuing a ‘continuous’ foreign policy embedded in Western institutional 
arrangements represented a lasting tribute to Brandt’s Ostpolitik. Ostpolitik had undergone a 
radical and positive transformation under Brandt. Schmidt’s objective was to consolidate his 
predecessor’s foreign and security policy through closer political and economic relations. In his 
first official government declaration in the Bundestag, Schmidt stressed that the main 
characteristics of Brandt’s Ostpolitik would be found in his own, vis-a-vis the GDR, Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union.46 Schmidt had played a critical role in shaping Brandt’s Ostpolitik; 
there was no reason to believe significant revisions would be forthcoming -  a policy heralded as a 
diplomatic success by the SPD/FDP coalition government but still derided by the CDU/CSU 
opposition. The idea of ‘continuity’ was a reminder o f the international parameters within which 
German chancellors had to conduct their foreign and security policies. Under Brandt and Schmidt, 
the FRG undoubtedly benefited politically and economically from the Ostvertrage’s 
implementation. On the other hand, Ostpolitik entangled the FRG in a web o f foreign and security 
policies which actually hindered its capacity to act in the international system.
The domestic debate about Ostpolitik, especially the ratification processes o f the 
Ostvertrage, was rife with accusations from the CDU/CSU opposition about selling out the FRG’s 
interests to the GDR, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe. There was no discernible cross-party 
political consensus on Ostpolitik’s emerging contours. The CDU/CSU opposition continued to 
engage in open warfare with the government on the content o f its Ostpolitik. Paradoxically, the 
same opponents o f Brandt and Schmidt’s Ostpolitik maintained SPD based policies when they 
gained power under Chancellor Kohl in 1982.
Internationally, the FRG operated in an environment where its Ostpolitik suffered from 
being a pawn in a complex diplomatic game subject to its NATO allies’ whims and the foreign
46Helmut Schmidt, Kontinuitat und Konzentration (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Neue Gesellschaft, 1975), pp. 9, 
15-16.
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and security policy interests o f the Soviet Union and its satellite states in ECE.47 The FRG 
fluctuated between both poles while trying to develop its diverse interests between the late 1970s 
and the end of the Cold War. This strategy had alienated the FRG’s Western allies. Brandt’s 
Ostpolitik had undermined Westpolitik. Schmidt intended to reverse this damaging trend whilst 
paying attention to burgeoning domestic and global economic crises, such as the drastic increase 
of oil prices by the Organisation o f Petroleum Exporting Countries in June 1979.
The notion of ‘concentration’ illustrated Bonn’s needs to ‘concentrate’ on the obstacles 
presented by the domestic political system and its external foreign policy machinery. However, 
like his predecessors, Schmidt inherited a completely different set o f external conditions which 
would shape his tenure as chancellor until his political demise in 1982. By 1974, the FRG’s 
position vis-a-vis the GDR, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union had fundamentally improved. 
The Ostvertrage had been successfully negotiated and implemented with all major actors in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The treaties reduced tensions and contributed to 
Entspannungspolitik. The Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin had been successfully 
negotiated and the multilateral processes o f the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (Helsinki Conference and Final Act o f 1975, and the follow-up conferences at Belgrade 
and Madrid in 1977-78 and 1980-83) and the Mutual Balance Force Reduction talks in Vienna de- 
escalated the East-West conflict on the European continent.
While the main objectives of Brandt’s Ostpolitik had been achieved, there were 
outstanding disagreements between the FRG and its Eastern neighbours still due to the 
superpower rivalry during the Cold War and the nature o f their bilateral relations. Brandt’s 
Ostpolitik was idealistic; Schmidt’s foreign policy style was realistic and pragmatic. For Schmidt, 
the superpower-dominated international system precluded the normalisation o f relations and close 
friendships with East Berlin, Moscow, Warsaw, and Prague.48 Schmidt and his foreign minister, 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, intended to consolidate the considerable gains achieved by Brandt’s
47Helga Haftendom, Sicherheit und Entspannung: Zur Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1955- 
1982 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1983), pp. 502-504.
48Helmut Schmidt, Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn: Memchen undMachte II (Berlin: Siedler, 1992), pp. 
506-507.
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Ostpolitik and eliminate any residual tensions with their Eastern European and Soviet neighbours.
One key element of Schmidt’s Ostpolitik is Genscherism. According to Helmut Wegner:
The meaning of Genscherism points to the very essence o f Ostpolitik: to step-up 
confidence-building measures; reduce tensions; give support to peace development in 
East-West relations a high priority; and finally, to exert a positive influence on 
democratisation within the Warsaw Pact nations without interfering in their domestic 
affairs.49
Using economic instruments to meet foreign policy objectives was regarded as a crucial measure 
to reduce tensions. They were just as critical in the FRG’s relationship with Poland.
The Warsaw Treaty o f 1970 continued to cast a shadow over the FRG’s relations with 
Poland. According to Genscher, Warsaw regarded normalisation as ‘swift economic assistance 
from the FRG’ whereas Bonn was concerned about ‘increased freedoms for human beings, the 
exchange o f information and opinions, and a satisfactory solution for the ethnic Germans living in 
Poland: between 100,000 and 300,000 Germans had applied for an exit visa with the Polish 
government after the signing o f the Warsaw Treaty and were waiting for an answer’.50 
Czechoslovak-German relations also continued to be hampered by Sudeten German revisionism 
within the FRG. Schmidt’s government firmly believed that economic instruments, in particular, 
Osthandel and the provision o f Ostkredite (Eastern credits), were vital in positively altering the 
nature o f the FRG’s relationship with its Eastern neighbours and in achieving Bonn’s political 
interests.51 One crucial component o f this strategy was Schmidt’s support for ethnic Germans 
residing in scattered communities throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Bonn and 
Warsaw negotiated on the provision o f credits worth DM 2.3bn to secure the right o f between 
120,000-125,000 ethnic Germans to emigrate. Dennis Bark and David Gress pointed out that 
Schmidt and the SPD right wing believed that economic incentives ‘would make the [communist] 
regimes more secure, consequently less inclined to repression and unrestrained violence against 
their own people, and therefore, eventually more liberal and less authoritarian’.52 According to
49Helmut Wegner, ‘The West German Ostpolitik’, RUSI Journal, vol. 135, no. 1 (Spring 1990), p. 37.
50Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1999), p. 255. MT.
51 Schmidt, Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn, p. 505.
52Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History o f West Germany. Democracy and its Discontents 1963- 
1991 (Oxford; Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 1993), p. 322.
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Garton Ash, however, this was a flawed premise hence the following dilemma for Brandt and 
Schmidt’s Ostpolitik:
In this case the original strategy o f Ostpolitik contained an inherent contradiction. Its 
premise was that communist rulers would make desirable changes only when they were 
not under pressure. But the effect o f the changes which presumably the West desired 
would be to increase the pressure on those rulers; pressure from outside would be 
replaced by pressure from below; and then, if  the premise was correct, those rulers 
presumably would feel impelled to clamp down again.53
The need to ‘clamp down’ became apparent during the Solidarity uprisings in Poland between
1980 and 1981. Bonn’s lack-lustre reaction was not lost on the Polish people and the Solidarity’s
leaders.54
Helmut Kohl’s Ostpolitik
The CDU/CSU/FDP coalition government under Chancellor Kohl which emerged after 
Schmidt’s demise on 1 October 1982 pursued an Ostpolitik once again based on ‘continuity’. In 
the international system, the spirit o f detente was waning. The Soviet invasion o f Afghanistan 
(December 1979), the elections o f Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom (1979) and Ronald 
Reagan in the United States (1980), and the Solidarity uprising in Poland (1980) contributed to 
the end of detente in Europe. The stationing o f Pershing II rockets and cruise missiles on German 
soil coupled with the Soviet response to place nuclear weapons in Poland did not help either. The 
foundations of Bonn’s Ostpolitik were unchanged but the new leadership was clearly dissatisfied 
with political and economic developments in the GDR and Eastern Europe. The prevalent idea 
that the FRG’s Ostpolitik had stagnated during Schmidt’s chancellorship had to be engaged.
It is worth considering the main foreign policy leitmotifs and personal convictions behind 
Kohl’s Ostpolitik from 1982-1989 as they set the tone for his second Ostpolitik after 1990. Kohl’s 
historical legacy as the chancellor responsible for unification includes an important Ostpolitik 
dimension which became even more apparent after Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise in the Soviet Union 
(1985) and during the diplomatic negotiations on German unification (1989-1990). Despite the 
CDU/CSU’s past criticisms o f the SPD’s Ostpolitik, the new coalition government did not attempt
53Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1999), p. 334.
54Artur Hajnicz, Polens Wende und Deutschlands Vereinigung: die Offnung zur Normalitdt, 1989-1992 
(Paderbom: Schoningh, 1995), pp. 26-27.
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to shake the foundations o f Brandt’s or Schmidt’s Ostpolitik. Actually, they welcomed the 
treaties’ provisions which, in retrospect, was rather surprising given the CDU/CSU’s fervent 
opposition to the negotiation and implementation processes o f the Ostvertrage from 1969-1974.55 
According to Clay Clemens, ‘the party continued to pursue a dualistic, two-track policy on 
relations with the East. Few observers were surprised that Kohl’s union once in power continued 
to deal with Bonn’s Soviet bloc neighbours, but the enthusiasm with which the party did so caught 
many off guard’.56 In part, this ‘continuity’ and ‘enthusiasm’, relating to Ostpolitik, was due to 
Genscher who controlled the Foreign Office under Kohl.57
The Ostvertrage still inspired Kohl’s Ostpolitik from 1982 to 1989. The FRG adopted a 
trilateral policy framework: the FRG’s Westbindung (close relations with France and the United 
States especially), an extensive reliance on multilateralism in foreign and security policy 
operations, and an Ostpolitik balancing the interests o f the two main superpowers: the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The latter still remained the dominant power on the European 
continent and most important actor in Bonn’s Ostpolitik calculations, particularly after 1985. 
Chancellor Kohl’s foreign policy adviser, Horst Teltschik, explained the Soviet Union’s 
omnipresence in Kohl’s Ostpolitik: ‘Germany’s Ostpolitik will be condemned to fail at the 
moment it attempts to pursue policies which circumvent Moscow or when it plays off individual 
members of the Warsaw Pact against Moscow or with one another to develop special 
relationships’.58 Kohl’s Ostpolitik still respected the traditional hierarchical structure: the Soviet 
Union first, followed by Poland, and the other Soviet satellite states. The GDR also played a
55Karl-Rudolf Korte, Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohl’s Kanzlerschaft: Regierungstil und
Entscheidungen 1982-1989 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998), p. 264. For a description of Kohl's 
thinking and internal party coalition deliberations on the Ostvertrage ratification, see Helmut Kohl, 
Erinnerungen: 1932-1982 (Munich: Droemer, 2004), pp. 379-384.
56Clemens, Reluctant Realists, p. 278.
57The FRG’s Ost- and Deutschlandpolitik suffered frequently from divergent interests expressed by Kohl 
and Genscher, especially regarding the legal recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as Poland’s Western 
border. For Genscher’s thoughts on this matter, see Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 464-468.
58Teltschik quoted in Dieter Bingen, Die Po/enpofitik der Bonner Republik von Adenauer bis Kohl, 1949- 
1991 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998), pp. 221-222.
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significant role in Kohl’s Deutschlandpolitik, and Ostpolitik, especially vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia 
and Poland between 1982 and 1989.59
Czechoslovakia
The FRG’s Ostpolitik vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia during Kohl’s first government suffered 
from the dynamics of the bipolar system but also disturbing memories rooted in history, especially 
between 1938 and 1946. The Prague Treaty (1973) was the highlight o f a lifeless relationship 
after 1949. Given the contours of FRG-CSFR relations after 1949 and the stem communist 
leadership in Prague, Kohl was not expected to alter the relationship after 1982. It was also 
unfortunate that President Gustav Husak applied repressive and rigid policies with the Soviet 
President Leonid Brezhnev’s tacit approval.
Relations were also burdened by disturbing historical memories on both sides, although 
they diminished in influence and intensity compared with the period 1949-1973. There were no 
outstanding, high-profile bilateral issues (such as territorial disputes) to overshadow relations 
between the FRG and CSFR. Nonetheless, revisionist demands by the Sudeten Landsmannschaft, 
under the political patronage o f Bavaria’s CSU, still upset Czech government officials. Husak and 
the Czech Prime Minister Lubomir Strougal exploited the Sudeten Landsmannschaft demands, 
with Moscow’s support, to fan anti-German sentiments in public and Czech media.60 This did not 
affect FRG-CSFR relations but was a constant reminder to the German leadership that the Sudeten 
Landsmannschaft’s and to a certain extent, the CSU leadership’s demands for Recht a u f Heimat, 
would not disappear from the political landscape.
From 1982 to 1985, bilateral relations were calm and there were no political highlights or 
breakthroughs. Bonn was not compelled to address the Sudeten Germans’ cries for Recht au f 
Heimat or Prague’s proposals for financial restitution for Czechs victims o f the Nazi regime. It 
intended to meet its foreign policy objectives through ‘positive-linkage’ politics: a ‘partial’
59Matthias Zimmer, Rationales Interesse und Staalsrason: zur Deutschlandpolitik der Regierung Kohl 
1982-1989 {Paderbom: Schoningh, 1992).
60Roucek, Die Tschechoslowakei und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1989, p. 107.
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normalisation o f relations would be achieved by promoting further economic and cultural ties.61 
Bonn actively influenced those domains which were not regarded as ‘controversial’ by Prague. 
There were annual meetings on a foreign ministerial level but the last German chancellor to visit 
Prague was Brandt in 1973, which was revealing. Kohl did not visit Prague until 1988.
Despite Gorbachev’s rise to power in 1985 and overtures thanks to perestroika and 
glasnost, relations between Prague and Moscow did not improve. To maintain its power base, the 
Czechoslovak Communist Party’s leadership resisted all of Moscow’s reform efforts which 
threatened to undermine its position.62 The relations between the FRG and the CSFR were 
consequently affected. Kohl looked increasingly to Moscow to promote changes in Eastern 
Europe but this tactic was complicated by NATO’s dual-track decision on medium-range nuclear 
missiles in Europe. Political changes in Moscow would necessarily have an impact on satellite 
states, especially Czechoslovakia and Kohl counted on that.63 The FRG and Czechoslovakia 
managed to sign three bilateral agreements: cultural exchanges (1986), environmental protection 
(1987), and inland navigation, concluded during Kohl’s first official visit as chancellor to Prague 
in January 1988. Unfortunately, his visit, however significant, failed to meet the expectations o f 
either side. It was almost overshadowed by Kohl’s threat to leave if  he was not permitted to pay a 
courtesy call on Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek. The Czech Prime Minister Strougal relented and the 
visit proceeded. Although not disastrous, Kohl’s visit was not a success either. Even the Velvet 
Revolution (1989) had little impact on German-Czech relations.64
Poland
Near the end o f Schmidt’s tenure in office, the FRG’s relations with Poland were 
dominated by the Solidarity uprising (summer o f 1980) and declaration of martial law by Polish
61 Silvia Engels, Deutsche Wirtschaft -  Gestalter der Ostpolitik? Die Bedeutung der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 
fu r  die Regierungspolitik: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Polen, Ungarn sowie die Tschechosfowakei 
1985-1992 (Cologne: SH-Verlag, 1999), p. 218.
62Rothschild, A Political History o f East Central Europe, p. 211. Kohl made a similar observation when he 
visited Prague in 1988. See Helmut Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit (Berlin: Ullstein, 1996), pp. 90- 
91.
63Kohl hinted at this strategy’s effectiveness in 1989. See Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, pp. 91-92.
64Vladimir Handl, ‘Zum Verhaltnis von Innen- und Aussenpolitik: die tschechoslowakische-deutschen 
Beziehungen seit 1945’ in NiedersSchsischen Landeszentrale flir politische Bildung (ed.), Tschechen, 
Slowaken und Deutsche: Nachbarn in Europa (Bonn: BfpB, 1995), pp. 78-79.
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President Wojciech Jaruzelski (13 December 1981). The magnitude and psychological impact o f 
this major domestic crisis on the Polish population captured the Germans’ attention; they sent 
over two million clothing and food packages.65 Paradoxically, the German political leadership 
under Schmidt did not do much.66 In response to the Solidarity upheaval, the Bundestag issued a 
cross-party resolution (18 December 1981) outlining several demands if  relations were to return to 
‘normal’: the lifting o f martial law, release o f all prisoners, resumption o f dialogue with the 
Church, and legalisation of Solidarity.67
When Kohl assumed office on 1 October 1982, the German conditions for a resumption 
o f ‘normal’ relations had not been met.68 In his first official address (13 October 1982) Kohl 
reiterated Germany’s demands. As long as the Solidarity crisis persisted, Kohl could not solve 
several outstanding foreign policy issues: reconciliation and normalisation under the banner o f 
Verstandigungspolitik (politics o f understanding) and the political foundations o f the Warsaw 
Treaty o f 1970, and the elimination and rebuttal o f German ‘enemy’ stereotypes (due to 
‘perceived’ German revanchism in Poland) among the Soviets and Poles. Dieter Bingen defined 
Bonn’s objectives as Schadensbegrenzung (damage limitation) during Kohl’s first term in office.69
The Warsaw Treaty, although highly controversial amongst the CDU/CSU right wing 
faction, helped Kohl manage relations with Poland after 1982. Vertragstreue (treaty loyalty) was 
essential; incidentally, this was also the case with the 1973 Prague Treaty. Kohl’s Ostpolitik 
centred on three issues: the Oder-Neisse line, support for ethnic Germans living in Poland, and the 
improvement and expansion o f economic ties, including the reduction o f the Polish debt owed to 
the FRG. The controversial Oder-Neisse line was undoubtedly the most delicate issue for Poland.
First, the treaty’s Article 1 stipulated that the FRG would not call into question the legality 
o f the Oder-Neisse line as Poland’s Western border. Kohl never did but he failed to stamp his
65Jorg K. Hoensch, ‘Der Normalisierungsprozess zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Polen’, 
A us Politik und Zeitgeschichte, nos. 12-13(16 March 1990), p. 48.
66For the reasons behind Bonn’s hesitant reaction to the crisis in Poland, see Garton Ash, The Polish 
Revolution, pp. 329-338.
67Bingen, Die Polenpolitik der Bonner Republik, p. 223.
68Martial law was suspended at the end o f December 1982 and formally lifted on 22 July 1983.
69Bingen, Die Polenpolitik der Bonner Republik, p. 230.
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authority thereby allowing the CDU/CSU’s fringe elements (expellee organisations such as the 
Bundesverband der Vertriebenen and the Schlesien Landsmannschaft) to exploit this old border 
issue for political purposes. Government ministers from 1982 to 1990 had insisted that only a 
unified Germany could decide whether the Oder-Neisse line would  remain Poland’s Western 
border.70 From a Polish perspective, Bonn’s emphasis on Rechtspositionen  (legalistic 
interpretations o f the treaty) was revisionist and revanchist.71
Various interpretations of Article 1 spawned internal differences in Kohl’s own party and 
with his coalition partner, the FDP. In the absence o f clear, unambiguous government statements 
on central issues in FRG-Polish relations in the immediate months following Kohl’s rise to power, 
it became increasingly apparent (after October 1982) that the CDU/CSU’s revisionist voice was 
becoming louder than in the past. It came from the right wing o f the party, especially the BdV, led 
by their President Herbert Czaja (CDU), and the Federal Chairman o f the Schlesien  
Landsmannschaft, Herbert Hupka (CDU). Both fuelled the notions that, first, the Ostgebiete 
should be returned to Germany so it could regain its 1937 territory and, secondly, that the Warsaw 
Treaty should be completely revised. These revisionist tendencies caused general unease in 
German-Polish relations after 1982. Between 1989 and 1990, Kohl dealt with the Polish border 
issue by encouraging consensus and party cohesion on pivotal foreign policy issues. The status o f 
the Oder-Neisse line was a divisive issue in the CDU, especially since fifteen per cent o f their 
membership were expellees.72 Power and party-political considerations were at the forefront of 
Kohl’s defence o f his position on the Oder-Neisse line; he always viewed himself first as political 
party leader and second as chancellor.7j
On this issue, differences between Kohl and Genscher became apparent in 1985. Whereas 
Genscher, backed by the FDP and the SPD, was keen to extend firm guarantees to the Poles on
70Korte, Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohl’s Kanzlerschaft, p. 245.
71These legal interpretations guided the FRG’s foreign policy towards Poland from October 1982 until the 
signing of the Border Treaty in November 1990 and the Friendship Treaty in June 1991 with Poland. They 
also explain, amongst other factors, why Kohl was hesitant in 1989-90 about recognising the Oder-Neisse 
line as Poland’s Western border. See chapter four.
72Korte, Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohl’s Kanzlerschaft, p. 250.
73Ibid., p. 249.
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the Oder-Neisse line, Kohl insisted on the treaty’s legal interpretation. Genscher made constant 
references to the permanence o f the Oder-Neisse line in several speeches, the most prominent one 
being in a Bundestag debate (June 1984). Genscher’s motives were guided by his deep sense o f 
M oral- and Verantwortungspolitik towards the Poles. This does not imply that Kohl was not 
moved by similar feelings. One major difference separated the two: Kohl’s need to silence his 
party’s right wing opposed to future concessions to Poland. On the other hand, Genscher had the 
full support of his party (and the SPD) for an immediate recognition o f the Oder-Neisse line as a 
unified Germany’s border with Poland.74 This issue continued to drive a wedge within the CDU 
and between the CDU and FDP until 1990. It also attracted the attention of Germany’s Western 
allies, especially from French President Francois Mitterand during the negotiations o f the Two 
Plus Four Agreements (1990) and the Border Treaty with Poland (14 November 1990).
The fate of the Volksdeutsche in Poland was another hot topic in Kohl’s Polenpolitik. The 
problems surrounding the ethnic Germans’ status in Poland resulted from the Allies’ decision to 
sanction their expulsion from their homeland after the Second World War. Those who were not 
expelled were fully incorporated into Polish society (Polonisation) at the expense o f their socio­
political, cultural, and historical heritage.75 Kohl’s Polenpolitik  offered support -  politically and 
financially -  to all the Volksdeutsche residing in Poland and all the lost Ostgebiete in Eastern 
Europe, the Soviet Union and Central Asia. According to Volker Ronge, this was a ‘policy 
addressing the consequences o f war, and not as a part o f a general (im)migration policy’.76 It took 
three elements into account: the treatment o f ethnic Germans by East European governments in 
their respective homelands, the FRG’s policies o f reception, and the lobbying efforts o f the 
Vertriebeneverbande.
The status and rights o f the Volksdeutsche in Poland were a major source o f contention 
during Kohl’s tenure in office. Ethnic Germans had been persecuted for their origins and, in some 
cases, allegiance to pan-German causes. After 1949, they were not recognised by Warsaw as a
74Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 271.
75Germany?s minority in Poland was not homogeneous. See Joachim Rogall, ‘Die deutschen Minderheiten 
in Polen heute‘, A us Politik und Zeitgeschichte, no. 48 (26 November 1993), pp. 31-43.
76Volker Ronge, ‘German Policies Toward Ethnic German Minorities’ in Rainer Miinz and Myron Weiner 
(eds.), Migrants, Refugees, and Foreign Policy: U.S. and German Policies toward Countries of Origin 
(Oxford: Berghahn, 1997), p. 118.
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legitimate minority and guaranteed national minority rights. Until the signing o f the Warsaw 
Treaty, successive Polish governments had never even acknowledged the existence o f minorities 
on their territory, let alone a German minority which, according to some estimates, fluctuated 
between 600,000 and 1,400,000 people. Warsaw wanted, with mixed success, to enforce the strict 
Polonisation o f all minorities residing in Poland.77 On the other hand, Bonn encouraged Warsaw 
to allow ethnic Germans to immigrate should they wish to do so (and large numbers left Poland to 
move to the FRG). Warsaw was always reluctant to agree to West German demands for increased 
rights for ethnic Germans residing in Poland.78 Polish authorities feared their exodus from: Upper 
Silesia (Katowice, Czestochowa, Opole), Lower Silesia (Wroclaw), Western Pomerania (Slupsk, 
Koszalin, Szczecin) and Mazurkas (Suwalki, Olsztyn). Bonn’s solution was to improve ethnic 
Germans’ general quality of life by ensuring better access to instruction in schools and religious 
services in the German language.
Closely linked to the ethnic Germans’ controversy was Bonn’s promise o f economic aid 
to Poland. Kohl had always insisted that the approval o f economic aid for Poland would depend 
on its positive handling of the ethnic German issue. This economic dimension o f Germany’s 
Polenpolitik was a way to fulfil Kohl’s political objectives, especially Verstandigungs- and 
Entspannungspolitik.79 There was, however, an ulterior motive, as Keith Sword argues: ‘Kohl’s 
actions were motivated by a desire not only to help this Volksgruppe, but also to stem the large 
influx o f ethnic Germans from the east which, when added to the massive inflow of non-German 
asylum seekers, was by the late 1980s reaching extraordinary proportions’.80 A paradoxical policy 
was in operation. Technically, the FRG’s borders were open to all ethnic Germans wishing to 
leave Poland. On the other hand, Bonn encouraged them to stay in their respective countries, so 
that they would not pose a considerable burden on the FRG’s domestic economy. Bonn targeted
77Tomasz Kamusella, ‘Asserting Minority Rights in Poland’, Transition, vol. 2, no. 3 (9 February 1996), p. 
16.
78Wlodek Aniol, Timothy A. Byrnes and Elena A. Iankova, ‘Poland: Returning to Europe’ in Peter J. 
Katzenstein (ed.), Mitte/europa: Between Europe and Germany (Oxford; Providence, RI: Berghahn), p. 93.
79Korger, Die Polenpolitik der Bundesregierung, p. 49.
80Keith Sword, ‘From Ethnic Cleansing to Ethnic Resurgence: The German Minority in Poland, 1945-1995’ 
in Roger Bartlett and Karen Schonwalder (eds.), The German Lands and Eastern Europe, p. 249.
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host countries’ socio-political, economic and cultural policies to ensure that ethnic Germans were 
not tempted to emigrate.
In contrast with Czechoslovakia, the FRG and Poland managed to achieve noticeable 
successes in their relations shortly after the fall o f the Berlin Wall (9 November 1989). The Joint 
Communique on the ‘firm foundation’ of the 1970 Warsaw Treaty was composed o f  eleven 
agreements which were signed by Kohl and the first non-communist Prime Minister o f Poland, 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki (11 November 1989).81 One o f the most important decisions was the 
creation o f a ‘Foundation for German-Polish Cooperation’ that would benefit ethnic Germans 
living in Poland and ethnic Poles living in Germany. The treaty’s Article III secured the political 
foundations: both Warsaw and Bonn agreed to ‘take further steps toward the complete 
normalisation and comprehensive development o f their mutual relations’. Cooperation in 
economic, scientific, scientific-technological, and cultural fields was to be promoted. Bonn 
offered economic and financial support to Poland’s struggling economy which was to be 
coordinated on a bilateral and multilateral level in conjunction with Western partners. Culturally, 
Bonn ensured that the identity of ethnic Germans residing in Poland was respected and preserved. 
Ending Polish discrimination against them was a first step towards the normalisation o f Polish- 
German relations. The Joint Communique marked a significant rapprochement which was utterly 
lacking in Bonn’s relations with Prague after the end o f the Cold War.
Ostpolitik Redux
Mitteleuropa has fascinated Germans for the past one thousand years and will continue 
throughout the next millennium. Germans and Slavs shared a similar historical destiny because o f 
their close geographic proximity; their fates were intertwined. Ostpolitik, as practiced throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, was the most visible manifestation o f Germany’s obsession 
with what Sir Halford Mackinder defined as part o f the geopolitical heartland.82 From Bismarck to 
Kohl, it was the product o f a complex set o f domestic and external factors, which had profound
81Horst Teltschik, ‘The Federal Republic and Poland -  A Difficult Partnership in the Heart o f Europe’, 
Aussenpolitik (English version), no. 1 (1990), pp. 3-14. Ironically, Kohl was in Warsaw when the Berlin 
Wall fell.
82Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1962).
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implications for Germany’s political leadership. Ostpolitik was, first and foremost, a story o f the 
FRG’s relationship with itself and its attitude towards the perennial ‘German question’. German 
control o f its political and economic hinterland in Mitteleuropa was viewed as a means to an end: 
preventing Russian hegemony and the influx of Bolshevism into Eastern Europe in particular.
The main dilemma for the FRG’s Ostpolitik was encapsulated in the following question: 
how could its political leadership achieve the correct balance in prioritising its relations with its 
Western European, transatlantic allies, and the Soviet Union while simultaneously meeting its 
own foreign and security policy objectives? These were not always compatible with other state 
actors. The West’s relations with Poland are a case in point. As Wladislaw Kulski pointed out: 
“ What the Poles could not understand, neither at that time [1941-1944] nor in their earlier history, 
was the fact that Western powers always formulated their policies toward Eastern Europe and in 
particular toward Poland only in consideration o f their relations with Germany and Russia’.8j 
Poland’s experience in Eastern Europe was not unique. Kulski’s conclusion also applies to 
Germany’s relationships with its Eastern European neighbours. The Soviet Union crucially 
influenced the FRG’s Ostpolitik towards Eastern Europe; so did Russia in Germany’s relations 
with the new independent states after 1990.
With the Ostvertrage, Bonn laid the foundations for a normalisation o f relations and 
political reconciliation between a unified Germany and ECE. After 1990, Bonn had success with 
Russia and Poland, before negotiating bilateral friendship treaties with other states. In the security 
domain, the FRG had been obsessed with Entspannungspolitik and its precarious strategic 
environment during the Cold War. After 1990, Ostpolitik included a military and security 
dimension designed to safeguard the stability of Germany’s Eastern frontier and the security o f its 
Eastern neighbours.
Thanks to its Ostpolitik, the FRG achieved its prime foreign policy goal after the Second 
World War: unification. Ostpolitik enabled Germany to address the political consequences o f the 
Second World War and overcome the animosity and tensions resulting from a bipolar and hostile 
Cold War environment. By recognising the Soviet Union’s ubiquitous position in Eastern Europe
83Wladislaw W. Kulski, Germany and Poland: from War to Peaceful Relations, p. 46. Poland was not an 
exception.
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and its potential role in helping solve the ‘German question’, the FRG’s leaders after 1969 created 
the socio-political foundations for a rapprochement with its neighbours to occur.
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CHAPTER FOUR
GERMANY’S POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION 
TOWARDS THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND POLAND
Unification marked a turning point in the evolution of Germany’s foreign relations with 
Czechoslovakia and Poland. One o f the principal components o f its foreign policy was political 
reconciliation. Czechoslovakia and Poland were concerned, for obvious reasons, about three 
important processes in Germany which dominated the agendas o f its domestic and external body 
politic: (1) the management o f unification, (2) the future course o f its Ostpolitik, and (3) 
Germany’s ability and willingness to address outstanding bilateral historical issues with its 
Eastern neighbours. Germany’s attempts to confront its historical legacy and pursue political 
reconciliation with Czechoslovakia and Poland form this chapter’s focal points.
This chapter raises the following questions: why did political reconciliation emerge as one 
o f the dominant leitmotifs o f Ostpolitik and how did it manifest itself in its application? In the 
spirit of normalising relations, were there any discernible differences in Bonn’s approach towards 
both states? In other words, does a comparison o f Germany’s foreign policy behaviour towards 
Czechoslovakia and Poland support the notion that Bonn pursued a ‘selective’ or ‘preferential’ 
Ostpolitik? Finally, what do the political reconciliation processes with its Eastern neighbours 
reveal about the effectiveness o f Germany’s foreign policy strategies in ECE after unification?
This chapter’s first section examines the concept o f political reconciliation in German 
diplomacy after unification. The second provides an analysis o f the foreign policy strategies and 
instruments used by Germany’s leadership to pursue a political rapprochement with 
Czechoslovakia from 1990 until its dissolution on 1 January 1993 and with the Czech Republic 
until the end o f the Kohl era in late September 1998. Finally, Bonn’s foreign policy strategies and 
political reconciliation with Poland will be examined. Similarities and differences in its foreign 
policy behaviour towards both states will be highlighted. Each section will reinforce the 
combination o f agential and structural factors in explaining Germany’s Ostpolitik after 
unification.
Political Reconciliation and German Diplomacy
German diplomacy after unification and its politics o f reconciliation are intimately linked. 
As Martin Wight explains, effective diplomacy is, in some cases, a precondition o f political 
reconciliation:
Diplomacy requires then, the ability to deal on even terms, the possibility o f give and 
take, where either side can make concessions while leaving the substance o f its interests 
intact, or else the side making the greater concessions receives compensation. This is the 
original meaning o f ‘negotiating from a position o f strength’.1
Nazi Germany’s aggressive behaviour in ECE from 1938-45 cast a permanent shadow over all
future German political and economic objectives there, especially during and after the Cold War.
The West German population and the political elites were reminded ad nauseam about their
country’s historical legacy while conducting their foreign affairs. For example, the psychological
impact o f atrocities on the German self-image is crucial when examining Germany’s political
reconciliation with its Eastern neighbours. Norbert Elias argues: ‘Germans have to struggle again
and again with the fact that the we-image o f the Germans is soiled by the memory o f excesses
committed by the Nazis, and that others, and perhaps even their own consciences, blame them for
what Hitler and his followers did’.2
Collective memories rooted in the ‘Holocaust’ or ‘Auschwitz’ factors clearly cast a
shadow over German foreign policy and had a profound effect on the shaping o f German history
and its national identity/ For Markovits and Reich, collective memory is defined as follows: ‘the
view of the past articulated by national leaders and the political class. It is collective in two
senses. First, it is memory about a ‘collectivity’, the nation state, about its domestic developments
and foreign involvements. Second it is a memory o f a collectivity’.4 The challenge o f overcoming
the power of collective memories, negative images, and stereotypes embodied in Germany’s past
became known as Vergangenheitsbewaltigung (coming to terms with the past), a word given a
'Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions (London: Leicester University Press for the 
R11A, 1994), p. 181.
2Norbert Elias, The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development o f Habitus in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 16.
3Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich, ‘The Contemporary Power o f Memory: The Dilemmas for Germany’, 
Communication Review, vol. 2, no. 1 (1997), p. 92.
4Ibid., p. 100.
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prominent and poignant role in German politics after the end o f the Second World War. This 
socio-political phenomena or process, although in a slightly less unencumbered form, still 
pervades the German political conscience today and is considered a leitmotif in Germany’s 
foreign relations with its Eastern neighbours.
Verantwortungsbewufitsein (sense o f  duty) towards the GDR and Soviet Union’s Eastern 
European satellite states also spread throughout German domestic politics, especially after 1969, 
which, in turn, complicated but in some cases advanced the conduct o f Germany’s Ostpolitik. The 
fall o f the Berlin Wall and collapse o f communism only reinforced the strong feelings and 
political affinities felt by Germany’s leadership for the struggling people o f ECE and their 
political leaders who played a crucial role in allowing East Germans to travel to third countries 
before making their escape to the West or German embassies in Budapest, Prague or Warsaw. 
Besides being aggressively and perhaps somewhat reluctantly involved in a constant self-analysis 
and inner-soul searching exercise, Germany’s foreign policy makers were forced to concentrate 
extensively on the shameful acts committed under the banner of National Socialism. Nazi 
atrocities in Czechoslovakia and Poland committed over 50 years ago deeply permeated the 
political reconciliation efforts after the end o f the Cold War.
Political reconciliation emerged as one o f the dominant leitmotifs of German foreign 
policy after unification, especially towards the Czechoslovak and Polish governments who were 
keen on normalising relations with a unified Germany. This was clearly in their interest as much 
as Bonn’s. But as with previous incarnations o f Ostpolitik, Bonn was guided once again by 
hierarchical interests, which were not necessarily congruent with those of its eastern neighbours. 
German Ostpolitik, before and after unification, was dominated by an implicit desire to 
hierarchically structure its relations with Czechoslovakia and Poland with Bonn perceiving the 
latter, initially, as the most important state. German unification provided the best catalyst for 
Bonn’s political reconciliation agenda in ECE although it quickly became evident that the 
majority of its diplomatic efforts would target Poland.
But what does ‘reconciliation’ - a term loaded with different meanings for different 
political institutions and leaders - mean in this context? Patricia Davis maintains that ‘Most 
official German statements equate reconciliation with increased contact and ‘understanding’ as
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well as future co-operation without necessarily delving into the more complex issues o f
confronting the past’.5 The root o f reconciliation, reconcile, stems from the Old French word
reconcilier, which means to ‘make friendly again after estrangement’, ‘settle’ or ‘harmonise,
make compatible’. Each o f these three definitions is applicable. Reconciliation is translated into
German as Versdhnung or Aussdhnung. Timothy Garton Ash notes that they ‘are heavy with both
emotional and religious overtones, containing in their root the word Suhne, meaning expiation,
penance, atonement, and evoking the image, if  not o f ‘God and sinners recoiled’ then at least o f
two human beings falling tearfully into each others arms’.6
These two words, however, as powerful and symbolic as their meanings may suggest,
were not the most commonly used in the German foreign policy discourse. Instead, a panoply o f
different terms was preferred, depending on a given situation or context: Wiedergutmachung
(compensation), gute Nachbarschaft (good neighbourhood), Verstandigung (understanding),
friedliche Kooperation (peaceful cooperation) or Zusammenarbeit (collaboration), and Ausgleich
(balance). They were all compatible with one o f the main leitmotifs o f German foreign policy
after the end o f the Cold War: Harmonisierungsbedurfnis or ‘an insatiable striving after
international harmony on all sides’, as defined by Hans-Peter Schwarz.7
In the context o f state-to-state interaction, ‘reconciliation’ has several meanings which all
apply to Germany’s foreign relations with Czechoslovakia and Poland. Anne Sa’adah argues:
Political reconciliation re-establishes a political community; it (re)creates the conditions 
of political trust. ... The various means used to achieve reconciliation -  limitations on 
participation and competition, punishment, forgiving, a kind o f negotiated memory, or 
forgetting -  often stand in tension with values central to the liberal project: freedom of 
thought, expression, and assembly; due process and the rule o f law and the moral agency 
o f the individual.8
5Patricia A. Davis, German-Polish Borderland Regions: The Need fo r  Reconciliation and the Desire for  
Community (Notre Dame, IN: Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University o f Notre 
Dame, 1997), p. 1.
6Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 
1993), p. 299. The most symbolic and visible act o f reconciliation in the history of Germany's Ostpolitik is 
when Brandt, on a visit to Warsaw in 1970, spontaneously kneeled in front o f the memorial to the victims o f  
the Warsaw Ghetto.
7Ibid., p. 33.
8Anne Sa'adah, Germany’s Second Chance: Trust, Justice, and Democratization (Cambridge, MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 1-2.
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For reasons related primarily to the nature o f the international order after the Second World War, 
it was only after unification that Germany was finally able to launch a ‘reconciliation’ strategy 
seeking to address its historical legacy from 1938-1945. As Garton Ash argues, the inclination to 
address and overcome differences, in short, reconciliation, was also facilitated by the existence o f 
an ‘elementary will to reconciliation and co-operation on the part o f governments and peoples, but 
also the basic compatibility o f political, economic and social systems’.9 Furthermore, Ann 
Phillips’ notion that ‘the need for reconciliation presupposes a traumatic experience(s) locking 
two peoples in an ongoing cycle of mistrust, fear and or hatred’ is particularly pertinent in this 
case.10 As a result o f the Second World War, manifested primarily by Nazi Germany’s brutal 
occupation of both states, feelings of profound hate and mistrust persisted from 1945 until the end 
o f the Cold War in 1989-90, and still exist in some political quarters.
Lily Gardner Feldman identifies four factors which are crucial in a reconciliation process 
between states and are relevant to our discussion o f German-Czech and German-Polish relations 
after 1990. First, history and the mutual interpretations o f the ‘living past’ by the actors involved 
offers insight into the basic foundations underlying the political reconciliation process. Second, 
institutions and the notion of ‘institutionalised transformation’ are an essential component. 
Feldman argues that
bilateral governmental institutions between states and institutionalised transnational 
networks between new societies afford new attitudes, new bureaucratic and personal 
relationships and a new framework within which the parties can confront one another 
as equals in a re-calibrated power relationship.11
Political reconciliation can happen when a country avoids a final settlement of accounts but
strives to create political arrangements or institutions to overcome historical differences or
prejudices. Third, a state’s domestic environment, including the government’s composition and
key domestic actors, undeniably influence the reconciliation process between states. Domestic
interests are paramount. The best examples are Chancellor Kohl’s personal role in defining and
9Ibid., p. 16.
10Ann L. Phillips, Power and Influence after the Cold War: Germany in East Central Europe (Lanham, 
MD; Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 52.
1 'Lily Gardner Feldman, ‘The Principle and Practice of ‘Reconciliation’ in German Foreign Policy: 
Relations with France, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic’. International Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2 (1999), 
pp. 335-336.
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guiding Germany’s socio-political and moral rapprochement with Prague and Warsaw, and the 
power of ethnic Germans and expellee organisations in shaping Germany’s foreign policy.
Finally, the international context cannot be ignored. It was especially important during and after
*■ '
the Cold War as Germany sought to reassure its Western allies about its honourable intentions in 
ECE, while trying to include the Czech Republic and Poland in international institutions such as 
the EU and NATO.
Political Reconciliation with Czechoslovakia, 1990-1992
Even before German unification was considered a remote possibility, Czechoslovakia’s 
political leadership, drawn from the ranks o f the dissident Charter 77 movement after the Velvet 
Revolution, had welcomed the idea as early as 1985. In the 11 March 1985 ‘Prague Appeal’, 
Charter 77 firmly supported the German people’s self-determination long before it was 
fashionable to take such a position.12 Prague’s support for German unification was also apparent 
after the Velvet Revolution o f November 1989 and throughout the negotiations o f the Two Plus 
Four Accords. However, Czechoslovakia, unlike Poland, did not play a prominent role in this 
forum. This is a crucial difference: Warsaw, although not directly involved in all aspects o f the 
Two Plus Four Accords, was nonetheless consulted extensively about the external ramifications o f 
German unification, especially on the Oder-Neisse line’s future status.
The Czech political leadership was absent from these major discussions. Bonn did not 
perceive Prague to be a major actor to be consulted on diplomatic matters pertaining to its future 
unification. It must also be said that Prague did not seek an active role in this process and 
expressed no desire to adopt a joint policy with Warsaw vis-a-vis Bonn. Its political leadership 
was keen on facilitating unification and addressing outstanding issues with Bonn within bilateral 
forums rather than the framework o f the Two Plus Four Accords.,J Incidentally, Prague agreed 
with Warsaw that Bonn had to recognise the Oder-Neisse line before unification. Bonn’s actions
12See Rick Fawn, The Czech Republic: a Nation o f Velvet (Amsterdam: Harwood, 2000), p. 132.
nRadko Brach, Die Republik der Tschechoslowakei zur Zeit der ‘Regierung der nationalen Verstandigung’ 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992), p. 71.
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on this specific issue were closely watched, as Prague waited to see how Germany would manage
one o f its first major foreign policy challenges.
After unification, Germany’s foreign policy had to address and, if possible, rectify the
bilateral problems which had plagued Bonn’s relations with Prague throughout the Cold War.
However, it became clear quickly that this process, despite the absence of a super-power conflict
and Soviet hegemon in ECE, would be bogged down in the hierarchical structure o f Germany’s
domestic and foreign policy priorities. In Czechoslovakia, domestic politics precluded a speedy
negotiation and conclusion o f a friendship treaty. Differing German and Czech perceptions o f
their mutual history only exacerbated the political gulf between both states. Ferdinand Seibt quite
accurately described one o f the main difficulties facing Bonn and Prague after unification:
‘German policy and public opinion are traditionally inclined to rank the Czechs in last place
among their neighbours. We are separated by an alarming number o f prejudices and
generalisations that are more quickly aroused than is the case anywhere else in our
neighbourhood’.14 For Wolf Oschlies, Germany was omnipresent in the Czech leadership’s mind:
‘the Czech Republic is more dependent on Germany, more fixated on Germany, more concerned
about Germany, and more irritated with Germany than the other way around’.15 These points were
not lost on President Vaclav Havel who declared in a speech at Prague’s Charles University:
Obviously, the relationship to the Czechs is not o f the same fundamental importance 
to the Germans; nevertheless, it may be more important to them than some Germans 
might be prepared to admit: traditionally, this relationship has also been one o f the 
tests revealing their own conception o f themselves. Let us recall that Germany’s stand 
towards us has many times been a mirror image o f its stand towards Europe as a whole!16
Peter Glotz went one step further pointing out the Czech Republic’s real fear that its identity
could be crushed by its larger neighbour.17 Political extremism in Germany was also a source o f
18concern.
u Der Spiegel, 9 January 1995, pp. 26-28, 30, FBIS-WEU-95-018, 27 January 1995, pp. 17-19.
15 Wolf Oschlies, Tschechen, Polen, Deutsche, 1990-96. Part 1 (Cologne: Bl-Ost, 22/1996), p. 6.
16Vaclav Havel, ‘Czechs and Germans on the Way to Good Neighborship’, Perspectives: The Central 
European Review o f International Affairs, no. 4 (Winter 1994/95), p. 5.
17Peter Glotz. Die Vertreibung -  Bohmen als Lehrstiick (Munich: Ullstein, 2003), p. 256.
18Karel Vodicka, ‘Tschechisch-deutsche Beziehungen und die Versohnungserklarung,’ Osteuropa, nos. 
10/11 (1997), p. 976.
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Complex and contentious historical memories blotted the domestic and foreign policy 
landscapes o f both states, thus preventing a quick and painless normalisation o f political relations 
after 1990. Forced to manage the collapse o f communism, Czechoslovakia still considered its 
future relations with a unified Germany to be o f paramount importance. Germany was not entirely 
apathetic about the political and economic affairs of its Czechoslovak neighbour yet domestic 
politics and the management o f the Two Plus Four Accords talks took immediate precedence.
Nevertheless, there was a flurry o f bilateral diplomatic activity towards the end o f 1989 
and in 1990 (meetings between Chancellor Kohl and President Havel on 2 January; between 
German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher and his Czechoslovak counterpart Jiri 
Dienstbier on 1-2 February and 2 November; the German President’s visit to Prague on 15 March, 
and visit of the Czechoslovak Prime Minister Marian Calfa in Bonn on 29-30 November) which 
suggests that serious attempts were made on both sides to enter a political dialogue about 
reconciliation and rapprochement. One o f the most important initiatives, launched in February 
1990, by both governments, was the creation o f a Joint Commission o f Historians whose task was 
to ‘investigate jointly and to evaluate the common history o f the peoples o f the two countries’ in 
the 20th century.19 Jeffrey Kopstein observed that the Czech and German historians were fully 
aware of their roles as their governments’ official representatives as well as agents o f international 
understanding.20
The immediate aim o f the German and Czechoslovak governments was to formalise their 
political, economic, and cultural relations thanks to a negotiated friendship treaty. President Havel 
-  unsurprisingly perhaps given his background as a thinker, political moralist, and as some would 
say ‘philosopher-king’ -  took the first step and set the moral and political tone for initiating the 
German and Czech governments’ mutual soul searching and self-flagellation process. This 
process also included interest groups, especially the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft which 
exerted an immense amount o f influence on the foreign policy making processes in both
19Czech-German Joint Commission of Historians, A Conjlictual Community, Catastrophe, Detente: an 
Outline o f the Portrayal o f German-Czech History since the 19th Century (Prague: Institute for 
International Relations, 1996).
20Jeffrey Kopstein, ‘Die Politik der nationalen Aussohnung. Erinnerung und Institutionen in den deutsch- 
tschechischen Beziehungen seit 1989,’ WeltTrends, no. 19 (Summer 1998), p. 59.
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countries. Havel’s first trip abroad to West and East Germany, just three days after becoming
president, launched the political reconciliation process between both states in earnest. His visit’s
objectives were to intensify bilateral relations; open new border points; promote better travelling
connections; open cultural centres; open new consulates; assess their mutual history, and examine
Germany’s role in Czechoslovak foreign policy considerations. His visit, praised in Germany as a
step in the right direction towards normalised relations and setting the foundations for future
reconciliation efforts, was regarded, however, with widespread suspicion in Czechoslovakia as he
criticised the politics o f the First Republic and apologised for the post-war expulsion o f
Germans.21 The domestic Czechoslovak reaction to this formal apology was scathing and
highlighted the absence o f a domestic political consensus on the Czech president’s adoption o f  a
conciliatory and remorseful tone vis-a-vis Germany.22 On the 51st anniversary o f the Nazi
occupation o f Bohemia and Moravia (15 March), West German President Richard von
Weizsacker visited Czechoslovakia. He used the occasion to make the following incisive
comment about the contents o f a personal letter written by Havel (before he became president) to
him after German unification was complete:
The heart o f his [Havel] letter was a carefully reasoned reconciliation with us Germans, 
true to the admonition o f the Bohemian Bishop Comenius: ‘When it comes to 
improvement, everyone must begin with himself.’ ... He wrote: ‘1 myself-as well as 
many friends-condemned the expulsion o f the Germans after the war. This deed always 
seemed to me deeply immoral, damaging not only the Germans but also perhaps to a 
greater degree the Czechs themselves’.2 J
Havel used Weizsacker’s visit to express the need for his countrymen to face the darker side o f
their national history, especially the Sudeten Germans’ post-war transfer, and address their
collective guilt. With their mutual statements and public outreach efforts, both statesmen were
consciously preparing the ground for a normalisation o f relations and the negotiation o f a bilateral
friendship treaty which would define their relationship after the end o f the Cold War.
21 John Keane, Vaclav Havel: A Political Tragedy in Six Acts (London: Bloomsbury, 1999), pp. 467-468.
22Milan Hauner, ‘The Czechs and Germans: A One-Thousand Year Relationship’ in Dirk Verheyen and 
Christian Soe (eds.), The Germans and their Neighbours (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), p. 253.
23Richard von Weizsacker, From Weimar to the Wall: My Life in German Politics (New York: Broadway 
Books, 1999), p. 314.
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German-Czechoslovak Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendship (27 February 1992) 
The Negotiation Phase: principal issues
Immediately after German unification, the German and Czechoslovak governments, as 
well as political parties and interest groups in both countries, staked out their respective positions. 
Czech nationalists, Communists and some Social Democrats remained vehemently opposed to 
any arrangement with Bonn including expressions o f regret over the expulsion o f the Sudeten 
Germans after World War II. Sudeten German organisations were concerned primarily about 
obtaining their Recht a u f Heimat and discussing Czechoslovakia’s past nationalisation o f German 
property before the Communist Party came to power. When asked whether the Sudeten German 
expellees might be taken into consideration within the framework of returning nationalized 
property to its former owners, Prime Minister Marian Calfa answered that ‘for many reasons’ the 
government ‘would prefer not to go back’ to before 1948.24 Czechoslovakia’s restitution laws 
were applied only to property confiscated between 25 February 1948 (date o f  the Communist 
takeover) and 1 January 1990, which ruled out any restitution o f property to Germans.25
During his visit to Prague (2 November 1990), Genscher noted that the new treaty would 
build upon the foundations o f the 1973 normalisation treaty and the German government looked 
forward to future prospects in the German-Czechoslovak relationship. Jiri Dienstbier emphasised 
the importance of laying all issues from the past on the table to ensure a lasting reconciliation.26 
He also indicated that any attempt on the part o f individuals or organisations to influence a 
process to be negotiated by federal parliaments would be dismissed. In Germany, this statement 
was perceived as a veiled attack on the Sudeten Germans.
On January 16 1991, the German coalition government took the key decision to omit 
questions of ownership and compensation from the German treaties to be signed with 
Czechoslovakia and Poland. The bilateral negotiations began in February 1991, and in April the 
two parties exchanged draft texts of the treaty. After four rounds o f secretive talks between
2*FAZ, 16 Oct 1990, p. 6, FBIS-EEU-90-201, pp. 15-16.
25Jan Obrman, ‘Relations with Germany’, RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe, vol. 2, no. 46 (15 November 
1991), pp. 11-16.
26DP A, 2 Nov 1990, FBIS-EEU-90-214, 5 November 1990, p. 16.
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German and Czechoslovak negotiators, the Czech Foreign Ministry’s spokesman, Egon Lansky, 
revealed that the German team was prepared to present its results to Kohl and wait for his 
agreement. Lansky also highlighted three contentious and unresolved issues: (1) the German 
position on the validity o f the 1938 Munich Agreement, (2) the drafting o f the Article on the 
current ethnic minorities on both sides and (3) the closing o f the chapter on the wrongs done in 
the past on an inter-state level.27
By early September, however, further progress had been made as provisional agreements 
between the Czechs and Germans had been reached in the following areas: (1) the invalidity o f the 
Munich Agreement on the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany in 1938, (2) the recognition o f 
the Sudeten Germans’ expulsion as an injustice, (3) the protection of the ethnic German minority 
still residing in Czechoslovakia, and (4) the compensation for Czechoslovak war victims and 
provisions for German economic aid. The Czechoslovak position on several key issues remained 
firm: the CSFR Ambassador to Germany, Jiri GruSa, pointed out his government’s insistence on 
Germany’s moral renunciation of the Munich Agreement and on the exclusion o f the Sudeten 
German demands for Recht au f Heimat and compensation for their expulsion from the 
Sudetenland.28 The Sudeten German reaction in Munich was swift. At a two-day national 
assembly o f the Sudeten Landsmannschaft, Franz Neubauer denounced the draft German- 
Czechoslovak treaty as it did not resolve the problems inherent in the Benes decrees, the Recht a u f 
Heimat principle and the return o f former Sudeten German property (which by one old estimate 
from 1981 amounted to over DM 265 billion).29 He stressed the need for dialogue directly with 
the Sudeten Germans, a demand Czech negotiators had always rejected.
President Weizsacker in an address given to the Federal Assembly said that the wounds in 
the relations between the two countries had not yet fully healed: ‘However, matters can be 
resolved with oneself and with one’s neighbour, only if  one adheres to the truth. He who is strong
21Lidove Noviny, 24 July 1991, p. 3, in FBIS-EEU-91-144,26 July 1991, pp. 15-16.
2%Die Welt, 4 September 1991, p. 4, FBIS-WEU-91-173,6 September 1991, pp. 13-14.
29Winson W. Chu, ‘Remembering the German Minority: The Search for Restitution and Reconciliation in 
Poland and the Czech Republic’, CSEES Newsletter, vol. 16, no. 2 (Summer 1999), p. 20.
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enough to face the truth is smoothing the path toward reconciliation, and thus uncovering our
strength for future co-operation’.30 He also maintained:
Germany supports with full confidence the wish o f Czechoslovakia to be rapidly 
included in European structures, especially in the EC. We will strive for a speedy 
conclusion o f the association negotiations and have reasons to believe that we will 
succeed. ... For German politics, it was never questioned that a united Europe could 
be constructed without its geographical and spiritual centre.31
Kohl, under considerable pressure from his Bavarian coalition partner, the CSU, 
postponed the treaty’s adoption several times, thus complicating the political situation in Prague 
even further. At a meeting with Genscher in early January, Jiri Dienstbier made it clear that Kohl 
had to sign the treaty by 15 February 1992 to prevent it from becoming an election issue. 
Otherwise, the signing ceremony would be postponed until after the elections, which would 
complicate the treaty’s ratification in the Federal Assembly. The potential postponement raised 
hopes among Sudeten Germans as well as Czech opponents o f the treaty that the text could still be 
modified.
The CSU’s role in the coalition government came under fire during the post-initialling 
phase o f the signing o f the Friendship Treaty as tensions between the CSU and Genscher became 
apparent. The CSU leadership disagreed with the treaty provisions as far as the Munich 
Agreement was concerned. The CSU, motivated by Sudeten Landsmannschaft demands, argued 
that it was a legal document when it came into force and was only invalidated later. The CSFR 
disagreed, insisting that the treaty was invalid when it was signed in 1938. As an addendum to the 
1992 treaty, the CSU wanted Bonn to include an exchange o f letters between both countries’ 
promising to address the Sudeten Germans’ property and asset demands. Genscher rejected this 
demand and declared that the treaty would be signed as initialled.32 The German side said that it 
would only offer a solution similar to that found with Poland, where victims o f National 
Socialism would receive compensation from a German government fund. In the end, the treaty 
was a compromise reflecting convergences and divergences o f opinion on the part o f the German 
and Czech negotiators.
30DPA, 8 October 1991, FBIS-EEU-91-195, 8 October 1991, p. 18.
31 Bulletin, ‘Staatsbesuch des Bundesprasidenten in der CSFR’, no. 113(16 October 1991), p. 891. MT.
32FAZ, 20 January 1992, FBIS-WEU-92-013, 21 January 1992, p. 18.
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Treaty Provisions
After ten months o f deliberations and wrangling on the part o f the negotiators and key 
domestic political actors, Bonn signed the Treaty o f Good Neighbourliness and Friendly 
Cooperation with Prague on 27 February 1992.33 On 22 April 1992, the Czechoslovak parliament 
ratified it and on 20 May, the Bundestag approved it with a few CDU/CSU dissenting voices. On 
26 June, the Bundesrat approved the treaty; however, Bavaria voted against its provisions in an 
effort to protest against the Czechoslovak Parliament’s intransigence in supporting a ‘Statement 
of Motives’ which included a justification o f the 1945 treatment o f the Sudeten Germans as a 
‘legal transfer’, instead o f an ‘expulsion’. The CSU and the Sudeten Landsmannschaft in 
particular viewed the ‘statement’ as an overt attempt to undermine the spirit o f ‘reconciliation’ in 
a treaty designed to absolve Czechs o f all guilt vis-a-vis the Sudeten Germ ans/4
The preamble (thirteen statements) is considered to be the treaty’s most controversial 
portion. The entire treaty contains thirty-five articles. On a consensual note, it confirms that 
Czechoslovakia and Germany are ‘Determined to build upon the fruitful conditions o f centuries o f 
common history’ and are ‘Intent upon putting an end, once and for all, to the use o f force, and to 
injustice and retaliation for injustice with new wrongs’. The parties are also ‘Convinced that 
fulfilment of the desire o f their peoples for understanding and reconciliation will contribute much 
to the consolidation of peace in Europe’ and they understand ‘the need to overcome the division 
of Europe once and for all’ in an effort to build a ‘new Europe united by a common heritage and 
common values’. Most importantly, both are: ‘Aware o f the significance that the membership o f 
the Federal Republic o f Germany in the European Community and more intensive cooperation
33For the German text, see Bulletin, ‘Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der 
Tschechischen und Slowakischen Foderativen Republik iiber gute Nachbarschaft und freundschaftliche 
Zusammenarbeit’, no. 24 (4 March 1992), pp. 233-238.
34The Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft, as the umbrella organisation for all Sudeten Germans, rejected the 
treaty but two other Sudeten German organisations (the Catholic Ackermann Gemeinde and the Social 
Democrat Seliger Gemeinde) supported it. The right wing Witiko Bund did not. See Karl Cordell and Stefan 
Wolff, Germany’s Foreign Policy Towards Poland and the Czech Republic: Ostpolitik Revisited (London; 
New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 44.
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between the European Communities and the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic have for their
future relations, and bearing in mind the membership o f both States in the Council o f Europe’.35
The following statement in the Preamble, however, required complex legal negotiations:
both parties recognise ‘that the Czechoslovakian State has not ceased to exist since 1918’ and
support ‘the Treaty on Mutual Relations o f 11 December 1973’. More controversially, the
preamble included the ‘provision on the nullity o f the Munich Agreement o f 29 September 1938’
and both parties are ‘Mindful o f the many victims o f tyranny, war and expulsion and the heavy
suffering inflicted on many innocent people.,j6 After signing the treaty, President Havel noted
there were many obstacles precluding easy negotiations on the contents of the preamble:
We have tried in the preamble, the introduction to this treaty, to express our joint will, 
our common determination, not to avoid the dark sides of our common history, to try 
and look them in the eye, to reflect them truthfully. It is not an easy process, 
especially under the conditions when for decades various superstitions, various dogmas, 
various taboos were being cultivated and built, when history was being distorted.37
There was much disagreement about this preamble. The Germans considered the Munich
Agreement to be valid between 29 September 1938 and 15 March 1939, the date on which
Hitler’s armies completely occupied Bohemia. The Czech negotiators would have preferred it
declared invalid ab initio. The Germans, however, did denounce it and recognised Germany’s
responsibility for all subsequent suffering.
The question o f whether the ‘transfer’ o f Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia in 1945
and 1946 (the term used at Potsdam) should be termed’ expulsion’ in the preamble was arguably
the most emotional issue, especially for Czechoslovakia’s domestic constituents. During the
negotiations, Germany had made it clear that it viewed the Germans’ expulsion and confiscation
of property without compensation as a breach o f international law /8 That the treaty does not
address this issue o f property confiscation was criticised in both countries. As far as borders and
35Bulletin, ‘Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Tschechischen und Slowakischen 
Foderativen Republik’, p. 24. MT.
36lbid.
31Prague Stanice Ceskosiovensko Radio, ‘Havel, Kohl Hold Joint News Conference’, FBIS-EEU-92-040, 
28 February 1992, p. 9.
38Miroslav Kunstat, ‘Germany and the Czech Republic’ in Vladimir Handl et al, Germany and East Central 
Europe since 1990 (Prague: Institute o f International Relations, 1999), pp. 238-239.
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territorial claims were concerned, Article III stated that the ‘Contracting parties confirm the
existing borders between them. They declare that they have no territorial claims against each other
and will not raise any such claims in the future’. Security issues were a serious concern for
Czechoslovakia whereas Germany understated their importance. The internal German debate
about the status of the Oder-Neisse line in Poland had obviously created an impression that it was
best to incorporate a border agreement within the Friendship Treaty.
While there were definitely points o f contention throughout the treaty’s negotiation for
both parties, they were able to settle several fundamental issues. First, they agreed to solve their
conflicts exclusively by peaceful means and both absolved themselves from any territorial claims
against each other. Second, the principle o f national self determination was highlighted. Third,
Germany promised to support Czechoslovakia’s economic development and future application for
full membership of the European Community. Thus, Germany, as with other Eastern bilateral
treaties, sought to provide an institutional framework to foster Czechoslovak aspirations vis-a-vis
the EC. This reflected Kohl’s wish to bring the Czechoslovaks closer to Europe. For him, the
treaty was a means not only to address bilateral issues but also emphasise Germany’s European
ambitions and German hopes for Czechoslovakia:
The treaty we have just signed on good neighbourliness and friendly cooperation is a 
step of fundamental importance in relations between our countries. We are taking this 
step in awareness o f our joint responsibility, as neighbours in the centre o f Europe, 
for building this new Europe, a Europe o f common values/9
Finally, both countries granted full minority rights to Czechs and Slovaks living in Germany and
Germans living in Czechoslovakia. Other important articles included provisions on economic,
scientific, ecological and cultural cooperation and the role o f the youth as a bridge between
domestic societies in Germany and Czechoslovakia. The decision by Germany and
Czechoslovakia to append two letters to the treaty indicated the lack o f crucial consensus in the
areas o f expellee claims and outstanding property questions. In the end, no agreement could be
reached in these crucial areas thus precluding a full reconciliation. It was hoped that
Czechoslovakia’s entry into the European Community would eventually help both parties settle
their historical differences in this area.
39Prague Federal 1 Television, ‘Kohl Speech at Treaty Signing’, FB1S-EEU-92-040, 28 February 1992, p. 
8 .
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Political Reconciliation with the Czech Republic, 1993-1998
Negotiating the Czech-German Declaration on Reconciliation
German-Czech relations after Czechoslovakia’s dissolution40 (January 1993) were still 
deadlocked on disputes concerning the ‘expulsion’ o f the Sudeten Germans, compensation for 
Czech victims o f Nazism, the term ‘state border’, measures against illegal immigration, and the 
opening o f a dialogue with the Sudeten Germans. Steve Crawshaw outlines the crux o f the 
problem by noting that ‘it is arguments about the treatment o f those German minorities prior to 
the Nazi invasion o f the region, their subsequent role under Nazi rule and the manner o f their 
expulsion after the war, which lie at the centre o f the most intractable disputes between Germany 
and some of the region’s governments’.41
The legality o f the Bene§ decrees, the Munich Agreement’s validity, and the right o f 
expelled Sudeten Germans and their descendants to claim compensation in Czech or international 
courts remained contentious. Bonn maintained that the Czech government should disassociate 
itself from the decrees authorized by the Czech President, Edvard Benes, after the Second World 
War, which led to the expulsion o f roughly three million Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia. 
Prague insisted that the Benes decrees were legal under Czechoslovak law when they were 
implemented which Germany disputes. The entire dispute was exacerbated by the political agenda 
o f Sudeten Germans, represented by various organisations involved in the political process, such 
as the Sudeten Landsmannschaft, the Bundesverhand der Vertriebenen (BdV), and Verein fu r  das 
Deutschtum im Ausland (VDA), all o f which enjoy close political links to the CSU, a member o f 
the ruling coalition in Bonn. This situation constituted the crux o f Kohl’s dilemma. Wlodek Aniol 
et al. argue that
40Michael Kraus and Allison Stanger (eds.), Irreconcilable differences? Explaining Czechoslovakia's 
Dissolution (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). According to Jacques Rupnik, it is highly 
unlikely ‘that the division o f Czechoslovakia came about as a result o f a new Central European system 
under German influence’. See Jacques Rupnik, ‘The International Context’ in Jiri Musil (ed.), The End o f 
Czechoslovakia (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 271-272. However, according to 
the former Czechoslovak Ambassador to Germany, Boris Lazar, there is evidence to suggest that before the 
CSFR’s dissolution, certain individuals were trying to persuade the German Ambassador in Prague to reject 
it and that there were also failed attempts by the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry to try and postpone the 
signing and ratification o f the 1992 Treaty to secure more concessions from the German government. 
Ultimately, Ambassador Lazar resisted such moves which resulted in the quick signature and ratification of 
the treaty. See Boris Lazar, “Der deutsch-tschechische Nachbarschaftsvertrag und die Erklarung uber 
Aussohnung” in Theodor Schweisfurth, Walter Poeggel and Andrzej Sakson (eds.), Deutschland, Polen, 
Tschechien: auf dem Wegzur guten Nachbarschaft (Berlin: Springer, 1999), p. 39.
4ISteve Crawshaw, ‘Special Report: Germany Looks East’, Prospect, January (1997), p. 51.
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With the CSU as a central partner in a shaky coalition in Bonn, Chancellor Kohl, German 
foreign policy, and German-Czech relations are thus hostage to a constellation o f 
domestic political forces that give enough weight, within Germany’s general European 
orientation, to a political constituency whose views express traditional Central European 
views.42
Handl, Kural and Reiman note ‘the attitude towards the Czech Republic can to a certain extent be 
the test o f German Europeanism: it can make it clear to what extent the strongest state in Europe, 
which in future will face more than one temptation o f national euphoria and ambition, is ready to 
perceive the interests of a small but not always straightforward partner’ 43
The principal difficulties behind the negotiation o f the Czech-German Declaration on 
Reconciliation were once again rooted in history (especially asymmetrical perceptions o f each 
other’s history) and the power o f domestic interest groups, specifically in Germany. The 1992 
German-Czechoslovak Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendship was perceived by both 
sides as a major step to improve their relations but the five year interlude between the Friendship 
Treaty and the Mutual Declaration proved to be quite challenging for Bonn and Prague. The 
Treaty o f Good Neighbourliness and Friendship was comprehensive but obviously left a bitter 
aftertaste among powerful German and Czech domestic political constituencies. The need to 
‘return to history’ to re-address outstanding issues rooted in the Second World War and its 
immediate aftermath was perceived to be indispensable if both the Czechs and Germans were to 
achieve their mutual objective of getting closer in the spirit o f political reconciliation.
After two years o f relative, or as some termed, ‘dangerous’ calm in their mutual relations 
(1993-1994), the Czech side launched an attempt to place outstanding historical issues back on the 
political agendas o f both states. For the Czech political elite, including President Vaclav Havel 
and Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec, the status quo in German-Czech bilateral relations had 
endured for far too long by early 1995. Below the political surface of both states, discord was 
spreading about the quality of their mutual relations and willingness to put a Schlufistrich (end) to 
their historical differences -  an admirable goal which had not been reached after German
42Wlodek Aniol et al. ‘Returning to Europe: Central Europe between Internationalisation and 
Institutionalisation’ in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), Tamed Power: Germany in Europe (Ithaca, NJ; London: 
Cornell University Press), p. 249.
43Vladimir Handl, Vaclav Kural and Michal Reimann, ‘The Czech Republic and Germany’, Perspectives: 
The Central European Review of International Affairs, no. 8 (Summer 1997), p. 34.
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unification. Missed opportunities and explosive public comments by politicians about the state o f  
Czech-German relations only exacerbated the relationship’s problematic nature. The Czechs 
feared that political reconciliation was in danger o f being marginalised and hijacked by difficult 
and attention-seeking Sudeten expellee organisations and CSU political representatives. More 
disturbing was the assumption that Sudeten German demands -  many of which were highly 
controversial -  were not being refuted or denounced in the manner its Czech counterpart would 
have wished, and were thus allowed to contaminate the complex negotiations o f a new 
declaration.44 Finally, to make matters worse, Czech policy makers believed that Bonn’s interest 
in their country was waning despite its active role in supporting the Czech Republic’s 
membership in the EU and NATO.
The Germans’ view was quite different. The momentum in German-Czech relations, on 
an official level, was perceived to be lost after 1992, primarily because o f internal considerations 
in each state. Germany focused on the management o f unification. The election o f a conservative 
government in Prague after June 1992 also slowed the momentum down. In 1993, the Czech 
government handled the CSFR’s dissolution -  a split that contributed to the notion that the Czech 
Republic would not be as important as the CSFR had been. Nonetheless, it increased Germany’s 
relative power in Czech affairs. 1994 was also an election year in Germany and politicians 
devoted their attention to domestic affairs. Furthermore, Czech Republicans and Communists 
routinely whipped up nationalist and anti-German fervour which alienated Bonn’s political 
leadership. In response, President Havel, as he had in November 1989, took the initiative in 
February 1995 to reflect on the state of German-Czech relations and made the following poignant 
observation about Germany’s importance in Czech eyes, in a speech at Prague’s Charles 
University:
44 Lazar, Boris, ‘Der deutsch-tschechische Nachbarschaftsvertrag und die Erklarung iiber Aussohnung’ in 
Schweisfurth et al., p. 40.
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Our relationship to Germany and the Germans has been more than merely one o f the 
many themes of our diplomacy. It has been part o f our destiny, even a part o f our identity. 
Germany has been our inspiration as well as our pain; a source o f understandable traumas, 
of many prejudices and misconceptions, as well as o f standards to which we turn. Some 
regard Germany as our greatest hope, others as our greatest peril. It can be said that the 
attitude they take towards Germany and Germans has been a factor through which the 
Czechs define themselves, both politically and philosophically, and that it is through this 
particular attitude that they define not only their relationship to their own history, but also 
their self-perception as a nation and state.45
Both sides have to consider the place o f the ‘past’ in Czech-German relations:
We have to know our past history and form our opinions about it. This does not mean, 
however, that we should move back into our past, try to live the lives o f our 
ancestors, time and again reconstruct the situations with which they were confronted 
and copy their behaviour, suffer their agonies or be moved by their successes and 
draw political consequences from such sentiments.46
One year after Havel’s speech, the Joint Commission o f Historians even spoke about the existence
of ‘historical baggage’ which ‘still complicates political understanding between the Federal
Republic o f Germany and the Czech Republic’.47 The Czech historian, Jan Kren, referred to both
countries’ history as a Schicksalsgemeinschaft (history o f a ‘community o f conflict’) where long
lasting struggles and dilemmas dominate the relationship.48
Czech Foreign Minister Zieleniec exploited the Czechs’ and Germans’ positive response
to Havel’s speech to start an initiative to put an end to the historical difficulties underpinning their
relations. He noted:
When we commenced the debate, the prevalent opinion here and in Germany was that 
the problem is a marginal one and would solve itself in the course o f time. Then it 
emerged that the problem basically possesses an internal Czech and internal German 
dimension. Look at the debate in Germany. It is not just a debate on Czech-German 
relations. It is a reverberation o f the big German post-war debate and o f everything 
connected with it.49
Zieleniec believed Prague and Berlin had to negotiate and sign a mutual declaration which would 
address outstanding issues in their relationship.
45Vaclav Havel, ‘Czechs and Germans on the Way to Good Neighborship’, Perspectives: The Central 
European Review o f International Affairs, no. 4 (Winter 1994/95), p. 5.
46Ibid., p. 9.
47Czech-German Joint Commission of Historians, A Conflictual Community, Catastrophe, Detente: an 
Outline o f the Portrayal o f German-Czech History since the 19th Century (Prague: HR, 1996), p. 8.
48Jan Kren, Die Konfliktgemeinschaft: Tschechen und Deutsche 1780-1918. Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1996.
^Frankfurter Rundschau, ‘Czech Foreign Minister on Reconciliation Declaration’, 2 October 1996, FBIS- 
FTS19961002000711.
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Czech-German Declaration on Reconciliation
Declaration Provisions
On 21 January 1997, after over two years of extensive and difficult negotiations, Czech 
Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus and Chancellor Kohl finally signed the Czech-German Declaration 
on Reconciliation. Kohl declared it represented a crucial step in bringing Germans and Czechs 
closer together:
The Declaration is unable to abolish the existing wounds from the past. Nor is it able to 
grasp and assess history in every detail. With due respect for their hurt feelings, however, 
the declaration is intended to make a contribution to reconciliation. It is intended to help 
us both to interrupt the vicious circle o f mutual reckoning and blame.50
In a gesture to generate goodwill with the Czech government, the preamble to the Declaration
states that both governments are ‘aware that the Federal Republic o f Germany fully supports the
acceptance o f the Czech Republic into the European Union and NATO in the conviction that it is
in the common interest.’ Chancellor Kohl had made the link between political reconciliation
efforts and Germany’s European objectives quite clear:
One central goal o f German policy remains the construction o f the European House. 
European unity is the best guarantee for peace and freedom in the 21st century. The 
Czech Republic can contribute a rich intellectual and cultural heritage to the process 
o f European integration. ... For this reason our joint declaration not only serves our 
bilateral relations, but also paves the way towards our common European future. 
Economic co-operation can help overcome conflicting interests. But without the 
contribution o f millions o f individuals we will not succeed in completing this work o f 
peace called European unity.51
Both governments are also ‘convinced that wrongs committed cannot be redressed, but at most
lessened, and that during this era new wrongs cannot be allowed to take place’ and recognise ‘the
need for trust and openness in bilateral relations as a condition for reconciliation that is permanent
and aimed towards the future.’
The principal motivation underlying the Declaration is contained in Article I: ‘both sides
are aware that their common path to the future requires a clear statement regarding their past
which must not fail to recognize cause and effect in the sequence o f events’. Both parties reaffirm
that they share ‘ ... share common democratic values, respect human rights, basic freedoms and
50‘Kohl Addresses Bundestag on Czech Relations’ ARD Television, 30 January 1997, FTS19970130001709.
51See Chancellor Kohl’s policy statement regarding the German-Czech Declaration on Mutual Relations 
and their Future Development, 30 January 1997, available at 
http://www.germanembassyottawa.org/news/sas/kohl-pr-970130e.html.
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norms o f international law, and are dedicated to the principles o f a legal state and a policy o f 
peace. On this basis they are resolved to work together in a friendly and close manner in all areas 
important to the development of relations.’
In Article II, the German government admitted its ‘responsibility for its role in the 
historical development which led to the Munich Agreement o f 1938, to the flight and expelling o f 
people from the Czechoslovak border areas, and to the breakup and occupation o f the 
Czechoslovak Republic.’ It also ‘regrets the suffering and wrongs inflicted on the Czech people 
by the National Socialist crimes of the Germans. The German side pays homage to the victims o f 
violence perpetrated by the National Socialist government, and honors those who put up 
resistance to this violence. The German side is also aware that the National Socialist policy o f 
violence towards the Czech people helped prepare the ground for the post-war flight, expelling 
and forced resettlement.’
In Article III, ‘The Czech side regrets that by the post-war expelling and forced 
resettlement o f Sudeten Germans from the former Czechoslovakia, the expropriation o f their 
property and the removal o f their citizenship, much suffering and many wrongs were inflicted on 
innocent people, with regard also to the collective nature o f the guilt which was ascribed. It 
particularly regrets excesses, which were at variance with elementary humanitarian principles and 
also with the laws then valid, and also regrets that under law 115 o f May 8, 1946, these excesses 
were not regarded as unlawful and as a consequence were not punished.’
Building upon these two fundamental statements o f regret and guilt, both sides agreed in 
Article IV ‘that the wrongs committed belong to the past, and that they should orientate their 
relations towards the future. It is because they remain aware o f the tragic chapters o f their history 
that they are decided to continue to give priority to understanding and mutual agreement in the 
creation o f their relations, although each side remains bound by its legal order and respects that 
the other side has a different legal opinion. Both sides therefore declare that they will not burden 
their relations with political and legal questions arising from the past.’ This agreement to disagree 
explains why it remained impossible to draw a successful legal Schlufistrich (to draw a line under)
161
to the negotiations.52 Political developments since the signing o f the Declaration and in the post- 
Kohl area, however, have rendered these statements hollow.
In Article V, ‘Both sides reaffirm their obligations arising from Articles 20 and 21 o f the 
Treaty of 27 February 1992 on Good-neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation, in which the 
rights o f the members o f the German minority in the Czech Republic and o f persons o f Czech 
descent in the Federal Republic o f Germany are set out in detail. Both sides are aware that this 
minority and these persons play an important role in mutual relations and state that their 
promotion continues to be in their common interest’. Paradoxically, the Declaration does not 
mention the German minority by name; the term ‘Sudeten’ having a negative connotation in 
Czech history.
Article VI reinforces the notion that ‘Both sides are convinced that the entrance o f the 
Czech Republic into the European Union and free movement within this space will further ease 
the co-existence of Czechs and Germans. Within the framework o f their valid laws, both sides are 
prepared, when judging applications for residence and access to the labor market, to take into 
special consideration humanitarian and other reasons, and especially family and other ties’. 
Article VIII supports the efforts o f the Czech-German Committee o f Historians to study their 
mutual relations.
According to Article VII, ‘Both sides will set up a Czech-German Fund for the Future.5"* 
The German side declares that it is prepared to put 140 million DM [German Marks] into the 
fund. The Czech side declares that it is prepared to put 440 million Czech crowns into the fund. 
Both sides will conclude a separate agreement on the joint administration o f the fund’ Most 
importantly, ‘the German side acknowledges its commitment and responsibility with regard to all
52Dieter Blumenwitz, Interessenausgleich zwischen Deutschland und den ostlichen Nachbarstaaten. 
(Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1998.), p. 101.
53‘The Fund for the Future received a total of EUR 84,886,389 from the two governments to finance its 
tasks (DM 165 million), which comprised its income during its first four years of existence and should be 
used in a targeted manner over a period of ten years. The Board o f Directors, composed o f four Czech and 
four German members appointed by the respective foreign affairs ministers, acts as the responsible body o f  
the Fund for the Future. Membership on the Board o f Directors is honorary, similarly to the parity-based 
four-member Supervisory Board, which controls finances. The Fund’s regular activities are secured by the 
secretariat, which includes Czech and German staff.’ See www.zukuntsfonds.cz.
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those who became victims o f National Socialist violence. For this reason those projects to which 
it is applicable should benefit above all the victims o f National Socialist violence.’ 54
Coming to Terms with the Declaration
Judging from the German and Czech political leaders’ public statements after the
Declaration signature ceremony, one would conclude that bilateral relations between the Czech
Republic and Germany had returned to a normal state o f affairs. Czech Prime Minister Vaclav
Klaus noted that there was enough goodwill on both sides to overcome the negative pages o f past-
Czech-German history. He was also convinced that the document paved the way forward for
better future relations with Germany but emphasised that the Declaration protected Czech
interests.55 On the German side, Kohl stated:
The text o f the common German-Czech Declaration deals with controversial stages in our 
mutual history clearly and courageously. This, and I would like to stress that, is 
unprecedented in our common history. I am convinced that it is a good text, which 
expresses the firm willingness on both sides to go into a better, European future 
together.56
German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel also praised the Declaration’s achievements and placed 
them within the broader context o f historical reconciliation efforts pursued by past German 
statesmen:
The German-Czech Declaration is to us not an end, but a cornerstone o f our policy of 
reconciliation with the West and the East. It completes the work which was begun by 
men like Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt, and Walter Scheel, and which was 
continued resolutely by Helmut Kohl and Hans-Dietrich Genscher over many years.57
Despite the Declaration’s success, there was still a great amount o f political tension in the
relationship. In effect, Article IV with its stipulation that ‘each side remains bound by its legal
order and respects that the other side has a different legal opinion’, sowed the seeds for further
political discord as each party shuffled to deal with the fall-out o f often undiplomatic and
54The quoted treaty extracts on pages 23-25 are all drawn from the unofficial English-language translation 
of ‘German-Czech Declaration on Mutual Relations and their Future’, Press Section, Embassy o f the 
Federal Republic o f Germany, Washington, D.C. For German text, see ‘Deutsch-Tschechische Erklarung 
uber die gegenseitigen Beziehungen und deren kunftige Entwicklung’, Bulletin, no. 7 (24 January 1997),
pp. 61-62.
55‘Klaus Comments on Czech-German Declaration’, Prague CTK (English), 17 December 1996, 
FTS19961217000844.
56‘Kohl Addresses Bundestag on Czech Relations’, ARD Television, 30 January 1997.
57‘Kinkel Speaks on Czech Declaration’, ARD Television, 30 January 1997, FTS 19970130001708.
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insensitive political statements made by important decision makers. In times o f crisis, Article IV 
could easily be trumpeted as the solution for managing different opinions about mutual 
interpretations o f the past. When the German Ambassador in Prague Anton Rossbach argued that 
the declaration ‘took nothing from the Sudeten Germans. On the contrary, it opens their chances 
and the Bonn government wishes that the chances be used’; the Czechs suspected that German 
interpretations o f the Declaration were different. In fact, each side comfortably pointed to the 
existence of Article IV as a political face saving mechanism when problems arose. Zieleniec 
avoided criticizing Ambassador Rossbach’s comments as he was only interpreting the official 
German position and also noted that ‘the Declaration is being discussed among the Sudeten 
Germans, and not all o f their leaders find its conclusions easy to reconcile with’.58
But as with all relationships, there were lows as well as highs, and it was up to more 
senior statesmen -  in this case the German and Czech presidents -  to strike the necessary tone and 
create a political environment conducive to discussions about problematic bilateral issues and, 
most importantly, construct a path through the political minefield o f expellee organisations and 
political parties opposed to any rapprochement. President Havel’s speech, delivered to the 
German Bundestag on 24 April, 1997, set the tone for building on one o f the Declaration’s 
principal tenets: the need to look to the future rather than the complex past in an effort to build a 
stronger German-Czech relationship.59 Havel’s speech was universally praised by all parties, 
except the Catholic Ackermann Gemeinde and the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft. Even the 
Bavarian Premier Edmund Stoiber, a fervent Sudeten German propoent, remarked that it was a 
demanding, clever and intelligent speech.60
German President Roman Herzog’s speech one week later in front o f Czech deputies and 
senators at Prague Castle was warmly welcomed by all members o f the Czech political system
58‘Zieleniec reacts to Statement by German Ambassador’, Prague CTK (English), 24 March 1997, FTS 
19970324000517.
59Vaclav Havel, ‘Aus der Rede des tschechischen Staatsprasidentin Vaclav Havel im Deutschen Bundestag 
am 24. April 1997,’ Politische Studien, vol. 48, no. 353 (May/June 1997), pp. 13-17.
60‘PoIiticians Praise Czech President’s Bundestag Speech’, Prague CTK (English), 24 April 1997, 
FTS 19970424001112. See ‘Commentary Calls Herzog’s Prague Speech ‘Exemplary” , FAZ, 30 April 1997, 
in FTS 19970430000420.
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with the exception o f the Communists.61 The then chairman of the Social Democrats and future 
Czech prime minister, Milos Zeman, noted that Herzog’s remarks were greatly balanced and 
convincing as he ‘frankly admitted the cause-and-effect connection between World War Two and 
its consequences’. The Senate Chairman Petr Pithart said: ‘1 did not even expect such words to 
come from the German side’.62 Both speeches injected a healthy dose o f realism and forward 
looking thinking into a relationship that was struggling to find its bearings after several years o f 
difficult negotiations and a prolonged exercise in soul wrenching historical reflection. The two 
neighbors being largely obsessed with their past, any initiative focused on the future, like the 
Declaration, had to overcome significant political hurdles. As Josef Abaffy noted: ‘When in 1995 
and 1996 the hectic fixation o f many official visitors on the statement [Declaration] 
overshadowed what was ‘normal’ at the time, the current constant comments on what is ‘good’ 
now sometimes threaten to overshadow what has not been done’.6J
Both presidents’ speeches raised important questions about what future steps were 
required to consolidate the achievements announced in the Declaration and foster closer ties 
between Germany and the Czech Republic. From April 1997 until the German national elections 
in September 1998, the debate about the ‘past’ largely subsided and implementing the provisions 
o f Article VII was made more difficult. In September, the Czech Parliament passed a law 
excluding affected parties (i.e., Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft) from belonging to the 
administrative and directorate structures o f the Fund. By October, Kinkel was being roundly 
criticized in the Czech media for considering the appointment o f Expellees’ Association President 
Fritz Wittmann64 and Sudeten German functionary Volkmar Gabert65 to the Fund’s directorate.66 
The German media was also critical. Ulrich Glauber complained that
6,Roman Herzog, ‘Ansprache von Bundesprasident Roman Herzog vor dem tschechischen Parlament am 
29. April 1997,’ Politische Studien, vol. 48, no. 353 (May/June 1997), pp. 3-11.
62‘Havel, Others Praise Herzog Prague Speech’, Prague CTK (English), 29 April 1997,
FTS19970429001080.
“ ‘Report Views Relations with Czech Republic’, Handelsblatt, 6 October 1997, p. 2, FTS 19971006000811. 
“ Fritz Wittmann was never appointed to the Fund’s directorate.
65Volkmar Gabert served on the Fund’s directorate from 1998-2003.
66‘Kinkel Views Implementation o f German-Czech Statement’, FAZ, 29 November 1997, p. 2, 
FTS 19971130000467.
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it must be understood by all well-meaning people that the Czech Government cannot 
accept having declared opponents o f all people nominated as board members o f the 
agreed on foundation. Besides, such a possibly destructive decision cannot be in the 
interest o f all those Germans who are anxious to achieve reconciliation... .67
The German and Czech foreign ministers, Kinkel and Sedivy met in Bonn and an agreement was
reached safeguarding the ‘balanced composition’ o f the Fund’s directorate, including the Sudeten
Germans. Sedivy had apparently secured a concession from Kinkel: only Germans actually
interested in reconciliation efforts by the German and Czech governments would be appointed to
the Fund.68
On the occasion marking the German announcement o f payments worth 11.6 million 
German Marks to the Czech victims o f Nazism and the Czech decision to approve the country’s 
membership in NATO on 15 April 1998, Kinkel, nonetheless, remarked that the road to 
reconciliation was still bumpy. He wished the reconciliation efforts achieved by Germany with 
France, Israel and Poland could be replicated: ‘It cannot be right that we succeeded in restoring 
relations with these countries and peoples, but the efforts for good neighbourly relations with the 
Czech Republic continue to meet with obstacles. It must be possible to make progress here’. He 
also made a vocal appeal to the Czech public ‘. . . to  seek a dialogue with everyone now, including 
the Sudeten Germans, and show them that we actually want to enter the future together.’ 69 Prime 
Minister Zeman’s statement that those invited to take part in the Czech-German Fund should be 
interested in Czech-German reconciliation and that, just as Prague had not nominated any right- 
wing extremists or communists, Bonn should not nominate any members o f the Sudeten German 
lobby group, incensed German politicians. Kinkel regarded the remarks as unacceptable and said 
Zeman would now have to straighten things up. Kohl’s government issued a statement saying his 
comparison was intolerable for the German-Czech dialogue. The comments made by Zeman, 
although disputed by the Czechs as a misinterpretation, did not help German-Czech relations in a 
time when both countries were seeking to implement the provisions o f their 1997 Declaration.
67‘Daily Blames Kohl for Czech Declaration Delay’, Frankfuriher Rundschau, 19 December 1997, p. 3, 
FTS19971219001119.
68‘Kinkel, Czech Counterpart Note Improvement in Relations’, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 6 February 1998, p. 2, 
FTS 19980206001046.
69‘Kinkel Assesses Relations with Czechs’, Die Welt (internet version), 16 April 1998, FTS 
19980416000718.
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Political Reconciliation with Poland
The Achilles Heel of Germany’s Polenpolitik: the Oder-Neisse Border
Germany’s political reconciliation towards the Czech Republic was complex in nature 
and significantly burdened by historical events stemming from the aftermath o f the Second World 
War and the Cold War. Germany’s relations with Poland were no exception. In Poland’s case, 
however, frontier and territorial issues over the status o f the Oder-Neisse line threatened to derail 
Germany’s efforts to seek a rapprochement with Poland. The Oder-Neisse line was the only post- 
Second World War border that remained legally provisional despite treaties with both the GDR 
(July 1950, May 1989) and the FRG (December 1970). Chapter three discussed the significance 
o f the Oder-Neisse River throughout Germany’s and Poland’s history; indeed, its significance 
gave rise to what Adam Krzeminski described as an ‘Oder-Neisse complex’ in Germany’s 
political and historical conscience. Warsaw was also obsessed with the status o f its Western 
border with Germany. This ‘Oder-Neisse complex’ thoroughly permeated the conduct o f  the 
FRG’s bilateral relations with Poland throughout the Cold War and played a major role during the 
negotiations of the Two Plus Four Accords in 1990, during bilateral negotiations and in the 
prelude to the signing of the German-Polish Border Treaty (November 1990).70
According to Kohl’s Foreign and Security Policy Advisor, Horst Teltschik, Germany and 
Poland had to come to a mutually beneficial arrangement on the status o f the Oder-Neisse line if 
they were going to enjoy ‘normal’ relations after unification.71 Germany’s internal resolution of 
this outstanding territorial issue with Poland was a two-fold indicator o f two important factors in 
Germany’s Ostpolitik: its commitment to the historical spirit o f the Ostvertrage after unification, 
and uncertainty over how Germany’s reconciliation towards Poland would evolve in the 
foreseeable future. The main question that permeated Poland’s domestic politics was whether a 
unified and more powerful Germany would demand the return o f its former Ostgebiete in ECE, 
especially Poland. In retrospect, such a demand was not likely given the international furore that
70Adam Krzeminski, ‘Deutsch-polnische Nachbarschaft als Gewinn und gegenseitige Befruchtung’ in Hans 
Henning Hahn (ed.), Polen und Deutschland: Nachbarn in Europa (Schwalbach/Ts: Wochenschau, 1996), 
pp. 37-38, and Harry Kenneth Rosenthal, German and Pole: National Conflict and Modern Myth 
(Gainesville, FL: University Presses of Florida, 1976), p. 128.
7,Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), p. 30.
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would have resulted but in the context o f the changes in the international system between 1989- 
1990, it is not impossible to rationalise the fears expressed by Poland’s leaders and other Western 
European powers who decided to press Germany for a speedy recognition o f Poland’s Western 
border.72 Poland did not appear in Kohl’s ‘Ten Point Plan’ for German unification. Indeed, the 
Oder-Neisse line was not mentioned. Poland’s Foreign Minister Krzystof Skubiszewski worried 
about the lack o f German attention being paid to issues which were at the heart o f Poland’s 
existence.7" International pressure, exerted by French President Mitterand in particular, was 
instrumental in shaping Germany’s foreign policy behaviour vis-a-vis accepting the Oder-Neisse 
line.
Despite increasing external opposition to Bonn’s Oder-Neisse politics, Kohl, nonetheless, 
demanded a contractual agreement with Warsaw that included a Polish renunciation o f future war 
reparations from Germany and a guarantee for the preservation of the rights o f ethnic Germans 
living in Poland.74 The former German demand was dropped as a precondition for the Oder- 
Neisse line’s recognition, although Kohl had argued persuasively that Germany was unwilling to 
pay supplemental reparations to the Poles on top of the DM 150 billion that had already been paid 
to Israel, Poland and other individuals.75 Bonn’s refusal to recognise the Oder-Neisse line as 
Poland’s Western border before unification raised levels o f mistrust amongst Poland’s political 
leadership and prompted them to demand full de jure  recognition o f the border in an official 
treaty, including participation in the Two Plus Four Accord talks.76 Polish fears about German 
unification were also endemic as Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki pointed out:
72Gisela Hendriks, ‘The Oder-Neisse Line Revisited: German Unification and Poland’s Western Border’, 
Politics and Society in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, vol. 4, no. 3 (Summer 1992), pp. 8-9.
73Krzysztof Miszczak, Deklarationen und Realitdten: die Beziehungen zwischen der BRD und der (Volks-) 
Republik Polen von der Unterzeichnung des Warschauer Vertrages bis zum Abkommen iiber gute 
Nachbarschafl undfreundschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (Munich: Tuduv, 1993), p. 372.
74Privately, Kohl lamented that there were no official apologetic gestures on the Polish government’s part 
for the expulsion o f ethnic Germans after the Second World War. This was in stark contrast to Havel’s first 
official apology in 1990. See Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 174.
75Kohl cited in George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1998), p. 252. The United States supported Kohl on the Oder-Neisse border issue but it was also apparent 
that Kohl’s politics frequently frustrated Washington. See pp. 255-256.
76Marion Donhoff, Polen und Deutsche: die schwierige Versdhnung (Munich: Goldmann, 1993), p. 205.
168
It would be dishonest to say that the unification of Germany has produced no fears and no 
anxieties; opinion polls in Poland confirm this. On the one hand, there has hardly been a 
people so predestined to understand what an artificial, imposed division means like the 
Poles. On the other hand, the burden o f the terrible past is too great for all the fears o f a 
strong Germany to be dispelled. These fears manifested themselves more clearly with us 
than anywhere else.77
Moreover, their fears were exacerbated by Polish President Lech Walesa’s belief that Poland’s
role in future German foreign policy deliberations would be limited after a unified Germany had
achieved its foreign policy objectives in Poland.78
The debate about the future o f the Oder-Neisse line also highlighted the fragile German
political consensus on this issue. Germany’s domestic political system was not immune to the
Oder-Neisse line controversy; indeed, it created a substantial crisis for the CDU/FDP government
coalition in 1990.79 German President Richard von Weizsacker’s visit to Warsaw (May 1990) and
his personal assurances to the Polish leadership about German intentions vis-a-vis the Oder-
Neisse line eventually allayed Polish concerns but it was not until November 1990 that a Border
Treaty was signed. Before that a joint resolution adopted by the Bundestag and the GDR
Volkskammer (21 June 1990) stipulated that the Oder-Neisse’s future status should be settled by a
formal treaty, similar to the 1970 Warsaw Treaty. It is worth quoting in detail since it outlines
Germany’s strategy for addressing its border with Poland:
At no time, either today or in the future, will it be questioned through territorial claims on 
the part o f us Germans. After Germany has been unified this will be reaffirmed in binding 
form under international law by means o f a treaty with the Republic o f Poland. Only an 
all-German Government can provide a signature which is binding under international law 
on behalf o f a future united Germany. And only an all-German parliament can ratify such 
a treaty. But there is clearly no doubt as to the will of the German people as testified by 
the German Bundestag and the Volkskammer.80
77Mazo\viecki quoted in Gottfried Erb, ‘Asymmetries in Polish-German Relations', Debatte: Review o f  
Contemporary German Affairs, no. 1 (1994), pp. 27-28.
78Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 13.
79Wemer Weidenfeld, Aussenpolitik fu r  die deutsche Einheit: die Entscheidungsjahre 1989/90 (Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998), p. 482. Brent Scowcroft made the following observation about the 
dynamics of the CDU/FDP coalition: ‘The coalition government in Bonn made foreign policy somewhat 
complicated -  both for the Germans and for us. Genscher did not see eye to eye with Kohl on every issue, 
which meant that we occasionally had differing perspectives on what their policy really was’. See George 
Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 237.
80German Press and Information Office, ‘Unified Germany: Statements by the Government o f the Federal 
Republic o f Germany’, Countries o f the World, 1 January 1991.
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With this resolution, Kohl at least laid his cards on the table but not after expending a great
amount of domestic political capital with the junior political party in the government coalition, the
FDP, and the Schlesier Landsmannschaft leadership who disagreed with the government’s
resolution. Bonn did not want to alienate this important domestic political constituency and right-
wing voters in the CDU and CSU which were perceived to be vital to Kohl’s electoral success in
upcoming German federal and Land elections.81 Brent Scowcroft offers another insightful reason
for Bonn’s wavering on the Oder-Neisse line: Kohl ‘had an eye on history and was reluctant to go
down as the leader formally identified giving up large territories which for centuries had been an
integral part of the homeland’.82 As Scowcroft and President George H. W. Bush also note:
The entire Oder-Neisse line dispute between the Germans and the Poles became farcical 
when it was decided that the FRG would integrate the GDR by means o f Article 23 o f the 
German Basic Law: A united Germany, which was simply an enlarged Federal Republic 
of Germany with its existing laws, would still be bound by its old legal commitment to 
the Oder-Neisse line. But no one thought to link Article 23 to the resolution o f the border. 
We had lost the forest for the trees.8j
It took several additional months until Germany was able to make its interests vis-a-vis the border
known to Poland.
Germany’s Border Treaty with Poland (November 1990)
After unification, Germany’s perceptions o f Poland were complicated by two factors: the 
stern content of Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s Deutschlandpolitik and the Polish 
Sejm ’s resolutions that alienated potential German investors.84 In Germany, especially amongst 
German advocates o f Polish interests, there had been confusion about the ultimate objectives o f 
Poland’s foreign policy-makers vis-a-vis German unification and the recognition o f the Oder-
81Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 14.
82Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 247.
83Ibid., p. 262.
84Thomas Urban, Deutsche in Polen: Geschichte und Gegenwart einer Minderheit (Munich: Beck, 1993), p. 
102.
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Neisse line, despite the positive results o f  bilateral meetings in the summer o f 1989 and the joint 
communique in November 1989.85
Bonn’s trials and tribulations about the need to link Germany’s consent to the Oder- 
Neisse border as Poland’s Western frontier and other bilateral issues became mute when Warsaw 
insisted on negotiating a separate border treaty and friendship treaty with Bonn. Kohl’s political 
brinksmanship on the frontier issue was abruptly halted when Bonn and Warsaw decided to 
negotiate two separate treaties beginning in October 1990. The Treaty negotiations were 
conducted between Ambassador Dieter Kastrup, State Secretary, at the German Foreign Office, 
and the Director of the Polish Foreign Ministry’s European Department Jerzy Sulek. The timing 
o f the negotiations was crucial as Poland’s presidential elections (November 25) as well as 
Germany’s Bundestag elections (2 December) were looming. The CSU stubbornly opposed the 
negotiation of a separate border treaty with the Poles but one o f its members, Wolfgang Botsch, 
acknowledged that the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and the loss of the Ostgebiete were the 
price to be paid for achieving unification.86 Kohl may have feared that a comprehensive 
negotiation with the Poles would result in his loss o f support from German expellee groups who 
had a stake in the outcome of the treaty negotiations; the reality suggests that domestic and 
international opinion had overtaken Kohl on this particular issue forcing him to negotiate two 
treaties.87 The Border Treaty’s text is short but significant since it eliminated an important 
obstacle in Germany’s political reconciliation with Poland. Chancellor Kohl described its 
significance:
85See Dieter Bingen, ‘Bilanz deutscher Politik gegeniiber Polen 1949-1997’, Aus Politik undZeitgeschichte, 
no. 53(1997), p. 7.
86See FAZ, 25 October 1990, p. 2 in FB1S-WEU-90-208, 26 October 1990.
87See Der Spiegel, 29 October, 1990, pp. 80-85 in FBIS-WEU-90-210, 30 October 1990.
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The signing o f the treaty between the FRG and Poland on the confirmation o f the border 
that exists between them is a fateful step between our two peoples and for the future o f 
Europe. It is an expression o f European responsibility for peace. It has a moral, historic, 
and a European dimension. ... We Germans are conscious that the treaty signed today 
gives up nothing that that was not already long lost as a consequence o f a criminal war 
and o f a criminal system. ... We are agreed that this treaty serves not mutual demarcation, 
but bilateral opening toward European common ground. The confirmation o f this frontier, 
binding under international law, is a decisive contribution to the prospect o f Europe 
without frontiers. Germans and Poles want to help in the construction o f a united 
Europe.88
The preamble highlighted Germany’s and Poland’s resolve to ‘contribute jointly to the 
establishment o f a European peace order in which frontiers will no longer divide’ and 
acknowledged that the ‘great suffering caused by that war, including also the loss by many 
Germans and Poles o f their native land as a result o f expulsion or resettlement, are a warning and 
a challenge for the establishment o f peaceful relations between the two peoples’. Claus Hofhansel 
also notes that Genscher’s wife was amongst those who had lost her home east o f the Oder-Neisse 
line after the Second World War.89 Article I reaffirmed the frontier between Germany and Poland 
and Article II declared ‘that the frontier between them is inviolable now and in future and 
mutually pledge to respect unconditionally their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Article III 
stipulated that the parties ‘have no territorial claims against each other and they shall not put 
forward such claims in future’.90
Treaty on Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Cooperation (17 June 1991)
Treaty Provisions
The successful conclusion o f the Border Treaty removed a significant obstacle before 
Bonn and Warsaw started to complete the negotiations o f the Treaty on Good Neighbourly 
Relations and Friendly Cooperation. For the first time in two hundred years the conditions were 
ripe for a German-Polish rapprochement (Poland only enjoyed twenty one years o f independence 
in this time period). According to Dieter Bingen, the challenge for both parties was not only to
S8 Warsaw Television Service, 14 November 1990, FBIS-EEU-90-221,15 November 1990, pp. 41-43.
89Claus Hofhansel, Multilateralism, German Foreign Policy and Central Europe (New York: Routledge, 
2005), p. 41.
90See ‘Treaty between the Federal Republic o f Germany and the Republic o f Poland on the confirmation o f  
the Frontier between them, 14 November 1990, at
www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLAT10NANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/DEU-POL1990CF.PDF
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negotiate a treaty based on ‘political friendship’ but also to acknowledge the dangers and risks 
inherent in the breakdown o f old political and economic structures in Poland and the nature o f 
Germany’s preventative responses.91
The treaty was comprehensive (thirty-eight articles, ten preamble statements) and in 
comparison with the German-Czech Friendship Treaty -  despite the existence o f complex 
bilateral issues such as the rights o f ethnic Germans living in Poland -  it did not take as long to 
negotiate and the negotiations themselves were less acrimonious, although significant opposition 
to both treaties amongst the Sudeten and Schlesier German constituencies was apparent. In 
content, the treaty bore some resemblance to the Franco-German Elysee Treaty o f 1963 as Marcin 
Zaborowski points out. Besides creating a number of bilateral institutions and meetings between 
governmental representatives, there are also similar provisions for fostering youth exchanges and 
promoting reconciliation though cultural institutes and a joint schoolbooks’ commission.92 The 
treaty also was a template for the German-Czech Friendship Treaty.
The contents of the treaty’s preamble and main body tie together many o f the principal 
leitmotifs of Germany’s bilateral and multilateral foreign relations with ECE after unification: 
political reconciliation, European ideals and integration, economic cooperation and the rights o f 
ethnic Germans living in Poland. Each theme is competently woven together to produce a treaty 
which reflects the solid political foundations necessary to achieve a successful German 
rapprochement with Poland. The ‘need to overcome the division o f Europe’ and ‘establish a just 
and lasting peaceful order in Europe’, including ‘the maintenance o f peace in Europe’ was a 
general theme highlighted by Germany’s political leadership on several occasions. The 
achievement of these objectives was regarded as a precondition for furthering its political 
reconciliation efforts with both countries.
Article 1(1) stated: “In a spirit of European responsibility, they [Germany and Poland] 
shall endeavour to realise the wish o f both o f their peoples for lasting understanding and 
reconciliation’ and ‘shall strive for the creation o f a Europe in which human rights and
91 Dieter Bingen, Deutschland und Polen in Europa: Probleme, Vertrage und Perspektiven (Cologne: Bl- 
Ost, 49/1991), p. 25.
92Marcin Zaborowski, Germany, Poland and Europe: conflict, co-operation and Europeanisation. 
(Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 95.
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fundamental freedoms are respected and borders lose their dividing nature, inter alia, through the 
bridging o f economic and social disparities’. Poland’s integration into ‘Europe’ and the ‘European 
Community’ was to function as the major catalyst for the transformation of the Polish economy. 
Bonn aimed to highlight Europe’s integration efforts as a positive force for Germany’s 
transformation after the Second World War to induce the Poles to follow suit as fast as their 
transformation efforts would allow. Article VI(1) provided the security parameters for ensuring 
their success: both ‘shall have the common goal, in a changing political and military environment 
in Europe, to work towards strengthening stability and increasing security’. Article VI(3) 
describes the use of bilateral and multilateral tools as ‘confidence-building and stabilising 
measures’.
By highlighting European themes throughout several treaty articles, Poland tied its future
to that o f Europe and by extension one o f its principal advocates, Germany. Article VIII(2) did
exactly that: ‘By concluding an agreement o f association between the European Community and
the Republic of Poland, the European Communities, their member States, and the Republic o f
Poland shall lay the foundations for a political and economic approach o f the Republic of Poland
to the European Community. The Federal Republic o f Germany shall further this approach to the
extent possible’. According to Article VIII(2), ‘The Federal Republic o f Germany views the
prospect o f accession o f the Republic o f Poland to the European Community as being feasible as
soon as the prerequisites for accession have been realised’. Germany was not Poland’s only
proponent as Jerzy Sulek acknowledged:
In bilateral contacts, the Germans are giving their backing to our associate membership 
and, in the longer term, our membership in the European Community, but French support 
has gone even further. Germany was the first state with which we started negotiations on 
a treaty, but what we have attained in our talks with France is in a sense ‘more mature,’ it 
pleases us more and should be included in the Polish-German Treaty.9j
Closely linked to the success o f  Germany’s and Poland’s ‘European’ objectives was the
crucial question o f the kinds of economic aid, assistance and cooperation Germany and other
parties could offer to Poland. The treaty’s preamble stressed that ‘economic cooperation is a
necessary element of comprehensive mutual relations on a stable and firm foundation’. Articles
IX through XIX cover Germany’s and Poland’s political, economic, and environmental
93 Rzeczpospolita, 16-17 March 1991, p. 1, FBIS-EEU-91-055, 21 March 1991, pp. 22-23.
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objectives. Article IX(1) reinforces the general goal o f striving ‘towards an expansion and 
diversification of their economic relations in all spheres’ and further notes that the ‘economic 
reform process that has been introduced in the Republic o f Poland should be promoted through 
international cooperation’ which included other states and international governmental and non­
governmental agents. Other areas o f support included investment and capital placement and 
industrial cooperation between German and Polish enterprises. Article X ’s provision o f 
intensifying financial cooperation in light o f Poland’s debt problem also sent a crucial signal that 
Germany was prepared to assist Poland in this area. In 1991, Poland’s foreign debts amounted to 
USD 46 billion. With Germany holding the largest portion o f that debt: USD 6.4 billion and 
German banks USD 2.4 billion, unsurprisingly, Poland made overtures to Germany to engage in 
some debt forgiveness.94
Article XII(l) highlights the roles o f ‘cooperative partnership between regions, cities, 
communities and other regional authorities, especially those near the borders’. In a border region 
rife with social and economic disparities but with strong historical ties, success could emerge, 
according to Dieter Bingen, ‘only when people, that live on both sides o f the border, come 
together, discover and develop common interests, will an economic rapprochement take place 
between both parties’.95 To facilitate this goal the Germans and Poles created a Government 
Commission for Regional and Border Cooperation (Article XII(2)) which was to function along 
the conventions and precepts o f the Council o f Europe and other relevant international bodies.96 
Article XV(1) highlights scientific and technical cooperation efforts between the two parties with 
the aim of ‘focusing on a dynamic, harmonious and comprehensive development o f this 
cooperation’. Article XVI(3) focuses on the environment stating that Germans and Poles shall 
‘strive for the development of harmonised strategies for a regional and international 
environmental policy, with the aim of a lasting and environmentally sustainable development in
94Krzysztof Miszczak, Deklarationen und Realitaten: die Beziehungen zwischen der BRD und der (Volks-) 
Republik Polen von der Unterzeichnung des Warschauer Vertrages bis zum Abkommen iiber gute 
Nachbarschaft undfreundschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (Munich: Tuduv, 1993), p. 431-432.
95Bingen, Deutschland und Polen in Europa, p. 31. In practise, this did not always work well.
96‘Notenwechsel iiber die Einrichtung der Deutsch-Polnischen Regierungskommission fur regionale und 
grenznahe Zusammenarbeit’, no. 68 (18 June 1991), pp. 68-69.
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Europe’. Article XVI was given extra meaning with the creation o f a German-Polish 
Environmental Council that would highlight areas o f cooperation in this sphere and suggest 
strategies to meet environmental challenges, especially in the German-Polish border region.97
The treaty’s most controversial component was Article XX since it dealt with the rights o f 
the German minority in Poland.98 For Germany, political reconciliation required Poland’s 
acknowledgement o f the existence o f a large German minority residing there. As Karl Cordell and 
Stefan Wolff note:
Successive Polish governments had never denied the presence o f such a minority. 
Indeed the incoming post-Communist government had no particular qualms in this 
direction. What had always been in dispute were the size, status and national 
orientation of ‘Germanised Poles’. The process o f relaxation resulted in mainstream 
Polish society being confronted with the fact that in the early 1990s anything up to 
500,000 Germans lived in Poland, and not the officially estimated figure o f 2,500."
If the Polish negotiating team was bent on securing Germany’s support for Poland’s inclusion in
the European Community, German negotiators were largely focused on securing as many
concessions they could from Warsaw vis-a-vis the German minority.100 On 30 January 1991, Kohl
made it clear that his government would be seeking, through bilateral treaties, to ensure that the
German minority was protected by national laws in their home countries.101
Expellee organisations and the representatives o f the German minority in Poland,
supported by the CSU, not only supported this initiative but demanded additional concessions
from Bonn and Warsaw, such as the introduction o f the German language as an official language
in those areas between the new Polish Western border and Germany’s eastern frontier from 1937,
German religious training, development o f a German-oriented school system, freedom to form
German minority political movements and media organisations, and the introduction o f two
97‘Bildung des Deutsch-Polnischen Umweltrats’, Bulletin, no. 68 (18 June 1991), pp. 549-550.
98For an historical overview of the German minority in Poland, see Joachim Rogall (ed.), Deutsche 
Geschichte im Osten Europas -  Land der Grossen Strbhme: von Polen nach Litauen (Berlin: Siedler, 1996).
"Cordell and Wolff, Germany’s Foreign Policy Towards Poland and the Czech Republic, p. 54.
100Bingen, Deutschland und Polen inEuropa, p. 33.
101‘Regierungserklarung des Bundeskanzlers vor dem Deutschen Bundestag’, no. 11 (31 January 1991), p.
74.
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language signs, including German.102 Bonn rejected many o f these demands, including the Recht
au/Heimat clause. Bonn argued that Poland’s eventual integration into the European Community
would provide for the free movement o f individuals and labour thus negating this objective by the
Schlesier Germans. Germans and Poles agreed to the following language in Article XX(1):
Members o f the German minority in the Republic o f Poland, i.e., persons having Polish 
nationality who are o f German origin or who affirm that they belong to the community o f 
German language, culture or tradition, as well as persons having German nationality in 
the Federal Republic of Germany who are o f Polish origin or affirm that they belong to 
the community o f Polish language, culture, or tradition, shall have the right, individually 
or in community with other members o f their group, freely to express, to preserve and 
further develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity, free from any 
attempts to assimilate them against their will.103
In a letter appended to the treaty and signed by Genscher and Skubiszewski, the German
government also agreed ‘to make it possible for persons living in the FRG who are o f  Polish
origin or whom affirm that they belong to the community o f Polish language, culture, or tradition
and who are not covered by the provisions o f Article XX(1), to enjoy to a large extent the rights
referred to in Article XX and the opportunities referred to in Article XXI’. The Polish
government, through a Ministerial Council Decision No. 142 established a Commission for
National Minorities ‘with a view to realising the rights o f Polish citizens who are members o f
national minorities, including the German minority’.
Another crucial bilateral initiative was located in Article XXX(2) which established a
German-Polish Youth Organisation whose objective was to ‘promote encounters and exchanges
o f young people’ and to ensure that ‘all young people and youth organisations in both countries
are entitled to participate in encounters and joint undertakings’ (Article XXX(l)). The rationale
behind this undertaking, modelled on the French-German Youth Organisation, was to create new
opportunities for younger audiences in both states with the aim of furthering political
reconciliation and promoting closer ties and trust.104 Crucially, from the perspective o f both
countries was language reflected in the appended letter which stated: ‘The present treaty is not
m FAZ, 11 February 1991, p. 6 quoted in Krzysztof Miszczak, Deklarationen und Realitaten: die 
Beziehungen zwischen der BRD und der (Volks-) Republik Polen, p. 425.
,03The contents o f all preamble and treaty citations are drawn from the ‘Treaty on Good Neighbourly 
Relations and Friendly Cooperation', available at http://untreaty.un.org.
104Bulletin, ‘Ansprache des Ministerprasidenten der Republik Polen’, no. 68 (June 18, 1991), p. 555.
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concerned with matters of nationality nor with matters o f assets’. Ironically, the Germans and 
Czechs used similar language to defer discussions on these important subjects until a later date. 
This decision was to have important political implications for Germany’s rapprochement with 
Poland after 1991.
Exploring the German-Polish ‘Community of Interests’ (1992-1998)
The groundwork for Germany’s political reconciliation efforts with Poland was laid with
the intense yet successful negotiation o f the Border and Friendship treaties. Having signed the
most comprehensive treaty with an eastern neighbour after unification, the challenge for both
parties was to implement the Friendship Treaty’s provisions and start the long and difficult path o f
becoming closer neighbours. Reflecting on the events o f 1990, Kinkel and the Polish Foreign
Minister Dariusz Rosati wrote:
There were fears that the question o f the enormity o f the crimes and wrongs that resulted 
from the German Nazi dictatorship, including the fact that many Poles and Germans had 
to leave their hometowns, would remain an insurmountable obstacle between us. 
Meanwhile, it turned out that the memories o f the painful historical events do not 
necessarily have to make it impossible to reach agreements.105
As Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka points out, however, both parties’ reconciliation efforts were taking
place on governmental and societal levels. Both treaties reflected the desire o f the German and
Polish governments to pursue a rapprochement. Can the same be said about German and Polish
society where according to Swidlicka, reconciliation ‘will require a complex and lengthy process
o f replacing prejudices, stereotypes, and generalisations with common goals and new experiences
that will enable both nations to coexist peacefully in the centre o f Europe’?106 Only time will tell
but Bonn and Warsaw’s expectations were high that after having overcome major historical
hurdles, the instruments and strategies were in place to bring Germans and Poles together through
the treaties’ frameworks, despite not having reached a consensus on issues such as assets and
nationality. Maintaining the high levels of intensity and interest in Germany and Poland for each
other’s mutual relations was going to be a major challenge for Bonn and Warsaw. Looking back
105Rzeczpospolita, 15-16 June 1996, p. 6, FB1S-EEU-96-118 (18 June 1996), p. 49.
106Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, ‘Polish-German Relations: Turning Borders into Bridges’, RFEJRL Report on 
Eastern Europe, vol. 1, no. 20 (18 May 1990), p. 38.
178
on the hectic years o f 1990-1991 in 1999, Markus Meckel remarked: ‘it appears that the energy 
that facilitated so much at the beginning of the 1990s is now missing. In some points, we are only 
moving tenaciously ahead’.107
In February 1990, Polish Foreign Minister Krzystof Skubiszewski coined the phrase 
‘community o f interests’ to highlight a nexus o f issues emerging between Bonn and Warsaw after 
the fall o f the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. It was welcomed by German President 
Richard von Weizsacker and subsequently used as a benchmark when referring to the state o f 
German-Polish relations. There is plenty o f substantive evidence to show that a German-Polish 
‘community o f interests’ emerged after 1990, beginning with the Border and German Friendship 
treaties. The treaties’ content and subsequent bilateral agreements paved the way for expanding 
the ‘community o f interests’ with German and Polish inputs at the governmental and 
nongovernmental levels. How was the ‘community o f interests’ defined and why did its 
development play such an important role in fostering closer ties between Germany and Poland?
The roots o f a German-Polish ‘community o f interest’ lie in the commonalities o f their 
respective positions and experiences after the end o f the Cold War. Both nations gained their 
independence and for the first time could structure their external relations vis-a-vis other powers 
as they wished. Both countries saw their future in what Kohl always called the ‘European house’. 
The model for this ‘community o f interest’ was a Franco-German one which had been established 
after the Second World War. This particular ‘community of interest’ was held up both parties as 
an ideal example o f what two long-standing enemies could achieve if they wanted to improve 
their bilateral relations and achieve political reconciliation. From 1990-1998, the German-Polish 
‘community o f interests’ took its inspiration from the comprehensive friendship treaty the 
Germans and Poles had negotiated.
In the context o f the ‘community o f interests’, the Polish Foreign Minister Wladyslaw 
Bartoszewski commented that one o f Poland’s long-term goals was the development o f a bilateral 
relationship with Germany on par with what Germany and France had achieved after the Second
107Markus Meckel, ‘Der deutsch-polnische Nachbarschaftsvertrag -  Bilanz nach fiinf Jahren’ in Theodor 
Schweisfurth, Walter Poeggel and Andrzej Sakson (eds.), Deutschland, Polen, Tschechien: au f dem Weg 
zurguten Nachbarschaft (Berlin: Springer, 1999), p. 6. MT.
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World War.108 There were many similarities and also differences between the two reconciliation 
processes. Writing in 1996, Bartoszewski reflected on the history o f Germany and France’s 
political reconciliation efforts and drew a comparison with what had been achieved in German- 
Polish relations:
As far as political relations are concerned, everything is fine thanks to the bold steps taken 
by Kohl and Mazowiecki in 1990, steps that have created foundations. ... We have only 
been able to develop our relations freely over the past six years. Six years after the end o f 
the war, the Franco-German relationship was anything but normal. And, in the end, the 
Polish war experience - after that o f the Jews and similar to that o f the Russians - was the 
most tragic o f mankind.109
Germany and Poland could already point to great achievements in their mutual political
reconciliation processes only two years after the end of the Cold War.
Anne Wolff-Poweska highlights three different types o f fora where Germans and Poles
should be gravitating towards each other within their ‘community o f interests’ (there are a number
of sub-categories): European110, bilateral (governmental and non-governmental) perspectives, and
regional in the context o f the German-Polish border.111 The ‘community’ and fora were constantly
evolving -  some more successfully than others -  and being challenged from 1992-1998 as new
issues took centre stage and others quietly faded away. In practise, however, the existence o f a
‘community o f interests’ provided Bonn and Warsaw’s foreign and security policy makers focus
during a crucial time when the provisions o f two o f the most seminal post-war treaties in
Germany and Poland’s mutual history were being promoted and implemented.
Bilateral Developments
The bilateral relations conducted on a governmental level continued at a fast pace after 
June 1991 -  so fast that one observer remarked that they were impossible to coordinate, especially
108Wladysla\v Bartoszeweski, ‘Polen und seine Nachbam: Bemerkungen zur polnischen Aussenpolitik’, 
Zeitschrift fur Politik, vol. 43, no. 1 (1996), p. 68.
m Franffurter Rundschau, 16 Mar 1995, p. 12, FB1S-EEU-95-052, 17 March 1995, pp. 15-16. See Davis, 
‘National Interests Revisited: The German Case.’, pp. 102-103, for a comparison o f the German-Polish and 
German-Franco reconciliation processes.
110This has been addressed in chapter two and will also be addressed in chapter six.
1,1 Anna Wolff-Poweska, ‘Zur Wahrung der Identitat von Polen und Deutschen’, in Deutsch-Polnisches 
Symposium 22.-24 January in Straus berg: Dokumentation (Strausberg: Amt fur Information und 
Kommunikation, 1995), pp. 54-59.
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if  you were working at the German Embassy in Warsaw.112 German-Polish relations underwent a 
flurry o f activity in several different areas: bilateral government and non-governmental activity, 
ethnic German issues, and border region developments. Bonn and Warsaw sought to use the 
positive momentum in their relationship to create and implement the tools and instruments 
necessary to fulfil the Good Neighbourliness and Friendship Treaty’s provisions.
The challenge for German and Polish politicians after 1991 was to ensure that their 
mutual friendship treaty was filled with life not only on a governmental but non-governmental 
level. The former was important for making sure the treaty provisions were honoured and bilateral 
contacts were nurtured in all treaty areas. The latter, including the German and Polish publics, 
played an important role in using the tools and instruments the treaty provided to implement 
projects on the ground and foster closer cooperation between both peoples. Building on the 
goodwill engendered by the treaty was a challenge for both Bonn and Warsaw. Maintaining the 
momentum of the political reconciliation efforts in both countries was an ever great one. High 
level governmental exchanges were symbolic and instrumental for setting the tone for German- 
Polish relations.
In 1992, Bonn and Warsaw concentrated on consolidating their achievements and 
promoting as many exchanges and visits as possible to gain a better understanding o f each other’s 
interests vis-a-vis each other and to discuss future plans. Polish President Lech Walesa’s visit to 
Germany from 30 March-2 April 1992 to discuss the Friendship Treaty’s implementation which 
had gone into effect several weeks earlier. During his visit, the theme of political reconciliation 
was voiced repeatedly by Weizsacker and Kohl. Calling attention not only to the suffering 
Germans had caused, Weizsacker noted the suffering o f those Germans who had been displaced 
from their homes after the Second World War and praised Walesa for being able to speak openly 
about Germany and Poland’s mutual history.113 Kohl took the opportunity to highlight the 
significance of their bilateral treaty as a symbol for Germany’s commitment to Poland to bring it
112Markus Meckel, ‘Der deutsch-polnische Nachbarschaftsvertrag’ in Schweisfurth, Poeggel and Sakson 
(eds.), p. 6.
Bulletin, ‘Staatsbesuch des Prasidentin der Republik Polen’, no. 34 (2 April 1992), p. 325.
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closer to the EC.114 The visit was hailed as a huge success in Poland as it underscored Germany’s 
positive political and economic intentions vis-a-vis Poland and its efforts to promote 
reconciliation.
Against the backdrop o f such a high level visit, the Germans and Poles pressed ahead in 
1992 with the creation of the Polish-German Cooperation Foundation whose mission is to finance 
projects o f mutual interest, for example, infrastructure, research, and cultural projects in Poland 
itself. After its first operational year, over DM 58 million had been set aside for funding. The 
Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation also began its operations and concentrated on paying 
damages to former concentration prisoners and forced labourers. In 1993, it distributed over DM 
200 million to 215,000 victims o f National Socialism."5 The first Polish-German prize for special 
services to the development o f mutual relations was awarded to Willy Brandt posthumously and 
Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki.
On a bilateral government level, there were extensive exchanges between German and 
Polish parliamentarians as well as heads o f government o f the German Lander. One o f the most 
important agreements signed in the aftermath of the Friendship Treaty was the Accord ensuing 
from the Effects o f Migration Movements (7 May 1993), negotiated by the German and Polish 
Ministers o f the Interior Rudolf Seiters and Andrzej Milczanowski. It was envisioned that from 1 
July (the day the new German Asylum Law came into force) until the end o f December 1993, 
Germany would be allowed to send back to Poland no more than 10000 refugees and, from 1994, 
there would be no limits. The signing o f the agreement allowed Germany to amend Article XVI o f 
its Grundgesetz which governs the criteria for the possibility o f claiming asylum in cases o f 
political persecution. In the six months after the agreement came into force, 2,697 people who had 
illegally entered Germany from Poland were turned over to the Polish authorities.116 A Treaty on 
Environmental Cooperation (6 March 1994) which augmented the creation o f the German-Polish
114Bulletin, ‘Ansprache des Bundeskanzlers’, no. 34 (2 April 1992), 327.
" 5German Foreign Office, Beitrag des Auswartigen Amts zwn Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung 1993
(Bonn: German Foreign Office, 1993), p. 55.
"6DDP/ADN, 31 January 1994, FBIS-EEU-94-021, 1 February 1994, pp. 21-22.
182
Environmental Council complemented the vast array o f agreements and accords the Germans and
the Poles signed after 1990.
Another highlight in German-Polish relations was German President Roman Herzog’s
visit to Warsaw to commemorate the 50th anniversary o f the Warsaw Uprising on 1 August 1994.
He echoed Kohl’s comments about German and Polish history, the need for reconciliation and
understanding as Germany seeks to atone for the sins o f the Nazi era, and also set the stage for
Kohl’s visit to Warsaw the following year:
In fact it is only history which divides us now. The Germans and the Poles do not have 
any opposing interests at present. Only history is now between us. At the same time, I do 
not simply believe that one can forget history...On the contrary, I believe in the strength 
o f historical truth, and in the fact that we cannot brush aside what has happened though it 
hurts.117
The aim o f Kohl’s visit to Warsaw (July 1995) for bilateral discussions with his
counterpart Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy was to assess the Friendship Treaty’s progress. It was his
first visit to Poland in six years. In his speech to the Polish National Assembly, Kohl made
references to the significance o f the bilateral treaties Germany signed with Poland in 1990 and
1991: ‘By signing Polish-German treaties we managed to tie in to good traditions o f peaceful
coexistence with our nations, fruitful cultural and economic exchange, as well as meetings with
people’.118 With references to Germany’s past, he stated: ‘We know the fundamental value and
truth in the lives o f nations, namely that a nation that does not know its own history does not
understand the present and cannot shape the future; but the thesis I would like to state here is:
Poland needs Europe and Europe needs Poland too’.119 Ambassador Janusz Reiter remarked:
Kohl’s July visit in Poland was unquestionable a sign o f the rapprochement which had 
taken place between our countries in recent years. German politicians made no secret o f 
the fact that six years ago they would have mentioned Prague or Budapest, not Warsaw, 
as capitals with which Bonn would have the closest relations. The assessments o f 
relations with Poland were all the more enthusiastic given the fact that the hopes placed in 
the Czechs were disappointed.120
n7 Warsaw Television Polonia Network, 1 August 1994, FBIS-WEU-94-148, 2 August 1994, pp. 15-16. 
u*Warsaw TVP, 6 July 1995, FB1S-EEU-95-130, 7 July 1995, p. 32.
119Ibid., p. 33.
120Janusz Reiter, “‘Relations with the Federal Republic o f Germany’ in Barbara Wizimirska (ed.), Yearbook 
o f Polish Foreign Policy 1996 (Warsaw: Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, 1996), p. 118.
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A further gesture o f major political symbolic importance was the German invitation to Polish 
Foreign Minister Bartoszewski to be the only foreign guest to speak at the German Bundestag's 
commemoration o f the 50th anniversary o f the end of the Second World War on 28th April 
1995.121
Wojciech Pomianowski observed accurately that in the context o f Germany’s bilateral 
relations with Poland the most important facets are not always treaties, governments, and the 
economy and finances, but also people - since they fill the bilateral relations with content and 
decide whether they will be successful or not.122 The Border and Friendship Treaties undoubtedly 
created the foundations for a solid rapprochement between the German and Polish governments 
but it was not entirely obvious how the treaties would be welcomed by ordinary Germans and 
Poles whose histories were intimately tied to the ground-breaking decisions made by their 
political representatives. Dietmar Scholich notes that a poll undertaken in 1991 revealed the 
existence o f strong historical stereotypes on both sides of the border but there was also evidence 
o f appreciation for the provisions o f the German-Polish Friendship Treaty.123 However, national 
stereotypes still permeated the discourse. Dieter Brehmer described the prejudices and stereotypes 
cultivated as follows:
On the Polish side it is the view that a German equals a Nazi. On our side, it is this image 
o f a Pole who is work-shy, who does not show regard for community property, and who 
would dump his own rubbish in a neighbour’s garden. Neither is a true picture: Both are 
the results of bias and prejudice.124
This opinion may be extreme but it is illustrative o f the challenges Germans and Poles faced in
creating mutual understanding. To counter these prejudices, Bonn and Warsaw officially and
unofficially presided over the growth o f a number o f organisations whose goals it were to promote
political, economical and cultural ties between Germans and Poles. The Polish-German Youth
,21Bartoszweski’s speech is reprinted in his memoirs. See Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, Es lohnt sich, 
anstandig zu sein: meine Erinnerungen (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1995), pp. 117-137.
l22Wojciech Pomianowski, ‘Bilanz der Verwirklichung des deutsch-polnischen Vertrages iiber gute 
Nachbarschaft und freundschaftliche Zusammenarbeit vom 17. Juni 1991’, in Schweisfurth, Poeggel and 
Sakson (eds.), p. 23.
123Dietmar Scholich, ‘Polnische-deutsche Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der Raumplannung -  ein 
wichtiger Baustein in einem zusammenwachsenden Europa’ in Hans Henning Hahn (ed.), Polen und 
Deutschland: Nachbarn in Europa (Schwa! bach/Ts: Wochenschau, 1996), p. 89.
m Trybuna Opolska, 24 November 1992, pp. 1, 3, in FB1S-EEU-92-237, 9 December 1992, p. 23.
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Cooperation, the Intergovernmental Commission for Border and Regional Cooperation, the 
European University in Frankfurt/Oder (Viadrina), the Polish-German Cooperation Foundation, 
and the Polish German Reconciliation Foundation all played a role in bringing Germans closer to 
Poles. The Goethe and German Historical Institutes also opened their doors in 1993 and a third 
Polish Cultural Institute was opened in Diisseldorf. Over 50 German-Polish societies came into 
existence under the umbrella o f the German-Polish Association network. Over 350 inter-city 
partnerships were created from 1990-1998, the most prominent one being the House o f German- 
Polish Cooperation which was opened in 1998.
Ethnic Germans in Poland
Articles XX-XX11 provided the legal foundations for the protection o f ethnic German 
interests in Poland. Whereas Bonn throughout the Cold War had consistently urged the ethnic 
Germans to repatriate to the FRG, after 1993, the German government implemented a new 
resettlement policy for ethnic Germans (1 January 1993) which did not necessarily close the door 
on those seeking to leave Poland or other countries in ECE but encouraged them to stay in their 
home countries and benefit from the protections accorded to them by the Friendship Treaty. 
Building upon the existence o f several major centres o f ethnic German activity in Poland: Upper 
and Lower Silesia, and Western Pomerania, ethnic Germans nurtured their culture with the 
support of the German government and organisations such as the Union o f German Social and 
Cultural Associations, local ethnic German community centres, and the German Union o f Youth.
As Wanda Jarzabek notes, despite having a very active cultural programme: meetings and 
seminars, libraries, choirs, orchestras, electronic and print media outlets, there are not enough 
professional journalists with a knowledge o f German and there are also few teachers who can 
teach German history and literature.'25 These areas were being paid close attention to by the 
German government. According to Patricia Davis, German financial assistance to the ethnic 
Germans, via their cultural associations and expellee organisations, was significant to prompt an 
observation that in 1994, Germany, through the Ministry o f the Interior, had spent more on aid
125 Wanda, Jarzabek, ‘Poland’ in Ivanka Nedeva and Joost Hermann (eds.), Minorities and Foreign Policy: 
Minorities in East Central Europe and their Impact upon Foreign Policy (Groningen: Centre for European 
Security Studies, 1998), p. 81.
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(DM 24 million) to its ethnic Germans than development aid to Albania, Estonia, Latvia and 
Macedonia combined.126 Ethnic Germans were also encouraged to participate in Poland’s 
domestic political systems, including serving at the highest levels o f Poland’s government, in the 
Polish Sejm (parliament) and the Senate.
Border Region Developments
Anna Wolff-Poweska describes the German-Polish border as a ‘scar o f history’ that has 
managed to bury itself into the German and Polish consciousness and psyche.127 One o f the most 
promising areas o f the German-Polish ‘community o f interests’ was the development o f their joint 
border regions along the Oder-Neisse River. The economic and social disparities along the border 
could not have been greater. Writing in 1996, Dieter Schroder observed that on the Polish side o f 
the border incomes averaged DM 450 per month whereas on the German side, they were eight to 
ten times that amount.128 There was an immediate urgency on the part of both governments to 
develop the border region. German-Polish efforts at redefining their relationship along the Oder- 
Neisse gained new momentum with the Treaty on Border Clearances (29 July 1992) and Border 
Crossings (6 November 1993) and a Memorandum o f Understanding on Border Regional 
Planning Policy (9 October 1995). The Friendship Treaty had created the German-Polish 
Government Commission for Regional and Cross-Border Cooperation (the first meeting convened 
on 22-23 April in Gorlitz before the Treaty’s signing) and its first major decision was to create a 
Commission for Interregional Cooperation whose goal it was to address questions pertaining to 
interregional cooperation, the development o f small and medium size enterprises, and the 
promotion of youth exchanges. In 1993, cooperation between the border regions was expanded to 
include Spree-Neisse-Bobr and Pro-Europa-Viadrina Euroregions along with an expansion o f 
contacts between the German Lander and the Polish voivodships.
126Patricia Davis, ‘National Interests Revisited: The German Case.' German Politics and Society, vol. 16, 
no. 1 (Spring 1998), p. 104.
127Anna Wolff-Poweska, ‘Zur Wahrung der Identitat von Polen und Deutschen’, p. 60.
128Dietrich Schroder, ‘Ungleiche Nachbam an der Oder - Perspektiven der deutsch-polnischen 
Grenzregionen.” Blatter fur deutsche und internationale Politik, no. 1 (1996), p. 102.
186
The existence o f a powerful ‘community o f interests’ should not obscure the practical,
day-to-day obstacles which threatened to undermine both countries’ reconciliation efforts and a
better German understanding of Poles and vice-versa. The Border and Friendship Treaties opened
up many new opportunities for Germans and Poles to discover each other and work together in a
cooperative fashion. However, the cultural, economic and socio-political challenges created by the
treaties gave rise to new bureaucratic deficiencies and criminal elements seeking to exploit
Germany’s transparent relationship with Poland. Dieter Bingen highlights five problem areas that
dominated German-Polish bilateral relations after 1992 and the implementation processes o f the
Friendship Treaty: German-Polish border operations, the rise o f criminal elements, shopping
tourism and border trade, the status o f ethnic Germans residing in Poland, and dual nationality
issues.129 The first three and last two areas are linked. The first major problem was highlighted by
Kohl in a speech to the Polish National Assembly:
Meeting one another means crossing the border. Polish-German cooperation is often 
narrowed to a difficult situation at border crossings. [We are] doing everything in our 
power to allocate the appropriate resources so that this state o f affairs, this impossible 
state of affairs, an be ended as soon as reasonably possible, since dynamic economic 
development is dependent upon fast access to other markets.130
Long delays at border crossing points along the 431 kilometer border between Germany and
Poland were common from 1991-1995. The proliferation of crime, especially car theft fuelled
notions in Germany o f the existence o f a Polish car mafia. Although increased levels o f border
trade and traffic were a positive outcome of Germany’s rapprochement with Poland, it often led to
resentment on both parts o f the border as German businesses were forced to shut down in the face
o f growing competition from their Polish counterparts. And Polish businesses and small towns
struggled to manage thousands o f German visitors who came to Poland to benefit from lower
prices. The ethnic German issue raises passions on both sides o f the border, not only in the
political circles of the German CDU and CSU but also in Poland’s domestic political circles. The
1991 Friendship Treaty accorded the ethnic Germans with the role of acting as a ‘bridge’ between
Germans and Poles but according to Dieter Bingen, they may not have the appropriate tools to
I29Dieter Bingen. ‘Rahmenbedingungen deutsch-polnischer Beziehungen nach 1991’, Deutsch-Polnisches 
Symposium 22.-24 January in Strausberg: Dokumentation (Strausberg: Amt fur Information und 
Kommunikation, 1995), pp. 66-72.
130 Warsaw TVP, 6 July 1995, FBIS-EEU-95-130, p. 34.
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perform such a function as they struggle to define their existence and gain basic recognition from 
their Polish neighbours.131 The ‘dual nationality’ conundrum is profound in Upper Silesia where 
ethnic Germans are still entitled to acquire German citizenship and passports. In effect, they are 
dual nationals with residential and work permits for two countries with natural implications for 
military service laws and cross border employment schemes.
Whereas after 1990, Germany’s foreign relations with the Czech Republic and Poland
were influenced by the internal and external dynamics o f unification; by 1998, their relations were
characterised by a burgeoning expansion o f bilateral activities, exchanges, and cooperation,
including Germany’s proactive support for Czech and Polish ambitions to join the EU and NATO.
In Poland, Kohl made highlighted the significance o f the unification o f Europe as a goal to be
pursued by all of its neighbours:
...the acceptance o f the Central and Eastern European states and the acceptance of Poland 
into the EU is not a matter o f balancing economic interests. Integration with the euro- 
Atlantic structures is an imperative o f solidarity between the nations o f Europe, a 
solidarity which has arisen by way o f common values.132
In the Czech Republic, his ambitions were similar but they were being pursued against the 
backdrop of difficult reconciliation processes which were drawn out throughout Kohl’s entire 
tenure in office. This was a major difference in the reconciliation processes between Germany and 
Poland and Germany and the Czech Republic. In the former, reconciliation was a complex process 
but the ground work, in the form of the Border and Friendship treaties, was completed by June
1991. The German-Czech Treaty was completed not long after in February 1992 but another 
mutual declaration was required in 1997 to address issues for which there was no agreement in
1992. Whereas the spirit o f German-Polish relations remained positive after 1991, the same could 
not be said o f Germany’s relations with the Czech Republic. Internal and external factors endemic 
to Germany played a role here, such as the power o f the Sudeten and Schlesier German 
organisations, including the CDU’s coalition partner, the CSU, which wielded an enormous 
amount o f political clout in Bavaria.
13,Dieter Bingen, ‘Rahmenbedingungen deutsch-polnischer Beziehungen nach 1991’, p. 69.
m  Warsaw TVP, 6 July 1995, FBIS-EEU-95-130, p. 33.
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CHAPTER FIVE
GERMANY’S ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE 
CZECH REPUBLIC AND POLAND
Germany’s Ostpolitik from Bismarck to Kohl illustrates how and why domestic and 
external economic objectives played such an important role in Germany’s foreign policy 
behaviour. The FRG, like its unified successor, operated a highly externally orientated economy 
in an international environment characterised by high levels o f interdependence with trading areas 
outside the European Union.1 Germany’s foreign economic strategies for maintaining a strong 
position in the global economy were founded on two leitmotifs: ensuring continued access to 
natural resources such as oil and gas and the expansion o f  its export capabilities. An 
intensification of economic ties with the Czech Republic and Poland was perceived by German 
political leaders to be a strategic economic necessity after 1990.
After the Second World War, the FRG received extensive economic assistance in the 
form of the Marshall Plan which was instrumental in creating a German Wirtschaftsw under 
(economic miracle) in the 1960s and 1970s. To remove the economic shackles o f communism, 
Bonn believed that similar economic assistance measures, with assistance from other powers, like 
Germany, were required for ECE to successfully embark upon its transition and transformation 
processes. To meet its multiple economic objectives, Bonn had to maintain its position as a pre­
eminent Handelsstaat (trading state) to preserve Standort and Modell Deutschland in the face o f 
growing economic competition from other European and Asian powers.
Economic instruments, such as the promotion o f foreign trade, foreign direct investment 
(FD1), and technological know-how, were regarded by Bonn as invaluable tools for achieving 
domestic political aims which could not be attained via traditional foreign policy means. Patricia 
Davis refers to economic incentives and instruments which can be used ‘as a means o f ripening 
conditions for political cooperation with a particular country’, in her case Poland, and for 
harnessing ‘the economic resources at its disposal, that is, by gaining the support and cooperation
'Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘The State o f External Adjustment after German Unification’. Monthly Report 
(May 1996), p. 57.
o f the private economic sector’.2 There is an important historical precedent here as the Germans
actively use their economic policy for political purposes. According to Ludger Kiihnhardt, there
was a crucial motive behind Germany’s pursuit o f its economic self-interests:
German foreign policy interests are linked closely to the safeguarding o f its foreign trade, 
that is to say, the export structures o f the German economy. Securing access to resources 
and guaranteeing market preservation or the expansion o f markets are priorities for 
Germany as a trading nation/
Economic instruments are indispensable -  when they are available -  and form the foundation for
what Hartmut Schumann defined as the ‘economisation o f foreign policy’ in the FRG: another
key German foreign policy leitmotif throughout the conduct of the Cold War.4
From Adenauer to Kohl, every chancellor pursued political and security goals via
economic means. This strategy was effective and uncontroversial, although occasionally
Germany’s economic prowess created envy, especially in Western Europe. The FRG’s economic
interests -  before and after unification -  should be examined in the context o f the bipolar order of
the Cold War and the Soviet Union’s political-military and economic hegemony in ECE. The
Cold War’s end and the Soviet Union’s collapse significantly altered the nature o f Germany’s
economic relations with ECE. Germany was no longer precluded by domestic or external
constraints from expanding its historic economic and cultural links with ECE: the foundation of
Germany’s Osthandel (Eastern trade) for decades.5 Germany’s rich history o f Osthandel allowed
Germany’s leaders to manage better the integration o f the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
into West German structures and the transition processes in ECE.
After unification, Germany faced insurmountable domestic economic obstacles, which
shaped its foreign policy choices and options in ECE. The first choice entailed two important
complementary strands and was perceived as the most ominous in the eyes o f Germany’s Eastern
and Western neighbours. The first focused on the loosening of Germany’s extensive Westbindung
2Patricia Davis, The Art o f Economic Persuasion: Positive Incentives and German Economic Diplomacy 
(Ann Arbor, Ml: University o f Michigan Press, 1999), p. 151.
3Ludger Kiihnhardt, ‘Germany’s Role - Germany’s Goals’, German Comments, no. 39 (1995), p. 17.
4Hartmut Schumann, ‘Wirtschaftliche Dimensionen der Aussenpolitik’, Zeitschrift fu r Politik, vol. 41, no. 2 
(1994), p. 146.
5Robert Mark Spaulding, Osthandel and Ostpolitik. German Foreign Trade Policies in Eastern Europe 
from Bismarck to Adenauer (Providence, RI; Oxford: Berghahn, 1996).
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after unification in favour o f the economic engagement o f its Eastern neighbours. The second 
raised the concern that Germany would use its strong economic power base to thoroughly 
penetrate their Eastern neighbours’ economic markets. This thinking received significant attention 
since Germany’s Western neighbours were curious about Germany’s economic motives in ECE.
Economic parallels between Mexico and the United States were widespread and fuelled 
the notion that the ECE economies would become more dependent on German aid, investment, 
and trade if  they were to manage their difficult transition processes successfully. Walter Russell 
Mead’s observation that the ‘West sees Europe through Wilsonian spectacles: pluckly little 
peoples striving for freedom. The Germans see something more like what Washington sees when 
it looks at Central America and the Caribbean . . . ’ encapsulates a rather cynical American view o f 
what Germany’s policy-makers are thinking about when they look eastwards.6 The fear o f total 
German economic dominance or what Paul Kennedy defined as a German commercial and 
financial penetration paciftque into ECE was acutely felt throughout Europe and the United 
States.7 Fear in Western Europe, especially France, that Germany would somehow capitalise from 
its enhanced geographic position and channel its economic power towards becoming a regional 
economic hegemon in ECE, was repeatedly expressed.
For some, this dangerous development was a foregone conclusion. Even before German 
unification (February 1990), the Czechoslovak Ambassador to Washington, Rita Klimova, 
declared: ‘The German speaking parts of Europe, including Austria, will succeed where the 
Habsburgs, Hitler and Bismarck were unsuccessful -  in Germanising Central and Eastern Europe 
by purely peaceful and laudable methods o f market economic development’.8 Wolf Jobst Siedler 
went even further:
6WaIter Russell Mead, ‘The Once and Future Reich’, World Policy Journal, vol. 7, no. 4 (Fall 1990), p. 
601.
7Paul Kennedy, Preparing fo r  the Twenty-First Century (New York: Random House, 1993), p. 271.
8Klimova quoted in Rick Fawn, The Czech Republic: a Nation o f Velvet (Amsterdam: Harwood, 2000), p. 
110.
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Once the problems o f unification have been overcome, Germany will not be able to avoid 
the economic penetration o f Eastern Europe and it will probably be able to achieve what a 
few hundred divisions o f the Third Reich could not achieve -  predominance in the regions 
between the Weichsel, Bug, Dnjepr and Don.9
Taking this one step further, ECE would be penetrated at the macro and micro economic levels by
a powerful and pervasive German economic presence. Once again, ECE would become an
integral component o f Germany’s political and economic hinterland raising fears o f the economic
conditions prevalent in the 1930s when Germany had succeeded in creating a
Grossraumwirtschaft (German economic realm). The publication o f a secret report commissioned
by the Czech Federal Security and Intelligence Agency claiming that Germany was ‘seeking the
political domination o f Czechoslovakia’ as part o f a ‘massive economic offensive’ only added
more fuel to the fire of the discontents worried about Germany’s future economic influence in
their country.10
The second choice entailed the least controversial and most popular option for Bonn’s 
political leadership: the channelling of its economic power to become a constructive and proactive 
player in the region’s political and economic development. Unilateralism would be shunned; 
international institutions such as the EU and NATO, the World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund, or the European Bank for Reconstruction for Development would provide the financial and 
security muscles to promote regional growth and economic stability. Germany would resume its 
historical function as a ‘bridging power’ between East and West and it would act as a champion 
for the interests of ECE in Western Europe. This strategy’s adoption would reduce suspicions 
about Germany’s motives for looking eastwards. All the states in ECE were motivated by two 
common goals: an irreversible return to the West and full inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic’s 
international economic, military and political institutions.
Finally, there was another scenario that generated concern. Germany’s intense 
preoccupation with its own internal socio-political and economic transformation processes raised 
the question whether it would be able to provide the economic assistance required for helping the
9SiedIer quoted by Wolfgang Michal, Deutschland und der nachste Krieg (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1995), p. 70. 
MT.
10Jan Obrman, ‘Czechoslovak Assembly Affirms German Friendship Treaty’, RFEJRL Research Report, 
vol. 1, no. 21 (22 May 1992), p. 19.
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emerging transition states in ECE. Due to overwhelming domestic constraints, Germany might be 
inclined to adopt an isolationist stance vis-a-vis ECE and thus concentrate less on pressing 
international matters. France, Britain, and even the United States would exacerbate this stance as 
they might opt to play a passive political and economic role in ECE. Subsequently, Germany 
would be thrust into assuming a more proactive role in the region —  one it could not sustain 
indefinitely — to prevent a collapse o f the transformation processes in ECE and forestall any 
security crises on its Eastern frontier.
Germany’s economic interests towards the Czech Republic and Poland are an 
amalgamation o f each o f these important choices, policy options or scenarios. Agential and 
structural features arising from the Soviet Union’s collapse, communism’s demise, and the 
emergence of new independent states in ECE catapulted Germany into devising an economic 
strategy, in concert with its allies, especially the EU, and German business that would mitigate the 
impact of these monumental events for itself and its Eastern neighbours. Any German economic 
strategy vis-a-vis ECE had to be tempered with restraint to dispel residual fears that Bonn was 
seeking to exercise ‘complete’ economic control over the region. It was, however, inevitable, 
given the existence o f powerful historical and cultural links and centuries o f intense economic 
cooperation, that Germany would focus increasingly on emerging political, economic, and 
security developments in ECE after 1990.
This chapter is divided into two major sections. The first provides an overview of the 
major factors encouraging Germany’s economic drive eastwards. The second discusses the 
bilateral economic dimensions o f Germany’s foreign relations with the Czechoslovakia (Czech 
Republic) and Poland, in particular foreign trade and FDI. The powerful roles o f Germany’s 
private sector and the Lander are addressed briefly in this context.
Why Go East?
Geographical Proximity
There are four principal factors which prompted Bonn to focus on the economic 
challenges in ECE as a result o f its new position in the European Mittellage: Germany’s 
geographic proximity to ECE; the economic impact o f unification on Germany’s position as a
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major European trading state; the economic impact o f the joint collapse o f the Soviet Union and 
the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) on the former GDR and Eastern Europe; 
and the German private sector’s proclivity towards expanding old markets and developing new 
ones in ECE.
New geographical and geopolitical realities on the European continent thrust Germany 
into a major fulcrum of political and economic power in Western and Eastern Europe after 
unification. The former GDR was an ideal launching pad for promoting Germany’s economic 
relations with ECE and spearheading its reconstruction.11 For Dieter Schumacher, a unified 
Germany’s
‘...proximity to the market has the greatest positive effect on German exports o f 
clothing, wooden articles, furniture, mineral oil products, textiles and shoes. 
Conversely, on the import side short distances between the CEECs [Central and East 
European Countries] and Germany give an advantage above all to supplies o f mineral 
oil products, iron and steel, wooden articles and motor vehicle industry products.12
After 1990, it was predictable that Germany’s economic relations with ECE would be more
intensive with the two states located on its eastern frontier: Czechoslovakia and Poland. The
reverse was also true; Germany became an instant economic magnet for both states and others in
ECE. With Germany’s close geographic proximity to ECE, Bonn focused increasingly on
safeguarding the transition and transformation processes being undertaken by emerging
independent states in ECE. The potential spill-over effect from political and economic turmoil on
Germany’s Eastern frontier had potentially disastrous consequences for the former GDR,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and other states in Eastern Europe. Germany was the principal transit
route for all goods travelling from East to West and vice-versa and its central geographic position
in Europe placed it in a vulnerable position.
n Hisashi Watanabe, ‘Germany’s Unification and the Effects on Central and Eastern Europe’ in Herbert Hax 
et al (eds.), Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and East Asia: A Challenge fo r  Japan and 
Germany (Berlin; New York: Springer, 1996), pp. 106-107.
12Dieter Schumacher, ‘Impact on German Trade o f increased division of labor with Eastern Europe’ in 
Stanley W. Black (ed.), Europe’s Economy looks East: Implications fo r  Germany and the European Union 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 151.
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The Economic Impact o f Unification
When assessing Germany’s post-Cold War political and economic development it is often 
forgotten that despite all the apparent benefits derived from the merger o f the FRG and the GDR, 
Germany remained a state in transition. This had important implications for Germany’s economic 
relations with the ECE. The preservation o f Standort Deutschland was contingent on several 
crucial factors which were intimately linked with Germany’s ability to manage its own internal 
transformation processes and recreate and restructure former GDR markets that had suffered or 
been lost as a result o f the CMEA’s collapse. The socio-political and economic conditions 
imposed by unification acted as a constraint and catalyst in forcing Germany’s economic interests 
in ECE onto the political agenda. The restoration o f the GDR’s trading ties with the defunct 
CMEA was an economic priority whose success would determine the outcome of Germany’s 
unification experiment.
Although domestic economic priorities within Germany were paramount, social and 
economic disparities on the periphery o f Germany’s eastern frontier were not ignored; however, 
they did not receive the same amount o f attention in the aftermath of unification. Bonn’s Eastern 
dilemma can be summarised by the following question: how would Germany be able to finance 
the tremendous costs of unification and provide financial and economic resources for the 
reconstruction o f ECE simultaneously? For Bonn, the former was the most important although the 
latter was regarded as vital if  the former was to succeed.
This particular conundrum resurfaced on numerous occasions and was essential in 
influencing Bonn’s -  at times -  ad hoc responses to the numerous challenges on its Eastern 
frontier. The ‘unification’ factor in Germany’s foreign policy behaviour was important for several 
reasons. First, the success o f German unification, especially the economic regeneration o f its 
eastern Lander, was directly linked to the protracted existence of a state o f socio-political, 
economic, and military stability on its Eastern frontier. Secondly, the preservation o f Germany’s 
internal stability (and the EU for that matter) was perceived by Bonn as intimately linked to the 
success o f external reform and transformation processes in ECE.lj Third, Germany’s ECE
13See the following speeches made by Kohl and published in Bulletin, ‘Aufgaben deutscher Politik in den 
neunziger Jahren’, no. 56 (22 May 1991), pp. 441-46, and Bulletin, ‘Fundamente und Strukturen einer 
gemeinsamen europaischen Zukunft’, no. 60 (29 May 1991), pp. 473-477.
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counterparts were fully aware that if  its internal transformation processes faltered, or even failed, 
attempts successfully to assist and reconstruct ECE would suffer a serious and irreversible setback 
which would have profound implications for European stability. As the principal motor for 
European integration and the EU’s enlargement to the East, all ECE governments, especially the 
Czech Republic and Poland, relied extensively on Germany’s ability successfully to manage its 
unification processes and devote substantial political and economic resources to the region’s 
recovery.
This particular dilemma was exacerbated by the exasperation Germany’s political 
leadership felt when trying to secure Western and especially Southern European participation in 
the economic reconstruction o f ECE. From Germany’s perspective, it was self-evident that there 
were legitimate comparisons between the situations o f Greece, Portugal, and Spain in the 1970s 
and 1980s, and the new independent states in ECE after 1990.14 There is, however, little economic 
evidence to suggest that from 1990 to 1998 other European powers such as France, Italy, the 
United Kingdom, or even the United States (despite large investments spread across few sectors) 
played an active role, commensurate with their status in the international system, in assisting with 
the region’s political and economic development.
Germany’s economy was faced with multiple challenges as it was faced, first, with 
reversing forty years of centralised Soviet planning in the GDR and, second, integrating the 
GDR’s socio-political, economic and military structures into its own. These daunting tasks had 
profound implications for Germany’s external position vis-a-vis ECE and the Former Soviet 
Union (FSU). Unification, despite early buoyant proclamations, especially by Chancellor Kohl, 
presented the German economy with complex challenges and also contributed to a general slow­
down in the European Community’s growth in the early 1990s.
The following economic indicators briefly illustrate how Germany’s economic fortunes 
were reversed after 1989. First, Germany’s current account surplus in 1989 amounted to DM 108 
billion or 5 per cent of GDP; by 1991, its current account showed a deficit o f more than DM 30 
billion. Second, the current account deficit crisis was closely linked to the sharp decline o f West
I4Hans-Peter Schwarz, ‘Aussenpolitische Agenda fur das Fin de siecle’, Merkur, no. 48 (September/October 
1994), p. 783.
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German exports in the first two years after unification. German imports outpaced export growth 
because o f the growing internal demand for West German products in the former GDR. West 
German exports to ECE, however, remained unaffected by this trend. Indeed, West German 
enterprises, fuelled by an incredible consumer demand in ECE, increased their exports to the 
region by one-third from 1989 to 1991. On the other hand, East German exports never recovered 
from their pre-1989 levels; they never even reached forty per cent o f their 1989 level. West 
German imports from ECE increased by forty per cent whereas East German imports collapsed to 
an all-time low because o f the CMEA’s dissolution.15 Thirdly, net payments to the European 
Community from 1989 to 1991 increased although Germany’s per capita income had decreased 
since unification. Finally, the dramatic appreciation o f the German Mark from 1989 to 1991 
raised concerns about the price competitiveness o f German products abroad.16
This potent mix o f economic indicators signalled the problems and challenges faced by a 
unified Germany undertaking the economic reconstruction o f its eastern Lander. A crippling 
economic recession in the early 1990s also severely handicapped its ability and capacity to pursue 
its political and economic objectives in ECE. The economies o f its Eastern neighbours who were 
becoming increasingly dependent on Western, especially German financial assistance and aid to 
overcome the devastating economic legacy o f communism, displayed similar trends. Against this 
economic backdrop, Germany’s policy-makers were forced to confront their Eastern 
problematique and manage their own internal transition processes simultaneously.
The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the CMEA
The Soviet Union and CMEA’s collapse offered several economic challenges for 
Germany’s policymakers. Under the provisions o f the State Treaty with the former GDR and the 
currency union of 1 July 1990, the FRG agreed to maintain the CMEA’s transfer rouble 
mechanism. It also purchased the transfer rouble claims arising from trade with CMEA countries 
at a preferential rate until the end o f 1990. Consequently, through this arrangement a unified 
Germany became economically tied to potentially collapsing markets in the East. This was only
15Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘The Economic Relations between Unified Germany and the Countries o f Central 
and Eastern Europe Undergoing Reforms’. Monthly Report (July 1992), p. 15.
l6Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘The State of External Adjustment after German Unification’, pp. 48-49.
197
for a short period of time but it was part o f an overall German strategy to prevent the total 
collapse o f the GDR’s former internal and external markets in ECE and bolster trade with the 
Soviet Union.17 The CMEA’s demise had dramatic economic implications for the GDR which, in 
turn, affected Germany’s ability to shape its reunification processes. To illustrate the gravity o f 
this state o f affairs, three-quarters o f all GDR exports went to the Soviet Union and CMEA 
countries; one quarter went to the West and the FRG received half that total.18 Within the Eastern 
European CMEA, trade volume had fallen between fourteen and sixteen per cent in 1990.19 The 
CMEA’s dissolution eventually led to the collapse o f the GDR’s external markets there and in the 
FSU.
Trade patterns between the former GDR and their CMEA counterparts in ECE were also 
severely disrupted by the collapse o f communism. Trading levels amongst the CMEA states 
decreased as they attempted to increase their trade with Western industrial countries. The 
CMEA’s demise therefore led to a fundamental reappraisal o f ECE economic interests which 
became increasingly focused on the expansion o f economic relations with the West and, in 
particular, Germany. For Germany and ECE, the expansion o f economic ties against 
overwhelming economic odds -  although welcome on almost every level -  could not dispel the 
historical angst of economic domination contemplated by Germany’s smaller neighbours.20
After forty years o f Soviet domination, ECE was obviously keen to cut its dependent 
economic ties with Russia and return to their West European roots. Due to its weakened position, 
the Soviet Union, followed by the Russian Federation, had no leverage in this matter and 
reluctantly yielded its economic influence in the region to Germany. This dramatic role reversal 
had important consequences, especially for the Poles who, according to Norman Davies, had 
‘traditionally acted as the bridge between the dynamic German economy and the vast Russian
17Jeffrey J. Anderson and Celeste A. Wallander, In the Shadow o f the Wall: Germany’s Eastern Trade 
Policy after Unification (Cambridge, MA: Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, Working 
Paper, no. 96-3, 1996), p. 15.
I8W.R. Smyser, The German Economy: Colossus at the Crossroads (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 
p. 151.
19UN/ECE, Economic Survey o f Europe in 1990-1991 (New York: UN/ECE, 1991), p. 74.
20Heinrich Machowski and Wolfram Schrettl, ‘The Economic Impact o f Unified Germany on Central and 
Eastern Europe’, Study Papers, 103rd Congress, Second session (Washington, DC: Joint Economic 
Committee o f the Congress o f the United States o f America, November 1994), p. 414.
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market’ but ‘were tom between admiration for the quality o f German achievements and fear o f
domination by German interests’.21
There were two immediate economic priorities for the Czech Republic and Poland. First,
they had to expand their economic relations amongst themselves. Second, ECE was intent on
severing their links with traditional Soviet markets and limiting their overall dependency on the
Soviet style of economic management. It was inevitable given Germany’s strong historical,
cultural, and economic traditions in ECE that it would eventually emerge as a regional economic
power responsible for spearheading economic reforms throughout the entire region. Germany was
increasingly looking eastwards to meet foreign and security policy challenges whilst its
neighbours in ECE were looking westwards in the hope that they would become future members
of Western institutions, such as the EU and NATO. In almost all cases, the path for the return of
the East to the West was via Germany. According to the UN/ECE Secretariat, this dramatic
economic re-orientation o f interests and priorities had the following impact on Germany’s
economic relations with ECE:
Probably the most pronounced structural tendency which can be observed since the late 
1980s has been the rapid ascent of Germany to the position of the dominant trade partner 
of transition countries, and a parallel tendency for Russia’s role to decline. The 
replacement of Russia by Germany as the main trading partner o f most east European 
economies not only demonstrates a geographic reorientation of trade on a substantial 
scale... It is clear that a new pattern o f ‘hub and spoke’ integration has emerged in 
Central Europe with the German economy as a centre o f gravity and a pole for attraction 
for nearly all transition countries from Estonia in the north to Bulgaria in the south.22
To expand on its West German traditions as a successful ‘trading state’ throughout the
Cold War, a reunited Germany needed to create new markets in ECE and preserve old ones. This
was essential for Germany to safeguard its economic investments in its eastern Lander, promote
and expand its Osthandel, and remain globally competitive. There were, however, strategic
implications arising from this strategy’s adoption, especially for Germany’s economic
competitors. The prevailing opinion amongst Germany’s neighbours was that the rise o f a German
economic giant in ECE was a potential reality, although paradoxically, these fears amongst
Germany’s allies in Western Europe and the United States did not result in a marked increase o f
2INorman Davies, ‘One Thousand Years o f Polish-German Camaraderie’ in Roger Bartlett and Karen 
Schonwalder (eds.), The German Lands and Eastern Europe: Essays on the History o f their Social, Cultural 
and Political Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p. 269.
22UN/ECE, Economic Bulletin fo r  Europe, vol. 46 (New York: UN/ECE, 1994), p. 57.
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their economic interest in ECE.2j In its 1993 annual report, the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe echoed repeatedly voiced German concerns that not enough attention was
being paid to the development o f the ECE economies:
First, there is still a tendency in many western countries to regard economic developments 
in the east as o f relatively minor importance to western interests. This is short-sighted: 
economic failure in the transition economies would increase the risks o f political 
instability in Europe, while economic success could eventually provide a significant 
stimulus to the west European economy. Second, western governments have become 
increasingly preoccupied with their own domestic problems.24
This crucial point was not lost on Germany’s political leadership or its Eastern European
neighbours. There were profound implications for the following areas: Germany’s perceptions o f
economic instability in the region, the urgency o f devising a co-ordinated bilateral and multilateral
approach to transformation and transition problems in ECE, and the development and
implementation of economic strategies designed to forestall further economic difficulties in the
region. The monumental political and economic events witnessed from 1989 to 1991 exacerbated
Germany’s economic malaise and its ability to shape internal and external developments without
being gripped by a potentially perilous recession.
Foreign Economic Relations with Czechoslovakia and Poland 
Post-unification Interregnum, 1990-1992
After 1990, Bonn was focused on mastering the economic challenges posed by 
unification. They far outweighed any foreign economic interests Germany may have contemplated 
entertaining, although there was an important link between the two. Germany’s foreign economic 
policy infrastructure, composed o f multiple agents (ministries, divisions, committees, etc.) and 
individual actors (highlighted in chapter two), was not readily prepared to adapt itself to the 
requirements of a new international system with an entirely different set o f rules o f engagement, 
especially as far as Germany’s relations with Czechoslovakia and Poland were concerned. There 
was a lack of a concerted and coordinated effort on the part of these economic agents and actors, 
including the chancellor, to develop a coherent bilateral economic approach towards ECE.
23Andras Inotai, ‘Economic Implications o f German Unification for Central and Eastern Europe’ in Paul B. 
Stares (ed.), The New Germany and the New Europe (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1992), p. 295.
24United Nations/Economic Commission o f Europe, Economic Bulletin fo r  Europe, Vol. 45 (New York; 
Geneva: UN/ECE, 1993), pp. 1-2.
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Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that there was minimal trade activity between
Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland during this period or that German foreign direct investment
in these countries was negligible. Indeed, it became clear that from 1990-1993, a pattern was
emerging which suggested that Germany was already playing a prominent economic role in both
countries. According to Machowski and Schrettl,
a comparison o f German foreign direct investment and German exports reveals a strong 
discrepancy in the extent o f reorientation toward the CEE [Central and Eastern Europe] 
region. While the share o f the CEE region in German exports increased from 3 per cent in 
1990 to 4 per cent in 1993, the region’s share in German foreign direct investment jumped 
over the same period from a mere 0.7 per cent in 1990 (and practically nil before) to as 
much as 8.5 per cent in 1993.25
That Germany’s foreign economic policy lacked structure and coherence should not 
imply, however, that it was complacent about the economic problems on its Eastern doorstep. 
Germany was in a state o f economic transition like its Eastern neighbours so it had, unlike its 
Western neighbours, a much better appreciation for the transformational political and economic 
changes Czechoslovakia and Poland were undertaking.
In this time period, two occurrences are worth noting. From 1990-1992, the Kohl 
government was able to achieve two important political objectives via economic means which are 
worth highlighting. Kohl successfully linked an aid package (DM2 billion in debt forgiveness and 
export credit guarantees) to Poland with political concessions on the ethnic German minority in 
Poland which were to form the basis for foundation for negotiating Germany’s bilateral treaty 
with Poland. Second, Kohl successfully used economic carrots to induce the Soviet Union to 
support German unification.26 Throughout the broad spectrum of Germany’s foreign economic 
relations with Czechoslovakia and Poland, it struggled to define its economic raison d ’etre by 
relying on ad hoc arrangements and responses on the part of ministries, the Lander, and the 
private sector to answer requests for economic and financial assistance from ECE governments. 
Despite these informal arrangements, however, Germany was still able to provide financial
25Macho\vski and Wolfram Schrettl, ‘The Economic Impact o f Unified Germany on Central and Eastern 
Europe’, p. 421.
26Patricia Davis and Peter Dombrowski, “Appetite o f the Wolf: German Foreign Assistance for Central and 
Eastern Europe,” German Politics, vol. 6, no. 1 (April 1997), pp. 5-6.
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resources totalling DM 27.5 billion to the transition countries in Eastern Europe (Albania, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania).27
Bilateralism and Germany's Foreign Economic Policy
Germany was clearly in an advantageous position to be able to shape if  not dictate the
contents o f its foreign economic relations with the Czech Republic and Poland. Bilateral
economic instruments played an important role in establishing and sustaining Germany’s
predominant economic position in ECE. They also functioned as effective security policy tools in
the combat against economic instability. At Bonn’s disposal were a broad range o f bilateral
economic instruments to help it prioritise its economic investments and protect its economic
interests. Their application, however, was controversial since they assisted in the expansion of
Germany’s economic power and influence in the region. Germany held an inordinate high level o f
structural power in ECE. According to Susan Strange, structural power
...in short, confers the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape 
frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate 
enterprises. The relative power o f each party in a relationship is more, or less, if  one party 
is also determining the surrounding structure of the relationship.28
Germany’s political leaders were conscious of their country’s political and economic clout and
ability to shape economic environments to their liking. From the perspective o f its ECE
neighbours, Germany was a magnet for all economic activity within the EU and, most
importantly, Czech and Polish exports. Germany’s 1200 kilometer border with the Czech
Republic and Poland was investment starved and crying out for economic stimuli that only
Germany could provide. TRANSFORM, foreign trade (exports and imports) and direct foreign
investments were crucial economic instruments in spearheading the transformation processes o f
its Eastern neighbours. The private sector’s role was invaluable in identifying joint venture
opportunities and channelling direct capital investment into Germany’s neighbouring economies.
27The majority o f this assistance went to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. See Deutsche Bundesbank, 
‘The economic relations between unified Germany and the countries o f  central and eastern Europe 
undergoing reforms’, p. 18.
28Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter, 1994), pp. 24-25.
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TRANSFORM
In 1992, the Bundeskanzlei took the decision to formalise the aid and assistance 
arrangements between Bonn and ECE by placing the technical assistance programs o f the 
individual ministries under the TRANSFORM consulting programme. Its implementation began 
in 1994. The BMWi and the Foreign Office were tasked with coordinating TRANSFORM: a 
programme designed to promote advisory aid for countries undergoing transformation and 
transition processes and for strengthening democratic efforts in all states targeted. Bonn laid down 
several important guidelines and priorities which were to influence its assistance and aid 
programmes for the foreseeable future: (1) the promotion o f activities in target countries was 
contingent on where it felt it had a comparative advantage; (2) assistance would only be provided 
to ‘priority’ countries (this included the Czech Republic and Poland); and (3) technical assistance 
requests from national coordinators for foreign aid in the recipient countries were required before 
assistance could be provided.
Several cabinet decisions between March 1992 and July 1993 were instrumental in 
defining further the criteria for providing assistance and aid to target countries. Bonn prioritised 
those reform states that had made the most progress in their transition processes and trade 
liberalisation policies from 1990 to 1992. Not surprisingly, Czechoslovakia and Poland were 
defined as ‘priority’ countries. The BMWi cited numerous economic areas that the German 
government, in particular, the Foreign Office and the BMWi, in conjunction with the 
Kreditanstalt fu r  Wiederaufbau (Reconstruction Loan Corporation - KfW), wished to emphasise 
in their bilateral economic relations with target countries: (1) political and economic advice for 
governments engaged in reform and transitional processes; (2) the development o f mid-level 
structures and companies; (3) help for business restructuring and privatisation efforts; (4) creation 
o f tax, border, insurance and bank regimes; (5) advice for agricultural sectors; (6) professional 
training in all economic areas; (7) law advice, in particular, in the field of business law; (8) help 
for the erection o f administrative structures, and (9) extensive advice in the field o f work and 
social politics.29 These measures assisted transitional states in their reform and transformation 
efforts and they were co-ordinated by government ministries and agencies, including the Lander.
29BMWi, Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mil Mittel- und Osteuropa 1994. no. 373 (Bonn: BMWi, 1995), pp. 8-9.
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In July 1993, Kohl appointed retired State Secretary Walter Kittel as overall co-ordinator 
for consultancy (technical) assistance to Part II countries, which included the Czech Republic and 
Poland. The BMWi emerged not only as the principal charge o f coordinating assistance activities 
but also for identifying the main areas for advisory services. The KfW also played an important 
role in this process, aided by other federal ministries, the Lander, and the municipalities. In daily 
practice, KfW offices were set up in German embassies overseas. These offices acted as 
clearinghouses for all aid and technical assistance projects undertaken in the recipient countries. 
They performed the following functions: ‘(1) identifying main areas o f advice together with the 
partner country, (2) receiving and discussing applications from the partner country and giving a 
preliminary opinion on them, (3) giving advice to receiving governments on services available to 
them, (4) coordinating German technical assistance, (5) monitoring the implementation o f 
projects, (6) observing the reform process, and (7) observing the aid activities o f other donors and 
ensuring coordination with these activities’/ 0
TRANSFORM and the Czech Republic
The German government’s TRANSFORM report for 1996 noted that by 1994 the Czech 
government had been successful in its transformation efforts and did not require as much 
assistance, except in special sectoral areas where there was demand. Through TRANSFORM, the 
Czech Republic received approximately DM 15 billion for fiscal years 95-96. Germany was 
focused on providing technical assistance to the Czech government in the following areas: 
development of the market economy; support to small and medium sized enterprises; support for 
EU integration; education and training; the environment; support for the state and social sector; 
agriculture; the financial sector, and science and technology. In the Czech Republic, 
TRANSFORM was coordinated by the Bilateral Co-operation Unit o f the BMF and the 
responsible national Czech ministry with the purpose o f implementing the following tasks: (1) 
sending missions o f experts from Germany to the Czech Republic and Poland, (2) educating and 
training Czech and Polish officials, professionals, managers and public officers, (3) delivery o f
30Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in Europe, Assistance Programmes fo r  Central 
and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. (Paris: OECD, 1996), pp. 36-37.
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material and equipment necessary to the carrying out o f the consultancy, (4) feasibility studies, 
and (5) elaboration o f analyses and other kinds of documents demanded by the EU.
More specifically, the TRANSFORM report highlights several projects completed in 
1995-1997. The BMWi assisted with the creation o f an institute for administration in Benesov 
which was tasked with educating state, local and communal employees. In Hradec Kralove, a pilot 
project for the reorganisation o f the city’s administration was organised. In the areas o f work and 
social politics, the BMWi helped reform the Czech social insurance and pension systems and a 
model work promotion, employment and structural development centre in Zdar. Within the 
context o f the environment, Germany provided advice on emergency and plant safety to their 
Czech counterparts. In the private sector, the Germans promoted the creation and development o f 
a structure designed to advise small and medium sized enterprises with their projects and 
exchanges with their German counterparts. In the tourism sphere, the BMWi played an active role 
in contributing funds for the development o f tourism infrastructure sites in the Euroregions o f 
Sumava and Labe. In the financial sector, the BMWi concentrated on expanding the operations o f 
the Bohemia-Moravia Guarantee and Development Bank and restructuring the operations o f the 
Czech Savings Bank.
In 1997, the TRANSFORM budget for the Czech Republic was reduced in light of the 
Czech Republic’s limited needs for TRANSFORM financial resources. Programmes initiated in 
1996 were continued and Germany sought to continue its efforts to prepare the Czech Republic 
for eventual membership in the EU and to educate the country about the EU’s membership 
requirements, laws and regulations.31
The Lander
A Bavarian-Czech Working Group, established in 1990, has implemented over 70 
projects focused on state administration reform, particularly the education o f managers and higher 
officials. Cross border projects aimed at improving the environment have also been undertaken, 
Study visits for Czech judges and prosecutors have been organised. Saxony created a joint
3IBMWi. Die Beratung Mittef- und Osteuropas beim Aufbau von Demokratie undsozialer Marktwirtschaft: 
Konzept undBeratungsprogramme der Bundesregierung (Bonn: BMWi, 1997), p. 104.
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commission with the Czech Republic to promote the education and further education o f 
manpower, including the education o f managers and the development of relations between 
companies and enterprises in their respective private sectors, especially in the agricultural sector.
The joint working group of the Czech Republic and Baden-Wurttemberg, created in 1991, 
focuses its activities on technical assistance for small and medium sized enterprises and on the 
promotion of bilateral business, university and forest administration links. The working group 
also promotes youth outreach and internship opportunities for their students. Brandenburg 
supports cooperation in agricultural fields, education and research. Bremen provides a permanent 
representative in Prague to provide advice on harbour issues.32 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern assists 
in the field of education, especially high schools and the teaching o f agricultural ecology.33 The 
Lander's priorities did not change in 1997.
TRANSFORM and Poland
The German government’s TRANSFORM report for 1996 highlighted Poland’s number 
one position in the political and economic transformation processes o f ECE and its first report on 
the priorities o f TRANSFORM in Poland from 1995-1996.34 From a TRANSFORM budget of 
DM 295 billion, Poland was allocated DM 29.5 billion for its programme (Russia received the 
highest allocation with DM 75 billion). The TRANSFORM report calls attention to the following 
areas the BMWi provided advice: (1) government consulting in the fields o f social and 
environmental reform to prepare the Poles for the EU; (2) support for the private sector, especially 
small and medium sized enterprises; (3) education and further education o f professional and 
leadership manpower, and (4) support for the agricultural sector.
In (1), the BMWi consulted with its Polish counterparts in the areas of pension, accident 
and health insurance and the modernisation o f its social insurance systems. Within the context o f 
the environment, Germany provided advice about emergency and plant safety. In support o f 
Poland’s aspirations to join the EU, Germany also requested that Polish government officials be
32Source: www.mfcr.cz
33BMWi, Die Beratung Mittel- und Osteuropas beim Aufbau von Demokratie undsozialer Marktwirtschaft: 
Konzept und Beratungsprogramme der Bundesregierung (Bonn: BMWi, 1996), p. 107.
34Ibid., p. 64.
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educated in the laws and regulations o f the EU so that the Polish government could easily adapt 
its national legal structures and laws within EU community law. This project was undertaken in 
cooperation with the French government. In (2,3), within the Polish private sector there was a 
high demand for technological and business know-how, and education for its workforce that 
would be useful for Poland’s transformation processes. Initiatives like consulting programmes, the 
creation o f the German-Polish Economic Development Society and other regional cooperation 
bureaus (in the four bordering voivodships in west Poland) were all important instruments for 
furthering German and Polish economic objectives. In (4), the BMWi emphasised Poland’s 
agricultural sector as an area where its professional expertise could be valuable. Here the BMWi 
concentrated on educating more agricultural consultants and instructors in several consultation 
centres in Brwinow and Posen.
From 1996-1997, the BMWi focused on furthering the implementation o f the 
aforementioned projects, including the recurrent emphasis of bring Poland closer to the EU 
through consultations and education o f key Polish governmental officials. A particular focus was 
on the voivodship o f Koslin where a tourism project was being developed with German 
assistance.
The Lander
The Lander undertook their own consultations with Poland and concentrated on areas 
where they felt they could make an impact and areas o f interest to them. The following Lander 
participated in special projects with their Polish government or voivodship counterparts: 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Lower Saxony, Brandenburg, Berlin, North Rhine Westphalia, 
Saxony, Hesse and Baden-Wurtemmberg. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern supported economic 
cooperation between itself and Poland through a joint venture located in Gdansk which promoted 
exchanges and trips between management delegations. Lower Saxony expanded its bilateral 
twinning arrangements with the cities o f Posen and Wroclaw. Brandenburg concentrated on 
regional border development (the Land shares a 250 kilometre border with the Poles). Bavaria, 
Lower Saxony and Berlin consulted on the creation o f several ‘East-West’ management and 
consultation bureaus which would foster closer cooperation between Germans and Poles. North-
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Rhine Westphalia worked closely with the following regions: Kattowitz, Cracow and Opplen in 
the area o f development. Baden-Wiirtemmberg concentrated on similar projects in Oppeln. Hesse 
created a Hesse-Poland information bureau in 1996 which was designed to promote cooperation 
and joint ventures between their respective private sectors.
The German government’s TRANSFORM report for 1997 highlights the following 
additional projects implemented by the Lander. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern participated in the 
development o f company community associations in Srem and Olsztyn, including the expansion 
of communal projects along its border with the Euroregion Pommerania. Lower Saxony 
intensified its twinning arrangements with Posen and Wroclaw in the areas o f office 
communication, electronic engineering and support for the agricultural sectors (delivery o f heavy 
machinery). Bremen opened up a ‘Bremen Business Office in Gdansk and the city o f Hamburg 
supported a number of projects initiated by the Polish Consulate in Hamburg. North Rhine 
Westphalia continued to focus on the regions o f Oppeln, Kattowitz and Cracow.35
Foreign Trade and Direct Investments
In 1996, German President Roman Herzog gave a speech entitled ‘Trade with Central and 
Eastern Europe -  An Arrow of our Export Economy’ where he classified foreign trade (exports 
and imports) with the region and direct foreign investments as the principal foundations o f 
Germany’s economic relations with the region/6 In Bonn, the expansion of foreign trade between 
Germany and its Eastern neighbors was seen an important precondition for the establishment o f a 
vibrant growth market for Germany’s exporters seeking new opportunities. Increased levels o f 
German direct investments abroad, especially in ECE were necessary to maintain traditional sales 
markets and open up new ones. Capital investments allow recipient countries to benefit from the 
following: economic resources that they otherwise would not get access to technological, 
management, and organisational knowledge which increases productivity, product quality and
35BMWi. Die Beratung Mittel- und Osteuropas beim Aujbau von Demokratie und sozialer Marktwirtschaft: 
Konzept und Beratungsprogramme der Bundesregierung (Bonn: BMWi, 1997).
36Bulletin, ‘Handel mit Mittel- und Osteuropa -  ein Pfeiler unserer Exportwirtschaft’, no. 101 (10 December 
1996), pp. 1091-1093.
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international competitiveness, and invaluable privatisation assistance.37 The link between trade
exports and German direct investments could not be more profound for the German and ECE
economies. The German Bundesbank states:
The parallel trends in German direct investment abroad and German exports indicate that 
domestic enterprises expand their involvement in other countries principally for strategic 
sales reasons. The regional distribution o f the stock o f German direct investment abroad 
is, moreover, largely identical to the regional pattern of German exports.38
The Czech Republic and Poland were at the forefront o f Germany’s interests to intensify trade
with them as they had made a strong commitment to their economic reform and transformation
processes and liberalised their trade regim es/9 At stake was access to a market with
approximately four hundred million people o f which thirteen per cent were located in the Czech
Republic and Poland. In his speech, Herzog described Germany’s eastern neighbours as ‘tigers at
the doorstep’ and he also addressed complaints about Germany’s economic dominance in ECE
and worries that its passive economic engagement there was allowing other states to establish a
vital foothold. He acknowledged the veracity of both sides’ claims at a time when Germany had
just completed two of its most vibrant years of foreign trade and investments with ECE (1993-
1995).40 According to the German Bundesbank, after several years o f transformation
more than one half o f the foreign trade o f the CEE countries is now with the industrial 
countries. Germany has by far the greatest share in this trade -  being just as much a 
consumer o f raw materials and industrial products as a supplier of consumer goods and, 
more importantly, o f capital goods for the creation o f efficient production facilities’.41
Driving this growth were the following areas: the increased division of labour in textiles, leather,
and clothing, in the form of outward processing, but also in the motor vehicle industry and in
electrical engineering.42 Germany’s consumption o f raw materials, industrial products, and as a
37Jorg Bey fuss, Erfahrungen deutscher Auslandsinvesloren in den Reformlandern Mittel- und Osteuropas 
(Cologne: Deutscher lnstituts-Verlag, 1996), p. 11.
38Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘Developments and determinants o f international direct investment’, Monthly 
Report (August 1997), p. 66.
39Dieter Schumacher, ‘Impact on German Trade o f increased division o f labour with Eastern Europe’, p. 
101.
40Bulletin, ‘Handel mit Mittel- und Osteuropa’, p. 1092.
4IDeutsche Bundesbank, ‘Recent trends in Germany’s economic links with central and east European 
countries in transition’, Monthly Report (July 1996), p. 29.
42Dieter Schumacher, ‘Impact on German Trade of increased division o f labour with Eastern Europe’ p. 
153.
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supplier o f consumer and capital goods were equally important. Investing in ECE was popular and 
made easier by the following conditions: cheap commercial properties, investment friendly legal 
systems, limited environmental laws, a broad selection o f highly educated workers, high levels o f 
readiness to work, limited union influence, and good prospects for energy and natural resources.43
Before 1993, however, Germany’s domestic economic picture was a different one marred 
by unification costs, a shrinking global economy, considerable losses in world trade share growth, 
and its tendency, in the first few years after unification, to look inward. The German Bundesbank 
acknowledged that unification induced changes in foreign trade links were attributed to Germany 
becoming more domestically oriented in line with experiences which support the assertion that ‘a 
country’s links with other countries diminish, as its size increases.44 After 1993, Germany’s 
foreign trade with the region expanded rapidly with double digit growth rates as German exports 
there rose by almost thirty per cent to under DM 61 billion in 1995 making this region a more 
important German export market than the United States.45 Imports from ECE amounted to nine 
per cent o f  Germany’s total imports, in comparison with 7 per cent in 1993, thus allowing the 
ECE economies and their private sectors to benefit from increased sales to Germany and access to 
vitally needed foreign exchange.46 German exports to ECE totalled DM 61 billion while imports 
totalled DM 58.5 billion, producing a trade surplus o f DM 2.5 billion in Germany’s favour.47 
Germany accounted for approximately 25 per cent o f all trade with ECE countries.48
By 1994, the trading volume between Germany and the Czech Republic had increased by 
28.8 per cent to approximately DM 18.1 billion. As in the previous two years, the level of 
German exports (an increase over the previous year by 26.1 per cent to DM 9.7 billion) was
43Hans-Georg Melhorn, ‘Chancen im Osten und die Folgen fur Deutschland’ in Hans-Georg Melhom (ed.), 
Chancen in Osteuropa und die Folgen fu r  Deutschland (Leipzig: Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Ost- und 
Sudosteuropa e.V./Kreativitatszentrum Leipzig, 1995), p, 23.
44Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘The state of external adjustment after German unification’, p. 56.
45Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘Recent trends in Germany’s economic links with central and east European 
countries in transition’, p. 32.
46Ibid., p. 34.
47Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung, ‘German trade with Central Eastern Europe 
Increasingly Important’, Special No. 4454 (E), 22 July, 1996.
48United Nations/Economic Commission o f Europe, Economic Survey o f Europe in 1994-1995 (New York; 
Geneva: UN/ECE, 1995), p. 123.
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higher than the level o f imports, which increased by 32 per cent to a level o f DM 8.5 billion, a 
trading surplus o f over DM 1 billion. The focus o f trade between the two countries was on durable 
goods. Germany imported goods such as iron and steel, clothing/textiles, machinery, electro­
technical goods and exported machinery, electronic and technical goods, and most importantly 
motor vehicles. By the end o f 1994, Bonn had granted capital loans to the Czech Republic with a 
total value of DM 981 million. The Germans regarded the Czech Republic as the premier location 
in ECE for receiving capital guarantees from the German government. 60 outstanding applications 
totalling DM 1060 million were still being processed.49
In 1995, the trading volume between German and the Czech Republic increased by 23.4 
per cent to approximately DM 22.4 billion. As in the previous two years, the level o f German 
exports (an increase over the previous year by 22.6 per cent to DM 11.8 billion) was higher than 
the level o f imports, which increased by 24.5 per cent to a level of DM 10.6 billion, a trading 
surplus o f over DM 1.2 billion. By the end o f 1995, the German government granted capital loans 
in the amount of DM 1015.7 million. 39 outstanding applications totalling DM 937.7 million were 
still outstanding.50 By the end o f 1995, German direct investments in the Czech Republic rose by 
more than DM 2 billion to under DM 4 billion. In Poland, they rose by DM 1 billion to under DM 
2 billion.51
Poland was Germany’s most important trading partner in ECE in 1994. In comparison 
with 1993, the trade volume between both countries had increased by 11.6 per cent to DM 20.5 
billion. German exports, in comparison with 1993, increased to DM 10.4 billion. Germany’s 
imports from Poland increased by 17.2 per cent to a level o f DM 10.1 billion. The principal 
exports from Poland were textiles, clothing, wood, iron and steel whereas the principal exports 
from Germany were machinery, clothing/textiles, chemical and pharmaceutical products, and 
electronic equipment. By 31 December 1994, the German government granted capital loans to
49BMWi, Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit Mittel- und Osteuropa 1994. No. 373 (Bonn: BMWi, 1995), p. 16.
50BMWi, Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit Mittel- und Osteuropa 1995 (Bonn: BMWi, 1996), p. 19.
5'Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘International capital links between enterprises from the end o f 1993 to the end of  
1995% Monthly Report (May 1997), p. 70.
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promote investments in Poland at a level of DM 254 million. 157 applications amounting to DM 
487 million were outstanding.52
In 1995, Poland remained Germany’s principal trading partner in 1995. The trading 
volumes between both states increased 22.6 per cent over the previous year to DM 25.1 billion. 
Germany’s exports to Poland, in contrast with 1994, increased by 22.6 per cent to a level o f DM 
12.7 billion. German imports from Poland reached a level o f DM 12.4 billion and increased by 
22.6 per cent. The principal exports from Poland were still textiles, clothing, wood, iron and steel. 
One significant addition to the list of principal exports from Germany was motor vehicles. By 31 
December 1995, the German government had granted capital loans to promote investments in 
Poland at a level o f DM 400 million. 131 applications amounting to DM 320 million were still 
outstanding.5j By the end o f 1995, German direct investments in Poland rose by DM 1 billion to 
under DM 2 billion.54 Total German direct investments in Eastern Europe amounted to DM 10.5 
billion by the end o f 1995 and from 1995-1996, Hungary (32 per cent); Poland (31 per cent) and 
the Czech Republic (27 per cent) received 90 per cent o f all the German direct investments in 
Eastern Europe.55 It is estimated that 55 per cent o f all German investments were directed towards 
cost saving measures whereas 45 per cent were undertaken for the purpose o f securing greater 
market shares.56 In 1996, German exports to Poland increased by 29 per cent to DM 16.4 billion 
and exports to the Czech Republic increased by 17 per cent to DM 13.9 billion. German imports 
from Poland decreased by -1.9 per cent to DM 12.2 billion and increased from the Czech 
Republic by 7.5 per cent to DM 11.4 billion57
By 1997, Germany was conducting about 10 per cent o f its global trade volume with 
Eastern Europe (six candidate countries for the EU), overtaking the United States for the first time
52BMWi, Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit Mittel- und Osteuropa 1994. No. 373 (Bonn: BMWi, 1995), p. 15.
53BMWi, Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit Mittel- und Osteuropa 1995, p. 18.
54Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘International capital links between enterprises from the end o f 1993 to the end of 
1995’, p. 70.
5SVolkhart Vincentz, Die aussemvirtschaftlichen Beziehungen mit Osteuropa und ihre Auswirkungen auf die 
deutsche Wirtschaft (Munich: Osteuropa-lnstitut, Working Paper, no. 207, 1997), pp. 20-21.
56Ibid. p. 28.
57Andreas Kuhn, ‘Der deutsche Aussenhandel 1995/1996’, Wirtschaft undStatistik, no. 4 (1997), p. 242.
212
in importance (the region also overtook East Asia as a trade target in 199758). German exports to 
Poland increased by 16 per cent in 1997 for a total value o f DM 20 billion and by 11 per cent to 
DM 15 billion.59 From 1993-1997, foreign trade (exports and imports) volume doubled between 
Germany and these countries.60 From three countries’ perspectives (the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland), Germany is their most important trading partner accounting for approximately 25 per 
cent of their total imports as well as being their most important market for their exports.61
As regards imports, Germany's main trading partner in ECE in 1998 was the Czech 
Republic, followed by Poland and Hungary. These three countries accounted for nearly two thirds 
o f imports from the group o f candidate countries. The imports from the Czech Republic consisted 
mainly of motor vehicles, motor vehicle parts and machinery.62 In 1998, Poland confirmed its 
position as Germany’s top trading partner in the region with a volume o f trade totalling DM 40.6 
billion, followed by the Czech Republic with DM 35.9 billion.63
The Private Sector
The German private sector was at the forefront o f all attempts to extend Germany’s 
economic influence beyond its Eastern frontier and assist in the transformation efforts o f its 
Eastern neighbours. It played a lead role in the reinvigoration o f former East German markets in 
ECE and the FSU to promote the economic recovery o f its Eastern Lander. It also was responsible 
for maintaining and expanding Germany’s role as a Handelsstaat in the global economy. The 
momentum behind the German private sector’s incursion into ECE was to remain competitive in 
global markets. To do so, as James Kurth pointed out:
58Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung. “Starke Ausweitung des Handels mit den Reformlandem 
Mittel- und Osteuropas 1992 bis 1997.” Wochenbericht, no. 7 (12 February, 1998), p. 142.
59‘German Trade with Eastern Europe Increasing', Week in Germany, 26 September 1997.
60Andreas Kuhn, ‘Der Aussenhandel mit den EU-Beitrittskandidaten’, Wirtschaft undStatistik, no. 9 (1998), 
p. 755.
61lbid., p. 759
62Federal Statistics Office Press Release, ‘Foreign trade with candidate countries for the EU’s 
enlargement', 25 January 2000.
63Report from the Federal Republic o f Germany (German Embassy, UK), ‘Trade with Eastern Europe 
Soars’, April 28, 1999.
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Germany needs markets that will give preference to its products, and its most natural 
market is Eastern Europe. With its cheap labour, Eastern Europe is also the most natural 
area for German industrial investment and expansion. German economic leaders need 
East European equivalents o f Mexico and the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
There is consequently a German economic drive to the East, an imperative to create a 
Wirtschaftsraum, or German economic realm, in the region.64
As a country driven by the necessity to create new markets for its products and promoting its
export, Germany was dependent on the success o f its business community and their efforts to
promote Standort and Modell Deutschland. The private sector was ideally placed to perform this
role because of Germany’s proximity and decades of intensive trade and economic co-operation
with ECE.
Germany’s private commercial enterprises benefited immensely from the following four 
main advantages after 1990: geographical proximity; Germany’s historical place in Eastern 
European foreign trade; co-production deals between German and Eastern European enterprises in 
the 1970s; the historical tradition o f German capital expansion in the region, and the provision of 
the relevant German skills and know how in developing the economies o f ECE.65 Bonn’s foreign 
relations with the Czech Republic and Poland were conducted under the pretext that its private 
sector would only be able to thrive economically in an external environment where investment 
and aid were not jeopardised by political or military instability. This strategy’s success relied on 
Bonn’s role to promote closer political and economic relations with its counterparts.
In addition, it required generous amounts o f governmental economic assistance in the 
form of aid, technological know-how, and general economic and financial advice on the creation 
of an economic climate that promoted and encouraged investment, trade, and the establishment o f 
joint ventures. The exploitation of sales potential and cost advantages in these regions was also a 
consideration.66 One such example is the significance o f the German Volkswagen Group’s 
investment in the Czech automotive company Skoda which cannot be underestimated as a 
powerful symbol of German capital investment in what was a fledgling Czech automotive
64James Kurth, ‘United Germany in Eastern Europe: The New Eastern Question’, Problems in Post- 
Communism, vol. 42, no. 1 (January-February 1995), p. 52.
65Zbigniew Dobosiewicz, Foreign Investment in Eastern Europe (London; New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 
93.
66Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘Recent trends in Germany’s economic links with central and east European 
countries in transition’, p. 29.
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industry in 1991. Not only did VW invest USD 2.6 billion in Skoda but it also accounted for 7.5
per cent o f the Czech Republic’s total exports in 1997.67
According to the Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart, the Germans enjoyed several
comparative advantages over their economic competitors:
People in Germany are incomparably better prepared, and most important, they have 
adapted to our conditions. An American businessman comes, and after three days he still 
does not understand the reactions o f people he is dealing with ... A German businessman 
is different. This is not only due to physical proximity. I particularly ascribe it to the 
circumstance that the former GDR is part o f the Federal Republic. These people know the 
mentality of our managers and ministerial bureaucrats, they have an insight that a 
Japanese or an American lacks.68
On the other hand, potential pitfalls for the German private sector loomed large in ECE: low
production rates; experience shortages and perceptions o f low quality control on the part o f
employees; lack o f legal protections; bureaucratic procedures; planned economy practices;
difficulties in acquiring land; (7) criminal elements and corruption, and infrastructure deficits.69
Nonetheless, after the Berlin Wall’s collapse the private sector recognised immediately that vast
economic benefits could be gained from communism’s demise and the collapse o f planned
economies. The role o f German finance, especially German banks, played a key role in
maintaining a strong German presence in ECE.70 Banks, private corporations, and non-profit
organisations were catalysts for projecting and expanding German influence in the region and
promoting economic stability.
In a survey undertaken by M anager Magazine  (March 1994), cited by Hans-Georg
Melhom, from over one thousand German companies polled, a third indicated a willingness to
relocate their production sites overseas (45.6 per cent to the Czech Republic and 6.9 per cent to
Poland). Although large companies, with over one thousand employees, were willing to consider
other Western European sites for production purposes, companies with less than fifty employees
67United Nations/Economic Commission o f Europe, Economic Bulletin fo r  Europe, Vol. 49 (New York; 
Geneva: UN/ECE, 1997), p. 48. In addition, see Peter Becker, ‘Das Joint Venture zwischen Volkswagen 
und Skoda -  Eine erste Bilanz’, Osteuropa-Wirtschaft, vol. 42, no. 4 (1997), pp. 388-417.
6*Respekt, no. 7, 17-23 February 1992, FBIS-EEU-92-037,25 February 1992, pp. 8-9.
69J5rg Bey fuss, Erfahrungen deutscher Auslandsinvestoren in den Reformldndern Mittel- und Osteuropas, 
p. 13.
70Edward Russell-Walling, ‘Good Neighbours’, Central European (July/August 1997), pp. 31-33.
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(78 per cent of those polled) were considering ECE as the ideal location for their production 
investments because o f lower costs and wages.71 The trend for German small and medium sized 
enterprises to relocate to ECE was becoming more attractive as production and wages costs in 
Germany were on the increase. By the end o f 1996, the number o f German small and medium 
sized enterprises operating with significant investments o f capital in the Visegrad was put at 
20000, of which 6,800 were located in the Czech Republic and 5,600 in Poland (there were 1,450 
and 800 large enterprise investments in Poland and the Czech Republic with German capital).72
In a survey of over 1,500 German businesses in 1993-1994, the German-Czech Chamber 
o f Commerce analysed the main reasons for the private sector to become economically engaged in 
the Czech Republic. First, 31.2 per cent o f those companies polled expressed an interest in 
increasing their market share through acquisitions. Second, 18.2 per cent o f the companies polled 
want to use the Czech Republic as a spring board for exploiting additional markets in ECE. 14.9 
per cent noted their principal rationale for looking east was to take advantage of lower labour 
costs in the Czech Republic.73 As Melhorn notes, the German economy’s success was dependent 
on its ability to take advantage o f lower wage costs in other production countries. ECE was an 
ideal target for ensuring that Germany maintained its position as a Handelsstaat.74
Germany’s foreign economic policy towards the Czech Republic and Poland revealed the 
powerful link between the use o f economic instruments and tools to achieve its political aims. 
There was a German strategic imperative to maintain its dominant position as a Handelsstaat in 
the global economy. Economic instruments were perceived by Bonn to be the ideal tools for 
assisting the transformation processes o f the Czech Republic and Poland and securing the success
7,Hans-Georg Melhorn, ‘Chancen im Osten und die Folgen fur Deutschland’, p. 10.
72Friedrich Kaufmann and Andreas Menke. ‘Direktinvestitition und ihre Beschaftigungseffekte: Eine 
empirische Analyse mittelstandischer Engagements in den Visegrad-Staaten’, Osteuropa-Wirtschaft, vol. 
42, no. 2(1997), p. 107.
73Deutsch-Tschechische Industrie- und Handelskammer (ed.), Deutsche Direktinvestitionen in der 
Tschechischen Republik: Motive, Erfahrungen, Perspektiven (Bielefeld: Bertelsmann, 1994), p. 17.
74Hans-Georg Melhorn, ‘Chancen im Osten und die Folgen fur Deutschland’, p. 15.
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of unification. After recognising the necessity to play a proactive role in the economic affairs o f 
its neighbours, Germany emerged as the most powerful exporter and capital investor in ECE. The 
emphasis may have been on small and medium size enterprises and not large investments 
(Siemens and VW were exceptions) but it was clear that BMWi chose to concentrate on economic 
areas where German expertise and financial assistance would be welcome and would not clash 
with the interests o f other powers seeking to create new markets. The TRANSFORM programme, 
foreign trade, and capital investment were all areas which would allow Germany to fulfil its 
foreign policy goals in ECE: forestalling any ‘threats’ to its Eastern frontier and by extension its 
unification processes and the preparation o f the Czech Republic and Poland for their memberships 
in the EU. Germany’s Eastern neighbours were desperate for economic investment and advice and 
looked, primarily, to Germany for political and economic guidance. Germany capitalised on its 
geography and extensive ties to Mitteleuropa to achieve its goals. The private sector was only too 
happy to follow.
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CHAPTER SIX
GERMANY’S EASTERN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT:
PROMOTING INTEGRATION AND COOPERATION WITH THE CZECH REPUBLIC
AND POLAND
The triad o f German interests concludes with a study o f Germany’s quest for security and 
stability in ECE after October 1990. How was Germany’s Sicherheitspolitik (security policy) 
influenced by domestic and international factors? The epochal European events o f 1989-1991 
transformed ECE’s security landscape, especially Germany’s Eastern security environment. With 
German unification and the Soviet Union’s and Warsaw Treaty Organisation’s (WTO) collapse, 
Germany’s leaders were confronted with a new set o f security challenges. The eastward extension 
o f Germany’s frontier into the heartland o f ECE -  a geo-strategic space formerly dominated by 
the Soviet Union -  had important strategic implications for a unified Germany, a Soviet Union in 
rapid decline, and ECE. Structural changes in the international system and Germany’s former 
hegemonic role in Mitteleuropa influenced the dynamics o f the German-ECE-Russia triangle. One 
of Germany’s Eastern conundrums -  promoting peace and security in ECE whilst avoiding 
alienating Russia -  illustrates the difficult balancing act Bonn had to play after 1990.
Why did ECE emerge as one o f the most important regions in Germany’s foreign and 
security calculations after 1990? Besides the obvious socio-political, economic, historical, and 
cultural interests, Bonn was obsessed with its security and its strategic environment. Germany 
maintains a 1,200 kilometer long border with two pivotal states: the CSFR and Poland. Its 
exposed geographic position in Europe’s centre led it to be more susceptible to socio-political and 
economic turmoil emanating from ECE and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Germany’s political 
leadership could not afford to be complacent about its security and the security o f its Eastern 
neighbours as the two were inextricably linked.
The physical withdrawal of the Soviet Union’s conventional and nuclear forces from ECE 
between 1991-1994 prompted an urgent reassessment o f Germany’s strategic priorities vis-a-vis 
ECE and the FSU. Bonn’s ECE security vacuum included ‘fragile’ states with poor economies 
and non-existent democratic structures, and potentially high levels o f nationalism and ethnic 
strife. The axiom that international politics abhors a vacuum was a reminder that peace and
stability in ECE were not automatic outcomes o f the Cold War’s end. Bonn’s Eastern neighbours 
no longer enjoyed the protection o f a formidable military power or bloc. Military power or ‘high 
politics’ in International Relations still played a role in international politics after 1990. This 
crucial fact was not lost on the defence planners and security policy-makers in the Ministry o f 
Defence (BMVg) and the Bundeswehr.1 The proposed relocation o f the German government from 
Bonn to Berlin (48 kilometers from the Polish border) in 1999 also reinforced the growing 
political, military, and economic significance o f ECE, and highlighted German interests in 
safeguarding the security o f its Eastern frontier and its own domestic transformation and 
unification processes in Eastern Germany.
This chapter has three aims. The first is to define the strategic nature o f Germany’s 
immediate eastern security environment as perceived by Germany’s leaders, the BMVg, and the 
Bundeswehr. Second, the roles o f the CSFR (Czech Republic after 1993) and Poland as pivotal 
actors in Germany’s Sicherheitspolitik will be examined. The bilateral dimension of Bonn’s 
security relations with Prague and Warsaw will be addressed. Finally, the multilateral dimension 
o f Bonn’s Sicherheitspolitik will be studied to explain how international institutions, especially 
NATO helped Germany to achieve its foreign and security policy objectives in both countries. 
Germany’s position within Europe’s security architecture and, more specifically, its role as a 
proactive advocate of ECE interests within NATO will be examined.
Germany’s Eastern Security Environment after 1990
From 1949 to 1989, West German chancellors from Adenauer to Kohl wrestled with the 
‘German question’: how to achieve unification within a bipolar, superpower-dominated, 
international order. The ‘question’ was answered in 1990 but a Pandora’s Box o f sources o f 
instability on Germany’s Eastern frontier emerged. Bipolarity had been replaced by multi-polarity 
and within this new order Germany was confronted with new strategic challenges in ECE and the 
FSU which were profoundly to affect its position in the European Mittellage?
'Dieter Mahncke, Parameters o f European Security. Chaillot Paper no. 10 (Paris: WEU Institute for 
Security Studies, September 1993), p. 4.
2Wolfgang Schlor, German Security Policy: An Examination o f the Trends in German Security Policy in a 
New European and Global Context. Adelphi Paper 277 (London: Brassey’s for IISS, 1993).
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The structural changes were manifested by the Soviet Union’s collapse, the WTO’s 
demise, the overwhelmingly peaceful revolutions o f 1989 in ECE, and German unification. 
Germany’s Western and Eastern European neighbours viewed it, in some cases, reluctantly and 
sceptically, as the main benefactor o f the Cold War’s end. Changes in the Eastern European sub­
system forced Bonn to become a more assertive foreign and security policy actor there. 
Constraints imposed on Germany by the bipolar dynamics o f the Cold War and its division had 
precluded an active role for the FRG in Eastern Europe. Consequently, the demise o f Soviet 
hegemony gave Germany more freedom to assist in the region’s future political and economic 
development.
Bonn’s use o f bilateral and multilateral frameworks reinforced political-military and
economic stability in ECE and was one o f the reasons pushing Germany eastwards after
unification. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel opined that Germany needed to focus on
political-military and socio-economic developments in ECE for the following reasons:
As a result o f our central location, our size, and our traditional relations with Central 
and Eastern Europe, we are also predestined to derive the main benefit from the return o f 
these states to Europe. ... Like no other Western country we are exposed to the enormous 
problems with which the young reform states from the Oder River to Vladivostok are 
struggling. We are carrying the main burden o f immigration and — at least — until now — 
economic support; we are the ones who are most affected by the collapse o f Eastern 
markets; our traditional economic sectors feel the pressure o f cheap imports most 
intensely.3
Bonn’s security interests in ECE were locked into the socio-political, economic and historical 
dimensions of its foreign relations with the CSFR and Poland. The German Defence Minister 
Volker Rtihe pointed out: ‘the stability o f our eastern neighbours and ourselves was not primarily 
a military question but a political and economic one’.4 Germany’s perceptions o f the quality o f its 
own security depended on the levels o f political and economic stability in the East. Germany was 
charged with safeguarding its own domestic transformation processes in Eastern Germany and to 
perform this task it required peaceful neighbours.
How can Germany’s security environment in the East after unification be characterised? 
Shortly before the restoration o f German sovereignty (15 March 1991), the first defence minister
3FAZ, 19 March 1993, FBIS-WEU-93-054, pp. 12-17. Kinkel succeeded Hans-Dietrich Genscher as 
German foreign minister on 18 May 1992.
4Volker Riihe, Deutschlands Verantwortung (Frankfurt am Main; Berlin: Ullstein, 1994), p. 63. MT. Riihe 
succeeded Gerhard Stoltenberg as defence minister on 1 April 1992.
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of a unified Germany, Gerhard Stoltenberg, argued that Germany’s geo-strategic position had
improved after the end o f the Cold War since Germany no longer functioned as a ‘front-line’ state
with an exposed Eastern frontier.5 For Stoltenberg, the WTO states’ armies no longer posed a
military threat to German security. Military threats from the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) or ECE were perceived as benign. In January 1992, the General Inspector o f the
Bundeswehr Klaus Naumann echoed Stoltenberg’s assessment when he observed: ‘the risk o f a
large-scale aggression against Central Europe will be practically zero for the foreseeable future’.6
Germany also featured in this calculation. General Naumann expressed worry if  Germany’s
existence were threatened, or if there were visible risks for Europe in the sense o f a likely 
outbreak o f war. This is not so. Nonetheless, there is concern about the way security 
structures should be organised to allow us to prevent lasting war in Europe. There is great 
insecurity and instability in Eastern Europe.7
For Naumann, Russia’s domestic instability, military capacity, nuclear capability, and
conventional military strength were primary sources o f concern.8 These concerns were
exacerbated by the presence o f Soviet/Russian troops and materiel in the former German
Democratic Republic (GDR) until August 1994: 338,000 soldiers, 207,400 family members and
civilian employees, 123,481 pieces o f machinery, and over 2.7 million tonnes o f ammunition.9
During the Two plus Four Accords, the presence o f Soviet troops in the GDR had the potential to
have a negative impact on Germany’s interests to unify. The U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet
Union, James Matlock Jr., observed the following:
Gorbachev could have played a spoiler’s role in negotiations on German unity and 
actually improved his political position at home. While he could not close borders 
and reimpose a puppet regime on the GDR, he did not have to give official blessing to 
the unification. He had 370,000 troops in East Germany, and neither the Germans nor 
NATO as a whole could have used force to expel them.10
5Bulletin, no. 29 (15 March 1991), p. 215, and Gerhard Stoltenberg, ‘Der Osten wendet sich zum Westen. 
Neue Herausforderungen durch Veranderungen in Osteuropa’, Information fu r die Truppe: Zeitschrift fu r  
Innere Fuhrung, no. 1 (1990), pp. 4-21.
6Der Spiegel, 20 January 1992, FBIS-WEU-92-013, 21 January 1992, pp. 19-21.
7Berliner Zeitung, 18 March 1993, FBIS-WEU-93-055, 24 March 1993, pp. 18-19.
8See Klaus Naumann ‘Bundeswehr Faced with New Challenges’, Soldat und Technik (January 1995,), FBIS- 
WEU-95-017, 26 January 1995, pp. 11-17.
9Claus-Jiirgen Duisberg, ‘Germany: The Russians Go’, The World Today, vol. 50, no. 10 (1994), p. 192.
,0James F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy on an Empire (New York: Random Flouse, 1996), p. 387.
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Their continued presence in the former GDR, four years after unification, raised many concerns in
Bonn. First, the resumption o f full German sovereignty was not possible as long as Soviet troops
were stationed on German soil. Second, as long as Moscow was enveloped by political
uncertainty, the Soviet troops’ future status could be called into question by a new leadership.
Third, Bonn worried about the Soviet troops’ conduct and the proliferation o f organised crime in
military units." The German public shared similar fears. A Rand study highlighted the German
public’s worries about ‘critical threats’ to Germany’s ‘vital interests’ emanating from the East.12
As Claus-Jurgen Duisberg, Germany’s representative in charge o f the Russo-German Treaty on
the presence and withdrawal o f Russian troops in Germany, pointed out:
The potential for conflict was considerable. Fears voiced in Germany were o f  a sudden 
rush o f asylum-seekers, o f arms deals, and weapons offences and a general increase in 
criminality. Admittedly, most o f these fears were realised, but on a comparatively small 
scale, considering the magnitude o f the task. ... The arrival o f the so-called Soviet mafia 
is quite a different manner. Over the past few years these mafia-style elements have been 
gaining a foothold in the new German Lander, and particularly in Berlin, where they 
frequently set up operations near the Russian troops."
Defining the Threats and Vulnerabilities
Militarpolitische und militdrstrategische Grundlagen und konzeptionelle 
Grundrichtung der Neugestaltung der Bundeswehr
The most unambiguous statements about the nature of Germany’s security environment 
were contained in three BMVg publications: Militarpolitische und militdrstrategische Grundlagen  
und konzeptionelle Grundrichtung der Neugestaltung der Bundeswehr (MMG)14, the 
Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien (VPR)15, and the Weissbuch zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik  
D eutschland und zur Lage und Zukunft der Bundeswehr 1994 (Defence White Paper).16 Their
"Angela E. Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse and the New Europe 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 160-165.
"Ronald D. Asmus, German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall, 1990-1993 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 
1994), p. 17.
"Duisberg, ‘Germany: The Russians Go’, pp. 192-193.
I4BMVg, “Militarpolitische und militarstrategische Grundlagen und konzeptionelle Grundrichtung der 
Neugestaltung der Bundeswehr” reprinted in Blatter fu r  deutsche und Internationale Politik, no. 4 (1992), 
pp. 506-510.
"BMVg, “Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien fur den Geschaftsbereich des Bundesministers der 
Verteidigung vom 26. November 1992” reprinted in Blatter fu r  deutsche und international Politik, no. 9 
(1993), pp. 1137-51.
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contents represent a logical evolution of German security interests after unification; they are also 
evidence o f the BMVg’s thinking on the domestic and international factors which were liable to 
shape German interests into the next millennium. The documents’ contents confirm that German 
security was not threatened by military developments or threats emanating in ECE or the FSU, 
although a general air of caution about Russia’s future political and economic development 
pervaded all.
The MMG  was a background paper for defining the future role o f the Bundeswehr in 
German security policy. Conceived by Stoltenberg and Naumann, the document states that one o f 
Germany’s security objectives was to ‘promote the democratisation processes and economic 
rehabilitation o f all states in central east, south-east and Eastern Europe’. Germany’s 
Demokratisierungspolitik (democratisation politics) towards ECE: the support and promotion o f 
democratic norms and values was regarded as a major component of its Sicherheitspolitik. 
Military threats from the Cold War era had been replaced by latent but potentially acute sources o f 
instability: economic, ethnic, demographic, and religious strife on German border periphery.
Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien
In stark contrast with the MMG, the VPR, conceived by the Bundeswehr’s policy planning 
staff, defined Germany’s specific national security interests and assessed geographic regions that 
should be o f concern to Germany’s leaders. The VPR highlighted the Atlantic Alliance and 
European integration in German security policy-making calculations. This ground-breaking policy 
document confirmed the content o f many o f the official policy statements made by Germany’s 
leaders after unification: Germany faced no immediate military threats to its national security but 
there were potential non-military risks, especially in ECE, which threatened the internal stability 
of Germany and its Western neighbours. ‘Risks’ and ‘vulnerabilities’, not military threats were 
highlighted.17 According to Bundeswehr defence planners, the warning period for the emergence
16BMVg, Weissbuch zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage und Zukunft der 
Bundeswehr 1994 (Bonn: BMVg, 1994). The Weissbuch represents the most comprehensive document on 
security issues and objectives published by the German government since unification.
l7Celeste Wallander argued that ‘the distinction between threat and risk is fundamental to an understanding 
of the effect o f common interests on German and Russian security strategies after the Cold War’. She also 
notes that ‘a German official said that the government now does “risk assessment” rather than “threat
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of any military threat from ECE or the FSU was approximately one year.18 The VPR proclaimed
that Germany’s strategic environment had vastly improved after the Cold War and it stressed the
need for Germany to assume more responsibilities in ECE. Constructed on two pillars o f
‘cooperation’ and ‘integration’, the VPR argued that Germany was an indispensable actor in
helping the new democracies in ECE meet their security objectives:
Without Germany, it will be impossible to integrate the peoples o f Eastern Europe. 
Without Germany, there will be no security structures in and for Europe that meet the 
security interests of the young democracies. Without Germany, the states who have been 
ruined by communist planned systems will not be economically or socially content; only 
with Germany can the EU use its political-economic dynamism as a source o f power to 
promote the economic renewal o f all of Europe. In this situation, Germany is a model for 
the politics o f  its partners.19
Weissbuch zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage und Zukunft 
der Bundeswehr 1994
The Weissbuch was the VPR’s principal successor. It highlighted the features o f
Germany’s security environment; its security interests and challenges, and examined potential
threats in Europe and globally, and suggested strategies -  bilateral and multilateral -  to manage
challenges and risks which could affect German security. It recognised the importance o f three
main factors: Germany’s geopolitical position in the European Mittellage with the most
neighbours in Europe; its economic position as an export-dependent industrial nation and its
strong verflochtene Interessen (interwoven ties) in the global economy; and the experiences of
German and European history’.20 The Weissbuch also noted the major benefits Germany derived
from the international system’s transformation:
Germany was only surrounded by democratic states, friends, and partners. From this 
follows a special responsibility to widen our partnerships with the new democracies 
in central and Eastern Europe — this is built on the basis o f a continuing close 
anchoring o f Germany in NATO and in the deepening integration o f the EU. ...The 
political-military changes have fundamentally improved Germany’s strategic 
situation.21
assessment” because the former is a function o f instability which can arise from forces such as ethnic and 
economic migration’. See Celeste A. Wallander, Mortal Friends, Best Enemies: German-Russian 
Cooperation after the Cold War (Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 47.
18Bulletin, no. 104 (30 September 1992), p. 973.
19BMVg, “Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien’, p. 1142, MT.
20BMVg, Weissbuch, p. 42. MT.
21 Ibid., p. 24. MT.
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Germany’s overall security environment improved after 1990 but its Eastern border 
region was categorised as a potential source o f instability. The Weissbuch recognised the 
problems inherent in the collapse of communist systems in ECE and the CIS which could have a 
significant impact on the following areas: socio-political and economic transformation processes, 
social stability, ecological dangers, and migration influxes from East to West. It was feared that a 
combination of problems in these crucial areas might result in ‘regressive developments with 
continued fragmentation o f states, groups o f states, changing coalitions and, as a result, the 
eruption of violent conflicts’.22 The Weissbuch provided a snapshot o f Europe’s political-military 
landscape:
The political-military landscape o f Europe offers a contradictory picture. Ongoing 
integration processes in Western Europe are confronted with centrifugal tendencies 
accompanied by the fragmentation o f states in the east and south-east o f the 
continent. Europe is experiencing the simultaneous processes o f integration and stability 
and disintegration and instability.2^
To safeguard Germany’s security environment and the security of its Eastern neighbours, the
Weissbuch advocated implementing a security policy which promoted stability in ECE through
‘cooperation’ and ‘integration’. By intensifying ‘cooperation’ and advocating increased
‘integration’ with its ECE neighbours through the dual enlargement processes o f the EU and
NATO, Germany’s security environment would improve. For Germany, these enlargement
processes ran parallel to each other and were never to be viewed in a contradictory manner. A fact
sheet released by NATO in March 1996 made the following incisive statement about the dual
enargement processes of NATO and the EU:
22Ibid., p. 27. MT.
23Ibid., p. 27. MT.
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Both enlargement processes will contribute significantly to extending security, stability 
and pros perity enjoyed by their members to other, like-minded, democratic European 
states. All full members o f the WEU are also members o f NATO. The maintenance o f this 
linkage is essential, because o f the cumulative effect o f security safeguards extended in 
the two organisations. The enlargement o f both organisations should, therefore, be 
compatible and mutually supportive. An eventual broad congruence o f European 
membership in NATO, EU and WEU would have positive effects on European security. 
Therefore, the Alliance should, at an appropriate time, give particular consideration to 
countries with a perspective o f EU membership, and which have shown interest in joining 
NATO, in order to consider how they can contribute to transatlantic security within the 
Washington Treaty and to determine whether to invite them to join NATO.24
The prospects o f the EU’s enlargement to the East, to include states like the Czech Republic and
Poland, should therefore not be underestimated as an important mechanism that facilitated
NATO’s enlargement and allayed German fears about its vulnerabilities on its eastern frontier.
The BMVg’s main conclusion was that Germany no longer faced any direct military threats which
could threaten its existence; however, this state o f affairs could only be maintained while
Germany remained firmly integrated within NATO and the EU for that matter.
The existence o f non-military threats, dilemmas, and challenges to Germany’s security
emanating from ECE, the CIS, and south east Europe, however, continued to shape its
Sicherheitspolitik. Germany was no longer a ‘front-line’ state in the traditional Cold War sense
since it no longer faced a conventional military threat from the Soviet-controlled WTO.
Democratic and friendly neighbours surrounded Germany for the first time in fifty years; hostile
forces did not threaten its Eastern frontier. On the other hand, a new front-line seemed to replace
old Cold War lines. Victor Gray notes that ‘Germany seems cursed with being a front-line state.
On both sides o f the Cold War front line, it finds itself again on the edge o f Western Europe’s
political stability and economic prosperity facing an East that lacks both’.25 As Riihe pointed out,
‘the end o f the Cold War removed the threat of old dangers but not new risks’.26 ‘Old’ dangers
were inherent in bipolar dynamics: the risk o f a large-scale conventional or nuclear attack by
WTO states, the presence o f a large number o f conventional and nuclear forces in East and West
Germany, and the likelihood that Germany would be the major battleground of any future war
24See NATO Fact Sheet on NATO’s Enlargement (March 1996) available at 
http://www.fas.org/man/nato/natodocs/fact_mar96.htm. In addition, see chapter two.
25Victor Gray, ‘Germany: The ‘Reluctant Power’ Turns East’, Parameters, vol. 24, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), p. 
86 .
26Bulletin, no. 37 (7 April 1992), p. 346. MT.
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between NATO and the WTO. ‘New’ risks originated from the collapse o f communism and the 
socio-political and economic difficulties associated with managing a new European system 
characterised by three main factors: first, the absence o f an ‘enemy’ in the form o f the Soviet 
Union; secondly, a unified Germany with an extended border in the heartland o f ECE, and thirdly, 
the unstable nature o f those states located in a political ‘no man’s land’ or a ‘half-way house’ in 
ECE.
Military and Non-military ‘Risks’ Emanating from the CSFR and Poland
As Germany’s neighbours, the CSFR and Poland were central components in German 
designs to secure the territorial integrity of its Eastern frontier. Germany’s close geographical 
proximity to ECE created a strong interest on the part o f Germany’s leaders to influence the 
domestic and international environments o f both states. Both were located in a region 
characterised by political and economic instability and had the potential to adversely affect 
German security interests. Furthermore, both states were perceived to be located in a security 
vacuum: a condition permeating all o f ECE and manifested by the new independent states in ECE 
no longer being able to guarantee their own security. Whereas the CSFR and Poland were o f 
significant interest for Germany’s foreign policy-makers after unification, they regarded Germany 
as their main political and economic advocate within Europe’s international security institutions.27 
The actions o f all three states were governed by one mutual interest: securing stability in ECE and 
the preservation o f their respective transition and transformation processes.
Why did Bonn perceive the CSFR (Czech Republic) and Poland as important security 
actors? What were the principal military and non-military ‘threats’ or ‘risks’ coming from these 
two important states? Before 1993, Bonn had been reluctant to enter or even initiate a proper 
debate about the future course of its security policy towards ECE, although it was cognisant o f the 
‘threats’ on its ‘exposed’ Eastern frontier.28 A similar phenomenon was apparent in ECE as 
political leaders projected their security and threat perceptions o f their environment in
27Rainer Winkler, Deutschlands Geopolitische Lage im sich wandelden Europa (Bergisch Gladbach: Amt 
fur Studien und Ubungen der Bundeswehr, 1993), p. 10.
28Ulrich Weisser, NATO ohne Feindb'dd: Konturen einer europaischen Sicherheitspolitik (Bonn; Berlin: 
Bouvier, 1992), p. 30.
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contradictory terms depending on the nature o f their audience. Jan Zielonka highlighted the
contradictory dynamics o f this process:
It is easy to get the impression that different threats are presented to different 
audiences, depending on the circumstances. One day the audience is confronted with 
a vision o f domestic anarchy and foreign aggression. Another day the same 
politicians describe their country as exceptionally stable and surrounded by peaceful 
neighbours ... the latter vision is usually presented to Western bankers and investors, 
the former to security experts.29
Managing the Soviet Union’s collapse, including the withdrawal o f its military infrastructure from
the former GDR and ECE, was Bonn’s first strategic priority.
Immediately after unification, Germany’s Sicherheitspolitik lacked a clearly defined and
coherent agenda. Bonn was immersed in its unification processes, including the integration o f the
GDR’s National People’s Army (NVA) into the Bundeswehr, and the adaptation of its foreign and
security policy operations to its new domestic and international environment. It was also
preoccupied with the negotiation and implementation of the Two Plus Four Accords, the ‘new’
Eastern treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland in particular where the future status o f the
Oder-Neisse line had threatened to derail German-Polish relations. Bonn had also begun to
negotiate the Czech-German Agreement on Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation,
initialled in October 1991 but not signed by Kohl and the CSFR President Vaclav Havel until
February 1992.
How did Bonn formulate and implement its security objectives in ECE? The twin tools o f 
German bilateralism and multilateralism towards these states are relevant here. Projecting stability 
via bilateral and multilateral security forums and instruments, primarily the EU and NATO, to 
states in need o f political and economic assistance in their respective transformation processes 
was a priority. The maintenance o f stability depended on three crucial factors: the CSFR and 
Poland’s ability to master their internal socio-political, military and economic transformation 
processes; Germany’s role as an ardent advocate o f Czech and Polish interests in NATO, the EU, 
and other Western international institutions, and Germany’s prominent role as a bilateral conduit 
o f aid, trade, and foreign investment.
29Jan Zielonka, Security in Central Europe. Adelphi Paper 272 (London: Brasseys for IISS, 1992), pp. 33- 
34.
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The Czech Factor in Germany’s Sicherheitspolitik
The Czech lands have been a fixture o f the European security landscape for centuries. 
Before 1918, the region’s population was subject to the interests o f successive Austrian and 
German leaders. With the CSFR’s independence and subsequent freedom from Austro-Hungarian 
hegemony in 1918, the amalgamated lands o f Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia became a constant 
source of irritation for the political leaders o f the Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany. Adolf 
Hitler, for example, once remarked that the CSFR symbolized a ‘dagger pointing at the heart o f 
the Reich’. After being thoroughly dismembered in 1938 and occupied by Nazi Germany in 1939, 
Czechoslovakia regained its independence again after the Second World War only to find itself 
firmly embedded in a Soviet-dominated sphere o f influence after the Czech Communist Party 
assumed power in the spring o f 1948. Throughout the Cold War, successive Soviet leaders 
maintained their firm grip on the CSFR and the other Eastern European satellites to preserve their 
political-military hegemony in the region. The CSFR was a pivotal security actor for the Soviets 
throughout the duration o f the Cold War because o f its vital strategic location on the WTO’s 
Western front.
The Soviet invasion o f the CSFR in August 1968 by WTO forces reinforced its control 
over Eastern Europe and underlined its strategic importance. The Soviets regarded 
Czechoslovakia as one o f their principal bulwarks against any possible NATO attack. The 
stationing of the Soviet Central Group of Forces (CGF) in Czechoslovakia: two tank divisions, 
three motorised rifle divisions, and an air division with over one hundred combat aircraft 
illustrated Czechoslovakia’s military importance in Soviet military planning and as a tool for 
discouraging any potential attack by NATO’s conventional forces/0 The ‘Czechoslovak 
corridor’s’ protection was also deemed vital for the Soviet Union’s Western Group of Forces 
(WGF). The WTO’s collapse and loss o f this strategic corridor after 1990 represented a serious 
military blow to the Soviet Union’s political and military leadership. The WTO’s dissolution 
allowed Czechoslovakia to break free from Soviet military control. The Soviet CGF’s withdrawal
30David Cox, Retreating from the Cold War: Germany, Russia, and the Withdrawal o f the Western Group o f  
Forces (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996).
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from Czechoslovakia weakened its military position in ECE but also resulted in a significant de- 
escalation of military tension along the German-Czech border.
To assess the CSFR’s strategic significance (and one of its principal successor states, the 
Czech Republic) for Germany, it is important to differentiate between two significant time periods 
in the CSFR’s history after the Cold War’s end: 1990-1992 and 1993-1998. The distinction is 
necessary since from December 1989 (creation o f the CSFR’s first non-communist government in 
forty-one years) to the dissolution o f the CSFR (1 January 1993), it was a single actor in the 
international system. Two successor republics emerged as a result o f its division: the Czech 
Republic and the Republic o f Slovakia.
Czechoslovakia, 1990-1992
From 1990-1992, Germany’s Sicherheitspolitik vis-a-vis the CSFR was not preoccupied 
by security issues, although this changed quickly after the BMVg’s policy planning staff began to 
contemplate the enlargement o f the Atlantic Alliance in late 1992 and early 1993. Whereas the 
Soviet Union and Poland figured prominently in the negotiation and implementation processes o f 
the Two Plus Four Accords, the CSFR did not.31 This major factor precluded Prague from 
occupying a prominent position in Bonn’s strategic thinking. Consequently, there were no 
domestic or international pressures, with the exception o f the Sudeten Germans, being exerted on 
Bonn to address the future course o f German-CSFR relations or the security implications resulting 
from this transition state’s independence. Unlike Poland, there were no outstanding border 
disputes with the CSFR stemming from the Second World War, although there were contentious 
minority issues between Germany and Czechoslovakia and Poland. Relations between Germans 
and Czechs were complicated by unanswered historical questions which had no profound security 
implications for either state after 1990.
On 27 May 1991, the last Soviet soldier withdrew from the CSFR. The continued 
presence o f the Soviet Union’s military infrastructure in ECE, after the peaceful revolutions o f 
1989-1990, was a concern for all ECE states. Germany was not immune to this feeling. External
31One Polish official surmised that the Poles were much more energetic and therefore more successful with 
their political demands vis-a-vis a unified Germany than the Czechs. Source: interview with Polish official 
in Warsaw.
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military threats to the CSFR’s security stemmed from the political-military implications o f the
Soviet Union’s collapse and Russia’s unpredictable foreign and security policy interests. Within
Czechoslovakia, there was a latent fear o f Russian hegemonic designs in ECE. German leaders
were worried since Russian troops did not withdraw from the CSFR until May 1991. These
worries were exacerbated by the Soviet Union’s use o f force against the independence movements
of Lithuania and Latvia in January 1991/2 The CSFR’s porous border with Ukraine, a former
Soviet republic and pivotal state within the newly-formed CIS, was also a potential source o f
instability, although there was no evidence to suggest that Czechoslovakia’s Eastern border was
physically threatened by any party. Bonn did not perceive any military threats coming from
CSFR. Indeed, Germany’s strategic position vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia improved after the Soviet
troops departed in May 1991.
After achieving independence, the CSFR’s main domestic conundrum, ironically, was to
maintain its union: an objective which became increasingly untenable after the national elections
on 5-6 June 1992. Czechs and Slovaks advocated divergent political and economic interests which
threatened to split the union thus establishing two separate republics. According to Jan Zielonka,
the split had major implications:
It is not the danger o f armed confrontation between Czechs and Slovaks that represents 
the greatest security concern, but the destabilising consequences o f an eventual partition 
of Czechoslovakia into two or more weak states. Such a partition may stimulate a chain 
reaction of local ethnic conflicts, territorial claims, foreign intervention, and possible even 
war in the region.JJ
These fears did not materialise yet events in the Balkans were illustrative o f what could happen 
when states decided to aggressively pursue their independence aspirations. Germany’s leadership 
did not discount an escalation of the Balkan War; paradoxically, however, it is still difficult to 
discern Germany’s strategic rationale for its unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia on 23 
December 1991. In the context o f increased levels o f violence and hostility on the European 
continent, Kohl noted it was premature to declare a ‘time o f eternal peace’ in Europe; instead, he 
argued that ‘events in the Balkans would have catastrophic consequences not only for states
32This controversial intervention was in stark contrast with the contents o f  a document that had been signed 
in Bonn by Kohl and Gorbachev on 12 June 1989 ‘affirming’ the right o f European states ‘to determine 
their own political systems’.
33Jan Zielonka, Security in Central Europe, p. 14.
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involved in the conflict but the security o f all states in Europe would be endangered’/ 4 According
to W. R. Smyser: ‘To the Germans, sitting closest to the edge o f Eastern Europe, the Yugoslav
crisis was a grim reminder that the new Europe would present genuine threats and that Germany
might not be able to rely on the United States as it often had in the past’.35 The outbreak o f the
Balkan hostilities had implications for Germany and Western Europe and played an important role
in shaping Germany’s internal debate on its security challenges in ECE.
Czechoslovakia’s dissolution had profound political, economic, and security implications
for both successor republics and Germany. The division o f resources between the Czech Republic
and Slovakia was altered. For the former, the domestic consequences o f the CSFR’s division were
less punishing than for Slovakia since the Czech Republic was viewed as the split’s principal
economic benefactor. Nevertheless, both republics still remained dependent on each other’s
economic resources.36 James Brown argued:
Even though the Czech lands are economically stronger and more developed than in 
Slovakia, her production and assembly industries are dependent to a major degree on 
deliveries of raw materials and products from Slovakia. She is also dependent on energy 
deliveries from the FSU — if one believes that these will continue — by lines, which pass 
through Slovakia/7
The CSFR’s division also had important international implications for other ECE actors, such as 
Hungary which had a significant ethnic minority (600,000) in the Slovak portion o f the CSFR. For 
Germany, the CSFR’s division affected two processes where it had a stake: Czechoslovakia’s 
associate membership with the EC through the European Agreements (1991) and the continued 
validity of the German-Czechoslovak Treaty on Friendship and Good Neighbourliness (February
1992). Bonn was not supportive of the CSFR’s division which it viewed as a visible manifestation 
o f increasing nationalist tendencies in ECE. Citing the CSFR’s future division, Kinkel argued: ‘It 
cannot be right that on the one hand one is trying to abolish borders in Europe while at the same
34Bulletin, no. 66 (29 July 1993), p. 690.
35 W. R. Smyser, Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift? (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), p. 
66 .
36UN/ECE, Economic Survey o f Europe in 1992-1993 (New York: UN/ECE, 1993), pp. 217-218.
37James F. Brown, ‘Konfliktmoglichkeiten in Mittelosteuropa’ in Wolfgang Heydrich et al (eds.), 
Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands: Neue Konstellationen, Risiken, lnstrumente (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992), 
p. 352. MT.
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time separatist movements are gaining ground’/ 8 Riihe also issued a warning about nationalist 
forces:
In the former Communist East long suppressed tensions are being set free. Old 
nationalisms are breaking loose. The systematic, deepening integration o f the West is 
being accompanied by the rapid and unpredictable disintegration o f Eastern Europe. 
The collapse o f the Soviet Union is tied with risks that are not only characterised by 
ethnic, religious and nationalist tendencies but are also connected to the security o f 
nuclear weapons and minority problems o f an unquantified nature/9
The CSFR’s division, although highly peaceful in nature illustrated a dangerous trend which Bonn
found alarming. From 1990-1992, it was not a foregone conclusion that the CSFR’s choice to split
into two separate republics would be followed by other actors in ECE, especially those countries
with large ethnic minorities, such as Hungary and Romania. The socio-political and economic
implications o f future state disintegrations were incalculable but, nonetheless, Bonn felt their
potential likelihood more acutely.
Czech Republic, 1993-1998
After the CSFR’s amazingly peaceful division at the end o f 1992, the Czech Republic’s 
security environment improved dramatically. It was absent o f any real external threats. Indeed, in 
comparison with Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, its strategic location was the most favourable. 
The Czech Republic shared a border with neutral Austria, Germany, Slovakia, and Poland but, 
most importantly, from Prague’s perspective, it no longer shared a border with any former Soviet 
republics. Unlike Slovakia, it also did not harbour any significant ethnic minorities within its 
territory.40 The Czech Republic’s security environment was regarded as benign, especially by 
Bonn. The security dilemmas posed by a residual Russian threat were not as acute as with Poland 
since the Czech Republic’s geographical position was less exposed.
The quality o f the Czech Republic’s external relations with Slovakia, however, still 
remained a potential source o f concern in Bonn. Slovakia’s commitment to democracy was
3ZHandelsblatt, 22 June 1992, FBIS-WEU-92-120, 23 June 1992, p. 11.
39Bulletin, no. 104 (30 September 1992), p. 973, MT.
40From a total population o f 10,350,000 in the Czech Republic in 1996, Slovaks constituted 3 per cent, 
Poles, 0.6 per cent, and Germans 0.5 percent. From a total population o f 5,370,000 in Slovakia in 1996, 
Hungarians constituted 11 per cent, Romany approximately 5 per cent and Czechs 1 per cent. See 1ISS, The 
Military Balance, 1998/99 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for 1ISS, 1998), pp. 82, 93.
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consistently questioned by Prague and Bonn. After the CSFR’s division, Slovakia inherited all o f 
the major security dilemmas which had plagued the CSFR. For the Czech Republic, Slovakia’s 
strategic vulnerabilities, exposed more visibly after its NATO membership in NATO (1999), 
continued to influence its foreign and security policy deliberations. Being located in a region rife 
with internal and external threats, the Czech Republic, however, was still categorised by Germany 
as a state existing in a potentially dangerous security vacuum. Bonn calculated that this state o f 
affairs would persist unless measures were undertaken to integrate the Czech Republic into 
Western international institutions. Germany did not have the economic resources to fill this 
vacuum unilaterally; indeed, this approach was viewed as politically counterproductive by its 
political leadership.41
The Czech Republic was not regarded as a threat to Germany’s security, although its 
mutual border was a significant flashpoint for illegal immigration. The severity o f the threat posed 
by immigration pressures from the states bordering Germany’s Eastern frontier, especially the 
Czech Republic depended on external factors which were beyond German control. Bonn feared 
that immigration pressures would increase should the transformation and reform processes in ECE 
and the CIS falter or even fail. The German Minister for Employment Norbert Blum 
acknowledged the problem in 1991 early; he pointed out that Germany was experiencing 
‘considerable immigration pressures’ from the East which could be eradicated if  the reform efforts 
in ECE succeeded.42 Speaking at a conference on migration and the protection o f ethnic minorities 
in Vienna, Austria, Kohl also highlighted the immigration pressures being experienced by 
Germany. He stated:
In 1991, 760,000 immigrants came to Germany. In 1992, there were one million 
immigrants o f which there were: 230,000 ethnic Germans originating from east and 
southeast Europe and Central Asia; 444,000 asylum seekers, o f which less than five 
per cent left their home country for political, racist or religious reasons; 260,000 
refugees, primarily from the former Yugoslavia; approximately 100,000 illegal 
immigrants.4j
41Ronald D. Asmus, ‘NATO’s Double Enlargement: New Tasks, New Members’ in Gary Clemens (ed.), 
NA TO and the Quest fo r  Post-Cold War Security (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p. 71.
42Bulletin, no. 42 (26 April 1991), p. 314. MT.
43Bulletin, no. 85 (13 October 1993), pp. 969-970. MT.
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An influx o f immigrants, especially illegal ones from the East, challenged Germany’s 
political, economic, and security interests, especially the economic recovery o f its Eastern Lander. 
By playing a proactive role in the political and economic reconstruction efforts o f the post­
communist states, Bonn hoped to stem the tide o f immigrants coming from the East. In 1993, the 
German Minister o f the Interior Manfred Kanther observed that the Czech-German border was 
rife with the presence o f illegal immigrants attempting to enter Germany. In 1993 alone, 29,834 
‘aliens’ were caught trying to enter Germany from the Czech Republic illegally.44 Fifty-five per 
cent o f  all illegal immigrants caught on Germany’s borders came from the Czech Republic. In 
Germany alone, between 1991 and 1993, there were 2.5 million immigrants from ECE and the 
Soviet Union; furthermore, there were one million emigrants. To address this problem, Bonn 
signed bilateral agreements with the Czech Republic and Poland to define the procedures for 
returning illegal immigrants to their point o f origin.45
Germany’s extensive focus on its border with the Czech Republic did not alleviate the 
prevailing impression there that the CSFR’s division had had a deep effect on its self-perceptions 
and identity as an actor in international relations and as one o f Germany’s eastern neighbours. 
Vladimir Handl argued that the Czech Republic’s foreign policy-makers after 1993, especially its 
Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec, recognised that the Czech Republic’s importance in German 
foreign policy calculations would decrease as a result o f the dissolution o f the CSFR and German 
national elections in 1994.46 There was a widespread fear amongst the Czech political leadership 
that the Czech Republic would have to fend for itself since its relative significance in ECE had 
declined. Nonetheless, the Czech Republic’s membership in the Visegrad Group enhanced its 
profile as a state that could not manage its own security requirements if an external threat emerged 
in the foreseeable future. Bonn viewed the Czech Republic as an important regional actor because 
it maintained a border with Germany and was perceived to be located in a ‘strategic no-man’s 
land’ along with other states in ECE.
44‘Erklarung des Bundesinnenminsters’, Bulletin, no. 104 (10 November 1994), p. 957.
45For the Czech Republic, see ‘Deutsch-tschechisches Regierungsabkommen tiber die Ruckubemahme von 
Personen an der gemeinsamen Staatsgrenze’, Bulletin, no. 104 (10 November 1994), pp. 953-957.
46Vladimir Handl, ‘Czech-German Declaration on Reconciliation’, German Politics, vol. 6, no. 2 (August 
1997), p. 151.
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Regional cooperation entailed a comprehensive ECE strategy that focused on the 
dynamics and benefits o f regional cooperation among the new transition states. The Cracow 
Declaration (6 October 1991) was the preliminary framework for expanding ties between the 
Visegrad states and NATO.47 Bonn encouraged these ties. The founding agreement for the Central 
European Free Trade Association (CEFTA), signed by the four Visegrad states (1 March 1993) 
was motivated by political and economic concerns but it also had implications for promoting 
security in the region and preparing the member states for future integration into Western 
international institutions. The CSFR, Hungary, and Poland had realised that the successes o f their 
respective political and economic transition processes were intimately linked, although each state 
viewed the importance of this cooperation differently.48 Consequently, there was a significant 
amount of competition amongst all states in ECE to gain entry into the EU and NATO in the 
fastest possible manner.49
The Czech path to Western and European international institutions was widely believed to 
be via Germany. This was the case in the security sphere but this did not dispel the fears o f one 
segment o f Czech’s foreign policy elite who considered it possible that ‘Germany might loosen its 
ties with existing institutions, and reaffirm its position as the ‘land in the centre -  between East 
and West’.50 A report issued by Prague’s Institute of International Relations acknowledged the 
‘German factor’ in Czech foreign and security policy calculations: ‘Germany was and will always 
remain the most important neighbour of the Czech nation’. The report also urged caution by 
warning: ‘it is of course impossible to rule out the theoretical possibility of the transformation o f 
an economically strong Germany into an imperial superpower with aspirations o f creating a
47Cooperation amongst the Visegrad states, however, began to wane. This became more apparent after the 
dissolution of the CSFR and Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus’ interest in obtaining Czech memberships in 
international institutions via unilateral measures which did not rely on regional cooperation efforts. See 
Ryszard Zieba, ‘New Frameworks of Co-operation in East-Central Europe’ in Andrzej Dumala and 
Ziemowit J. Pietras (eds.), The Future o f East Central Europe (Lublin: Marie Curie-Sklodowska University 
Press, 1996), p. 267.
48Andrew Cottey, East Central Europe after the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary in Search o f Security (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995).
49This competition was actually welcomed by Bonn. See Riihe’s views on competition and 
Nachbarschaftsstabilitat (neighbourly stability) in Bulletin, no. 15, 14 February 1996, pp. 168-171.
50See Vladimir Handl, ‘The Czech Perception o f Germany: Hopes and Apprehensions’ in Tamas Szemler 
(ed.), Relations between Germany and East Central Europe until 2000: Prospects and Policy Options 
(Budapest: Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy o f Sciences, 1996), p. 12.
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‘German Europe” .51 These sentiments were echoed by Antonin Sverak who wrote: ‘Germany is 
the European power which most substantially influences the security climate on our continent. It 
is the only one o f our neighbours which is a member o f the EU, the WEU, and NATO’.52 From 
1993 to 1998, this political reality significantly influenced Prague.
The Polish Factor in Germany’s Sicherheitspolitik
Poland was always a pivotal security actor in Europe’s history. Sandwiched between 
Germany and Russia -  two o f the most important continental powers -  it has struggled to survive 
and maintain its independence throughout its one thousand year history. In the two hundred years 
preceding 1989, Poland enjoyed only 21 years of political independence from foreign powers. 
Having been partitioned three times was as an enduring reminder o f how fragile and threatened 
Poland’s security was throughout its history. According to Adam Michnik, it was possible that 
‘Poland could disappear from the political map o f Europe, as history shows. Poland needs to 
maintain a dialogue with Russia, with any Russia -  that is the law of Poland’s geopolitics’.53 After 
the Cold War’s end, Poland’s leadership concentrated on safeguarding its security and 
independence from foreign powers. Germany and Russia played a crucial role in the achievement 
o f this objective. After communism’s demise in ECE and German unification, Poland was the 
most important security actor on Germany’s Eastern frontier because o f its crucial geographic 
position. As with the CSFR and Germany, the withdrawal of the Soviet WGF from the former 
GDR through Poland and the Northern Group o f Forces (NGF - 50,000 strong) from Poland was a 
controversial political issue until all Soviet troops had left Poland by the end of 1991. The Soviet 
military’s presence in Poland was perceived by Warsaw as a high-risk security threat to its
51I1R, The Security Policy o f the Czech Republic (Prague: HR, 1997), p. 16.
52Antonin Sverak, ‘The Foreign Activities o f the Ministry o f Defence of the Czech Republic’, Perspectives: 
The Central European Review o f Internationa! Affairs, no. 10 (Summer 1998), p. 16.
53Michnik quoted in Anatoli Frenkin, ‘Russland und Polen: Verscharfung des Konflikts’, Europaische 
Sicherheit, no. 1 (1997), p. 46, MT.
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interests.54 Only after the Soviet Union’s permanent withdrawal from Poland and the former GDR 
could Poland pursue a normal existence.
When Bonn looked eastwards and contemplated its security dilemmas, Poland came to 
mind. Poland evolved into Germany’s security cornerstone in the East. Unlike the Czech 
Republic, Bonn viewed Poland’s external security environment as precarious and unstable. 
Poland’s environment improved when the Soviet Union removed its military from Polish territory 
but deep-seated strategic vulnerabilities plagued Poland’s security discussions. Historically, 
Poland was a major invasion route through Europe between central and Western European states 
and Russia. Its flat physical terrain and exposed borders (over 800 kilometers) made it difficult to 
defend if an external threat emerged. An external threat from Russia in the East would need to 
pass through Lithuania, Belarus or Ukraine. With the Soviet Union’s disintegration, Poland 
bordered seven states, six o f which were former communist states (not including Eastern 
Germany) and four o f which were former Soviet republics. It was located at a crucial juncture 
between Germany and the FSU. Poland also had a border with the tiny Russian Kaliningrad 
(Konigsberg) oblast, the home of Russia’s Baltic Fleet. Kaliningrad is completely encircled by 
Poland, Lithuania and the Baltic Sea.
For Polish Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszeweski, Poland’s security concerns were 
shaped by three factors: first, Poland’s borders with new states that had emerged from the FSU 
and, second, Poland’s position as a reunited Germany’s neighbour and, third, its membership in 
the EU and NATO.55 Poland’s political and military leadership agonised over four issues at the 
outset o f unification: first, the future direction of German military power; second, the implications 
o f the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) which would create a potential 
imbalance o f Polish and German armed forces; third, that Poland might have to face a unified 
Germany alone, and finally, fourth, the possibility o f a second Treaty of Rapallo (1922).56 Poland
54Douglas L. Clarke, ‘Poland and the Soviet Troops in Germany’, RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe, vol. 
2, no. 4 (25 January 1991), pp. 40-44.
55Wladyslaw Bartoszweski, ‘Polen und seine Nachbam: Bemerkungen zur polnischen Aussenpolitik’, 
Zeitschrift fu r  Politik, vol. 43, no. 1 (1996), p. 68.
56See Ronald D. Asmus and and Thomas S. Szayna, Polish National Security Thinking in a Changing 
Europe: a Conference Report (Santa Monica, CA: Rand/UCLA Centre for Soviet Studies, 1991), pp. 15-17.
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was potentially caught between a unified and more powerful Germany and an imperialist, unstable 
and unpredictable Russia.57 According to Krzystof Miszczak, how to escape this trap successfully 
was the ‘cardinal question’ o f Poland’s security dilemma.58 Confronting the spectre o f the Rapallo 
Treaty -  a potentially fatal rapprochement between Germany and Russia after 1990 -  was to be 
avoided at all costs if Poland was to protect its political independence. In the aftermath o f 
unification and the Soviet Union’s collapse, Germany and Russia continued to dominate Poland’s 
threat perceptions.
Poland was bordered by the tiny Russian enclave o f Kaliningrad, Belarus, Ukraine, and 
Lithuania, all of which were potential sources o f instability for Germany. Poland’s external 
security threats existed on its Eastern and Northern frontiers. The main threat to its external 
security was located in the possible collapse o f the transition and democratisation processes in 
Russia. Domestic instability or political turmoil in Russia which gave rise to nationalist 
movements seeking to re-establish Russia’s former hegemony in ECE threatened Poland, ECE 
and Germany.
The Russian national elections (12 December 1993) exposed the fragility o f its political 
and economic climate and demonstrated how political parties pandering to nationalist themes 
benefited from promoting political chaos and exposing the Kremlin’s leadership vacuum. Any 
ripple of tension from Moscow would also impact the tiny Russian enclave o f Kaliningrad, an 
area of historical significance for Germany. Russia’s potential use o f Kaliningrad as a base to 
promote unrest or stage an attack threatened German and Polish interests.
Polish fears about Belarus and Ukraine’s integration into a Russian dominated CIS were 
also legitimate. After assuming independences, Belarus forged closer political, economic, and 
security closer ties with Russia whereas Ukraine remained largely indifferent to Russian overtures 
about consolidating the CIS. Unresolved ethnic tensions in the region, i.e. the uncertain status o f 
Polish minorities in Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus also plagued the bilateral relations o f  these 
states. The status o f the Belarusian and Ukrainian minorities in Poland was a source o f concern,
57J. Stefanowicz, ‘Central Europe between Germany and Russia -  A View from Poland’, Security Dialogue, 
vol. 26, no. 1 (March 1995), pp. 55-64.
58Krzysztof Miszczak, ‘Russland und Polen: Spielball gegen den Westen?’, Europaische Sicherheit, no. 9 
(1995), p. 42.
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although Poland signed agreements with Belarus and Ukraine (1992) and Lithuania (1994) to 
ensure that the rights o f all ethnic minorities were protected.
German-Polish relations after 1990 entered a difficult time, especially in the domain o f 
security. After achieving independence, Poland was the most geographically exposed state with 
the largest population in ECE (38 million). Bonn was fixated on Poland’s domestic political and 
economic environment for several reasons. The status of Poland’s Western border, the uncertain 
peaceful evolution o f Russia, intra-Westem differences on the future design o f a European 
security architecture, and Polish insecurities about its environment all played a role in German- 
Polish security discussions.59 The raison d’etre of Germany’s eastward orientation was the need to 
protect the domestic transformation processes o f its Eastern Lander. Joachim von Amim noted 
that ‘the reconstruction of the new German states would hardly be possible if it was not connected 
to the reconstruction processes o f neighbouring states like Poland or the Czech Republic’.60 For 
Germany, Poland represented what Sherman Garnett described as a ‘bulwark’ against the eruption 
o f ethnic conflicts and instabilities in the East.61 ECE was a buffer zone, or as Jochen Thies 
argued, a ‘threefold cordon sanitaire\ which protected Germany from three factors: the dangers 
posed by the collapse of Soviet communism, the collapse o f transformation processes in ECE, and 
the revival of a Russian threat in ECE.62 To counter these sources o f instability, Bonn pursued a 
strategy aimed at incorporating the Visegrad states into Western international institutions, 
although from 1990-1998 this aim was only partially achieved.
59Friedbert Pfluger, ‘Die deutsch-polnische Interessengemeinschaft’ in Karl Kaiser and Joachim Krause 
(eds.), Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik: Interessen undStrategien. Vol. 3 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1996), 
pp. 145-148.
60See Joachim von Amim, ‘Deutsche und polnische Sicherheitsinteressen im gesamteuropaischen Kontext: 
die deutsche aussenpolitische Sicht’ in Lennart Souchon and Kai Hirschmann (eds.), Die Deutsche- 
Polnische Kooperation in Fragen der Sicherheitspolitik. Diskussionspapiere des 1. Deutsch-Polnischen 
Workshops vom 28.-30. November 1994 in Berlin/Bundesakademie fur Sicherheitspolitik (Bonn; Berlin; 
Hamburg: Mittler, 1995), p. 69, MT.
61See Sherman W. Garnett, ‘Poland: Bulwark or Bridge?’ Foreign Policy, no. 102 (Spring 1996), pp. 66-82.
62See Jochen Thies, ‘Germany and Eastern Europe, Past and Future’ in Arnulf Baring (ed.), Germany's New 
Position in Europe: Problems and Perspectives (Oxford; Providence, RI: Berg, 1994), p. 73.
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Bilateralism and Germany’s Sicherheitspolitik
Germany’s Sicherheitspolitik vis-a-vis the Czech Republic and Poland also included 
important and often underestimated bilateral security instruments which complemented 
multilateral ones. A vast array o f German bilateral security instruments were used to foster closer 
military ties with ECE. These entailed annual military exchange programmes, joint and 
multilateral military manoeuvres, especially within NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), 
economic assistance in military education and training, the education o f German officers in ECE, 
and the German civilian models o f Innere Fiihrung (moral leadership and civic education) and 
Staatsbiirger im Uniform (citizen in uniform) which evolved into extremely popular concepts in 
the militaries of ECE. According to Thomas-Durrell Young, these models were the product o f a 
combination of the
liberal traditions of German military history and 19th century Prussian reformers’ 
designed to promote a strategic culture in the Bundeswehr which ‘would embody the 
institutional spirit of the state, uphold the immutable human rights o f those serving it, and 
recognise soldiers’ responsibilities to a higher purpose— all in the pursuit o f national 
defence.63
German-Polish and German-Czech cooperation on military and security matters was viewed as 
litmus test for the successful pursuit o f a political rapprochement between Germany and both 
states. Military-to-military cooperation reduced tensions. The introduction o f confidence-building 
measures and transparency in the German Bundeswehr’s internal and external operations created 
an atmosphere of trust that had been lacking during the Cold War. Overcoming the 
overwhelmingly negative Czech and Polish political-military stereotypes o f Germans which had 
dominated the Cold War was important if Germany was to be able to successfully pursue ‘normal’ 
relations with its Eastern neighbours. Germany’s ability to achieve this objective was also an 
important barometre o f the state o f Germany’s bilateral relations with its two neighbours.64 The 
foundations for all bilateral and trilateral military activities between Germany and its Eastern
63Thomas-Durrell Young, ‘Defence Planning and the Bundeswehr’s New Search for Legitimacy’ in 
Thomas-Durell Young (ed.), Force, Statecraft and German Unity: The Struggle to Adapt Institutions and 
Practices (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996), p. 56.
64See Sven Bernhard Gareis, Verstandigung und Stabilitat in Europa: Stand und Entwicklungsperspektiven 
der deutsch-polnischen Sicherheitskooperation (Strausberg: Akademie der Bundeswehr fur Information and 
Kommunikation, 1996), p. 10.
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neighbours were rooted in treaties and agreements, general declarations, and military cooperation 
agreements designed to promote the mutual security objectives o f the signatories.65
Germany’s bilateral military agendas concentrated on the establishment o f civilian control 
in states where defence policies had been largely dictated by defence planners in Moscow. This 
was a starting point towards transforming the armed forces and strategic cultures o f those states 
undergoing transformation. Germany was also keen to gain more insights into the defence 
structures o f its Eastern neighbours and to benefit from their experiences in UN peacekeeping 
operations.66 The military and security components o f ECE’s economic revival and transformation 
efforts also required attention. There was also a German interest in the arms procurement and 
production mechanisms in ECE.67 This was largely motivated by economic self-interest but it 
highlights the nexus between this particular domain and Germany’s position as a major exporting 
and trading nation in the global economy. Finally, the FRG’s civilian control o f the military, with 
the development of a new strategic culture in the FRG after the Second World War, included the 
adoption o f democratic practices and transparency in its entire military and security 
infrastructures. Bonn hoped that a similar model could be applied to its Eastern neighbours.
Military Cooperation with the Czech Republic
The Treaty on Good Neighbourliness and Friendship between Germany and the CSFR 
(27 February 1992) included a short but important commitment on the part o f the signatories to 
expand military ties and pursue joint security objectives in Europe.68 Under the headline o f 
promoting peace and stability on the European continent, Germany and the CSFR committed 
themselves to upholding the provisions o f the Paris Charter (21 November 1990). Article VIII 
stipulated the need to expand bilateral and multilateral measures that would increase stability and
6SEckart Lohse, Das sicherheitspolitische Engagement Deutschlands in Osteuropa (Sankt Augustin: 
Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, 1996), p. 11.
66FAZ, 16 September 1994, p. 4, FBIS-WEU-94-181, 19 September 1994, pp. 14-15.
67Elmar Rauch, ‘Riistungszusammenarbeit mit osteuropaischen Staaten’, Europaische Sicherheit, no. 2 
(1999), pp. 33-36.
68‘Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Tschechischen und Slowakischen Foderativen 
Republik’, Bulletin, no. 24 (2 March 1992), pp. 233-238.
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mutual trust and promote transparency.69 This was relevant in the sphere o f military cooperation. 
Article XI(4) provided for increased contacts between the defence ministers and officials of both 
governments.
The preamble to the German-Czech Declaration on Mutual Relations and their Future 
Development (1997) stated ‘that the Federal Republic of Germany strongly supports the Czech 
Republic's accession to the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance because it is 
convinced that this is in their common interest’. In this context, Germany reaffirmed its 
commitment to assist the Czech Republic’s efforts to become a permanent member o f the EU and 
NATO. In the latter’s domain, bilateral military cooperation between Germany and the Czech 
Republic played an important role in achieving this goal.
The following agreements represent the foundations o f bilateral military cooperation 
between Germany and the Czech Republic: Agreement between the Federal Ministry o f Defence 
(MoD) of the CSFR and the BMVg o f the FRG on Securing the Presence o f Members o f the 
Czechoslovak Army in the FRG and Members o f the Forces o f the FRG in the CSFR in the 
Course o f their Official Visits signed in Prague on 8 November 1990; Agreement between the 
MoD of the CSFR and the Federal BMVg of the FRG on Ensuring the Exchange o f Information 
on Flights by Military Aircraft on Areas Close to the State Border between the CSFR and the 
FRG, signed in Prague on 25 June 1992.
The Agreement between the Czech Republic MoD and the German BMVg on 
Cooperation in the Military Sphere (24 May 1993) was the formal recognition o f the close ties 
between the Bundeswehr and the Czech armed forces which had been developing on a low level 
since 1989. Between 1989 and 1993, Germany and Czechoslovakia were involved in small 
military, personnel, and educational exchanges which served as forums for discussing ideas and 
promoting trust between the forces. Between 1989 and 1992, 98 Czech military officers attended 
German universities and military academies in Koblenz and Hamburg. Between 1993 and 1998, 
240 officers completed similar courses. In military-to-military contacts (cross-border exercises)
69This particular article was the same as article 6, paragraphs 2 and 3, o f the German-Polish Treaty on Good 
Neighbourliness and Friendship.
243
between Germany and the Czech Republic, there were 60 military exercises in 1995, 90 in 1996, 
150 in 1997 and 350 in 1998.70
For the German military, these exercises and exchanges were classified as effective 
confidence-building measures which played a role in changing the Czech Republic’s perceptions 
o f Germany’s Bundeswehr. The Czech Republic was intent on gaining more knowledge about the 
Bundeswehr’s internal decision making and leadership structures and encouraging the transfer o f 
Western technological know-how. Exchanges and military agreements also permitted the Czech 
and German militaries to gain more knowledge about each other’s strengths and weaknesses and 
created opportunities for forging a joint strategy to meet their mutual security objectives in ECE, 
especially within NATO and the PfP framework. Finally, a Treaty on Cooperation in the Sphere 
o f Education was signed as well as an Agreement on Cooperation in the Research and 
Development of Defence Material June 1997).71
Military Cooperation with Poland
After unification, the pursuit o f close military ties between the Bundeswehr and the Polish 
Armed Forces was a key component o f Germany’s Sicherheitspolitik vis-a-vis Poland. The 
principles o f this cooperation were enshrined in a ‘Program for the development o f political- 
military relations and contacts between the armed forces o f Germany and Poland’ (24 August 
1990). This program highlighted ten specific measures for intensifying ties between both parties 
on a troop and ministerial level.72 The Treaty on Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation 
(17 June 1991) between Germany and Poland also acknowledged common German-Polish 
security objectives in Europe and the bilateral and multilateral tools required to achieve these 
objectives.7"
70Source: German official in Prague.
71Antonin Sverak, ‘Germany’s Military Policy vis-a-vis the Central and East European Region’ in Vladimir 
Handl et al, Germany and East Central Europe since J990 (Prague: HR, 1999), p. 140.
72Gareis, Verstandigung undStabilitat in Europa, pp. 11-12.
73See ‘Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Polen iiber gute Nachbarschaft 
und freundschaftliche Zusammenarbeit’, Bulletin, no. 68 (18 June 1991), pp. 541-546.
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In the German-Polish friendship treaty, the articles dealing with peace, security and the 
expansion of bilateral military ties were similar in nature to the articles included in the German- 
CSFR friendship treaty. The pertinent articles are III, V, and VI. Article 111(1) stipulated that both 
parties would undertake regular consultations to promote a deepening o f their bilateral relations in 
all areas, including military ones. Article 111(4) stated that there should be regular meetings and 
increased contact between the defence ministers and officials o f the two countries. Article V (l) 
states: ‘The treaty parties reinforce that they will desist from making threats or using force which 
is directed against the territorial integrity and the political independence o f the other party or is 
not compatible with the goals and principles o f Charta o f  the United Nations and the Helsinki 
Act’. In Article VI(3), ‘The parties commit themselves, and together, for the multilateral and 
bilateral expansion o f trust-building, stabilising, and other arms control measures which 
strengthen stability and trust and lead to greater transparency’ in German-Polish civil-military 
relations.74 These aims were to be pursued under the Paris Charter provisions and ensure the 
continued state of peace and stability on the European continent. Until the creation o f the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (now OSCE) served as the principal forum for joint German-Polish military activities.75 
Contacts between German and Polish defence officials (summer of 1990) laid the foundation for 
future cooperation between the two states until a formal defence agreement could be negotiated 
and implemented.76
The Treaty on Preventing Conflicts at Sea (27 November 1990); the Agreement on 
Cooperation o f the Air Force in the Event o f an Emergency (5 March 1992); Agreement on the 
Search and Rescue Service (5 March 1992); Joint Statement on Cooperation in the Field o f Anti- 
Aircraft Defence and the Agreement on the Conditions o f Arrangement o f Official and Working
74Rauch, ‘Rustungszusammenarbeit mit osteuropaischen Staaten’, p. 36.
75Dieter Korger, Die Polenpolitik der deutschen Bundesregierung von 1982-1991 (Bonn: Europa Union 
Verlag, 1993), p. 115.
76The ‘Programme for the Development o f Political-Military Relations between the Armed Forces o f  
Poland and Germany’ was the first to delineate the nature of future military contacts. See Sven Bernhard 
Gareis, ‘Stabile Beziehung: Sicherheitskooperation zwischen Deutschland und Polen’, Information fu r  die 
Truppe: Zeitschrift fu r Innere Fiihrung, nos. 7-8, (1997), p. 18.
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Visits (27 November 1992) formed the first tranche o f bilateral military treaties signed between 
the Bundeswehr and the Polish Armed Forces.
A formal defence agreement between Germany and Poland, however, remained elusive 
and was not discussed by the Germans until Stoltenberg visited Poland (23-25 March 1992). One 
o f the principal foundations o f bilateral military cooperation between Germany and Poland is the 
Agreement on Cooperation between the Defence Sectors which was eventually signed by Riihe 
and his Polish counterpart Janusz Onyskiewicz in Bonn (25 January 1993).77 The agreement was a 
watershed in German-Polish military relations since it was the first comprehensive agreement on 
bilateral military cooperation to be negotiated and implemented by Germany with a former 
Warsaw Treaty member state.78 Several important areas were highlighted: promotion o f increased 
contacts between the Bundeswehr and Polish Army; internal military issues ranging from training 
to the organisation of the armed forces; the intensification o f military consultations on subjects o f 
mutual interest; military training; environmental issues, and plans for the deployment o f troops in 
times o f catastrophe.
Three levels o f cooperation formed the backbone o f German-Polish military cooperation 
efforts: (1) official meetings between the directors o f ministerial departments and the chiefs o f 
staff, (2) exchange of information in the fields o f science, means o f education, human resources, 
medicine, military history, and sociology, and (3) logistics and the promotion o f military 
activities.79 At the level of chiefs o f the general staffs, the Outline Agreement on Military 
Cooperation of 1994 was the foundation for the conclusion o f partnership between units and 
formations o f the Bundeswehr and the Polish Army. On 5 November 1996, an Agreement on
77BMVg, Vereinbarung zwischen dem Bundesminister der Verteidigung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
und dem Minister fur Nationale Verteidigung der Republik Polen iiber die Zusammenarbeit im 
militarischen Bereich von 25 Januar 1993 (Bonn: BMVg, 1993).
78Jaroslaw Drozd, ‘Poland’s Relations with the Federal Republic o f Germany’ in Barbara Wizimirska (ed.), 
Yearbook o f Polish Foreign Policy 1993/1994 (Warsaw: Polish Institute o f International Affairs, 1994), p. 
118.
79Information fu r  die Truppe: Zeitschrift ju r  Innere Fuhrung, ‘Optimistischer Blick in die Zukunft. 
Militarische Zusammenarbeit zwischen Deutschland und Polen - Fragen an Oberst i.G. Stefan Janus, 
Verteidigungsattache der Republik Polen in Deutschland, 1992-1995’. No. 8 (1995), pp. 22-27.
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Arms Cooperation was signed, whose aim was to institutionalise military relations, especially in
the fields of arms procurement and production.80
Promoting more bilateral military cooperation between Poland and Germany was
important for several reasons. According to the German Military Attache in Warsaw, Captain
Hartmut Spieker, and the Acting Director of the Planning Staff at Poland’s Ministry o f Defence,
Lieutenant Pawel Seydak, this cooperation
constituted a concrete form of preparation for Poland’s eventual integration. ... The 
pronounced interest o f Poland for a complete integration into the West’s security 
structures is based on the notion that in this manner it can contribute to the 
stabilisation o f the situations o f the central and east European reform states and can 
stabilise and secure the democratic development o f Poland.81
Military cooperation between the two states also helped break down national stereotypes which
had dominated mutual relations since 1949, a problem not uncommon in Germany’s bilateral
military relations with the Czech Republic.82 Germany was a pivotal supporter o f  Polish interests
within NATO and steadfastly assisted Polish efforts to achieve inter-operability and compatibility
with NATO forces.83 Nonetheless, the expansion o f military ties between Germany and Poland
was not uncomplicated and without tension. Initially, language barriers and disputes involving the
availability of surplus arms and munitions from the NVA for the Polish Armed Forces strained
Germany’s military ties with Poland after 1990, but not for a long period of time.84
The Trilateral Foundations of Germany’s Sicherheitspolitik 
The Weimar Triangle
The Weimar Triangle was a useful consultative forum for the Germans, French, and Poles 
to address their mutual security concerns in ECE. The triangle itself did not have any institutional
80Rauch, ‘Rustungszusamenarbeit mit osteuropaischen Staatem, pp. 33-34.
81Hartmut Spieker and Pawel Seydak, ‘Deutschland und Polen: ein Beispiel fur die Normalisierung einer 
schwierigen Nachbarschaft’, Europaische Sicherheit, no. 6 (1997), p. 38. MT.
82Eva Feldmann and Sven Bernhard Gareis, ‘Polens Rolle in der NATO: zur Bedeutung extemer Hilfen bei 
der Stabilisierung Osteuropas’, Zeitschrift fu r Politikwissenschaft, vol. 8, no. 3 (1998), p. 991.
83Hartmut Spieker, ‘Klischees verlieren an Bedeutung -  Fragen an Dr Andrzej Karkoszka, 1. Stellvertreter 
des polnischen Verteidigungsministers’, Europaische Sicherheit, no. 11 (1997), p. 8.
84Jaroslaw Drozd, Probleme der militarischen Sicherheit in den po/nisch-deutschen Beziehungen (Frankfurt 
am Main: HSFK, 1995), p. 6.
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characteristics since it did not function as a decision-making body. Its creation was symbolic as it
focused exclusively on fostering Poland’s development after the end o f the Cold War. As a
security instrument, the triangle was focused on Poland’s immediate security environment: its
relations with Belarus and Ukraine and their democratic evolution in the post-Soviet order. The
significance o f the triangle as a trilateral security instrument for meeting German, French, and
Polish foreign and security policy objectives in ECE cannot be underestimated.85
The Polish Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski explained the Weimar Triangle’s
significance for Poland as follows:
Cooperation among Poland, Germany and France within the Weimar Triangle is an 
example of the creation o f new structures to overcome former divisions and pacts. This 
particular form o f cooperation between European Union countries and a country from the 
former area of the Soviet bloc constitutes a symbol uniting three great European nations. 
The former zone o f great European wars is being transformed into a pillar of security on 
the continent.86
The triangle’s dynamics offered a mechanism by which Poland could intensify its relations with 
two o f the most important states in the EU: France and Germany. Warsaw believed the Weimar 
Triangle was an instrument through which Poland could involve another Western European 
power, France, besides Germany, to play a more active role in the region. For Germany, the 
Weimar Triangle’s significance could be measured by its position as a ‘point of stability in the 
middle o f the European house’ and as a political instrument for pursuing ‘normal’ relations with 
the Poles.87 By playing an active role in the triangle, Germany would allay external concerns 
about its interests in ECE, especially Poland and put fears to rest in the East and the West about 
the re-emergence of a German hegemon or creation o f a German sphere o f influence in its 
political and economic hinterland.88 The French were motivated by assisting Poland’s reform
85HeIena Boguslawska and Aleksandra Konieczka, Die politisch-militarische Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen 
des Weimarer Dreiecks und des Dreiecks Polen-Deutschland-Danemark (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Adam 
Marszalek for Polish Ministry o f Defence, 1998).
86Bartoszweski quoted in Stanislaw Parzymies, ‘The Interests o f Partners in Weimar Cooperation’, Central 
European Review, vol. 5, nos. 20-21 (February 1998), p. 74.
87Kinkel quoted by Krzysztof Skubiszewski, ‘Deutschland: Anwalt Mitteleuropas’, Internationale Politik, 
no. 2 (1997), p. 30.
88Horst Teltschik even proposed a joint ‘Ostpolitik’ with the French. Genscher added that ‘it was 
particularly important that Germany and France attempt to coordinate their policy toward the East during 
this significant phase in German history’. See DPA, 16 May 1991, FB1S-WEU-91-097, 20 May 1991.
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efforts but, more importantly, the triangle was a useful mechanism to examine and monitor 
Germany’s objectives vis-a-vis Poland and also ECE.
After 1993, simultaneous meetings o f the defence ministers complemented the yearly 
meetings of the French, German and Polish foreign ministers. Following the initiative taken by 
the foreign ministers o f the Weimar Triangle in Warsaw (11-12 November 1993), Germany and 
France declared their support for Poland to become an associate member of the WEU: a step to 
integrate Poland more into the Euro-Atlantic security structures.89 The first trilateral military 
meetings between the triangle’s defence ministers convened in Paris (18-19 July 1994). In the 
military sphere of their relations, the meeting’s main ostensible aim was to support Poland’s 
integration into the EU and expand its military contacts with NATO and the WEU. The next 
military trilateral meeting did not convene until February 1997. The initiative o f the defence 
ministers of Germany (Volker Riihe), France (Charles Millon) and Poland (Piotr Kolodziejczyk) 
on the intensification o f political-military and military co-operation (2 February 1997) was 
essential in deepening and enhancing trilateral military contacts. It also played an instrumental 
role in providing an institutional foundation for co-ordinating military co-operation projects and 
furthering military ties. This initiative had four main objectives: (1) to provide support for 
integrating Poland into the Atlantic Alliance, (2) to create a foundation for a common defence 
policy for the three states, based on the Franco-German model, (3) to coordinate expansion o f the 
input of the three states into the European Security and Defence Initiative (ESDI), and finally (4) 
to strengthen peace and stability in Europe. The security aspects o f the Weimar triangle also 
played a paramount role in preparing Poland for its admission into NATO.
The German-Danish-Polish Corps
The second major dimension o f Germany’s trilateral military cooperation with Poland 
was with Denmark. Unlike the Weimar triangle which had political, economic, and military 
dimensions, the German-Danish-Polish corps was focused exclusively on intensifying military 
cooperation (participating in joint exercises, creating twin units, and intensifying daily contact
89See Adam Halamski and Mariusz Kazana, Politische und militarische Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen des 
Weimarer Dreiecks (Warsaw: Polish Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, 1997), pp. 54-55.
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between soldiers) amongst the three actors, preparing Poland for NATO membership, and 
achieving the security objectives o f the three participants in ECE and the Baltic Sea region.90 
Bonn viewed this form of trilateral cooperation as additional proof o f its support for Poland’s 
integration in NATO and unwillingness to pursue unilateral military initiatives in ECE or in the 
Baltic Sea. This form of trilateral cooperation reassured Poland, and like the Weimar triangle, was 
a vehicle for the Poles to overcome negative historical experiences with their German 
counterparts in a military context. For the Danes, the corps’ formation prepared Poland for NATO 
membership and re-channelled German interests into the Baltic Sea region, a geographical area 
not immediately recognised by Bonn as a priority after unification.
The impetus for this trilateral military cooperation began at a meeting o f the Danish, 
German and Polish defence ministers on the German island o f Rugen (12-13 May 1994). 
Following these consultations, an ‘Agreement on Military Cooperation’ was signed on the island 
o f Aeroe in Denmark (17 August 1995). The agreement allowed for an extension o f the bilateral 
and trilateral military projects which had been conducted amongst the Danes, Germans and Poles 
before 1995. It also formed the basis for promoting further military cooperation after 1996. 
Cooperation between the Danish, German, and Polish naval units was formally enshrined in an 
agreement signed in Gdynia, Poland (2 June 1997). Cooperation between the air forces o f the 
three states went into effect after 22 September 1997.
The defence ministers o f Denmark, Germany, and Poland took the most important 
decision concerning the creation o f the Danish-German-Polish corps in Skagen, Denmark (6-8 
May 1997). An agreement was subsequently signed on 30 August 1997 whose aim was to 
institutionalise further military cooperation in the form o f a trilateral Danish-German-Polish corps 
by 1999. A Convention on the Multinational Corps North-East and Agreement on the Tasks o f the 
Multinational Corps North East was signed in Szczecin, Poland (5-6 September 1998). Each o f 
these measures was a steeping stone towards instrumentalising and institutionalising the military 
relationships between Denmark, Germany and Poland in the form o f a trilateral corps.
90For a historical assessment of the FRG’s role in the Baltic Sea region, see Hans-Jochen Meyer-Hoper, 
‘The Significance o f the Baltic Sea in the Security and Defence Policy o f the Federal Republic o f Germany, 
1950-1989’ in Gunnar Arteus and Bertel Heurlin (eds.), German and Danish Security Policies towards the 
Baltic Sea Area: 1945 until Present (Copenhagen: Danish Institute o f International Affairs & National 
Defence College o f Sweden, 1998), pp. 35-51.
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The Multilateral European and Transatlantic Security Dimensions o f Ostpolitik 
Germany and the Evolution of a European Security Architecture, 1990-1992
Germany’s decision-makers exerted influence via numerous bilateral and multilateral 
frameworks to achieve their regional foreign and security policy objectives. German 
multilateralism within NATO is crucial to our understanding o f Germany’s Sicherheitspolitik 
towards ECE after unification. The purpose here is to examine the multilateral frameworks which 
Bonn used to promote its security interests vis-a-vis ECE, the Czech Republic and Poland in 
particular.
In December 1990, Kohl strongly warned against the creation o f a ‘new and dangerous 
prosperity border becoming consolidated in the centre o f Europe after the overcoming o f the Iron 
C urtain.... Failure o f political and economic reform in central, Eastern, and south-Eastem Europe 
would have serious consequences for the rest of Europe, including us’.91 This was not an isolated 
warning from Germany’s political leadership. Kohl often reiterated the necessity to offer a 
‘European perspective’ to its Eastern and South-Eastem neighbours in Europe. This was easier 
said than done as Germany was to find out. Mustering support from Germany’s European and 
transatlantic allies for the transition processes in ECE was not a goal everyone shared by 
everyone.92
Bonn’s answers to the security dilemmas on its Eastern frontier relied on promoting more 
intense co-operation between ECE and Europe’s multilateral institutions. From 1990-1992, 
NATO membership was not on the cards for the new transition states in ECE as the contours o f  a 
new European security architecture had not yet been defined. The first German foreign minister 
after unification, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, played an important role in crafting Bonn’s position on 
the future evolution o f this architecture. Already in early 1991, Bonn indicated that it did not 
advocate NATO’s extension to the East, although it had been instrumental in tying its Eastern
91Kohl’s remarks in DPA, 30 December 1990, FBIS-WEU-90-251, 31 December 1990.
92Kohl’s remarks in Bulletin, no. 11 (31 January 1991), p. 61.
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neighbours to the EC via the European Agreements.93 Instead, Genscher offered the following
‘temporary’ and non-committal solutions to ECE’s security conundrums:
It will be important for us to create all-European security structures in which the CEE 
[Central East Europe] states will find their own place. Thus, it is advisable for the CEE 
states not to seek membership in the Western alliance. This also corresponds to the 
alliance’s attitudes because it is not in our interest that the changes in Europe lead to a 
new division o f the continent, a division that would run along the Western border o f the 
Soviet Union.94
The emphasis of Genscher’s all-European security structure was based on the foundations o f the 
CSCE (at the expense o f NATO95) and the Charter o f Paris for a New Europe, signed by the 
CSCE heads of state and government (21 November 1990), the EC, and eventually the WEU.96 
Genscher believed that only these organisations could safeguard the security o f Germany’s 
Eastern neighbours. Genscher also advocated that the Soviet Union be included and not isolated 
from the creation of any future European institutional structures.97 This was a common theme 
voiced by the Kohl government from 1990 to 1998. The CSCE, however, did not have the 
appropriate institutional structures at its disposal to shape a European security architecture after 
unification. Not all member states, in particular the United States, were keen to adopt the CSCE as 
a substitute mechanism which included the Soviet Union but might consequently signal NATO’s 
death.
The Treaty on the European Union negotiated at the Maastricht European Council (9-10 
December 1991) laid the groundwork for the development o f a Common Foreign and Security
93During the Two Plus Four negotiations in early 1990, fundamental disagreements on the future nature of 
the Alliance were raging between the German foreign and defence ministries. See Werner Weidenfeld, 
Aussenpolitik fur die deulsche Einheit: die Entscheidungsjahre 1989/90 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags- 
Anstalt, 1998), pp. 260-263.
^Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network, 31 March 1991, FBIS-WEU-91-062,1 April 1991.
95Kohl distanced himself from this approach. See Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innenansichlen der Einigung 
(Berlin: Siedler, 1991), p. 182
96The adoption of the ‘Prague Theses’ with the Czechoslovak government (11 April 1991) is important. 
This document contained a list o f ten points concerning German and Czech perceptions on the development 
of new structures for European security and stability. See German Foreign Office (ed.), Beitrag des 
Auswartigen Amts zum Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung 1991 (Bonn: German Foreign Office, 1991), p. 
48. The text o f the ‘Prague Theses’ is in Berlin ADN, 11 April 1991, FBI S-EEU-91-071, 12 April 1991.
97A s Genscher notes in his memoirs, the failure of this strategy was apparent at the World Economic 
Summit in London in 1991 where the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was treated in a ‘cool’ manner. See 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Errinerungen, (Berlin: Siedler, 1999), p. 970 and Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs 
(London: Doubleday, 1996), pp. 613-617.
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Policy (CFSP) and included a reference to the WEU as a major component o f the Treaty which 
was to enter force only on 1 November 1993. The CSCE framework, with the EC’s and WEU’s 
Forum on Consultation, however, did not have the appropriate mechanisms in place to address 
Germany’s as well as NATO’s security concerns in ECE.
NATO had formed the bedrock o f German security since 1955. It was unlikely that Bonn 
would sever its links with NATO to embrace the creation o f new security structures in Europe. On 
the contrary, Bonn advocated that the Alliance should transform itself to meet numerous and new 
security challenges in the post-Cold War era. Bonn considered NATO the ideal multilateral 
security framework for advancing German and ECE interests. The Alliance had to devise the 
consultative frameworks necessary to address issues o f stability and security in ECE and the 
Soviet Union. NATO, under the leadership o f Secretary-General Manfred Womer, was already 
redefining its mission in the post-Cold War era and that included a more extensive focus on the 
countries in ECE and the Soviet Union.
Germany’s passionate support for NATO’s proactive engagement with its Eastern 
neighbours was a central component of its foreign relations with the CSFR and Poland. The 
Heads of State and Government at the London Summit (July 1990) acknowledged the need for 
NATO to re-launch itself in the absence of an acute Soviet threat and the presence o f a unified 
Germany firmly embedded in NATO’s institutional framework. The London Summit also began a 
consultation exercise on the development o f a future Strategic Concept for the Alliance and 
extended offers to the governments o f the Soviet Union and ECE to establish regular diplomatic 
liaison with NATO and promote the intensification o f cooperation and dialogue between itself and 
these states.
NATO’s Strategic Concept was published at the Rome Summit Meeting (November 1991). 
Besides focusing on the Alliance’s future role and reaffirming the transatlantic link within NATO, 
the Strategic Concept acknowledged that a new European security architecture was dependent on 
NATO’s involvement and a plethora of other international institutions and frameworks in the 
Euro-Atlantic area: WEU, EU, CSCE, and the Council o f Europe. Only mutually reinforcing 
institutions could address the security challenges faced by their member states. Bonn supported 
this objective and Genscher acknowledged that security and stability throughout Europe could
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only be supported with a three-tier approach to European security: a European tier focused on the 
EC and the WEU; a transatlantic tier focused on NATO; and a CSCE/Council o f Europe tier that 
included the Atlantic to the Urals.98 Using the London Declaration, NATO created a formal 
institutional structure for its relations with nine countries in Eastern Europe. The NACC’s 
creation (December 1991), although highly controversial in Paris, evolved into a new consultative 
forum designed to address the security concerns of all participating countries.99
Given this three-tiered approach to European security, Bonn was not able to pursue 
unilateral options in ECE, although it was possible to advocate and pursue German objectives 
with other partners and within the confines of European security institutions.100 Bonn expressed 
an interest in formulating and implementing its foreign and security policy with its European 
partners, in particular, France. Deflecting any criticism o f German Sonderwege in ECE by 
proposing a Franco-German Ostpolitik was a priority in the region.101 The Weimar Triangle’s 
creation (August 1991) served this purpose well.102
Despite Bonn’s efforts to multilateralise its foreign and security policy, it was frustrated 
by the general lack of support and apathy displayed by its European and transatlantic partners 
when it came to assisting the transition efforts in ECE from 1990-1992. Managing Germany’s 
Eastern conundrums were goals not every European country viewed with the same intensity and 
urgency as Germany. Indeed, other states became increasingly wary o f German motivations and 
intentions in the region. Berghahn, Flynn, and Liitzeler articulate the fears expressed by many o f 
Germany’s allies in Western Europe and ECE:
98Bulletin, no. 81 (12 July 1991), p. 656.
"The NACC was replaced by the EAPC on 30 May 1997 at a meeting of the NATO and Cooperation 
Partner Foreign Ministers meeting in Sintra, Portugal. According to Peter Schmidt, the French viewed the 
NACC ‘as a German-American attempt to provide NATO with new political missions in Central and 
Eastern Europe’. See Peter Schmidt, Germany, France and NATO (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 1994), p. 14.
100It was unconstitutional for Germany’s armed forces to participate in missions exceeding common self- 
defence within the geographical areas defined by the EU and NATO. This constraint disappeared with the 
Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling on 12 July 1994 that Germany was no longer bound by this law.
101See Genscher’s comments in DPA, 16 May 1991, FB1S-WEU-91-097, 20 May 1991, and Genscher, 
Erinnerungen, p. 970.
102See ‘Gemeinsame Erklarung der Aussenminister von Deutschland, Frankreich und Polen in Weimar’, 
Bulletin, no. 92 (3 September 1991), pp. 734-735.
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The problem is thus not that Germany will voluntarily go into Eastern Europe by 
themselves and set up a comfortable sphere of influence that will be perceived by others 
as a threat. Rather the dilemma is that German leaders feel that the problems in the region 
must be dealt with, will be seeking partners to that end, and others may not follow.103
Bonn called for more ‘solidarity’ in ECE and, on several occasions, Germany’s leaders
acknowledged that they had reached the limits o f their generosity in ECE.104 For Bonn, Germany
and Europe’s stability were contingent on having security in ECE. The German President Roman
Herzog captured the essence of this important link by arguing quite forcefully that ‘if  we do not
stabilise the East, the East will destabilise us’. He also noted that instability in Eastern Europe
affects France as much as instability in the Mediterranean affects Germany.105 This link became
one o f the dominant themes in Germany’s Sicherheitspolitik after 1990 and played an important
role in shaping Germany’s future position on the Alliance’s enlargement.
The debate on the future of Europe’s security was not conducted solely in Germany or by 
NATO’s member states. From 1991-1992, it had become clear to the NACC members that the 
new independent states in ECE were keen to become permanent members o f the Alliance and not 
just partners alongside Russia in a consultative framework which did not provide extensive 
security guarantees. Kohl vaguely acknowledged these concerns in February 1993 when he 
stressed the NACC’s importance and advocated the adoption o f a ‘cautious’ approach to the 
region, which highlighted the security dilemmas in the region but failed to provide any 
substantive guarantees that would allow the ECE members o f the NACC to become permanent 
Alliance members.106 The fear of Russian imperial revisionism in ECE and a potential re- 
emergence of German revisionist thinking had sparked a concerted effort on the part o f the ECE
103VoIker Berghahn, Gregory Flynn and Paul Michael Lutzeler, ‘Germany and Europe’ in Konrad Jarausch 
( e d After Unity: Reconfiguring German Identities (Oxford: Berghahn, 1997), p. 185.
104See Kohl’s comments in Bulletin, no. 35 (3 April 1992), p. 335; President Richard von Weizsacker’s 
remarks in DPA, 9 January 1992, FB1S-WEU-92-006, 9 January 1992, p. 6, and Finance Minister Theo 
Waigel’s comments in Wirtschaftswoche, 6 September 1991, FBIS-WEU-91-187, 26 September 1991, p. 9.
105Roman Herzog, ‘Die Grundkoordinaten deutscher Aussenpolitik’, Internationale Politik, no. 4 (1995), p. 
7.
106Bulletin, no. 13(10 February 1993), p. 103.
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governments to return to the West and become permanent members o f the Alliance, a concern 
Bonn was aware of.107
Bonn’s NATO Enlargement Agenda, 1993-1998
The internal German and NATO debates on the evolution o f NATO’s relationship with 
ECE fundamentally changed with a speech delivered by Riihe at the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, 1993) in London (26 March 1993).108 
Whereas the BMVg was extremely conscious o f the security dilemmas Bonn faced, the Foreign 
Office and the Chancellor had not engaged in any substantive discussions on how Bonn was to 
face external security vulnerabilities on its Eastern frontier. Within NATO, the NACC had 
become the cornerstone o f NATO’s relations with ECE but a coherent strategic vision on the part 
o f the member states for how the Alliance would manage future security challenges in ECE and 
the CIS was missing. Riihe pushed the debate forward in a public fashion by stating: ‘the Atlantic 
Alliance cannot remain a closed society. I cannot see one main reason why future members o f the 
European Union should be prevented from becoming members o f NATO’.109
According to the Director o f the Policy Planning Staff at the BMVg, Vice-Admiral Ulrich 
Weisser, Riihe was motivated by three main concerns: (1) the inconclusive debates in the NACC 
on the prospects o f offering permanent memberships to Germany’s Eastern neighbours, (2) the 
need to promote further European integration efforts and include Poland and other Eastern 
neighbours in Western international institutions, and (3) the need to ensure that Germany’s 
Eastern border was not contiguous with that o f NATO or the EU.no Poland was the most 
important factor in Germany’s strategic thinking, especially for Kohl and Ruhe. In a meeting with 
President Clinton in February 1995, Kohl noted: ‘We need to enlarge to Central and Eastern
107Michael Radu, ‘Why Eastern and Central Europe Look West’, Orbis, vol. 41, no. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 
39-57 and Gerhard Wettig, Central European Security after the End o f the Soviet Empire (Cologne: Bl-Ost, 
17-1994), p. 19.
108The strategy underlying the BMVg’s and Riihe’s position on enlargement had been conceived as early as 
September 1992. Riihe had not consulted the Foreign Office or the Chancellery about the speech’s contents.
109Bulletin, no. 27 (1 April 1993), pp. 229-233, especially pp. 231-232.
M0Ulrich Weisser, Sicherheit fu r  ganz Europa: die Atlantische Allianz in der Bewahrung (Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999), pp. 24-25.
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Europe. The issue, o f  course, is Poland, not Hungary or the Czech Republic...They [Poland] are
our closest neighbour’.111 Riihe noted:
I had the feeling, and I still have, that we owe a lot to Poland. We owe them in a negative 
sense for what we did to them during the war. And we owe them in a positive sense for 
their courage in the 1970s and the 1980s. Their liberating themselves was really the key to 
overcoming the division o f Europe. We need to understand that there would have been no 
Leipzig without Gdansk.112
His sentiments towards ECE had also been shaped by his political experiences as the foreign and
security policy spokesman for the CDU in the 1980s when he had met the dissidents who were
responsible for overthrowing communist leaders in their respective countries.
Kinkel echoed these concerns by acknowledging that ‘the peoples in the reform countries
have struggled for their freedom, we have called on them, even urged them to come into our free
community, and now we must not leave them in a lurch. Germany is their advocate.113 Germany’s
historical obligation or ‘special responsibility’ towards Poland and the Czech Republic114 was
rooted in two processes: (1) the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany against these states
throughout the Second World War, and (2) the roles played by both in facilitating German
unification. Germany’s Verantwortungspolitik towards ECE can be explained ‘in part by pangs o f
conscience in realising that Germany’s own postwar prosperity was built on Soviet victimization
o f East Europeans and erection o f an iron curtain that let modernization proceed in Western
Europe without being overstrained by claims from the East’.115
The main leitmotifs o f Ruhe’s historical speech were ‘integration’ and ‘cooperation’.
‘Integration’ was the implicit recognition that European unity could not be achieved if  ECE was
excluded from the design o f a future European security architecture. On the other hand, the
,n Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itselffor a New Era (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 102.
112Riihe quoted in Frederick Kempe, Father/Land: A Search fo r  the New Germany (London: Profile Books, 
1999), pp. 111-112.
u3FAZ, 11 September 1993, FBIS-WEU-93-178, 16 September 1993, pp. 16-17.
,14The U.S. also urged the Czech Republic to face up to its historical responsibilities by mending their 
relations with Germany over the issue o f the German expellees from the Sudetenland after World War Two. 
See Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself fo r  a New Era, p. 147, quoting 
‘Ambassador Holbrooke’s meeting with Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec’, Prague 006216, August 18, 
1994.
115Elizabeth Pond, ‘Germany Finds its Niche as a Regional Power’, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 
1 (Winter 1996), pp. 32-33.
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intensification of ‘cooperation’ with those states not willing or ready to join Western international
institutions was vital in reducing the fears o f a future division o f Europe into blocks o f stability
and instability. Russia was the key player here. These concepts’ dual application highlighted one
of the main features o f Germany’s classic Eastern conundrums: promoting the further integration
of ECE into Western international institutions versus the probable exclusion o f Russia from
similar institutions. Germany was forced to simultaneously balance its interests in ECE with those
o f Russia. This problem was exacerbated by what Richard Kugler described as incompatible
German and Russian foreign and security policy objectives in ECE in the post-Cold War period:
The long term worry for their (Germany and Russia) relations is that the two 
countries may be shaping incompatible strategic agendas for major parts o f ECE. 
Germany wants the heart o f the region brought into the Western community. Russia 
wants the region to remain a neutral zone, unless it too can get equal membership in 
Western institutions. Germany does not want Russia brought into these institutions 
anytime soon. These separate agendas do not add up to strategic harmony in the long 
run."6
Having publicly addressed the security concerns and membership aspirations voiced by 
Germany’s Eastern neighbours, Riihe’s controversial speech marked the genesis o f the dual 
German and NATO debates on the enlargement o f the Alliance to the East, especially to the 
Visegrad states: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Both debates were similar in many 
ways as they ran parallel to each other. They were also heavily influenced by Washington and 
Moscow’s positions on enlargement, and they exposed Bonn’s difficulties in devising a common 
strategy and position on shaping the dynamics o f enlargement: the timetable, choice o f new 
members, and the significance o f Moscow in the intra-German and NATO debates.
Amongst NATO’s key members: the United States, France, and Britain, the timing o f 
Ruhe’s speech was met with some scepticism since there was no consensus in the NACC on the 
feasibility o f opening up the Alliance to outside members and what impact the process would 
have on Russian politics. There were also many unanswered questions about the motives behind 
Germany’s support for enlargement.117 For Bonn, the reasons were self-evident. There was, 
however, a divergence o f opinions amongst the member states in the NACC on this major
n6Richard L. Kugler, Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1996), p. 166.
117See Weisser, Sicherheit fu r  ganz Europa, pp. 37-39. For a more sceptical view, see Lanxin Xiang, ‘Is 
Germany in the West or in Central Europe?’, Orbis, vol. 36, no. 3 (Summer 1992), pp. 411-422.
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strategic proposal. The proposal also exposed policy differences amongst the main foreign and 
security policy actors in Bonn which had surfaced in the latter half of 1993 lasting almost 
uninterrupted until the Madrid Summit (July 1997). The political discussions on enlargement were 
dominated by two schools o f thought in the summer o f 1993: (1) proponents o f the transfer o f 
stability to ECE through extensive cooperation but without the provision o f membership, 
especially in NATO, and (2) proponents o f a step-by-step, selective integration of new members 
into Western international institutions in combination with increased cooperation.118
Bonn’s official stance on enlargement, however, fluctuated between three positions: the 
‘aggressive’ BMVg approach which highlighted the military aspects o f enlargement and the 
legitimate right of any state in ECE to join NATO if they fulfilled the membership criteria119; the 
‘cautious’ approach by Kinkel and the Foreign Office which promoted extensive cooperation 
arrangements with ECE but not at the expense o f prematurely isolating Russia from Europe120, 
and the ‘reticent’ approach adopted by Kohl which lent favour to the strategies adopted by Kinkel 
but did not actively hinder the BMVg and Riihe from advocating Germany’s interests to enlarge 
the Alliance.
At a meeting o f the NATO defence ministers in TravemUnde, Germany (20-21 October
1993), Riihe’s ideas for a future ministerial summit that would set an enlargement timetable for all 
states in ECE were tempered by a US-sponsored Partnership for Peace (PfP) plan (officially 
launched at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Brussels Summit) which received strong support 
from the other member states since it postponed major decisions about enlargement. After nine 
months o f public disagreement amongst Bonn’s main foreign and security policy actors on the 
feasibility o f NATO enlargement and the Russian response, the Brussels Summit (January 1994) 
eventually yielded a compromise solution which appeased the concerns of both parties in the
118Weisser, Sicherheit fu r  ganz Europa, p. 39.
n9The BMVg’s position on enlargement had been formulated with some assistance by Rand, in particular, 
Ronald D. Asmus who was partly responsible for shaping the conceptual framework underlying NATO 
enlargement. For a discussion of the enlargement framework, see Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and 
F. Stephen Larrabee, ‘Building a New NATO’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 4 (September/October 1993), 
pp. 28-40, and Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itselffor a New Era 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
l20French ministers, along with Kinkel, were o f the opinion in 1993 that the NATO enlargement process 
would take at least ten years to complete. See USS, Strategic Survey, 1993-1994 (London: Brassey’s for 
I1SS, 1994), pp. 112-113.
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enlargement debate. The creation o f PfP enabled the Alliance to postpone any major enlargement
decisions until after the publication of its Study on Enlargement. On the other hand, member
states viewed the PfP as a new initiative to promote stability on the European continent. PfP
offered NATO’s partner states the prospect o f strengthened political consultation; the opportunity
for the military forces o f partner states to plan, train, and exercise with NATO; the
implementation o f co-operative measures designed to promote transparency in defence planning,
and closer liaison with NATO through a Partnership Coordination Cell based in Mons, Belgium.
One of the most important decisions reached at the NAC Summit was an agreement that NATO’s
member states would commit themselves to studying the ‘why’ and ‘how’ o f future admissions
throughout 1995 -  an exercise which culminated in the publication o f NATO’s Study on NATO
Enlargement (September 1995).121
Whilst PfP was not Rtihe’s ideal solution for addressing the security concerns o f
Germany’s Eastern neighbours, it, nonetheless, included a clear commitment from the Alliance to
open its doors to new members. In the German debate on enlargement, the PfP solution was a
success for Kohl and Kinkel who had managed to delay important decisions on the NATO’s
future evolution. Bonn used the PfP as a policy instrument to prepare for enlargement but also to
apply suitability tests to aspiring Alliance members. According to Thomas Szayna and Ronald
Asmus, Bonn’s attitudes toward PfP were based on the following logic:
German policy-makers have come to view PfP as an all-purpose instrument for pursuing 
multiple objectives vis-a-vis different countries. For those countries that the Germans 
consider firm candidates for Alliance membership, PfP is the path to enlargement. For 
those countries that the Germans view as possible candidates but where they are less sure, 
PfP is an antechamber where Germany can pursue cooperation and provide political 
reassurance and still keep its options open. For those countries that the Germans consider 
non-candidates, PfP is the alternative to expansion.122
There was also hope that the PfP states would benefit from their mutual partnership with NATO
before applying for permanent membership.12j
I21NATO, Study on NATO Enlargement (Brussels: NATO, 1995).
,22Ronald D. Asmus and Thomas S. Szayna, German and Polish Views o f the Partnership fo r  Peace, p. 11.
123VoIker Riihe, ‘The Future o f European Security: A German View’, Central European Issues: Romanian 
Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 1, no. 2 (1995/96), p. 17.
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The delay, however, to relegate important decisions on the future o f Europe’s security had
important consequences for Germany’s Eastern neighbours who were unhappy about Germany’s
as well as the United States’ reluctance to offer them ‘solid’ prospects for becoming future
Alliance members. Warsaw was particularly scathing in its criticism of the agreements reached in
Brussels, for the PfP did not offer any firm security guarantees for those states consumed with
fear about their internal and external stability.124 According to Christopher Bertram:
The program failed to address not only the matter o f whether, when, and how to extend 
NATO membership to Eastern European countries, but also o f how to define NATO’s 
relationship with Russia. Its ambiguity generated uncertainty in Moscow and in Eastern 
European capitals, inviting Russia to try to block these countries from membership and 
inciting the latter to regard membership as the only durable form of future relationship 
with the Western Alliance.125
The delay also exacerbated domestic German tensions on future membership questions which the
Alliance would have to address in the near future.
Making matters more complicated, Germany’s foreign and security policy actors had
several competing visions about the roles o f NATO and the EU vis-a-vis ECE. There was also no
common position on the process and timetable for the Alliance or EU’s enlargement. This became
clear when under U.S. President Bill Clinton’s leadership in 1994 the United States launched an
energetic campaign to prepare Poland and other states in ECE for future membership in NATO by
1996-1997. Bonn’s support was found wanting in this crucial area because it was unclear, based
on the policy statements o f several major actors, where it stood on the questions facing the
Alliance in the enlargement debate.
Despite having played a forceful role behind the WEU’s offer o f ‘associate partner’ status
with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Estonia and
Lithuania in May 1994, Bonn’s position on NATO enlargement was muddled. The BMVg and
Ruhe’s positions were blatantly pro-enlargement but there was some concern about the Foreign
124Kinkel’s remarks highlight Polish concerns about the nature o f the PfP arrangement. See FAZ, 21 January 
1994 in FBIS-WEU-94-015 (24 January 1994), pp. 31-32. See Krzysztof Miszczak, ‘Die Sicherheitspolitik 
der Tschechischen Republik', Europaische Sicherheit, no. 12 (1994), p. 636.
125Christopher Bertram, Europe in the Balance: Securing the Peace Won in the Cold War (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), p. 43.
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Office and Kohl’s blase stance on the issue.126 The issue was also about timing. This state of 
affairs culminated in the creation o f an interagency working group coordinated by the Chancellor 
on 6 September 1994 to address this issue. The main aim of the working group, in anticipation of 
major NATO summits in the fall, was to devise an official German position on enlargement. The 
working group was to define the conditions which potential membership candidates had to meet 
before they were considered for entry. It was also agreed that the Visegrad states were the 
preferred first-tier candidates for membership and that the Alliance should form a strategic 
partnership with Russia to alleviate any Russian fears about enlargement. Discussions on the 
timetable for enlargement were once again postponed to allow for the adoption o f a policy that 
complemented the EU enlargement process.127 The decisions taken by the working group were 
confirmed in the coalition agreement negotiated by the CDU, CSU, and the FDP, released on 14 
November 1994.
Paradoxically, after months o f indecision in Bonn, the working group, under extreme 
pressure from Kohl, reached a common position on enlargement only to be informed by the 
United States that it wanted to push for a more ambitious enlargement timetable which actually 
set deadlines for the admission o f new members. In American eyes, the Germans were suddenly 
looking like an obstructive alliance partner with no discernible enlargement agenda.128 Bonn was 
aware that any future solutions for solving the political, economic, or security concerns o f 
Germany’s Eastern neighbours within NATO required the consent of the United States. If the 
enlargement agenda was driven by Washington, then it was only logical that Bonn would be 
asked to play a major role in implementing Washington’s enlargement vision.
126The enlargement of NATO had not been declared Chefsache (priority issue for the chancellor). See 
Berthold Meyer, ‘Deutsche Aussenpolitik und die NATO-Osterweiterung’, Wissenschaft undFrieden, no. 2 
(1996), p. 9. In addition, Chancellor Kohl’s suggestion o f a moratorium on NATO enlargement -  for the 
purpose of allaying Russian concerns -  to U.S. Secretary of Defence Bill Perry in February 1996 raised 
alarm bells there although Bonn quickly back-tracked on the Chancellor’s comments. See Asmus, Opening 
NA TO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era, p. 142.
127Weisser, Sicherheit fu r ganz Europa, pp. 66-67, and Christian Hacke, ‘Die Haltung der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland zur NATO-Osterweiterung’ in August Pradetto (ed.), Ostmitteleuropa, Russland und die 
Osterweiterung der NATO (Opladen: Westdeutscher, 1997), pp. 231-249, especially pp. 240-242.
128Karen E. Donfried, ‘German-American Relations in the New Europe.” Congressional Research Issue 
Brief, no. 91018 (5 December, 1996).
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The role of the United States in Germany’s enlargement policy cannot be underestimated. 
Already in May 1991, Germany had joined the United States as ‘partners in leadership’. 
Washington wanted to use this partnership to formulate a joint US-German strategy for addressing 
Germany as well as NATO’s Eastern security dilemmas. Achieving a consensus in this 
partnership was crucial if the enlargement process was to proceed.129 The Americans were 
operating from the somewhat ‘dangerous’ assumption, from a German and ECE perspective, that 
the United States, through NATO, would seek to pursue a strategic partnership with Russia before 
initiating discussions with the Visegrad states about their future membership prospects. For the 
Visegrad states, NATO’s strategic priorities were clearly misplaced in that too much attention was 
being placed on Russia’s strategic interests.
Given these apprehensions, Bonn struggled to define a coherent policy that suited all parties 
and achieved a balance between advocating the legitimate security interests o f  its Eastern 
neighbours and the need to include Russia in the design of a future European security architecture. 
According to Weisser, Bonn was guided by the following principles in its relations with Russia 
and ECE:
For the federal government, it was important to counter the impression apparent in ECE 
that a new and strengthened focus on Russia would not relegate enlargement to a lesser 
priority. On the contrary, it was important to inform the potential new members that it 
should be in their own security interests if  a constructive relationship with Russia was 
maintained. It was necessary to find a right balance between the participation o f Russia in 
the Euro-atlantic processes on the one hand and securing the integrity and freedom of the 
Alliance in internal matters, including the acceptance o f new members ... .,J°
Bonn was tom between the priorities of both parties, especially after the decision taken by the
Allied foreign ministers in December 1994 to discuss the modalities o f enlargement, including the
key questions o f ‘why’ and ‘how’ enlargement should proceed. NATO’s Study on Enlargement
stated that by enlarging the alliance, NATO hoped to further ‘the Alliance’s basic goal o f
enhancing security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, within the context of a broad
129Joshua B. Spero and Frank Umbach, NATO's Security Challenge to the East and the German-American 
Geo-strategic Partnership in Europe (Cologne: Bl-Ost, 39/1994).
130Weisser, Sicherheit furganz Europa, p. 91. MT.
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European security architecture’.131 The PfP, NACC, and Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty
were instrumental in facilitating the Alliance’s enlargement. According to the study:
NACC/PfP will continue to provide the fundamental framework for developing 
relations with partner countries. Dynamic NACC/PfP cooperation is an integral part 
o f the European security architecture, deepening interaction and extending security 
and stability throughout Europe, and as a means to strengthen relations with partner 
countries, whether possible new members or not.132
From the perspectives o f future members, it was important that the study acknowledge that the
‘Alliance remains open to further accessions by countries not amongst the earliest to be invited to
join’. Secondly, it was made clear that ‘no country outside the Alliance should be given a veto or
droit de regard over the process and decisions’. This measure was particularly aimed at Russia,
the subject of increased attention during late 1995 and the first half of 1996.
Bonn’s position on the Alliance’s enlargement was not always clear, in part, because o f
the lack o f leadership shown by Kohl and his apparent reluctance to declare the issue as
Chefsache. The German domestic debate on devising a policy that would, first, reassure Russia
about NATO’s intentions in ECE and, second, conclude a strategic partnership between Russia
and NATO, was coherent and remarkably well-coordinated amongst the major actors. The
Chancellor with the Foreign Office and BMVg took an active role in promoting the dual-track
paths o f opening the Alliance to new members and forging a strategic partnership with one o f the
most important actors on the European continent: Russia. The interagency working group o f the
government concluded on 2 October 1996 that Germany’s Allianz (Alliance) and Russlandpolitik
would be guided by three main leitmotifs which had been agreed by the Chancellor, Foreign
Office, and BMVg: (1) the acknowledgement o f Russia’s interests in forging a stronger
relationship between itself and NATO, (2) the provision o f a mandate for the Alliance and the
secretary-general in their future negotiations with Russia133, and (3) an agreement that Bonn
131NATO, Study on NATO Enlargement, p. 1.
132Ibid., p. 11. All members o f PfP are also members o f EAPC. However, PfP retains its own separate 
identity within the framework of the EAPC.
133NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana was given a mandate to explore a strategic partnership with 
Russia (NATO Brussels Summit December 1996) but member states sought to influence Russian political 
and military opinion through a host o f bilateral and multilateral diplomatic contacts. Consequently, a flurry 
of diplomatic activity vis-a-vis Russia was evident in the months leading up to the signing o f the NATO- 
Russia Founding Act in Paris on 27 May 1997 and the creation o f the Permanent Joint Council.
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would not reach a concrete position on enlargement by December 1996 but would set a NATO
Summit date for 1997, when the member states would adopt decisions on accepting new
members, the content o f a NATO-Russia Charter, and the Alliance’s internal reform. There was
an internal German consensus that Russia could not be excluded from any future European
security arrangements if there was to be lasting peace on the continent and NATO was to proceed
with its fateful decision to accept new members.
The negotiations leading up to the Madrid Summit raised numerous questions about
preferred candidates and the timetable for extending invitations to new potential members.
Whereas Bonn’s decision to support the Alliance’s enlargement was not questioned, there were
uncertainties about which states should be invited to enter accession talks with NATO at the July
summit. Bonn wanted to enlarge the Alliance to include the Visegrad Three: the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland. There were, however, open question marks amongst Alliance members,
including Germany, about the feasibility of extending similar invitations to Romania and Slovenia
and sending positive signals to the Baltic States about their future prospective memberships in the
Alliance. For the United States, there was a consensus for accepting three new members but not
five. How other countries felt was not clear until all the parties had convened for the Madrid
Summit. For American policymakers participating in Madrid Summit, the quality o f support for
the German plan was uncertain. Ron Asmus noted the following:
While German Defense Minister Riihe was solidly behind us, Foreign Minister Kinkel 
was all over the map on the issue. President Clinton seemed confident that 
Chancellor Kohl would support him. But Kohl had yet to take a public position. And 
France, too, was invoking its special relationship with Bonn to gain German
134support.
Germany eventually supported the U.S. position when Kohl acknowledged at the Summit that 
‘One miracle has already come true...There is agreement on membership o f Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic...There would not be agreement on more than three countries’.lj5
The timetable for the Alliance’s enlargement was set as follows. In Madrid, NATO 
officially invited the Visegrad Three to become permanent members o f the Alliance. Between 
July and December (1997), NATO and the prospective member states completed their accession
,34See Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era, p. 239.
135Ibid., p. 243.
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negotiations and signed an accession protocol. Throughout 1998, the accession protocol was 
ratified by NATO’s member states and at the Washington Summit (4 April 1999), the fiftieth 
anniversary o f the North Atlantic Treaty, the Visegrad Three became permanent members.
Germany’s return to the Mittellage in Europe had profound implications for its 
Sicherheitspolitik. Although there were no direct military threats to German security, the principal 
non-military risks in ECE stemmed from the potential eruption of turbulent domestic 
developments resulting from the collapse o f transformation processes in neighbouring Eastern 
states. Bonn feared that the collapse of economic transition processes in ECE might serve as a 
catalyst for what Kohl characterised as ‘political instability, economic need, social 
discontentment, even revolutionary developments among our Eastern neighbours [which] would 
have a direct impact on Germany’s internal situation’.lj6 If  the states bordering Germany’s 
Eastern frontier were located in a sea o f instability, Bonn’s Ostpolitik, especially the political 
reconciliation and economic dimensions, would be undermined. Germany’s perceptions of 
impending instability on its Eastern frontier after 1990 and the need to safeguard its own 
unification processes are central to understanding why a unified Germany became an active 
security agent for ECE in particular the Czech Republic and Poland. But they do not explain in 
their totality why Germany relied on bilateral, trilateral and multilateral security instruments, 
including NATO, to address minimal threats to its security on its Eastern frontier. As discussed, a 
combination o f actor/agential and structural factors played a role in shaping Germany’s response 
to the security debates that reigned from 1990-1998.
Germany’s Sicherheitspolitik was intricately linked to its multilateralism which was 
regarded as the preferred method for meeting Bonn’s goals in the region. Not surprisingly, the 
emerging transition states in ECE favoured this strategy. The Czech Republic and Poland focused 
extensively on Germany, as well as other European and non-European states, as a point o f 
reference in their attempts to return to the West and gain memberships in its international 
institutions. However, both states remained wary o f German solutions to for Europe’s security 
problems. On the other hand, they enthusiastically welcomed German initiatives which 
highlighted their security interests. In the eyes o f Germany’s Eastern neighbours, Lord Ismay’s
136Bulletin, no. 35 (3 April 1992), p. 335. MT.
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adage that NATO was created to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down 
was still viewed as extremely accurate and current, especially with regard to tying the Germans 
down in multilateral institutions. By defining its foreign and security policy objectives from 
within international institutions such as NATO and the EU, Germany avoided any criticisms o f 
‘bilateralism’ in the conduct of its foreign affairs towards ECE.
Consequently, one o f the principal cornerstones o f Germany’s Sicherheitspolitik towards 
ECE was a German contrived but multilateral executed initiative: NATO enlargement. Support 
for this complex process despite numerous domestic and external obstacles was perceived by 
Bonn to be the ideal mechanism for integrating ECE into the West’s foremost political-military 
alliance. NATO was regarded as the most effective political-military organisation for providing 
the instruments and tools needed to address Germany’s security concerns on its Eastern frontier. 
What was primarily conceived as a German idea, the Alliance’s enlargement, was ultimately 
transformed and repackaged as a US driven initiative because of the absence o f a coherent 
German policy on enlargement. For a country struggling to define its raison d’etre in the post- 
Cold War world, this should not come as a surprise.
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CONCLUSION
Johann Wolfgang Goethe once remarked.that the ‘Germans make everything difficult, 
both for themselves and for everyone else’.1 His declaration aptly characterises the complex 
multi-level dynamics o f Germany’s foreign relations with the Czech Republic and Poland before 
and after unification. Germany’s perennial quest for national unity and its ambition to dominate 
the European balance of power system were the principal sources o f Europe’s malaise in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Through different incarnations, the two traits dominated 
Germany’s Staatsrason from 1871 until 1990. The unified Germany that emerged after the 
Second World War and forty-five years o f division and occupation, however, was the heir to 
entirely different socio-political and institutional impulses than its predecessors. Steered by its 
leaders through the potential pitfalls o f the Cold War, the FRG was remarkably successful in 
achieving its principal domestic policy priority: unification. The foreign and security policy 
strategies used to do so were rooted in the FRG’s extensive Westbindung. A proactive Ostpolitik 
had been discredited by Nazi Germany’s expansionist strategies in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. After 1949, finding solutions to German problems in the East was not perceived by 
Germany’s post-war leadership to be the appropriate strategy for achieving its most important 
objectives.
During the Cold War, relations between the FRG, Czechoslovakia, and Poland could only 
be described, at best, as apathetic. Nazi Germany’s brutal occupation o f both states between 1938 
and 1945 left deep wounds. The bipolar nature o f the Cold War and the Soviet Union’s political- 
military hegemony in Czechoslovakia and Poland precluded the resumption o f normal relations 
between the FRG and these states after its creation in 1949. Between 1949 and 1969, there was a 
remarkable absence o f political will in the FRG to address Nazi Germany’s historical legacy in 
Eastern Europe. Ostpolitik remained constrained by German and Eastern European perceptions o f 
Germany’s past in Mitteleuropa. This state o f affairs persisted throughout the entire Cold War and 
even continued after unification in 1990.
Nazi Germany’s domination o f Czechoslovakia and Poland between 1938 and 1945 
continued to cast its shadow over Germany’s relations with its Eastern neighbours. The FRG’s
'Gordon A. Craig. The Germans (New York: Penguin, 1991), p. 15.
post-war Ostpolitik flowed from the political fallout and disgust generated by Nazi Germany’s
policies vis-a-vis both countries. The unified Germany was not immune to these historical
sensitivities, especially the pervasive presence o f anti-German sentiments in both countries, which
resulted in the visible lack o f  political will in the FRG, Czechoslovakia, and Poland to address
outstanding bilateral questions and disputes stemming from the conclusion and immediate
aftermath o f the Second World War. The domestic and foreign policy implications for the conduct
o f Ostpolitik after 1990 were profound.
The FRG, however, was not the only country burdened by domestic and historical
constraints in the pursuit of its foreign and security policy objectives. Czechoslovakia and Poland
were forced to address their communist legacy and, after forty-five years, their complicity in
cruelly expelling ethnic Germans from the land they had called their home for generations. The
political reconciliation processes between Germans, Czechs, and Poles placed an immense
amount of emphasis on simultaneously acknowledging Germany’s war guilt and crimes, and
Czechoslovakia’s and Poland’s culpability, in defiance o f the Potsdam Agreement, in not
expelling ethnic Germans ‘in an orderly fashion’.
In 1956, Elisabeth Wiskemann made an insightful remark which could have echoed in the
minds of the Czechoslovak and Polish political leaderships after 1990. Anticipating the
implications of unification for Germany’s Eastern neighbours, she noted:
In the eyes of many Germans the phenomenal experience o f Western Germany in the 
last five years calls clearly for German economic leadership in Eastern Europe. And 
yet nothing might do greater harm to German-Slav relationships than for Poles and 
Czechs to feel that, no sooner are they free of the Communist yoke than they must go 
into German economic harness. It would call for exquisite tact for this impression to 
be avoided ... }
Having achieved unification on 3 October 1990 and full sovereignty on 15 March 1991, Germany 
had the potential to evolve into an unimpeded and unchallenged regional power in ECE. On the 
other hand, given Germany’s extensive historical, cultural, and economic links with the region, it 
was clear after 1990 that old patterns and dependencies could and would be revived. Germany’s 
neighbours in the east and west were acutely aware o f its economic potential, which had become 
sufficiently evident throughout the Cold War. The FRG’s rise as one o f the world’s principal
2Elizabeth Wiskemann, Germany’s Eastern Neighbours: Problems Relating to the Oder-Neisse Line and 
the Czech Frontier Regions (London; New York; Toronto: Oxford University Press for RIIA, 1956), p. 295.
economic powers after Second World War (albeit with massive political and economic assistance) 
was a foreboding sign that a united Germany would have few difficulties in maintaining and 
consolidating its position as the pre-eminent Handelsstaat (trading state) in Europe, let alone in 
ECE.
One o f the questions this thesis asked is whether a unified Germany was prepared to 
confront the domestic and foreign challenges posed by its new geopolitical position in Europe’s 
centre. Immediately after unification, the answer is negative because of Germany’s preoccupation 
with integrating GDR structures into West Germany’s. It took several years for Germany’s 
leadership to adapt to new domestic and international realities. Complicating matters, Bonn could 
not estimate the nature of the future international responsibilities that external powers such as the 
United States would expect and demand. This is somewhat surprising given Bonn’s newly won 
freedoms in the sphere o f conducting its foreign and security policy operations. 
Deutschlandpolitik no longer governed Germany’s Ostpolitik. The father o f national unity, 
Chancellor Kohl, had successfully solved the ‘German question’, a goal which had eluded all his 
predecessors since 1949. The Berlin Wall no longer stood as a physical barrier between the two 
Germanies although a new ‘psychological’ wall between Wessies and Ossies (West and East 
Germans) emerged. The foundations for exercising more power and influence were created but 
not used extensively.
It is hardly surprising that the response to the aforementioned question should be negative 
given the immense domestic and external challenges faced by Germany’s political leadership after 
1990. The radical internal and external transformation o f the German state after 1990 tested the 
German political leadership’s ability and capacity to manage not only complex unification 
processes but also demands o f a rapidly fluid and unpredictable international environment. This 
was evident in early 1990 when Bonn hesitated and acted slightly overconfidently on the question 
of recognising the Oder-Neisse line as Poland’s Western border, thus provoking a national outcry 
in Poland.
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Trends and Determinants in Germany's Eastern Diplomacy
Chancellor Kohl’s comment that had he been asked in 1989 which country in ECE 
Germany would enjoy the best relations with he would not have named Poland first is not 
surprising given the nature of Germany’s Ostpolitik after unification.3 He would more likely have 
elevated Hungary to the premier tier o f  countries Germany enjoyed unencumbered relations with. 
Furthermore, Czechoslovakia would have probably been placed before Poland. In fact, the reverse 
occurred. Whereas Hungary enjoyed excellent relations with Germany, Poland became the most 
critical actor for Bonn after unification. Although the bilateral issues burdening German-Polish 
relations were far more complex and potentially damaging for its Ostpolitik, Bonn placed 
increased emphasis on engaging Warsaw in its efforts to achieve political reconciliation. The 
unsolved border question was the prime catalyst. Poland’s role in the negotiations o f the Two Plus 
Four Accords also played a part in placing Polish concerns within Germany’s Ostpolitik priorities. 
There was a historical precedent for this prioritisation in Ostpolitik; between 1969 and 1974, 
Bonn employed a similar strategy under different international conditions. During the negotiation 
o f the Eastern Treaties, Moscow, for obvious reasons, was the pivotal power and required the 
most diplomatic efforts to conclude a friendship treaty. The Moscow Treaty paved the way for an 
agreement with Poland whereas Germany took an additional two years to negotiate a similar 
treaty with Prague.
The foundations for a unified Germany’s foreign policy behaviour towards 
Czechoslovakia and Poland were shaped and, in some cases, held hostage by historical processes 
and foreign perceptions o f Germany’s past which predated the creation o f the Federal Republic’s 
creation in 1949. Indeed, the collective memories o f Germany’s Nazi past affected its capacity 
and willingness to act in ECE after unification.4 The fear in Western and Eastern Europe was that 
Germany, if history was a guiding light, might strive to become Mitteleuropa’s dominant power.
3See Janusz Reiter, ‘Germany and the Eastern Enlargement Problematic: A View from Warsaw4 in Carl 
Lankowski (ed.), Break out, break down or break in? Germany and the European Union after Amsterdam 
(Washington, DC: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1998), p. 55.
4Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich. “The Contemporary Power of Memory: The Dilemmas for Germany.” 
Communication Review, vol. 2, no. 1 (1997), pp. 89-119. This trend has become less apparent after Kohl’s 
demise in September 1998.
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Whether Mitteleuropa already included Germany is an interesting question, which has been the
subject o f extensive debates throughout history. As Ole Waever noted:
In Germany, the Central Europe debate was transformed into a debate about Mitteleuropa. 
This was more than a matter o f translation. Whereas for Milan Kundera, Central Europe 
was the area between Germany and Russia -  an area eternally weak and constituted by 
resistance to uniformisation -  the Mitteleuropa discussed in Germany was one that 
(surprise!) contained Germany.5
Observers in ECE remained sceptical about the contours o f a unified Germany’s national interests 
and how this would affect its future objectives in Mitteleuropa. An examination o f Germany’s 
role in ECE suggests that Germany did not play the Mitteleuropa card although it undoubtedly 
was viewed in Western and Eastern Europe as the primary actor in the region’s political and 
economic development.
Bonn’s Ostpolitik was constructed with three main interests in mind: achieving political 
reconciliation with its Eastern neighbours; providing political and economic support for ethnic 
Germans living in the Czech Republic and Poland and for the transformation processes in ECE, 
and finally, safeguarding its Eastern frontier despite overwhelming challenges and risks. Each o f 
these priorities entailed an element o f self-interest in German calculations, although the Czechs 
and Poles clearly benefited from them as well. Germany was in an excellent geographical and 
political position to meet all of its objectives. One o f the most physical manifestations o f 
unification was the extension o f Germany’s Eastern frontier into the heart o f Mitteleuropa. In the 
context of examining Germany’s Ostpolitik, especially its foreign relations with the Czech 
Republic and Poland, this factor was paramount in the eyes o f Germany’s political leadership. 
Germany’s return to the Mittellage and its close geographical proximity to the Czech Republic 
and Poland coupled with the transfer o f the German capital from Bonn to Berlin in 1999 pre­
ordained an increased German focus on ECE. Pursuing a strategy o f domination in ECE, however, 
was not an option, given Germany’s Western orientation and domestic and external constraints 
inherited from the FRG’s operational environment.
The FRG clearly contended with the most domestic and external constraints during the 
Cold War. Once it was over, the parameters for pursuing a more independent foreign policy were
5See Ole Waever, ‘Three Competing Europes: German, French, Russian’, International Affairs, vol. 66, no.
3 (July 1990), p. 480, and Iver B. Neumann, ‘Russia as Central Europe’s Constituting Other, East 
European Politics and Societies, vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 349-369.
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certainly changed. That Germany’s political leadership did not choose to alter its foreign and 
security policy orientations is revealing. The FRG’s Western orientation, especially its 
membership in international institutions, was an incontrovertible fact o f Germany’s national 
existence. Nonetheless, the power and lasting influence o f the FRG’s historical legacy as a loyal 
ally and member o f European and transatlantic institutions was conveniently forgotten by some 
states after unification. Germany’s future Ostpolitik became a cause celebre in France, Britain and 
the United States. Germany was locked into a critical catch-22 situation. Bonn was damned if  it 
was too proactive -  a move reawakening fears o f German dominance in the region -  in the 
political, economic, and military spheres of its relations with ECE yet it was also damned if  it was 
not proactive enough in addressing the complex political and economic problems inherent in the 
independent states’ reform processes. Given Germany’s historical record, many analysts drew 
pessimistic conclusions about its future development after unification without even thinking that 
its newly won sovereignty and enhanced geographic position in the Mittellage of Europe might 
prove to be a positive asset for both its Western and Eastern neighbours.
To avoid this impression and achieve its Ostpolitik objectives, Germany’s West- and 
Einbindungspolitik (policy o f self-binding) became a dominant feature o f its foreign and security 
policy apparatus. One o f the principal features o f German foreign policy after unification was 
what Gunther Hellmann described as the ‘continuity of the rhetoric of continuity’. This stipulated 
that the main coordinates of German foreign policy, despite internal and external changes to its 
environment, did not profoundly alter the main determinants o f its foreign policy.6 Germany’s 
preference for Berechenbarkeit (reliability) was important in its efforts to project foreign and 
security policies, which offered continuity and did not entail unnecessary surprises. Kohl’s 
political philosophy as chancellor after 1982 served as the main foundation for the FRG’s 
aspirations during the Cold War: achieving German and European unity and maintaining an 
Atlantic community based on common ideals. The political philosophy adopted by Kohl’s
6See Gunther Hellmann, ‘Nationale Normalitat als Zukunft? Zur Aussenpolitik der Berliner Republik’, 
BfdiP, no. 7 (July 1999), p. 837, and David Schoenbaum and Elizabeth Pond, The German Question and 
Other German Questions (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), p. 211.
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political mentor, Konrad Adenauer, became the foundation for the FRG’s and unified Germany’s 
foreign and security policy raison d’etre.7
Germany’s multilateralism within the EU and NATO was the principal focal point o f its 
political, economic, and military relations with the Czech Republic and Poland. West Germany’s 
institutional bedrocks during the Cold War played just as important a role after unification. The 
evolution o f a German foreign and security policy agenda, although not always clear and 
coherent, especially between 1990 and 1993, was already discernible. Only a combination o f 
bilateral and multilateral instruments could be relied upon to achieve Germany’s prime objective 
in ECE: securing the territorial integrity o f its Eastern frontier by ensuring the success o f the 
transition and reform efforts in the Czech Republic and Poland. Multilateral instruments within 
the EU or NATO were viewed as effective tools even if Germany’s capacity to act in these 
institutions would be constrained by the interests of other actors who not only entertained 
different foreign policy objectives but also sought to limit German power in ECE. Although 
Germany’s foreign and security policy capabilities were enhanced after unification, its actions 
were restricted by its firm anchor in international institutions. They subjected Germany to a 
variety o f norms, rules, and procedures that ultimately shaped its behaviour. It is important to 
note, contrary to some opinions, that German objectives in ECE were not exclusively pursued 
within an institutional framework. Nevertheless, the application of the ‘European’ or 
EuropapolitiJc approach for explaining and predicting German foreign policy behaviour remained 
the preferred option for Germany’s policy-makers. It was the easiest, most convenient, and least 
controversial strategy to apply.
Chancellor Kohl’s Ostpolitik within the EU, however, was paradoxical in the sense that 
Bonn simultaneously supported the rapid enlargement o f the EU to include the Visegrad states, 
then refused even to contemplate the reform o f the bureaucratic and complex Common 
Agricultural Policy (an area o f immense concern to the Czech Republic and Poland) and 
advocated a decrease in Germany’s membership contributions to the EU. The three aims were 
incompatible. In addition, the rationale for the further institutionalisation of German power and
7See William A. Paterson, ‘The Chancellor and Foreign Policy’ in Stephen Padgett (ed.), Adenauer to Kohl: 
the Development o f the German Chancellorship (London: C. Hurst, 1994), p. 151.
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increased integration o f its political systems into EU structures often uttered by Germany’s 
leaders -  Germany needs to endure further integration to be protected against itself -  was 
paradoxical given the FRG’s peaceful evolution after 1945. Germany’s political leadership 
underestimated one of the country’s main political foundations after 1949, and its memberships in 
Western international institutions. The frequently made comparison that European unity was a 
matter of ‘war and peace’ naturally raised eyebrows in other European capitals such as Paris and 
increased apprehensions about Germany’s real motives for ceding its national sovereignty to the 
EU, especially its currency, the Mark.8
Germany, however, successfully managed to pursue its national aims and goals within 
multilateral institutions. Unlike many o f its political counterparts in Western Europe, Germany’s 
future was intimately linked to the political and economic stability of its Eastern neighbours. The 
German strategy focused on integrating the Visegrad states into Western institutions such as the 
EU and NATO. Moreover, these states preferred this multilateral strategy as they chose to 
negotiate with the West through international institutions and not on a bilateral or collective basis 
with Germany. Bilateralism raised fears o f German unilateral interests and the creation o f 
German-dependent states in ECE. On the other hand, the expansion o f bilateral contacts allowed 
Germany to convince its Eastern neighbours that its intentions in the region were well-meaning. 
The application o f bilateral instruments, for instance, in the field of military co-operation, served 
to highlight the transparency o f  Germany’s security policy machinery and reassure its neighbours 
about its military objectives.
Given the dramatic and complex changes in the international system after 1989, Germany, 
the Czech Republic and Poland became locked into a menage a trois characterised, like all 
marriages, by high and low points. All were central to each other’s vision in Europe; in several 
cases, their foreign policy objectives were compatible but in some cases, they were not. A 
powerful East and Central European Drang nach Westen (Westward urge) accompanied 
Germany’s Eastward urge. Often, the latter went via Germany. It was perceived to be a natural 
magnet for ECE because of its powerful position in the EU and NATO, and its potential as a
8Daniel Vernet, ‘Europaisches Deutschland oder deutsches Europa? Deutsche Interessenpolitik in Europa’, 
Internationale Politik, no. 2 (1997), p. 17.
275
major economic and trading partner. The Czech Republic and Poland, somewhat reluctantly, 
relied extensively on Germany as an advocate for their interests in Western Europe. Both were 
presented with relatively few foreign policy options given the apparent reluctance o f Germany’s 
European and transatlantic partners to understand Bonn’s perceptions about the urgency o f the 
transition and transformation problems in ECE.9
Foreign Policy after Helmut Kohl
After unification, Germany’s foreign relations with the Czech Republic and Poland 
functioned as a barometer for measuring its commitment to Westbindung, domestic political and 
economic development, and role as a bridge between its Western allies and Russia. After Kohl left 
political office in October 1998, each o f these factors were closely watched and commented upon 
by its Western allies and Eastern neighbours. Unsurprisingly, the domestic and external 
determinants of Germany’s Ostpolitik continued to play a significant part in the foreign and 
security policy deliberations o f Kohl’s successor, Gerhard Schroder, and his successor Angela 
Merkel.
With Chancellor Schroder’s rise to power, the tone o f Germany’s Ostpolitik changed. The
end of the Kohl era led to the emergence o f a group o f Social Democratic politicians who were
not intent on letting historical factors rooted in the Second World War obstruct their relations with
their neighbours. The ‘1968’ generation, embodied primarily by Schroder and the Green/Alliance
90 Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer did not pursue an Ostpolitik excessively bound by the
concepts o f Vergangenheitsbewaltigung, Verantwortungspolitik, and Wiedergutmachung, like
previous chancellors. Karl Dietrich Bracher gives several reasons:
The negative lessons from the period 1933-1945 were certainly decisive for the older 
generation, foremost as negative lessons of an earlier period of history. They were 
motivated [sic] to make efforts to do it better; they stood in constant contrast to the 
experiences o f the Weimar era and the German dictatorship. O f course, the same does 
not apply to that majority o f the population that has since been bom. The majority has 
another historical-political point o f reference. Their different breadth o f experience 
coincides with a natural desire to want positive orientation points, even in a fractured 
history.10
9UN/ECE, Economic Bulletin fo r  Europe. Vol. 45 (New York; Geneva: UN/ECE, 1993), p. 1.
10See Bracher quoted by Michael J. Inacker, ‘Power and Morality: On a New German Security Policy’ in 
Thomas-Durell Young (ed.), Force, Statecraft and German Unity: The Struggle to Adapt Institutions and 
Practices (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996), p. 103.
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Chancellor Schroder’s generation was not apathetic to the historical and political impulses which
shaped the Federal Republic; however, it did not see any reason why Germany, after proving itself
as a democratic, peaceful, and loyal state to Western causes, should continue to be haunted by
ghosts from the past. Assessing the impact o f different German generations on foreign policy,
Henry Kissinger noted that
... Germany will insist on the political influence to which its military and economic 
power entitle it and will not be so emotionally dependent on American military and 
French political support. These trends will not be fully apparent so long as Helmut Kohl, 
the heir o f the Adenauer tradition, is in office. The emerging generation has no personal 
recollection o f the war or o f America’s role in the rehabilitation o f the devastated post­
war Germany. It has no emotional reason to defer to supranational institutions or to 
subordinate its views either to America or France.11
Schroder’s government, unlike his predecessor’s, was influenced to a great extent by the 1968 
student protests, and the anti-nuclear and pacifist movements.
Ironically, however, it was the Schroder government -  despite the pacifist and anti­
military roots o f many members o f the coalition party arrangement -  which intervened in Kosovo, 
under a NATO mandate, in the spring o f 1999. The German troops witnessed battle for the first 
time since the Second World War. Germany’s participation marked a clear break from post-war 
rejection of external military engagements not directly affecting German security interests. It was 
also a fundamental shift in Germany’s desire to act like a ‘normal’ state with legitimate foreign 
and national security interests and assume a role more befitting its prominent stature on the 
international scene. These developments prompted one analyst to ask whether the ‘German 
question’, which had bedevilled the international community throughout the Cold War, was back 
on the table.12 In his foreign and defence policy speeches, Schroder routinely spoke about the 
emergence of a more ‘self-confident country’ and ‘grown-up nation’ which would not hesitate to 
pursue a more active defence policy that would catapult the Bundeswehr into more military 
deployments outside o f Germany than ever before.
One o f the most prominent theoretical frameworks for analysing Germany after 
unification, the ‘civilian power’ paradigm, was seemingly under threat and could not offer the
1'Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 821.
12Wemer Schafer, ‘The German Question Resolved: Making Sense of Schroder’s Foreign Policy’, Harvard 
International Review, vol. 23, no. 2 (Summer 2001), p. 39.
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appropriate tools for assessing Germany’s foreign policy behaviour during this particular conflict.
It is not easy to explain why Schroder decided to overtly remove Germany’s foreign policy
shackles so that it could pursue its interests more forcefully. His interpretation o f Germany’s
Europapolitik, for example, has different historical roots:
The generation of Helmut Kohl thought that we Germans must be European because 
otherwise the fear of the '‘Furor teutonicus’ would re-appear. His words ‘Europe is a 
question o f war and peace’ could only be understood in this way. I argue that we must 
also be European, but regard this as a natural fact o f life which we have freely chosen, 
rather than as a question o f historical duty. The advantage o f this is that one can then be 
less taciturn about pursuing one’s interests than was the case in the past.13
In contrast, Kohl rarely spoke o f German national interests per se but, in reality, never shunned
from pursuing them under the cloak o f a bilateral and multilateral foreign policy.
The intense focus on Germany by other powers in the international system will not abate
in the twenty-first century. Policy-makers in ECE and Western Europe will continue to grapple
with Germany’s evolution in the European order and remain apprehensive about perceived
increases in German levels o f influence, especially in the economic domain. Harnessing
Germany’s political, economic, and military power in international institutions will remain firmly
on the agenda o f its Western and ECE neighbours despite undeniable evidence suggesting that
Germany’s evolution in the latter half o f the twentieth century has been positive for Europe and
the world.
Where does this leave the Czechs and Poles? They will remain in a difficult position vis- 
a-vis Germany. Immediately after unification, German-Czech and German-Polish relations were 
incredibly intense and ambitious despite problems rooted in their mutual history. In the case o f 
German-Polish relations, there was a quick German rush to address outstanding issues in bilateral 
forums, although Germany’s recognition o f the Oder-Neisse line was influenced and decided by 
external actors within the Two Plus Four Accords. In the case o f Czechoslovakia, political 
reconciliation efforts took somewhat longer but nonetheless, a bilateral treaty was signed in 1992, 
followed by a mutual declaration in 1997. After a flurry o f visits and agreements in 1990 and 
1991, German-Polish relations quickly returned to a state o f  normalcy as far as major issues were 
concerned. Similar political reconciliation processes with Czechoslovakia took more time and
,3See Gerhard Schroder quoted by Adrian Hyde-Price, Germany & European Order: Enlarging NATO and 
the EU  (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 41.
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required more political energies, but with the signing of a friendship treaty in 1992 the
foundations, although not one hundred per cent satisfactory for both sides, had been set for a
‘normal’ relationship. In contrast with the Polish relationship, German-Czech relations after 1992
continued to be burdened by the past, thus necessitating the negotiation and implementation o f a
mutual declaration in 1997. The unsubstantiated fear in both states, which already became
apparent in the mid-1990s, was that after Germany had successfully solved its bilateral problems,
especially its political reconciliation objectives in ECE, it would pay less attention to issues
concerning the region’s political, economic, and military development. Nothing could have been
further from the truth as chapters five and six show. Political reconciliation processes, however,
are not completed overnight; indeed, Germany’s reconciliation processes with France and Israel
are cases in point and show they often require decades o f hard work and mutual understanding.
It will be extremely important for the new chancellor, Angela Merkel, to continue to
nurture Germany’s political and economic relations with ECE but not under the shadow o f a
larger German-Russian relationship which was sometimes apparent in Schroder’s Ostpolitik.
There are signs that Chancellor Merkel will re-orientate her country’s foreign policy away from
Russia in an effort to concentrate more on its political and economic relations with ECE,
especially Poland. As far as the past is concerned, it will be incumbent on all parties in ECE to
accept that Germany will no longer necessarily view its foreign relations through a historical
prism with the same intensity as during the Kohl era, for example. To Chancellor Kohl’s credit,
his government confronted the difficult challenges inherent in reaching a political rapprochement
with the Czech Republic and Poland at great domestic political odds, a fact even acknowledged
by one o f his fiercest Czech critics, Vaclav Klaus, when referring to the negotiation of the 1997
Czech-German Declaration on Mutual Relations:
By exerting pressure for the Declaration’s approval we complicated the political life 
for the right-wing coalition and did not win great sympathies for Czech-German 
relations at the given moment. It needs to be said, however, that Chancellor Kohl was 
a great politician who did not hesitate to use his own authority and pushed through 
the Declaration on the German political scene without regard for his momentary gains 
or losses.14
14Prague Hospodarske Noviny, ‘Klaus Sceptical about Solving Czech-Sudeten German Issue by Means o f  
Declaration’, 25 January 2002, EUP20020128000021.
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The Czech Republic, more than Poland, seems bent on preventing Germany from 
forgetting its past crimes to gain domestic political advantages in its bilateral relations with Berlin 
and this has been reflected in the hierarchy with which Germany. Kohl’s government did the 
same. But how can one expect to achieve any success at political reconciliation if  the provisions 
o f treaties and declarations are discarded for the purpose o f political expediency? Czech Prime 
Minister Milos Zeman’s remarks in January 2002 about Sudeten Germans being compared to 
‘traitors’ and Hitler’s ‘fifth column’ hardly improved relations. These remarks, largely attributed 
to the cancellation o f a proposed visit by Chancellor Schroder in March 2002, prompted the press 
secretary at the German Embassy in Prague to comment that ‘Prime Minister Zeman’s statements 
have thrown us back to the period before the Czech-German declaration was signed’ in 1997.15 
The expellee organisations, especially the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft, were also to blame 
for scuttling any political rapprochement processes between Berlin and Prague.
In Germany’s relations with ECE, Schroder increasingly focused on the future whereas 
Germany’s Eastern neighbours concentrated on the past. This was the principal foreign policy 
dilemma of Schroder’s Ostpolitik: managing different and often competing internal and external 
perceptions o f Germany’s role in the world. The solution, as Christopher Coker argues, was to 
adopt a common approach to end the antagonisms which plagued the European order from 1945 
to 1989:
If a common culture can be forged between Germany and its neighbours (predicated 
this time on the fact that they all share a common democratic political culture) then 
the chances will be correspondingly high o f a final elimination of the discontinuities 
between East and West which Mackinder identified at the turn of the century.16
Only in concert with other partners, including the Czech Republic and Poland, could Germany
achieve its multiple foreign and security policy objectives in the region and thus secure its
position in the European Mittellage. The Berlin Republic has gradually become more assertive in
international politics. Claiming that this phenomenon was not apparent under Kohl would be
mistaken. In the current political and economic climate, Germany’s relations with its Eastern
,5Mlada Fronta Dnes, ‘German Embassy in Prague Confirms Schroder Thinking o f Canceling Czech Visit’, 
25 January 2002, EUP20020125000285.
l6See Christopher Coker, ‘The Geopolitical Implications o f the Expansion o f Europe’ in Piotr Dutkiewicz 
and Robert J. Jackson (eds.), NATO Looks East (Westport, CT; London: Praeger, 1998), p. 12.
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neighbours are subjected to more strenuous tests whose outcome at this stage remains unclear. 
The enlargement o f the EU and NATO, with German support, has obviously been crucial for the 
Czech Republic and Poland.
Both countries have spent enormous political capital on preserving Germany’s strong 
economic presence in their respective countries. On the other hand, the perception, especially 
amongst older generations, is that too much German influence is negative. Consequently, to offset 
Germany’s preponderance in economic affairs in both countries, it is therefore necessary to 
engage more Western European and transatlantic powers in the region. After fifteen years o f 
transition in ECE, a reassertion o f German nationalist sentiments and a subsequent decrease in its 
multilateral and bilateral engagements in ECE are still feared. The Berlin Republic will 
undoubtedly need to strike the right balance to curb these fears and try to remain committed to 
pursuing its foreign and security policy interests in the region. This process will continue to be 
complicated by what can only be perceived as three competing and often contradictory priorities: 
promoting the ‘deepening’ and ‘enlargement’ processes o f the EU; spearheading the political and 
economic construction of ECE; and the strengthening o f its relations with the United States and 
NATO.
Germany’s future position in ECE will continue to depend on the effective 
implementation o f EU enlargement. The completion o f NATO’s enlargement to include the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland was viewed as a successful German driven initiative, which 
secured the territorial integrity o f its Eastern frontier. Despite the tempting and uncontroversial 
power of multilateral instruments in pursuing its objectives, Germany will undoubtedly, as it did 
between 1990 and 1998, not forfeit the right to use bilateral instruments to implement its foreign 
and security policy objectives in ECE. Bilateral instruments will complement multilateral ones. 
This is an important point which often flies in the face of those observers who continuously view 
Germany through a multilateral lens when examining its foreign and security policy behaviour. 
The bilateral dimension o f Germany’s foreign relations with ECE cannot be ignored; indeed, there 
is some cause for concern that it should be monitored closely, especially in the economic sphere 
o f Germany’s relations with the Czech Republic and Poland.
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This thesis demonstrates that a combination o f agential and structural factors have played 
a fundamental role in determining the course o f Germany’s foreign policy behaviour after 
unification, especially its Ostpolitik. International Relations theorists have struggled to define 
Germany’s enigmatic foreign policy behaviour for two reasons. First, Germany was engaged in an 
exercise o f self-introspection and transition after unification which did not readily facilitate the 
use of traditional International Relations tools to explain its behaviour. Second, this thesis asserts 
that each o f the major schools in International Relations theory offers insight into how to explain 
one or several facets o f Germany’s Ostpolitik after unification. A concentration on using the 
theoretical tools o f one school would naturally preclude us from gaining a better understanding o f 
all the variables that have shaped Germany’s Ostpolitik. For a comparative study o f Germany’s 
foreign policy behaviour towards the Czech Republic and Poland a different approach was 
required, one that took into account the multi-level nature of the internal and external 
determinants that influenced Germany diplomacy. The German use of bilateral and multilateral 
instruments must be viewed as two sides o f the same coin.
The Liberal view o f examining a state’s foreign policy behaviour through a domestic lens, 
i.e. with a focus on individuals or political leaders is an appropriate one. Germany’s political 
leaders, such as Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher and President 
Richard von Weizsacker, were crucial factors in setting the tone for Ostpolitik before and after 
unification. They were responsible for shaping Germany’s interests and managing powerful 
international and domestic constraints, which in turn influenced the German state’s behaviour. It 
is also important not to underestimate the power o f social constructivist tools, such as Germany’s 
historical record and the power o f citizens’ collective memory as potent forces in the development 
of German interests in the post-Cold War era. Historical processes shapted Germany’s political 
institutions, its political leadership, and the creation o f a German identity. These processes had a 
tremendous impact on Germany’s reconciliation efforts with the Czech Republic and Poland. The 
role of international institutions, such as NATO and the EU, in defining and shaping German 
interests after the Second World War, during the Cold War, and after unification cannot be 
underestimated in defining Ostpolitik. Germany successfully achieved its objectives in ECE under 
the aegis o f a proactive Europapolitik but its political leadership also relied extensively on
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bilateral frameworks to meet its foreign policy objectives. This trend has become even more 
apparent in the current German government as Berlin pursues explicit interests in ECE, even 
against the backdrop o f a resurgent Russia.
As this chapter demonstrated, scholars in International Relations have used numerous 
theoretical tools to interpret Germany’s foreign policy behaviour after unification. Germany's 
transition from a ‘semi-sovereign’ to a ‘sovereign’ state after the end o f the Cold War has 
presented them with multiple, unanswered questions sixteen years after unification. There is 
general agreement that a unified Germany experienced fundamental internal and external changes, 
which influenced its foreign policy behaviour, especially towards the CSFR and Poland. 
However, there is fundamental disagreement on whether primarily internal or external factors are 
responsible for shaping a state’s interests, strategies and conduct. Despite the dramatic changes 
which occurred in the international system after 1989, two crucial facts still apply: states coexist 
in an anarchic realm (since there is no higher authority they can depend on to ensure their 
security), and states continue to put national before supranational interests. Germany’s relations 
with the Czech Republic and Poland offer us a glimpse o f this reality.
Germany emerged as the primary political and economic power in both states between 1990 
and 1998. Moreover, its position in the region has been abetted as other European and 
transatlantic actors have been slow to become more politically and economically engaged in the 
region, despite great promises after the peaceful revolutions o f 1989-1990, and to the great 
consternation of Czechs and Poles. Post-unification Germany has slipped into a role which it 
plays comfortably without raising too many suspicions abroad. As a proactive advocate o f Czech 
and Polish interests, Germany has been allowed to play a dominant role in both countries’ 
political and economic development. Although often seen as controversial, it has provided more 
benefits than disadvantages to the Czech Republic and Poland. Unfortunate to be close neighbours 
with Nazi Germany, they are fortunate to be closer now to a united Germany which can be the 
neighbour they deserve to have.
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